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THE

POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE

WITH AN INTRODUCTION, TWO PREFATORY ESSAYS
AND NOTES CRITICAL AND EXPLANATORY

BY

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VOLUME I

INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICS

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PREFACE.

THE first of the two volumes which I now publish is an introductory volume designed to throw light on the political teaching of Aristotle. I have sought to view his political teaching in connexion not only with the central principles of his philosophical system, but also with the results of earlier speculation. I have endeavoured to discover how it came to be what it is, and especially to trace its relation to the political teaching of Plato, and to ask how far the paths followed by the two inquirers lay together, how far and at what points they diverged. It is only thus that we can learn how much came to Aristotle by inheritance and how much is in a more especial sense his own. If the investigation of these questions has often carried me beyond the limits of the Politics, I have sought in recapitulating and illustrating Aristotle's political teaching to follow as far as possible in the track of its inquiries. It will be seen, however, that I have dealt in my First Volume with some books of the Politics at far greater length than with others. Thus, while I have analysed with some fulness the contents of the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Books (in the order which I have adopted) and have also had much to say with regard to the inquiries of the First, I have dwelt but little on the Second Book and have given only a short summary of the contents of the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth. My plan has been in my First Volume to devote most space to the books in which the Political Theory of Aristotle is more especially embodied, particularly as they are books

the full significance of which is easily missed, and which are perhaps better dealt with in a continuous exposition than in notes on the text, so far at least as their substance is concerned. Other books seemed to be best studied in a commentary: thus, while I have said but little in my First Volume with regard to the Second Book, I have dealt with it at some length in the Notes contained in the Second Volume. The two volumes are, in fact, designed to complete each other. I shall have much to add in a subsequent volume on the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Books.

In both volumes I have sought to keep in view the links which connect the Politics with Greek literature generally. It is the work of a widely read man who writes for readers hardly less familiar with Greek literature than himself, and light is often thrown not only on the origin of a doctrine, but also on the meaning of a sentence or the turn of a phrase, when we can recall some kindred passage from the poets or prose-writers of Greece. Aristotle's contemporaries were probably far more aware than any modern reader of the Politics can be, how often he tacitly repeats or amends or controverts the opinions of others. He is especially fond of tacitly echoing or impugning the opinions of Plato, and in a less degree of Xenophon and Isocrates. But not a few works are lost to us which Aristotle had before him in writing the Politics. Among these is the historical work of Ephorus, of which we possess only fragments. We have no doubt lost much by losing all but the fragments of Aristotle's own 'Polities.'

My inquiries have carried me over a wide field, and the conclusions at which I have arrived cannot fail to be often open to correction. I would gladly have made my two volumes shorter than they are, but I have not found it easy to do so. The length of my explanatory notes is mainly due to the frequent—indeed, almost incessant—occurrence of ambiguities of language in the Greek of the Politics, which

cannot be cleared up without discussion, and which often need all the light that can be thrown on them from parallel passages. The style of the Politics is of an easy, half-conversational character and readily lends itself to ambiguities of this kind. My notes, however, would have been shorter if I had not often thought it well to print in full passages referred to in them. I hope to be less lengthy in my notes on the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Books, with which I have already dealt pretty fully in my Introduction. I fear that I shall frequently be found to try the patience of my readers, and not least in some of the opening pages of the First Volume, which treat of matters of a somewhat technical nature. I trust, however, that this volume may sometimes serve to smooth the path of thoughtful readers of the Politics, though I am well aware that no single student of the treatise can hope to exhaust its meaning. The volume, or volumes, completing the work will, I hope, follow after a not too long interval.

Since my remarks on the MSS. of the Politics (vol. 2. p. xli sqq.) were in type, the general preference which I have expressed in them for the authority of the second family of MSS. has received welcome confirmation from the discovery, or rediscovery, in the Vatican Library of twelve palimpsest leaves forming part of the second volume of a Vatican MS. of Aristides (gr. 1298), which contain fragmentary portions of the Third and Sixth Books of the Politics and are said to belong to the tenth century. These fragments were already known to Mai, who gives a short notice of them in Script. vet. nova collectio 2. 584 without, however, enabling his readers to identify the MS. in which they occur; hence they were lost sight of till the winter of 1886, when they were brought to the knowledge of Dr. G. Heylbut, who has published a collation of them in the *Rheinisches Museum* for 1887 (p. 102 sqq.), to which I may refer my readers. The

twelve leaves are stated by him to comprise the following passages of the Politics:—

3. 1. 1275 a 13—3. 2. 1275 b 33,
3. 4. 1276 b 17—1277 b 1,
3. 5. 1278 a 24—3. 10. 1281 a 37,
3. 15. 1286 b 16—6 (4). 1. 1288 b 37,
6 (4). 4. 1290 a 36—6 (4). 5. 1292 b 20.

According to a short notice of Dr. Heylbut's article contributed by Mr. R. D. Hicks to the *Classical Review*, No. 1, p. 20 sq., Professor Susemihl finds that these Palimpsest Fragments agree with the readings of the second family of MSS. in sixty-two cases and with those of the first family in twenty-seven only. Mr. Hicks suggests that the codex of which these are the fragments, or its original, 'belongs to a period anterior to any sharp distinction between the manuscripts of the two families': be that, however, as it may, it is clear that the fragments lend the support of whatever authority they possess rather to the second family than to the first. Dr. Heylbut, in fact, holds (p. 107), that 'any future recension of the text of the Politics should be based primarily on the manuscripts of the second family (eine künftige Textrecension in erster Linie auf Grund von Π^2 herzustellen ist).' He here anticipates the conclusion at which I had myself already in the main arrived.

My indebtedness to the writings of others may be measured by the frequency with which I refer to them. To no one do I owe more than to Professor Susemihl. His editions of the Politics, and especially that of 1872, have been invaluable to me, though I have never been able to follow him in his preference for the first family of MSS. and have often arrived at conclusions respecting the text at variance with his. I need not repeat here what I have said elsewhere (vol. 2. pp. xlii, 57 sqq.) of my indebtedness to his *apparatus criticus*. My debt to the Index

Aristotelicus of Bonitz is only second to that which I owe to Susemihl. The concise but important comments on passages of the Politics which it contains are but too likely to escape notice from their brevity, and I have done my best to draw attention to them. Among the works which I have found especially useful I may mention Zeller's Philosophie der Griechen; C. F. Hermann's Lehrbuch der griechischen Antiquitäten; several of the writings of Vahlen, Bernays, Teichmüller, and Eucken; Leopold Schmidt's Ethik der alten Griechen; Büchsenschütz' Besitz und Erwerb im griechischen Alterthume, and Henkel's Studien zur Geschichte der griechischen Lehre vom Staat. Dittenberger's valuable review of Susemihl's first edition of the Politics has long been known to me. To my many predecessors in the task of editing and commenting on the Politics from Victorius downwards, and to the numerous translators of the work, beginning with Sepulveda, I owe not a little. Mr. Welldon's careful and thoughtful version has constantly been consulted by me and often with profit, and I have made as much use of Professor Jowett's interesting work on the Politics as the comparative lateness of its appearance allowed. For a mention of other works which have been used by me I may refer my readers to the citations scattered over my two volumes.

My best thanks are due to the President and Fellows of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, for twice allowing me the use at the Bodleian Library of the MS. of the Politics (No. 112) belonging to the College; to the authorities of Balliol and New College for the loan of their MSS. 112 and 228; and to the authorities of the Bodleian and Phillipps Libraries for the courtesy they have shown me. I have mentioned elsewhere (vol. 2. p. 60) how much I am indebted to Mr. E. Maunde Thompson, Keeper of the MSS. in the British Museum, and to Mr. F. Madan, Sub-Librarian of the Bodleian Library, for important assistance in the

interpretation of an inscription in MS. Phillipps 891. To the friends who have done me the service of criticising my proof-sheets as they have passed through the press I am under the greatest obligations, and especially to Mr. Alfred Robinson of New College, who has kindly found time in the midst of his many engagements patiently to peruse the whole of them, and whose criticisms and suggestions have been of much value to me, to the Warden of Wadham College, to whom I owe a similar acknowledgment, and to Mr. Ingram Bywater, who has perused many of my proofs. The comments of Mr. R. L. Nettleship and Mr. Evelyn Abbott of Balliol College, and of Professor Andrew Bradley, on portions of my proof-sheets have also been of much use to me. I have profited much by the criticisms of friends, but for the shortcomings of this work I am alone responsible. I should add that Mr. Bywater has kindly lent me the late Mr. Mark Pattison's copy of Stahr's edition of the Politics, containing a few annotations from his hand, from which I have been glad to have the opportunity of quoting now and then.

In referring to the works of Aristotle, I give, in addition to the book and chapter of the treatise cited, the page, column, and line of Bekker's edition of 1831. My references to the work of Zeller are to the last edition, except where another is specified; these to C. F. Hermann's Lehrbuch are to K. B. Stark's edition of it, unless the contrary is specified, the latest edition being still incomplete. The abbreviation Sus.[1] refers to Susemihl's first edition of the Politics published in 1872, Sus.[2] and Sus.[3] to the two editions subsequently published by him. I have thought it better, especially in my First Volume, to translate the quotations which I have occasionally made from German books; I have, however, usually left German renderings of passages in the Politics untranslated.

August, 1887.

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THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE.

INTRODUCTION.

ARISTOTLE'S treatment of the science of πολιτική falls, unlike Plato's, into two distinct parts, and extends over two treatises, the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics. The fact is significant, and we are not surprised to find that the two sections show, as we shall see hereafter, a certain tendency to draw away from each other. They stand, however, in the closest mutual relation: the Ethics comes first in order, the Politics second. The Ethics naturally precedes, as it mainly analyses happiness in the individual, and Aristotle's principle is that the study of the part (τὸ ἐλάχιστον, τὸ ἀσύνθετον) should precede the study of the whole. Other reasons for the precedence of the Ethics will be pointed out elsewhere.

The Politics linked to the Nicomachean Ethics—the transition from the latter treatise to the former examined.

The transition from the one treatise to the other, however, is by no means as smooth and easy as we might expect. We are told in the last chapter of the Ethics that it is not enough for the student of Practical Philosophy to know what happiness and virtue and pleasure are without seeking their realization in practice, and that they can hardly be realized in practice without the aid of Law. The State, Aristotle continues, should use Law with a view to their realization, but the Lacedaemonian State is almost the only one which does this systematically, and which exercises a supervision over the rearing and life of its members. The head of the household is almost everywhere left to himself by the State and allowed to rule his household as he

pleases. He is, in fact, a lawgiver on a small scale, and hence it is desirable that he should learn to use Law scientifically for the purpose of making those he rules better, or in other words, that he should acquire the art of Legislation. He will hardly learn this art from persons versed in political life; still less will he learn it from the Sophists: Aristotle will therefore himself take in hand the subject of legislation, and indeed the whole topic of constitutional organization, in order that, as far as may be, his philosophy of things human[1] may be brought to completion.

'First, then,' he proceeds, 'let us try to notice anything of value on the subject, which has been said by those who have gone before us, and then to learn from a comparison of constitutions what things are preservative of, or destructive to, States, and what are so to each separate constitution[2], and for what reasons some constitutions are good and others bad: for when we have considered all these matters, we shall perhaps be better able to discern both what form of constitution is the best, and how each form must be ordered, and with what laws and customs, to be what we should desire it to be[3].'

When Aristotle wrote these, the concluding sentences of the Ethics, he evidently intended to deduce the true structure of the best and other States from a study of various constitutions and from a study of the causes which tend to the preservation or decay of States and of each constitution. This is, in fact, to some extent the plan followed by Plato in the Laws, though he does not go on to draw conclusions as to the true form of every constitution,

[1] This expression is apparently inherited from Socrates (Xen. Mem. I. 1).

[2] This inquiry would seem to involve a study of the history of the States themselves—a matter, however, into which Aristotle does not propose to enter.

[3] As much doubt has been thrown, not without good ground, on the authenticity of many of the references, backwards or forwards, to be found in the writings which bear the name of Aristotle, it may be as well to remark that this programme would hardly have been forged by any one who had the Politics before him either in its traditional order or perhaps in any conceivable order.

but confines himself to tracing the outline of one ideal community. He reviews in the Third Book the Lacedaemonian, Persian, and Athenian constitutions, noting the causes of the failure or success of each, and then proceeds to construct his State. The Politics, however, is arranged on a different plan. The Second Book, which contains the review of constitutions, does not commence the work, nor does it include or introduce an inquiry into the things which preserve or destroy States or constitutions. This is reserved for a book which, wherever we place it, must come much later. The first book of the Politics deals with a subject not marked out for consideration in the last chapter of the Ethics: it seeks to establish and emphasize a distinction between the householder and the statesman, the household and the State. We hear no more of the notion that the individual householder can, by acquiring the legislative art, in some degree make up for the State's neglect of education.

In some respects, no doubt, the close of the Ethics and the opening of the Politics are in harmony. The one implies what the other emphatically asserts—the natural supremacy of the State over the household and the individual. So again, the programme in the Ethics correctly foreshadows the scope of the inquiries of the Politics. It prepares us for an inquiry, not merely into the best constitution, but into every constitution. Both treatises agree that the true lawgiver will be capable of organizing all constitutions aright, and not merely of devising a best constitution. Still the fact remains that a track is marked out in the Ethics for the investigations of the Politics which they certainly do not follow. There is no need to imagine any other cause for Aristotle's departure from his programme than a simple change of plan on his part. The Politics was probably not only not written, but also not fully conceived, when the paragraph in the Ethics was drawn up, and the paragraph had not been amended when Aristotle died.

Nature of the distinction drawn by Aristotle between Theoretic, Practical, and Productive Science: the πολιτικὴ ἐπιστήμη falls under the second head.

Our first step must be to discuss as briefly as we may the somewhat thorny question, what is the nature of the science of πολιτική and its relation to other sciences. Is it a science in the sense in which Physics is a science, and how far is it related to sciences such as Physics?

If we follow the division of Science which we find in the Metaphysics (E. 1. 1025 b 18 sqq., E. 2. 1026 b 4) into theoretic, practical, and productive Science, πολιτική as a whole appears to fall within, or to be identical with, Practical Science, the kind of Science which serves as a guide to right action.

The groundwork of this classification of the Sciences seems to have been laid by Plato. Plato had already classified sciences by their subject-matter. In the Philebus (55 C sqq.) we find sciences contrasted in respect of the degree of truth attained by them, and this proves to vary according to their subject-matter, as does also the method employed. Sciences concerned with sensible things (τὰ γιγνόμενα καὶ γενησόμενα καὶ γεγονότα, 58 E sqq.) ask the aid of Opinion and attain only a low degree of truth: whereas the science dealing with Being and that which really is and that which is unchangeable is far the truest (58 A). This is Dialectic, which is thus distinguished from Physics (59 A). Πολιτική is not here mentioned, but would no doubt be distinguished by Plato from both, though we know not whether he conceived it as less or more exact than Physics: he describes it in the Gorgias (464) as 'ministering to the soul for its highest good,' and as comprising two parts, the art of legislation, which does for the soul what gymnastic does for the body, and justice, which does for the soul what medicine does for the body.

The distinction between Theoretic and Practical Science, again, is inherited by Aristotle from Plato, who distinguishes in the Politicus (258 E) between Cognitive (γνωστικαί) and Practical (πρακτικαί) Sciences, but the Practical Sciences of Plato correspond more nearly to the Productive Sciences of Aristotle, and the Political or

Kingly Science is classed by him among Cognitive Sciences: it is said to belong to that species of Cognitive Science which does not stop short at judging, but also rules (260 A–D). Plato seems to merge Ethical Science in πολιτική[1], for he has no separate name for it, and as his Political Science always has an ethical aim, he is quite consistent in closely connecting the two sciences of Ethics and Politics. Indeed, he not only relates Ethics more closely to Politics than Aristotle, but also makes the link between Dialectic and the less exact sciences a closer one than that which exists between the Theoretic Science of Aristotle and the other sciences. He seems usually to treat Political Science, at all events, as inseparably bound up with philosophy (Rep. 473 C, 501). A knowledge of the Ideas is as much a condition of true virtue and true statesmanship as it is of true knowledge[2].

Aristotle, on the other hand, though he describes the 'First Philosophy' in a remarkable passage of the Metaphysics (A. 2. 982 b 4 sqq.) as 'the most sovereign of the sciences, determining for what end everything is to be done,' appears in the Ethics to derive the first principles of Ethical, and probably also of Political, Science, not from the First Philosophy, but from Experience. He commonly speaks in the Ethics as if Practical Science sprang from a different root from Theoretic Science. It is to Opinion that he appeals in the First Book, not to the First Philosophy, when he seeks to discover what is 'the good for man' (*τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν*)[3]. It is from correct minor premisses furnished by experience that the end of moral action is obtained (Eth. Nic. 6. 12. 1143 b 4), or, as we read

[1] Cp. Euthyd. 291 C–D, where πολιτική is called *ἡ αἰτία τοῦ ὀρθῶς πράττειν ἐν τῇ πόλει.*

[2] See Zeller, Plato E. T., pp. 152, 218; and cp. Rep. 517 C, *δεῖ ταύτην (τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν) ἰδεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα ἐμφρόνως πράξειν ἢ ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ.* Plato does not seem even to arrange for any special training of his guardians in Political Science: all he appears to do in this direction is to give them fifteen years' practical experience in military command and in offices suited to young men (Rep. 537 D sqq.).

[3] Cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 5. 1097 a 28, *τὸ δ' ἄριστον τέλειόν τι φαίνεται*: 30, *τελειότερον δὲ λέγομεν*: 34, *τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ εὐδαιμονία μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ.*

elsewhere, in somewhat different language, from virtue rooted in the character by habituation.

Theoretic and Practical Science are regarded by him as differing (1) in subject-matter, (2) in aim, (3) in the faculty employed, and (4) in method[1].

1. The *subject-matter* of Theoretic Science is either 'things self-existent, unchangeable, and separable from matter' (this is the subject-matter of the First Philosophy), or 'things unchangeable and separable from matter only in logical conception' (the subject-matter of Mathematics), or 'things inseparable from matter and subject to change' (the subject-matter of Physics): see Metaph. E. 1. 1026 a 13[2]. The subject-matter of Physics is in close contact with that of Practical Science, though it is marked off from the latter by the fact that its principle is within and not outside itself (*ἐν αὑτῷ*, not *ἐν ἄλλῳ*). Man is a subject of Physics, so far as he has a soul which is the source of nutrition and growth (de Part. An. 1. 1. 641 a 32 sqq.: Metaph. E. 1. 1026 a 5), but at the point at which he commences to act, he ceases to be a subject of Physics and becomes the subject of Practical Science. So suddenly does the field of Physics break off and that of Practical Science begin. Both 'things done' (*τὰ πρακτά*), which are the subject of *πολιτική*, and 'things produced' (*τὰ ποιητά*) have their originating principle (*ἀρχή*) outside themselves in an agent or producer (Eth. Nic. 6. 4. 1140 a 1, *τοῦ δ' ἐνδεχομένου ἄλλως ἔχειν ἔστι τι καὶ ποιητὸν καὶ πρακτόν*: cp. Metaph. E. 1. 1025 b 22, *τῶν μὲν γὰρ ποιητικῶν ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι ἡ ἀρχή, ἢ νοῦς ἢ τέχνη ἢ δύναμίς τις, τῶν δὲ πρακτικῶν ἐν τῷ πράττοντι ἡ προαίρεσις*). It is thus that 'things done' lie as it were passively at the disposition of the agent, just as 'things produced' do at the disposition of the producer. They are therefore said to be in our power (*ἐφ' ἡμῖν*, Eth. Nic. 3. 5. 1112 a 31), and we are said to deliberate about things

[1] In dealing with this subject I have found more than one of Teichmüller's works useful.

[2] Cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 2. 1139 a 6, *ὑποκείσθω δύο τὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ἐν μὲν ᾧ θεωροῦμεν τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ὅσων αἱ ἀρχαὶ μὴ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἐν δὲ ᾧ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα.*

which 'come to pass by our agency, but not always uniformly' (1112 b 3). The defective exactness (*ἀκρίβεια*) of practical science is perhaps regarded by Aristotle as partly due to this subjection of 'things done' (*τὰ πρακτά*) to human *arbitrium*, but it is still more due to the fact that practical science, being concerned with action, is concerned with particulars. The Universal of Practical Science is only roughly exact. It cannot supply the place of a keen insight into particulars.

2. It follows from the modifiability both of the subject-matter of action and of the agent that the *purpose* of practical science is different from that of theoretic science. However much it may inquire, it never loses sight of the aim of promoting right action (Eth. Nic. 2. 2. 1103 b 26 sqq.). This need not, indeed, be its sole aim: cp. Pol. 3. 8. 1279 b 12, *τῷ δὲ περὶ ἑκάστην μέθοδον φιλοσοφοῦντι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀποβλέποντι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν οἰκεῖόν ἐστι τὸ μὴ παροραῖν μηδέ τι καταλείπειν, ἀλλὰ δηλοῦν τὴν περὶ ἕκαστον ἀλήθειαν*: and Eth. Eud. 1. 1. 1214 a 10, *τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν* (sc. *τῶν θεωρημάτων*) *συντείνει πρὸς τὸ γνῶναι μόνον, τὰ δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις τοῦ πράγματος*. Nor should it be forgotten that even in the interest of right action it is desirable to arrive at conclusions as scientifically accurate as possible (Eth. Nic. 10. 1. 1172 b 3, *ἐοίκασιν οὖν οἱ ἀληθεῖς τῶν λόγων οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι χρησιμώτατοι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον· συνῳδοὶ γὰρ ὄντες τοῖς ἔργοις πιστεύονται, διὸ προτρέπονται τοὺς ξυνιέντας ζῆν κατ' αὐτούς*).

3. Non-theoretic science differs from theoretic also in respect of the *faculty* employed in it. The rational part of the soul (*τὸ λόγον ἔχον*) is divided into two parts, the scientific and the calculative: *λεγέσθω δὲ τούτων τὸ μὲν ἐπιστημονικὸν τὸ δὲ λογιστικόν· τὸ γὰρ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ λογίζεσθαι ταὐτόν, οὐδεὶς δὲ βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν* (Eth. Nic. 6. 1. 1139 a 11). Both *τέχνη*, the faculty which operates in productive science, and *φρόνησις*, the chief virtue of the Practical Reason (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 655. 1), belong to the calculative part. In strictness *φρόνησις* deals with the individual and his welfare, *πολιτική* with that of the

State (Eth. Nic. 6. 7. 1141 b 23 sqq.), but they are so nearly the same that we need not attend to this distinction. The faculty concerned in moral action would seem to be in Aristotle's opinion the same as that which deals with the science of moral action. The deliberation which precedes a moral act and which is expressed in the practical syllogism is apparently regarded by him as a repetition on a small scale of the process which ends in the construction of practical science. In both operations the act of deliberation, as we shall see, is conceived to follow the same path[1].

The ends, or at all events the ultimate ends, of action are held by Aristotle to be given by the character, the true end by moral virtue: it remains for *φρόνησις* to determine the means, under which term we must probably include the intermediate ends. *Φρόνησις* conducts the whole process of deliberation, till it lights on the actual step which must be taken in order that the end may be attained: this is the last point reached in the deliberation, and the point at which action begins (Zeller, ibid. 650. 2). As these means must be morally correct, or in other words, as *φρόνησις* has to adjust its choice of means to the end suggested by moral virtue, *φρόνησις* needs to be completed by moral virtue, just as moral virtue is incomplete without *φρόνησις*. Its close connexion with moral virtue relates it to the passions and even to man's physical nature, and separates it from speculative virtue (Eth. Nic. 10. 8. 1178 a 9 sqq.). It belongs to the more human part of man's nature, as that to the more divine. Its genesis is also different. Moral virtue, from which it is inseparable, is the outcome of correct habituation: the germ of it only, an undeveloped perception of the good and the bad, the just

[1] We note, however, in Eth. Nic. 6. 8. 1141 b 22 sqq. the recognition of two forms of *φρόνησις περὶ πόλιν*: one *ἀρχιτεκτονική*, the other more distinctly *πρακτικὴ καὶ βουλευτική*, and therefore more impressed with the characteristics of *φρόνησις*, for *φρόνησις* is essentially *πρακτικὴ καὶ βουλευτική*. Thus it would seem that the *φρόνησις* of the *νομοθέτης* is to some extent different from that of the practical statesman and less characteristically *φρόνησις*. We should have been glad of some further treatment of the subject, but we do not seem to learn anything more about it from Aristotle.

and the unjust (Pol. 1. 2. 1253a 15), is born with us and comes by nature. Φρόνησις, again, is mainly, though not exclusively (Eth. Nic. 6. 7. 1141 b 14), concerned with particulars (τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα). Its particular judgments need to be correct, and this they can hardly be without experience: experience, though it arrives at a sort of Universal, never wanders far from particulars. It is evident, then, that the faculty which is concerned with practical science, is to be developed in life and in life only. Its beginning lies in habituation, its growth in experience. The young fall short in both respects. It is a faculty which cannot be passed from hand to hand. Hence, though the sphere of Contingency (and this is the sphere of Practical and Productive Science) is that which is most amenable to human influence, the faculty which is concerned with it can only be produced by a circuitous and indirect process beginning in infancy—a slower process than that by which speculative virtue comes into being, though intellectual virtue generally, which includes speculative virtue no less than φρόνησις and τέχνη, is said to 'stand in need of experience and time' (Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 a 15). Thus the faculty which presides over conduct was once for all parted off by Aristotle from the speculative faculty. The two faculties might be and should be possessed by the same person, but they were different. The Greek language already distinguished between γνώμη and σοφία, and Aristotle reasserted the important truth embodied in this distinction.

4. Lastly, non-theoretic science differs from theoretic in *method*. Θεωρία finds a place in the methods of both; but the θεωρία of the one is not the same as the θεωρία of the other. In theoretic science, the object is simply to analyse: in practical and productive science, to bring into being. Τὸ ὅν is to the former what τὸ ἐσόμενον is to the latter (de Part. An. 1. 1. 640 a 3). Theoretic Science takes a given fact or thing and inquires into its cause. Thus 'the plan of Aristotle's biological treatise on the Parts of Animals is to take the parts in succession and inquire what share Necessity and the Final Cause respectively have

in their formation[1].' Practical science, on the other hand (and productive science also), starts from an end to be attained, and inquires into the means of attaining it, till it arrives at a means which it lies within the power of the inquirer to set in action. Cp. Metaph. Z. 7. 1032 b 6, *γίγνεται δὴ τὸ ὑγιὲς νοήσαντος οὕτως· ἐπειδὴ τοδὶ ὑγίεια, ἀνάγκη, εἰ ὑγιὲς ἔσται, τοδὶ ὑπάρξαι, οἷον ὁμαλότητα, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, θερμότητα· καὶ οὕτως ἀεὶ νοεῖ ἕως ἂν ἀγάγῃ εἰς τοῦτο ὃ αὐτὸς δύναται ἔσχατον ποιεῖν. Εἶτα ἤδη ἡ ἀπὸ τούτου κίνησις ποίησις καλεῖται ἡ ἐπὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν.* (The illustration here is taken from productive science, not practical, but in this point there is no difference between the two: cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 5. 1112 b 12 sqq.) In practical and productive science the analysis is pressed forward till we reach 'that which we have it in our power to do.' The man of practical science who wishes to produce happiness inquires into its cause, which he finds to be mainly virtue, then he inquires into the cause of virtue and finds it to be law; the framing of law, however, is a thing which lies in his power; hence here his analysis stops, and the question which he has to solve is, how should laws be framed so as to produce virtue? Thus, while both in theoretic and non-theoretic science there is a search for the cause, in the former we search for the cause which will explain a given thing or fact, in the latter for the cause with the aid of which we can attain a given end.

It is easy to see how different the plan of the Politics would have been if Aristotle had identified the methods of physical and political study. We should have had the actual phenomena presented by the life of States accepted as normal, and the problem would have been to refer them to the Material or the Final Cause. As it is, happiness is the starting-point of Political Science, and the object of the inquiry is to discover some line of action lying within the power of the inquirer—the correct way of framing laws, in fact—which will bring it into being to the utmost extent possible in each particular case.

The difference which exists between the problem of

[1] Ogle's translation, p. xxxv.

Practical Science and that of Theoretic Science is not, however, the only cause of the difference between their methods of inquiry. The subject-matter of Practical Science is more variable and less universal, and the faculty which operates in it, though scientific in its nature, ripens only with the help of Experience and correct habituation: it cannot hope to achieve the same exactness as is attained in Theoretic Science, and leans more largely on Opinion, and especially the opinion of *φρόνιμοι*.

How far does the method actually followed by Aristotle in the Politics agree with that which he ascribes to πολιτική?

We might almost expect, looking to the language which Aristotle holds, to find him constructing Practical Science from the judgments of experienced and well-habituated Greeks, and accepting in its fulness the principle that in this sphere the *φρόνιμος* is the standard.

But this he is far from doing. If he consults Opinion, as he constantly does, the opinion he consults is not exclusively the opinion of this small class, but that of Philosophers or even of the Many. The opinions of the Many are valuable as expressions of Experience[1]. But he does not accept Opinion as conclusive without verification: he subjects it to a variety of tests. First, that of 'observed fact' (*τὰ ἔργα, τὰ γινόμενα*). *Συμφωνεῖν δὴ τοῖς λόγοις ἐοίκασιν αἱ τῶν σόφων δόξαι· πίστιν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει τινά, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τοῦ βίου κρίνεται· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τὸ κύριον. Σκοπεῖν δὴ τὰ προειρημένα χρὴ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὸν βίον ἐπιφέροντας, καὶ συνᾳδόντων μὲν τοῖς ἔργοις ἀποδεκτέον, διαφωνούντων δὲ λόγους ὑπολητέον* (Eth. Nic. 10. 9. 1179 a 16 sqq.). Thus, for instance, questions as to the true nature of happiness are to be settled by observing what sort of persons are, as a matter of fact, happy, and how they come to be so. We see that the happy individual is he who has much virtue and a not more than adequate amount of external goods (Pol. 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 38 sqq.); that a State, if it is to be well ordered, must not exceed a certain size (Pol. 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 25 sqq.). We learn best from the lives men lead what their real opinions are (Eth. Nic. 10. 1. 1172 a 27 sqq.). It is true, that even

[1] See the authorities in Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 243. 3.

when Aristotle appeals to observed fact, he often means by this not so much 'facts' as men's impressions about them. This is not always so, however: see for instance the well-known passage, de Gen. An. 3. 10. 760 b 27 sqq.

Next, he controls Opinion by 'reasoning' (λόγος). That which is reasonable and probable (τὸ εἰλογον) has a certain *prima facie* weight with him: of this the arguments in de Gen. An. 3. 11. 760 a 31–b 27 afford an instance. These are arguments from our reasonable anticipations, looking to the principles which prevail generally in Nature. He has, indeed, more confidence in deductions from less general principles: still we shall find that his conception of Nature and the natural is constantly present to him in his political inquiries, and the conception of Nature is one which falls within the province of Theoretic Science.

Aristotle's own account in the Ethics of the method of πολιτική leads us, in fact, to expect in his treatment of the subject a larger use of unproved Opinion and a slighter reference to the results of Theoretic Science than we actually discover in it. Practical Science turns out to be more a matter of reasoning and less a matter of insight than we were prepared to find it. The interval which parts man as an agent—the subject of Practical Science—from man as possessing a nutritive and perceptive soul—the subject of Physics—cannot, after all, be insuperably great. The study of the passions falls within the province of Ethics, yet they are closely related to man's physical nature (Eth. Nic. 10. 8. 1178 a 9 sqq.), with which Physics has to do. The principle which enables Aristotle to explain the subject-matter of Physics is also that which enables him to explain moral action and the State: the movement from Potentiality to Actuality is common to both. The end of Man and of Society—living nobly and well (τὸ εὖ ζῆν)—is an end which appears also in the field of Physics[1]. The truth that man lives for this end, and that the State should be constructed for its attainment, is one which Aristotle does not need to rest on Opinion, for his physical

[1] De Part. An. 2. 10. 656 a 3 sqq.

studies have proved to him that the end of every individual thing, according to the design of Nature, is 'the best of which it is capable' (τὸ ἑκάστῳ ἐνδεχόμενον βέλτιστον). And if it be urged that without the aid of Opinion we cannot tell what is the best which is possible to man, we may reply that when Aristotle seeks to discover the highest element in happiness (Eth. Nic. 10. 7), or to illustrate its dependence on character rather than on external goods (Pol. 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 23), he refers us to his conception of God—a chief topic of the First Philosophy, or, as it is otherwise called, the Theologic Science. Teichmüller has pointed out in reference to the Ethics, how much the actual method of Aristotle in Practical Science differs from that which he lays down for himself in theory. 'The philosophy of Aristotle,' he remarks, 'with its fondness for sharp distinctions cannot possibly preserve its logical consistency. It is as a complete man (als ganzer Mensch), in full possession of all practical, technical, and theoretic powers and perceptions, that Aristotle everywhere speaks: he forgets that he has only the right to speak as a good and wise man or Statesman (φρόνιμος)[1].'

Aristotle does not probably intend, even in theory, to ignore the links between Theoretic and Practical Science, or the elements which are common to both. He traces, as we have said, in 'things done' (τὰ πρακτά) no less than in the subject-matter of Physics the operation of the Four Causes —the movement of matter to an end, an advance from Potentiality to Actuality. If this could not be done, there would be no Science of Practice. He is less clear on the question whether Practical Science derives any of its principles from Theoretic. But even if he answered this question in the affirmative, it would still be open to him to assert the distinctness of Practical and Theoretic Science, as he unquestionably does. He not only holds that Practical Science aims at Practice in addition to knowledge, but that neither the end of man nor the means to its attainment can be ascertained, at all events in detail, except by

[1] Neue Studien zur Geschichte der Begriffe, 3. 354-7.

an appeal to the judgment of the φρόνιμος, and also to the collective experience of men, sifted and corrected as we have seen that he sifts and corrects it. Even Plato does not think that a knowledge of the Ideas will suffice to make his guardians good rulers without fifteen years of practical experience. Perhaps, if Aristotle's treatment of Ethical and Political Science had been more abstract and had concerned itself less with concrete detail, and if, again, he had not construed its aim to be the promotion of correct Practice, he might have been better able to dispense with the aid of Opinion: but, after all, do not all inquirers on these subjects to this day tacitly follow the method which Aristotle avowedly adopts? Where is the inquirer who does not tacitly refer to the best Opinion of his own epoch in framing his account of virtue? What European philosopher ever doubts that European institutions are the best?

The alleged difference between the aims of Practical and Theoretic Science, which seems more than anything else to lead Aristotle to distinguish between the two, appears, indeed, to be an unreal ground of distinction between them. May not moral and political science speculate about moral action without any aim beyond the attainment of truth? Is not Aristotle himself led by his view that the aim of Political Science is to promote right action to make his study of social facts, patient and comprehensive though it is, less the central feature of the Politics than the study of Society as it ought to be? Should not the careful analysis of social tendencies, which we find, for instance, in the book on Revolutions, have preceded and prepared the way for the attempt to depict a best state[1]? Might we not have been gainers, if he had addressed himself even more closely than he has done to understanding social phenomena and less to modifying them? Political Science

[1] We have already noticed that this would seem to have been the plan which Aristotle intended to adopt in his political investigations, when he penned the concluding sentences of the Nicomachean Ethics.

'begins' for him 'in History,' no less than in Ethics: but might not History have filled with advantage an even greater place in his investigations?

It is possible, again, to overrate the value of the verdict of the *φρόνιμος*, both in ethical and political questions. In politics, the 'wise and good man' often clings overmuch to the Good at the very moment when the Better is about to take its place. Even on ethical questions, the *φρόνιμος* perhaps has no monopoly of insight. There is some truth in one of the many shrewd remarks which are scattered over the Laws of Plato—*οὐ γὰρ ὅσον οὐσίας ἀρετῆς ἀπεσφαλμένοι τυγχάνουσιν οἱ πολλοί, τοσοῦτον καὶ τοῦ κρίνειν τοὺς ἄλλους οἱ πονηροὶ καὶ ἄχρηστοι, θεῖον δέ τι καὶ εὔστοχον ἔνεστι καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς, ὥστε παμπολλοὶ καὶ τῶν σφόδρα κακῶν εὖ τοῖς λόγοις καὶ ταῖς δόξαις διαιροῦνταί τοὺς ἀμείνους τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τοὺς χείρονας* (Laws, 950 B–C). With this we may compare a remarkable saying of Niebuhr:—'I am bold enough not to shrink from the admission that I can picture to myself as the inspired preacher of a wisdom at once elevated and profound, I won't exactly say Satan himself, but a possessed person over whom the evil spirit often comes and whom he often pervades; and looking to the risk that denouncers of heresy may lay hold of what I say, I will not speak hypothetically, but name Rousseau and Mirabeau[1].'

Powers acting within the domain of *πολιτική*—Necessity, Nature, Spontaneity, Fortune, Man.

We need not wonder that the science of *πολιτική* is one which is 'hardly meet to be called' a science, and that it demands maturity both of mind and character, if we bear in mind the sphere in which it works and the difficulties with which it has to grapple. Its sphere is, as we have seen, that of the Contingent—one in which the tendencies to Good, that here, as elsewhere, exist, are met, and often baffled, by the irregularities which attach to matter and, above all, to human agency. It possesses

[1] Kleine Schriften, I. 472, quoted by Bernays, Phokion, p. 104. I am well aware how imperfectly I have rendered this energetic and highly characteristic utterance.

not only all the variability which characterises M
also that which characterises Man.

The first rude analysis of the subject-matter v
it has to deal—we now confine our attention to th
branch of πολιτική—reveals to us the working
well known to Greek literature and speculation—
Nature, Chance, and Man; and if, as we gain
view of things, these agencies tend to fade aw
be replaced by less familiar and less personal
the four causes, or again, Potentiality and Act
will still be worth while to cast a hasty glance
more popular conceptions before they disappear.

The poets had spoken in well-known utte
Chance, Art, Necessity and Nature, as supreme
things. Agathon (Fr. 8) had said—

> Καὶ μὴν τὰ μέν γε τῇ τέχνῃ πράσσειν, τὰ δὲ
> ἡμῖν ἀνάγκῃ καὶ τύχῃ προσγίγνεται.

Euripides had connected Necessity and Nature—

> Τί ταῦτα δεῖ
> στένειν ἅπερ δεῖ κατὰ φύσιν διεκπερᾶν;
> δεινὸν γὰρ οὐδὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων βροτοῖς.
>
> Fr. 757, from the Hypsi

and had elsewhere doubted whether Zeus is the
which reigns in nature, or the intelligence of man

> Ὅστις ποτ' εἶ σύ, δυστόπαστος εἰδέναι,
> Ζεύς, εἴτ' ἀνάγκη φύσεος, εἴτε νοῦς βροτῶν.
>
> Troad. 847–8: cp. Fragm.

There were philosophers who traced back the
things to Nature and Chance, Art supervening
but not adding much to their work (Plato, Laws, 8
cp. 967 A); and Plato himself finds it easy to u
how everything in the State, at all events, look
outcome of Chance (Laws, 709 A); but he add
that this is not the fact; on the contrary, Goc
co-operate with Chance to shape its destini
scientifically, Plato finds Matter, or Necessity,
or the Idea, at the root of things[1]. 'He is una

[1] Cp. Tim. 68 E–69 A.

to his Dualism, to merge these two causes in one, or to recognize in Necessity the work of Reason and the positive intermediary, not merely the limitation and negative condition, of her working' (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 1. 489 sq., ed. 2).

Necessity.

It is the tendency of Aristotle to soften this sharp antithesis, and to view the Necessary as the friend, if often the inconstant friend, of the Good. He distinguishes three kinds of the Necessary, two of which have no place in the State (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 331. 1): cp. Metaph. Λ. 7. 1072 b 11, *τὸ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον τοσαυταχῶς, τὸ μὲν βίᾳ ὅτι παρὰ τὴν ὁρμήν, τὸ δὲ οὗ οὐκ ἄνευ τὸ εὖ, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς*: de Part. An. 1. 1. 642 a 1, *εἰσὶν ἄρα δύ' αἰτίαι αὗται, τό θ' οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης· πολλὰ γὰρ γίνεται ὅτι ἀνάγκη· ἴσως δ' ἄν τις ἀπορήσειε ποίαν λέγουσιν ἀνάγκην οἱ λέγοντες ἐξ ἀνάγκης· τῶν μὲν γὰρ δύο τρόπων οὐδέτερον οἷόν τε ὑπάρχειν, τῶν διωρισμένων ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν· ἔστι δ' ἕν γε τοῖς ἔχουσι γένεσιν ἡ τρίτη· λέγομεν γὰρ τὴν τροφὴν ἀναγκαῖόν τι κατ' οὐδέτερον τούτων τῶν τρόπων, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄνευ ταύτης εἶναι· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως*. The State falls so far under the sway of Necessity, as it begins in Matter[1] and needs instruments (*ὄργανα*)[2]: its matter and its provision of instruments are necessary pre-requisites, if it is to attain the Good: they are conditionally necessary (*ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαῖα*). But these indispensable conditions may assume two very different characters. They may, if favourably present, be positive contributors to the End, almost rising to the level of its efficient cause (de Gen. An. 2. 6. 742 a 19 sqq.). Necessity, if only we have to do with favourable Matter, may be the fore-runner, the first or nascent form of the Best: it may be Nature in disguise. On the other hand, there may lurk in it an element of unfitness for the Best, which will mar the whole evolution: the indispensable condition, which may be the friend of the Best, may also be its worst foe. The State must have a territory; yet

[1] Phys. 2. 9. 200 a 30 sqq.: cp. 200 a 14, *ἐν γὰρ τῇ ὕλῃ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον*.

[2] Zeller, ibid.: cp. de Gen. An. 2. 6. 742 a 22 sqq.

the characteristics of this territory may be unfavou
its political wellbeing (Pol. 7 (5). 3. 1303 b 7 sqq.).
start with a population, and here again the sam
may occur (Pol. 4 (7). 7. 1327 b 23 sqq.). It must
due supply of external goods; yet the pursuit
may draw men away from higher things. Thus t
pensable condition may prove a fetter and even a stu
block, for men may mistake the necessary for the
means for the end. In any case, as the statesman
the carpenter or builder, is seldom free to select th
rial for his State, this element is likely, whether
or for woe, to play a considerable part in sha
destiny. It might be better away, were this possil
there is a power capable of giving it a new direct
making it a positive aid to the Best. Many thin
into existence for one end, marked out by Ne
and then Nature adroitly gives them a new turn,
them to the Best. The State itself came into e
in the hands of Necessity, 'for the sake of mere li
Nature carries it on to the higher end of 'good life.'
which originates in necessity (Pol. 1. 3. 1253 b 25),
eventually a source of virtue: the household in
undergoes a similar re-adaptation. But indeed
that are necessary may often be also expedient:
relation of ruling and being ruled is not only a n
condition of unity, but also expedient (Pol. 1. 5. 12
and if Necessity forges the link which binds toget
and wife, father and child, master and slave (P
1252 a 26 sqq.), and so calls into existence the H
and State, Necessity and Expediency here coincid

Nature. Closely allied with the 'conditionally necessary
side of the conception which Aristotle terms Natu
*μὲν οὖν τρόπον οὕτως ἡ φύσις λέγεται, ἡ πρώτη ἑκάστ
μένη ὕλη τῶν ἐχόντων ἐν αὑτοῖς ἀρχὴν κινήσεως καὶ μ
ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἡ μορφὴ καὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγ*
2. 1. 193 a 28). It is in the former of these two se
Nature borders closely on Necessity. Nature is als

of as the end (ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα, Phys. 2. 2. 194 a 28); and even as the path which leads from the one point to the other (ἔτι δὲ ἡ φύσις ἡ λεγομένη ὡς γένεσις ὁδός ἐστιν εἰς φύσιν, Phys. 2. 1. 193 b 12)[1]. Nature is thus 'a principle of motion and rest implanted and essentially inherent in things, whether that motion be locomotion, increase, decay, or alteration' (Phys. 2. 1. 192 b 13). For though Aristotle in countless passages speaks of Nature as a person, seeking to realize aims and giving evidence of wisdom and virtue, we soon learn to seek its agency rather in things themselves. Its working seems hardly distinguishable from that of God[2], except that it is more ubiquitous, more immanent in things, more Protean and multiform; evidencing itself, as we see in the Politics, not only in 'that which is best,' but also in 'that which is necessary,' 'that which is coeval with birth' (τὸ εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς), 'that which obtains for the most part' (τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ). If we know the State to be the work of Nature from the fact that it brings what is best, we learn this also by tracing it back to its beginnings in Necessity, by investigating its origin in the Household and Village. The real being, however, of Nature is rather to be found in the end than in the process, and rather in the process than its starting-point.

With Aristotle's conception of Nature as bringing the Best we may contrast the less cheerful Epicurean view, which Lucretius adopts (5. 195 sqq.):—

> Quod superest arvi, tamen id natura sua vi
> Sentibus obducat, ni vis humana resistat
> Vitai causa valido consueta bidenti
> Ingemere et terram pressis proscindere aratris:

and Virgil in his train (Georg. 1. 197 sqq.):—

> Vidi lecta diu et multo spectata labore
> Degenerare tamen, ni vis humana quotannis
> Maxima quaeque manu legeret: sic omnia fatis
> In peius ruere, ac retro sublapsa referri.

Aristotle, on the contrary, finds in things a tendency to

[1] Sir A. Grant, Ethics, 1. 278–9. and cp. de Gen. An. 731 b 24
[2] See Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 387–9, sqq.

evolve themselves right. Men sometimes can hardly choose but do or say the right thing (de Part. An. 1. 1. 642 a 19, 27: Metaph. A. 3. 984 a 18: Teichmüller, Kunst, p. 383): and if the State needs human contrivance to bring it into existence (cp. ὁ πρῶτος συστήσας, Pol. 1. 2. 1253 a 30), its contriver perhaps only 'followed the guidance of things themselves,' for we hear of a 'growth in things' (τὰ πράγματα φυόμενα) in connexion with the rise of the State (Pol. 1. 2. 1252 a 24). Nature often gives us clear intimations of the true course: she seeks, for instance, to mark off the natural slave by a special physical aspect and bearing (1. 5. 1254 b 27 sqq.); she creates in men a difference of age, and so suggests the true basis for distinctions of political privilege within the citizen body (4 (7). 14. 1332 b 35). Yet she is often baffled (1. 5. 1254 b 32 sqq.), and needs the aid of Art to bring things right. Thus it is that Art partly completes what Nature is unable to carry to completion, partly imitates Nature (Phys. 2. 8. 199 a 15).

Aristotle, as we shall see, is at even more pains to show that the State is a product of Nature than Plato[1] had been before him. His direct object in so doing is to strengthen and consecrate its authority and to exhibit its true relation to the individual. An incidental consequence of his arguments, however, is that whatever holds good of 'compounds formed by Nature' (τὰ φύσει συνεστῶτα) holds good of the State. Thus, as Nature does everything 'either from considerations of that which is necessary or from considerations of that which is better[2],' the structure of the State must satisfy one or other of these tests. So again, in all things that exist by nature, and not by accident, whose essence is disorder (ἀταξία)[3], we look to find order (τάξις) and proportion (cp. Phys. 8. 1. 252 a 11, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδέν γε ἄτακτον τῶν φύσει καὶ κατὰ φύσιν· ἡ γὰρ φύσις αἰτία πᾶσι τάξεως· τὸ δ' ἄπειρον πρὸς τὸ ἄπειρον οὐδένα λόγον ἔχει, τάξις δὲ πᾶσα λόγος: Phys. 8. 6. 259 a 10, ἐν γὰ

[1] Laws, 889 sq.
[2] De Gen. An. 1. 4. 717 a 15, ἢ διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ διὰ τὸ βέλτιον: cp. Plato, Tim. 75 D.
[3] De Part. An. 1. 1. 641 b 23.

τοῖς φύσει δεῖ τὸ πεπερασμένον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον, ἂν ἐνδέχηται, ὑπάρχειν μᾶλλον). Consequently, Aristotle insists on order and proportion in the State: he cannot accept the haphazard organization of actual communities (Pol. 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 5), the social anarchy of democracies (8 (6). 4. 1319 b 27 sqq.), or even the indefinite and varying magnitude of Greek cities (4 (7). 4. 1326 a 8 sqq.: cp. de An. 2. 4. 416 a 16, τῶν δὲ φύσει συνισταμένων πάντων ἐστὶ πέρας καὶ λόγος μεγέθους τε καὶ αὐξήσεως). So again, 'Nature always gives things to those who can use them, either exclusively or more largely than to others' (de Part. An. 4. 8. 684 a 28). The State, therefore, must follow the same rule in distributing the advantages at its disposal—wealth, office, political power, and the like. So again, in all products of Nature we find elements of two kinds—ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ and μέρη: the former necessary conditions of the thing but not parts of it, the latter its parts. This holds also of the State (Pol. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21 sqq.), and thus we find Aristotle breaking the population of his State into two sections, the one merely a necessary condition of the State and not a part of it, the other concentrating in itself the substance and true life of the State.

Spontaneity and Fortune.

We have already seen that Matter, while indispensable as a condition of the things into which it enters, is also so variable that it may prove either the first step in the process of Nature which ends in Actuality, or a distorting and enfeebling influence. It is in this variability of Matter that Spontaneity (τὸ αὐτόματον) and Fortune (τύχη) take their rise (Metaph. E. 2. 1027 a 13, ὥστε ἡ ὕλη ἔσται αἰτία ἡ ἐνδεχομένη παρὰ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἄλλως τοῦ συμβεβηκότος). 'The accidental,' says Zeller[1], 'arises when a free or unfree activity directed to an end is brought by the influence of external circumstances to produce a result other than that end.' Spontaneity is predicated in the case of such a disturbance generally, whether the activity disturbed and impeded is that of a being exercising Moral

[1] Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 335.

Choice or not; Fortune, only when the agent whose activity is thus modified is a being exercising Moral Choice. A third form of the Accidental is the *σύμπτωμα*—e.g. the occurrence of an eclipse while one is taking a walk; and here the Accidental appears in its purest form[1]. It here takes the shape of a mere co-existence in Space or Time of two events standing in no causal relation to each other. As Torstrik points out[2], Accident is not always a marring influence: the movement to an end may be satisfactorily accomplished, and yet incidentally set going the aimless activity of Chance. Chance plays round the ordered process of Nature, careless whether it mars or aids it or does neither. Its essential characteristic is to be without design and irregular; it is the negation of Intelligence and Nature—a power which acts without reason and without that approach to regularity (*τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ*) which Nature exhibits. Aristotle evidently holds that if everything happened by accident, nothing would be calculable beforehand. This is not really the case. Chance itself is in some degree reducible to uniformities.

The popular Greek view set down the Accidental to the Gods: thus Herodotus speaks frequently of *θεία τύχη*, Thucydides of *ἡ τύχη ἐκ τοῦ θείου*[4]; Timoleon, according to Plutarch[5], 'having built a temple to Automatia close to his house, sacrificed to her and consecrated the house itself to the *Ἱερὸς Δαίμων*.' Euripides, however, distinguished between Fortune and the hand of the Deity[6], and we find Philemon[7] placing in the mouth of one of his characters the utterance—

[1] Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 335. 3.

[2] *Hermes*, 9. 425.

[3] It sometimes aids Art at all events: cp. *τέχνη τύχην ἔστερξε καὶ τύχη τέχνην* (Eth. Nic. 6. 4. 1140 a 19).

[4] Thuc. 5. 104, 112.

[5] Timol. c. 36. The fate of the Athenian Timotheus, who had said that his success was due to himself more than to Fortune (Scholiast on Aristophanes, Plutus, 180), was perhaps present to Timoleon's mind.

[6] L. Schmidt, Ethik der alten Griechen, 1. 56, who refers to Cycl. 606 (582 Bothe), Hecub. 491 (465 Bothe)—to which reference may be added Herc. furens, 120 sqq., where gods no less than men are viewed as the sport of fortune.

[7] Inc. Fab. Fragm. 48 Didot.

Οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῖν οὐδεμία Τύχῃ θεός,
οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ ταὐτόματον, ὃ γίνεται
ὡς ἔτυχ' ἑκάστῳ, προσαγορεύεται Τύχη.

Menander makes a near approach to Aristotle in the lines—

Ὡς ἄδικον, ὅταν ἡ μὲν φύσις
ἀποδῷ τι σεμνόν, τοῦτο δ' ἡ Τύχη κακόν[1],

and

Οὐδὲν κατὰ λόγον γίνεθ' ὃν ποιεῖ Τύχη.

To Aristotle, at any rate when he speaks scientifically, Accident is an influence arising at the opposite pole of things to the Deity, and inasmuch as it is not directed to an end, bordering closely on the non-existent[2].

The domain of Politics is exposed to the action of Accident in all its forms. It was a *σύμπτωμα* that brought the extreme democracy of Athens into being (Pol. 2. 12. 1274 a 12). It rests with Fortune whether the State possesses the adequate supply of accessories (*σύμμετρος χορηγία*) with which it should start, or not (Pol. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 29: cp. c. 4. 1325 b 37 sq.).

To these powers Aristotle apparently adds as a fourth Man. that of human agency, for though we might conceive it as already included under the heads of Nature, Necessity, and Accident, inasmuch as human beings form, as we shall see, the Matter of the State, he clearly marks off the agency of *διάνοια* from that of *φύσις* (e.g. Phys. 2. 5. 196 b 21)[3].

He does not trace the gradual ripening of political wisdom in man, as he traces in the Poetics the dawn of Poetry. We do not learn whether Chance played the same part in the growth of the State as it did in the development of the Poetic Art (Poet. 4. 1448 b 22: 14. 1454 a 10). Was the State the outcome of Trial and Failure (*πεῖρα*, Poet. 24. 1459 b 32)? We are not told, but we may probably

[1] Ὀλυνθία, Fragm. 1 Didot.
[2] Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 336.
[3] The enumeration in Eth. Nic. 3. 5. 1112 a 31, *αἴτια δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φύσις καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη, ἔτι δὲ νοῦς καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου*, may also be referred to, though it loses weight owing to the employment of the word *δοκοῦσιν*.

assume that in this, as in other fields, Experience long preceded Science.

The State only imperfectly amenable to human control.

But even when human agency approaches the subject-matter of Politics with all the resources both of Experience and Science, it finds the State only imperfectly amenable to its control. The reason of this will be readily inferred from our review of the agencies at work in this sphere. Science has to steer her way among the potent influences of Necessity, Nature, and Accident, not to speak of human aberrations. Nature, indeed, is her ally and guide, but with the rest she has to do the best she can.

The State is to Aristotle neither an 'organism' which it is beyond man's power to influence, nor a creation of man which man can mould as he likes. It is in part, though only in part, beyond his control. The Matter out of which the State issues—the population with which it starts—may be untowardly; the territory may be other than it should be; and even if, as in the best State, both population and territory are all that can be wished, Accident may still mar its development. The lawgiver often has to deal with adverse conditions which he cannot alter, and it is the business of Political Science to point out not only what is to be done when wind and tide are favourable, but also how the best may be made of adverse circumstances[1].

The necessity of the State, its value to man and its authority over the

In entering on his subject, Aristotle's first care is to reassert the authority of the State, nominally in opposition to those who had drawn only a quantitative distinction between it and the household, but really in correction of more serious errors—the error of those who had asserted

[1] Cp. 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 5 sqq. It is hardly necessary to remark that in asserting the existence of a Science of Society Aristotle is far from claiming that it enables us to 'ascertain the fundamental laws of social evolution' or to 'forecast the future of society.' History hardly groups itself to him as an evolution. Accident plays a large part in it. All he asserts is that it is possible to determine more or less scientifically how the State should be organized and administered under varying social conditions.

it to exist, not *φύσει*, but *νόμῳ*, and the error of those who, like the Cynics, regarded it as a non-essential.

individual reasserted by Aristotle. Human society and the State originate in Nature: the State is prior to the individual and the household, and is the whole of which they are parts.

The distinction between *τὰ φύσει* and *τὰ νόμῳ* arose in connexion with the question as to the reality of things—a question which presented itself early in the history of Greek philosophy. Gorgias appears to have denied existence *in toto*. Others distinguished between things which exist *φύσει* and things which exist *νόμῳ*. Some inquirers found that which exists by nature mainly in sensible things—in the elements, earth, air, fire, and water, and their compounds (Plato, Laws, 889 A sqq.); others denied existence by nature to the heaven, but allowed it to the world of animal life[1]. More commonly, the natural was identified with the necessary, as in the already quoted fragment of Euripides: or with that which is fixed and invariable (cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1094 b 14, *τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια . . . τοσαύτην ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην, ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μή*): or the immemorial, not 'made with hands'; as in Diog. Laert. 9. 45, *ποιητὰ δὲ νόμιμα εἶναι* (sc. *ἔφασκεν ὁ Δημόκριτος*), *φύσει δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν*, and in the famous lines of the Antigone of Sophocles, which Aristotle quotes (Rhet. 1. 13. 1373 b 9 sqq.: cp. 15. 1375 a 32 sqq.), and understands as asserting existence by nature:—

> *Οὐ γάρ τι νῦν γε κἀχθές, ἀλλ' ἀεί ποτε*
> *ζῇ ταῦτα, κοὐδεὶς οἶδεν ἐξ ὅτου φάνη:*

or the true, as distinguished from that which seems true to the many (Aristot. Soph. Elench. 12. 173 a 15): or that which is universally or generally recognized: thus the sophist Hippias refused to recognize any laws as divinely authorized, except those which are everywhere accepted (Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 19; cp. the passages from Aristotle's Rhetoric just quoted).

Plato would probably find the natural, above all, in that which participates in the Idea of Good; and Aristotle,

[1] Cp. Aristot. de Part. An. 1. 1. 641 b 20 sqq., *οἱ δὲ τῶν μὲν ζῴων ἕκαστον φύσει φασὶν εἶναι καὶ γενέσθαι, τὸν δ' οὐρανὸν ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ τοῦ αὐτομάτου τοιοῦτον συστῆναι, ἐν ᾧ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἀταξίας οὐδὲ ὁτιοῦν φαίνεται.*

following in the same path, finds the natural in tha
is either a necessary condition of, or a direct
butor to, that which is best for the species—the
not the universal, end. The tests of primitiveness (
ἐκ γενετῆς, Pol. 1. 5. 1254 a 23: τὸ ἀρχαῖον, Pol. 4
1329 a 40 sqq.) and of generality of occurrence (τὸ
τὸ πολύ) are also accepted by him. To ascertain
natural, we are taught to ask what obtains in
instances, what holds good of healthy and well-con
subjects (Pol. 1. 5. 1254 a 36 sqq.). It is not fro
barians, but from Greeks that we learn the natural
the State and household (Pol. 1. 2. 1252 a 34 sqq
μὲν οὖν . . . ἐν δὲ τοῖς βαρβάροις: cp. 6. 1255 a 33 s

It is by showing that the State satisfies these te
Aristotle is enabled to reassert its naturalness
authority over the individual. Both had been im
The assertion that Right is not φύσει but νόμῳ led
inevitably to a similar assertion with respect to the
which represents a distribution of rights; and the e
this view was to weaken the authority of the Sta
the individual. Some, indeed, like Callicles in the
of Plato, by implication allowed the State to be
if it were in the hands of a man of transcendent
and force of character, but this condition of things
exception, not the rule.

Those who claimed that the State is not φύσει b
did not necessarily imply that it owes its existen
compact, though the two ideas do not lie far apar
might mean only that its claims rest on general acc
—that it is the traditional, received thing—that its a
is artificial, not based on Nature, but 'of man's d
and that it need not have existed, if men had not
that it should. The phrase brought its origin, h
perilously near that of money (νόμισμα) or of law
both of them things commonly conceived to rest on
and to depend on it for acceptance and authority[1];

[1] Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1133 a 28 sqq.: Pol. 1. 9. 1257 a 35. The sophist Hippias (Xen. Mem treated law as a kind of

are not surprised to find Glaucon, who undertakes in the Republic to state the views of Thrasymachus, tracing the origin of law and justice to compact. His language implies that not only law but anything like legally regulated society originates in compact. There are, indeed, passages even in the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle in which social relations seem to be rested on contract: thus we read in Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1161 b 13, *αἱ δὲ πολιτικαὶ καὶ φυλετικαὶ καὶ συμπλοϊκαὶ καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται (φιλίαι) κοινωνικαῖς (φιλίαις) ἐοίκασι μᾶλλον· οἷον γὰρ καθ' ὁμολογίαν τινὰ φαίνονται εἶναι* (cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 1. 1163 b 32 sqq.: Pol. 2. 2. 1261 a 30 sqq., passages on which some light is thrown by Rhet. 1. 15. 1376 b 11 sqq.). In the Politics, however, Aristotle not only contrasts law with compact (Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 10), but seems everywhere to imply that the State neither came into being by way of compact nor is dependent on compact for its authority. It began in the blind impulses which first formed the household and broadened there into wider aims which nothing but the State could satisfy. It glided imperceptibly into existence, as men became successively aware of the various needs bound up with their nature. Men could not choose but form it, or some imperfect substitute for it. It is as much a necessity of human existence as food or fire. Its authority rests on the same basis as the authority of the father, not on consent, but on the constitution of human nature. Epicurus, on the contrary, 'insisted on an original compact between the individual members of society as the origin of its establishment[1],' and in so doing reasserted the doctrine ascribed by Glaucon to Thrasymachus in a slightly more unequivocal form[2].

in agreement with popular opinion (Aristot. Rhet. 1. 15. 1376 b 9), and asked, *νόμους, ὦ Σώκρατες, πῶς ἄν τις ἡγήσαιτο σπουδαῖον πρᾶγμα εἶναι ἢ τὸ πείθεσθαι αὐτοῖς, οὓς γε πολλάκις αὐτοὶ οἱ θέμενοι ἀποδοκιμάσαντες μετατίθενται;*

[1] Prof. Wallace, Epicureanism, p. 158.

[2] The doctrine of the origin of society in contract, when Epicurus at last distinctly put it forth, was put forth, not with the comparatively restricted aim of limiting monarchical authority, with which it has often been upheld in modern times, but with the far more revolutionary aim of throwing the State further into the background of human life by representing it as a thing of man's devising, not an imperious dic-

As the teaching of some of the Sophists had tended impair the authority of the State, or to limit its functions the protection of the individual from wrong, so the teachi of the Cynics led up to a denial that the wise man needs State of his own other than the whole world. The doctrin of the Cynics, no less than those of these Sophists, are co troverted in the opening chapters of the Politics. Even Plat in one of his dialogues at all events, had failed, in Aristotl opinion, to do full justice to the State and its claims. H had treated the City-State as a mere enlarged household and had spoken as if the master of slaves, the head of household, and the King or citizen-ruler of a State on differed in the number of those they ruled. It is primari in correction of this doctrine, which is not indeed much harmony with Plato's ordinary view of the comparati claims of State and household, and is perhaps rather Socrat than Platonic, that Aristotle traces, first the beginnings the household, and then the rise of the household into t City-State. The inquiry, however, offers a convenient o portunity of refuting other and more serious errors—tho of the Sophists and Cynics.

The genetic method which Aristotle follows in th inquiry may surprise those who remember that he la down the principle elsewhere[1], that the genesis of a thing to be explained by its nature or essence (*οὐσία*), not t nature of it by its genesis. It is, he says, because the thi is what it is, that it came into being as it did. If we wa therefore, to know what the State is, we must ask, it wou seem, not the mode of its genesis, but rather its end. Y he invites us, at the very outset of the Politics, to study t growth of the State *ab ovo* (*τὰ πράγματα φυόμενα*). H object, however, in this is not so much to ascertain wh the State is as to prove that it exists by nature, and to sho

tate of his nature. Epicurus, in fact, trod in the footsteps of the Sophists referred to in the text. But then he had a philosophical discipline to set in the place of the State, which they had not.

[1] They struck down the traditio guide of human life without havi anything to substitute for it.

[1] De Part. An. 1. 1. 640a 13 (especially a 33-b 4): 642a 31.

that it stands to the household as a whole stands to its part or as a full-grown plant stands to the seed from which it sprang.

In correction of the errors of Plato and others to which reference has been made, Aristotle first traces back the household to necessity and nature, and then shows that the State is a derivative of the household. It differs in species from the household, but yet it is akin to it and issues from it. He takes the two relations which make up the earliest form of the household, before, with the birth of children, a third is added, that of father and child, and he shows how they issue, not from deliberate choice, but from impulse and necessity—the relation of husband and wife from an impulse common to man with animals and plants, that of master and slave from the instinct of self-preservation. The household thus arises; and probably some of those who were most earnest in impugning the naturalness of the State accepted the household as natural. The sophist Hippias, at all events, regarded the law which enjoins reverence to parents as a law universally accepted and imposed by the gods (Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 20). But the State rises out of the household through the intermediate institution of the Village, which is properly a Clan-Village, and thus betrays its relation to the household. Already the Village supplies a wider range of wants than the household—ministers to some wants which are not mere daily wants; and the State does no more than proceed a little farther in the same path. The State itself originally exists for the sake of ministering to life, and only by degrees goes on to minister to noble living. Thus there is no traceable break in the rise of the State out of the household; the early State, like the household, is under kingly rule; and if the one is self-complete, while the other is not, if the one is the culmination, or full-grown form, of the other, there is but one movement, one aim—that of supplying human needs—underlying the whole process. The household cannot be natural and the State other than natural: what holds of the former must hold of the latter: if the household is

natural, *a fortiori* the State is so, for it is the completion of the household. We need not, however, trace the State back to the household, in order to prove that it is natural. It is by nature, because its end is the end of all natural things—that which is best (1252 b 34 sq.).

These facts already justify the assertion that man is a naturally political being, for we find that man is, as it were, started by nature on an inclined plane which carries him in the direction of the Best, and that thus a movement is initiated which cannot pause till it closes in the State: but he is a naturally political being for another reason also; he possesses the gift of language, which reflects a consciousness of the just and the unjust, the good and the bad, and it is this consciousness that serves as a basis for household and State; whereas even the most naturally social of the lower animals only possess voice, and voice expresses no more than a sense of pleasure and pain. In drawing this marked distinction between the sociality of man and that of gregarious animals, Aristotle probably aims at correcting the mistake, as he conceives it to be, of Plato, who had protested in the Politicus (262 A sqq.) against an abrupt distinction of ἀγελαιοτροφική in relation to man from ἀγελαιοτροφική in relation to other animals, explaining that one might just as well divide mankind into Hellenes and barbarians, or into Lydians and non-Lydians[1]. If, then, at the outset we found Society traced to impulses shared by the lower animals, we now learn to regard the household and State as exclusively human institutions[2]. We see also that the State

Justice exists in Household.

[1] He may possibly also have in his mind a passage of the Laws (680 E)—οἷς ἑπόμενοι καθάπερ ὄρνιθες ἀγέλην μίαν ποιήσουσι, πατρονομούμενοι καὶ βασιλείαν πασῶν δικαιοσύνην βασιλευόμενοι, which occurs in Plato's sketch of the origin of society. Plato strangely enough seems more inclined than Aristotle to reason from the lower animals to man (cp. Pol. 2. 5. 1264 b 4: and Laws, 713 D).

[2] It is indeed implied, Pol. 3. 9. 1280 a 32, that the πόλις might exist among the lower animals, if its end were τὸ ζῆν μόνον. Animals are said (Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1144 b 4 sqq.: cp. Eth. Nic. 7. 1. 1145 a 25) to possess φυσικὴ ἀρετή (see also Hist. An. 8. 1. 589 a 1 sqq.). Some echo of Pol. 1. 2. 1253 a 9 sqq. is possibly traceable in Plutarch de Amore Prolis, c. 3, a passage which may be based on, or contain extracts from, some composition of the great physician Erasistratus, who was a pupil of Theophrastus.

is not merely forced on man by his needs, but foreshadowed by his nature, and requisite to give full play to his faculties; that man bears marks of being intended for life in the State. The ἄπολις, if a man and not above or below humanity, is not only a man whose needs are incompletely satisfied, but also one whose faculties are without an adequate field for their exercise.

We might imagine that Aristotle would stop at this point, having now come to the end of the argument by which he seeks to establish that the State is by nature and that man is intended by nature for life in the State; but he goes on to assert that the State is prior in nature to the household and the individual. He argues that the individual, being incomplete without the State, is related to it as a part to a whole, and that the whole is prior in nature to its part. He makes no subsequent use of this principle[1]; so that we can only conjecture why he lays stress upon it. He does so probably, partly because if the State and individual were both pronounced to be by nature and therefore to stand so far on an equality, the authority of the State over the individual would still be imperfectly restored, and its relative dignity imperfectly vindicated; partly in order to place in the strongest light the disparity of the household and the State, and therefore the contrast of the householder and the statesman. He goes on further to enforce the claims of the State by showing from what a depth of degradation the State saves man, and how great are the benefits it has conferred upon him. Without the State and the virtue it developes in man, man would be the worst of animals: with it he rises far above their level.

In Aristotle's view, the State is as essential to man's existence as the act of birth. For existence means complete existence, and without the State a man is a mere bundle of capacities for good or evil without the faculty (φρόνησις καὶ ἀρετή), for whose hand they were intended:

[1] It is not on the priority of the State to the individual, but on the fact of its relation to him resembling that of a whole to its part that he dwells in 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 27.

he is, as it were, a helm without a helmsman—'nave sen nocchiero in gran tempesta.' Existence also means re living existence, not such an existence as that of the pa after the whole is destroyed—as that of the hand or ey after life has left the body. The State is a condition complete and real human existence—of existence in the fu sense of the word: its place in the process of man's life thus as assured as that of the act of birth, or of the takin of food. It matters not that whole races of men a doomed to remain half-grown and never to realize t City-State: we judge of what is natural for man by th which holds good of well-constituted natures. Man is being marked out by nature for the gradual attainment a definite limit of growth, and the State is the means enabling him to do so. Man's duty to the State is more a matter of compact than his duty to be virtuou Compact is not needed as a basis for the authority of State which fulfils the end of the State, nor can it le authority to a State which does not do so.

The State does not come into being, in Aristotle's vie in derogation from, or limitation of, man's natural right on the contrary, it calls them into existence. It enunciat what is just (Pol. 1. 2. 1253 a 37, ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη πολιτικ ἡ γὰρ δίκη πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας τάξις ἐστίν· ἡ δὲ δίκη τοῦ δικα κρίσις): it is in the State, and with reference to its end, th men's rights are to be determined (Pol. 3. 12. 1282 b 14 sqq If persons outside a given State are recognized by tho belonging to it as possessing rights—for example, rights freedom or to be ruled not despotically but as freem should be ruled, Aristotle would probably nevertheless s that rights in their origin are traceable to the inter relations of the State. Contrast Chrysippus, Περὶ Θεῶν (a Plutarch. de Stoicorum Repugn. c. 9)—οὐ γάρ ἐστιν εὑρεῖν δικαιοσύνης ἄλλην ἀρχὴν οὐδ' ἄλλην γένεσιν ἢ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ Δ καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως. Finding the natural in the b form of the State, Aristotle has no call to imagine a st of nature antecedent to society, and involving risks wh compel the formation of the State as a *pis aller*. The St

exists, according to him, because of the better elements in human nature, rather than because human nature is a compound of good and bad. The love of society and the perception of right and wrong implanted by nature in man, the impulse of self-perpetuation, the need of protection and sustenance, the higher needs that gradually assert themselves: these are the things to which the State owes its existence. Man is a being the satisfaction of whose material needs suggests and leads on to the satisfaction of higher needs. The rise of the State merely reflects man's destination to moral development. Kant, on the contrary, in his 'Idee zu einer allgemeiner Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht,' traces the State to antagonisms resulting from the fact that men have both tendencies to social union and tendencies disruptive of it, both general sympathies and private interests[1].

Remarks on Aristotle's argument.

The argument of Aristotle must probably have failed to convince the partisans of the opposite doctrine. Some of his opponents would reject his account of the functions of the State, and would confine them to the protection of men's rights: others might say that the picture he draws of the State is a picture of an ideal State very different from the State as it is, and that his defence of the State is consequently a defence of a State which is nowhere to be found: others would perhaps dispute the genesis of the State from the household, and make it out to be rather a thing of man's devising, and to be designed less for man's improvement, than his convenience.

For ourselves, the close historical connexion between the family relation and the State has been placed beyond doubt, though the intrinsic difference between the two institutions is more evident to us than to the Greeks, whose State was in many respects more like a household than our own. Aristotle indeed himself rightly rests the claims of the State rather on its adaptation to human nature and its incalculable services than on its succession to the household.

[1] Kant, Werke, 7. 321 sq. See Flint, Philosophy of History, 1. 391.

Its authority, however, may be vindicated without seeking to prove that it is everything to man; or even that it is a product of nature. The word 'nature' means less to us than it did to the Greeks. On the other hand, so far as Aristotle's argument goes to show that the authority of the State is not based on consent, it possesses permanent importance.

Cicero (de Rep. 1. 24. 38) is sarcastic at the expense of some inquirers who had begun their political speculations in a similar fashion to Aristotle, though one or two of his expressions (e.g. 'quot modis quidque dicatur') make it doubtful whether he is thinking of Aristotle:—'Nec vero, inquit Africanus, ita disseram de re tam illustri tamque nota, ut ad illa elementa revolvar, quibus uti docti homines his in rebus solent, ut a prima congressione maris et feminae, deinde a progenie et cognatione ordiar, verbisque quid sit et quot modis quidque dicatur definiam saepius: apud prudentes enim homines et in maxima re publica summa cum gloria belli domique versatos quum loquar, non committam ut sit illustrior illa ipsa res, de qua disputem, quam oratio mea.' He so states the primary cause of the formation of the State, as to give a greater prominence to man's natural sociality than to his needs: 'Coetus autem prima causa coeundi est non tam imbecillitas quam naturalis quaedam hominum quasi congregatio: non est enim singulare nec solivagum genus hoc' (Cic. de Rep. 1. 25. 39). Elsewhere, however, neglecting Aristotle's distinction between the cause of the original formation of the State and the cause of its existence[1], he makes τὸ εὖ ζῆν the cause of its formation: 'Considerate nunc cetera quam sint provisa sapienter ad illam civium beate et honeste vivendi societatem: ea est enim prima causa coeundi et id hominibus effici ex re publica debet partim institutis, alia legibus' (de Rep. 4. 3. 3).

Bacon's account of the origin of society[2] is noticeable

[1] Something not altogether unlike Cicero's statement appears, however, to be implied in Pol. 3. 6. 1278 b 21 sqq., and also, as a friend has pointed out to me, in Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 11 sqq.

[2] 'Argument of Sir F. Bacon His Majesty's Solicitor-General

both because it is obviously influenced by Aristotle's views, and because it does not trace society to a primitive compact. 'The first platform of monarchy,' he says, 'is that of a father, who governing over his wife by prerogative of sex, over his children by prerogative of age and because he is author unto them of being, and over his servants by prerogative of virtue and providence (for he that is able of body and improvident of mind is *natura servus*), is the very model of a king.' On this pattern the earliest society was constructed. 'The first original submission is paternity or patriarchy, which was, when a family growing so great, as it could not contain itself within one habitation, some branches of the descendants were forced to plant themselves into new families, which second families could not by a natural instinct and inclination, but bear a reverence and yield an obeisance to the eldest line of the ancient family from which they were derived.' Bacon adds, as secondary and later sources of monarchy, admiration of virtue or gratitude towards merit, gratitude for salvation in war, or enforced submission to a conqueror. 'All these four submissions are evident to be natural and more ancient than law.' 'All other commonwealths, monarchies only excepted, do subsist by a law precedent . . . but in monarchies, especially hereditary . . . the submission is more natural and simple, which afterwards by laws subsequent is perfected and made more formal, but it is grounded upon nature[1].' 'Nulla apud Baconem,' Friedländer remarks,

in the case of the Postnati of Scotland;' quoted by C. Friedländer, De Francisci Baconis Verulamii doctrina politica, p. 15.

[1] Bacon evidently intends to suggest that the claims of Monarchy are superior to those of other constitutions—an inference which Aristotle is far from drawing from its priority in point of time. 'While the Protestant writers on Natural Law persistently maintain that the State is a divine ordinance—while they incline to place the subject in the same position with respect to his King as that which the child holds to the father whom he has had no part in selecting—while again they firmly assert the indefeasible Majesty of the Head of the State, the Jesuit writers on the subject take a diametrically opposite view. They insist in the interest of the Church on the human origin of the State, on its origin in a primitive social compact, and infer from this that where the Prince shows himself unworthy of the power committed

'vestigia ficti illius, quem Hobbesius profert, status naturalis, qui bellum fuisse cogitatur omnium contra omnes; nulla vestigia pactorum illorum quibus homines se invicem obstrinxissent, occurrunt.'

Aristotle's account of the origin of the State.

It will be observed that, if Aristotle deals with the question of the origin of the State, he deals with it only incidentally, and in course of proving that the State exists by nature. We must not, therefore, expect from him more than a cursory treatment of the question.

Plato had twice sketched the origin of society—first in the Republic and again in the Laws; and his two accounts do not altogether coincide. He had traced its origin in the Republic[1] to man's need of the services of his fellows: he here starts with the single individual and shows how unable he would be to supply his own needs without the aid of at least four or five others, and how the efforts of this group of individuals would fail of full efficiency in the absence of a scheme for distributing and combining their labour. The interchange of the products of their industry is thus, according to this passage, the first and most characteristic fact of social life. In the Laws[2], however, while tracing the succession of constitutions from its starting-point, he incidentally developes another view of the origin of society. He had apparently noticed that the sites of ancient cities were often close under the slopes of high hills, still more ancient traces of habitation being found on the summits of these hills[3]; and these facts seemed

to him, the mandate he holds may be withdrawn from him' (J. E. Erdmann, Geschichte der Philosophie, 1. 574). A Solicitor-General's argument in the time of James I, and especially an argument of Bacon as Solicitor-General, was, however, certain to be sufficiently monarchical in tone.

[1] Rep. 369 A sqq., *εἰ γιγνομένην πόλιν θεασαίμεθα λόγῳ κ.τ.λ.* Plato's treatment of the subject in the Republic is no doubt, however, more ideal and less historical than in the Laws. Perhaps indeed we could hardly expect him to trace the State back to the household in a dialogue in which the household was about to be abolished.

[2] B. 3, 676 A-682 B.

[3] Or, very probably, he was merely building on Homer's description of the Cyclopes, which both Plato and Aristotle take as a picture of the earliest human society:—

to him to point to the further fact of a primitive deluge, the survivors of which began society afresh on the hill-tops, each household being ruled by the father and existing either independently or in combination with a few others. Why the survivors of the deluge should be found, when the curtain draws up, grouped in such small bodies, Plato does not explain. The next phase of society is a larger agglomeration of households, accompanied with a change of the site of the settlement to the foot of the hill-slope.

It is evident both from the general tenour of Aristotle's account of the origin of society, and from the repetition in it of incidental expressions used in this passage of the Laws[1], that he has this sketch before him in his own treatment of the subject. The deluge, indeed, is dropped out, and all the picturesque features of Plato's story: we lose also some instructive hints, such as the *aperçu* that the earliest men were hunters and herdsmen (Laws, 679 A); and the series of societies—household, clan-village, and city-State—is marshalled before us, stripped of historical detail and reduced to a somewhat bald outline. But Aristotle has seized the idea that society begins with the household, not with the group of producers to which the Republic traces it back, and he holds firmly to it. He adds, however, an account of the origin of the household—a subject which Plato had not touched. As we have seen, he traces this, not, like Locke, to the long infancy and long minority of the human being, which, but for wedlock, would impose an overwhelming burden on the mother, but

ἀλλ' οἵγ' ὑψηλῶν ὀρέων ναίουσι κάρηνα,
ἐν σπέσσι γλαφυροῖσι.

Cp. Laws, 677 B.

[1] e.g. Laws, 681 A, τῶν οἰκήσεων τούτων μεζόνων αὐξανομένων ἐκ τῶν ἐλαττόνων καὶ πρώτων—cp. Pol. 1. 2. 1252 b 15, ἡ δ' ἐκ πλειόνων οἰκιῶν κοινωνία πρώτη χρήσεως ἕνεκεν μὴ ἐφημέρου κώμη: Laws, 681 B, παῖδας καὶ παίδων παῖδας—cp. Pol. 1. 2. 1252 b 18: and Laws, 680 D–E, μῶν οὖν οὐκ ἐκ τούτων (sc. δυναστείας γίγνονται) τῶν κατὰ μίαν οἴκησιν καὶ κατὰ γένος διασπαρμένων ὑπὸ ἀπορίας τῆς ἐν ταῖς φθοραῖς, ἐν αἷς τὸ πρεσβύτατον ἄρχει διὰ τὸ τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτοῖς ἐκ πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς γεγονέναι, οἷς ἑπόμενοι καθάπερ ὄρνιθες ἀγέλην μίαν ποίησουσι, πατρονομούμενοι καὶ βασιλείαν πασῶν δικαιοτάτην βασιλευόμενοι;

to certain powerful instincts, which hardly, perhaps, s
for the permanence of the conjugal relation.

We see that, in Aristotle's view, the State so far
in the steps of the Household and Village, that it
ceases to be a common life, for this is implied in th
κοινωνία. A sundered and scattered citizen-body, lil
of Rome, would not be to Aristotle a citizen-body
Mutual personal acquaintance (4 (7). 4. 1326 b 14 sq
essential to the citizens for the discharge of their p
duties; and besides, a common life (τὸ συζῆν), thou
enough of itself to constitute a State (3. 9. 1280 b 2
is, in his opinion, a necessary condition of State-life
though the State resembles the household and vil
this particular, it developes virtues unknown or imp
known to them. Justice, in the true sense, first app
the State.

We have already seen that too much must
expected from a sketch of the origin of society,
is introduced mainly to prove its naturalness, an
not profess to aim at exhaustiveness. It is, ev
largely ideal. Each of the successive κοινωνίαι is
sented in its correct and normal form. The co
common among barbarians, of the wife with th
(1. 2. 1252 b 5 sq.) is just noticed and no more. N
is spent on such deviation-forms of the Household
mentioned as prevalent in Persia (Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 11
where the father uses his sons as slaves. The
between master and slave is conceived as a relation i
each side finds its advantage. The retrospect thus
rather an ideal aspect. It is an historical retrosp
the many erroneous types of each κοινωνία which h
sented themselves are thrown on one side, and
note only of the normal evolution. The gradual
sion of the solitary household into the clan-villa
the city-State is an ideal picture, rather than an his
traceable fact. If Aristotle intends to imply t
household is coeval with the first origin of soc
omits to notice that society occasionally exists, a

dotus already knew, without the institution of marriage, even in its rudest polyandric form. Aristotle, again, traces the development of society without reference either to religion or to war, each of which has probably exercised a powerful influence upon it, even if they have not been the main factors in the movement.

If we doubt whether the household finds a place in the most rudimentary form of society, and therefore whether the starting-point of Aristotle's evolution is really the true starting-point, we need not hesitate to deny that the culmination of the process, as he conceives it, is really its culmination. He seems to close the social evolution long before its real termination. The city-State, as he depicts it, without a Church, without fully developed professions, with an imperfectly organized industrial and agricultural system and a merely parochial extent of territory, cannot be considered 'self-complete,' as he asserts it to be: perhaps, indeed, no single State can be held to be so. The *ἔθνος*, again, finds no place in this sketch of social development: Aristotle's view of it, indeed, does not seem to be wholly self-consistent. For though not only *βασιλεία*, which is one of the normal constitutions, but even *παμβασιλεία*, the most divine of them all, might exist in an *ἔθνος* or group of *ἔθνη* (Pol. 3. 14. 1285 b 31 sq.), the *ἔθνος* is pronounced to be self-complete only in respect of things necessary (*αὐτάρκης ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις*, 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 4), and also deficient in the 'differentiation' which marks the State (2. 2. 1261 a 27).

Two conclusions, especially, result from this inquiry: the one, that the *πόλις* is the true subject of the investigations of Political Science; the other, that the *πόλις*, being a natural entity (*τῶν κατὰ φύσιν συνεστώτων*), is not a thing to take any and every shape that the convenience of the individual may dictate, but, on the contrary, has a physiology of its own, and a natural structure of its own, which must be ascertained.

The Greek language left Aristotle no alternative, save

to identify the πόλις with the State. The term, which was thus placed before him for analysis, was not a term like our word 'State,' vague in etymology and meaning and thus susceptible of any connotation. It came to him fresh from popular use and full of associations of a definite kind. Evidently it implied, in the first place, that a State without a city at its centre was not a State at all. It is true that the word πόλις is occasionally used in the sense of 'a country[1]'; but it has nothing of the vagueness in this respect of the Latin word 'respublica.'

Another obvious inference from the word πόλις was that the State was something inclusive and all-comprehending. The word 'respublica,' on the contrary, implies a distinction between 'res publica' and 'res privata.' The Greek word made it easy to regard the State as the whole of which the individual was a part. It led to a view of human society as a whole: no line was drawn between the social and the political system: production, trade, science, religion were as much phenomena of the State as government. Πολιτική was held to regulate all human activities and to provide for their harmonious co-operation for a common end.

The word πόλις, again, tended to suggest a limit to the size of the State. The city, it would be felt, could not be indefinitely large, and therefore, as the State was a city, neither could the State. It implied, further, that the State involved a common social life (τὸ συζῆν); that a mere participation in a common government was not enough. It perhaps suggested the idea that the State was not an abstraction, existing apart from the human beings and the territory which made it up, but that it was a concrete thing hardly separable from its walls, its soil, its inhabitants, and, above all, its citizens. Aristotle, indeed, uses the word πόλις in conflicting senses. He often seems to use it so as to include all who exchange services of whatever kind within the State (e.g. Pol. 1. 3. 1253 b 2 sqq.: 2. 2. 1261 a 23: 3. 4. 1277 a 5 sqq., a passage which is perhaps only aporetic): more strictly, the πολῖται are the πόλις (6 (4).

[1] See Liddell and Scott, s. v.

11. 1295 b 25: 3. 6. 1279 a 21); and this appears to be his prevailing view (3. 1. 1274 b 41).

Lastly, the word implied, by its antithesis to the Household and the Village, that the State, though the highest, was not the only form of Society. To Hobbes the State is the earliest social unity. It was not so to Aristotle.

The πόλις a κοινωνία, and a compound Whole, a σύνθετον.

Aristotle assumes, in the very first sentence of the Politics, that the State is a κοινωνία[1]. But what is a κοινωνία? We search in vain in Aristotle's writings for any systematic account of κοινωνία. As in the case of many other terms, we are left to make out the meaning he attaches to the word from a number of scattered passages which rather imply than state it. The subject of κοινωνία is touched upon by Aristotle, partly in the Nicomachean Ethics, partly in the Politics. The household, for instance, so far as it is a form of Friendship (φιλία), is treated in the Ethics. The virtues which go to the maintenance of a κοινωνία are described in the Ethics. In the Politics we have mostly to do with κοινωνίαι composed of rulers and ruled, and with the principles which determine the nature of the rule exercised. For there are κοινωνίαι which are not composed of rulers and ruled, as will shortly be seen. We seem to gather from the scattered data we possess that every κοινωνία must—

1. Consist of at least two human beings diverse from each other (Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1133 a 16 sqq.): and these human beings must not stand to each other in the relation of instrument and end, for in that case there will not be enough in common between them. At least, this is the teaching of Pol. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21 sqq., and Eth. Nic. 8. 13. 1161 a 32 sqq.: yet the first book of the Politics asserts a κοινωνία between master and slave, which is a case of precisely that disparity. Perhaps the very unequal κοινωνία, like the unequal form of friendship, is to be regarded as a lower form of the thing, though not so low as wholly to forfeit the name.

[1] The word κοινωνία is hardly translatable in English. It is, as will be seen from the text, a far wider term than 'association.'

2. These human beings are regarded as possessing ἀγαθ
and exchanging them: thus a κοινωνία is formed by
buyer and a seller, or by husband and wife. Beings wh
do not stand in need of anything or anybody do not form
κοινωνίαι: thus the gods, whom the Stoics conceived as being
in κοινωνία with men, cannot be so in Aristotle's view
The ἀγαθά exchanged, even if in truth so diverse as to b
incommensurable, must be commensurable in relation t
demand (Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1133 b 18): their ratio will in a fully
developed society be measured by money.

3. The two parties unite in a common action (πρᾶξις): se
for illustrations Eth. Nic. 9. 12. 1172 a 3 sqq. Buyer an
seller unite in exchanging. The κοινωνοί of a State unit
in 'the best life of which they are capable' (Pol. 4 (7). 8
1328 a 36): those of the best State in 'the actualizatio
and perfect exercise of virtue' (38). This is the κοινόν τ
which the existence of the κοινωνία implies—a common ain
(Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 8 sqq.) and common action.

4. A passage here and there in the Ethics seems to impl
a compact, tacit or other, between the parties to the κοινωνί
So in Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1161 b 13 sq. we are told that 'Politica
Friendship' appears to rest on compact (αἱ πολιτικαὶ κα
φιλετικαὶ καὶ συμπλοϊκαὶ καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται (φιλίαι) κοινων
καῖς (φιλίαις) ἐοίκασι μᾶλλον οἷον γὰρ καθ' ὁμολογίαν τι
φαίνονται εἶναι· εἰς ταύτας δὲ τάξειεν ἂν τις καὶ τὴν ξενικήν
while the friendship of relatives and comrades is held, o
the contrary, not to rest on any such basis. There
nothing, however, to this effect in the Politics, where t
State is distinctly traced to a root in the family relation.

If we examine the ἀλλακτικὴ κοινωνία, or union f
exchange, we shall find all these features present. Buy
and seller combine to exchange certain commodities
certain terms with a view to their own advantage.

In a κοινωνία of this simple kind, however, we notice t
absence of one feature which is conspicuously present in t
κοινωνίαι which pass before us in the opening chapters
the Politics—the household, village, and State. In Tra
no relation of rule and subjection is established betwe

the *κοινωνοί*[1]. The parties to an union for exchange stand, as such, on one and the same level.

The State is thus not only a *κοινωνία*, but a *κοινωνία* consisting of rulers and ruled. It is a Whole composed of parts (1. 2. 1253 a 20: 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21 sq.), not a *μίξις* or a *κρᾶσις* in which the mingled elements vanish, replaced by a new entity, the result of the mixture; still less is it a *σύμφυσις* (Pol. 2. 4. 1262 b 10 sq.): it is, on the contrary, a *σύνθεσις* (3. 3. 1276 b 6), an union in a compound form of uncompounded elements (*ἀσύνθετα*), which continue to subsist as elements or parts within the compound Whole. Being a Whole, the State is composed of dissimilars (2. 2. 1261 a 29), and includes within itself a ruling element and a ruled (1. 5. 1254 a 28 sq.). Its parts—and here its parts are taken to be the individuals composing it—stand to it in just the same relation as the parts of any other Whole do to that Whole (1. 2. 1253 a 26). The fact that the State is a Whole thus leads to various important inferences as to its nature.

Plato had drawn a close parallel between the State and the soul of the individual human being, but had not explained how this resemblance comes to exist. Aristotle finds a parallel between the structure of the State and that of all *σύνθετα*; so that it resembles, according to him, not one single exceptional entity, but nine-tenths of existent things, and the analogy becomes more comprehensible. If Aristotle seems, in one passage (Pol. 1. 2. 1252 a 24), to speak of the State as the outcome of a process of growth, he does not apparently entertain the idea that this creates a special resemblance between it and a plant or animal—an 'organism,' as we term it. Still all Wholes,

[1] By using the expression *οὐδ' ἄλλης κοινωνίας οὐδεμιᾶς ἐξ ἧς ἓν τι τὸ γένος* (Pol. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 25: cp. 1. 5. 1254 a 28), Aristotle seems to imply that there are *κοινωνίαι* which do not issue, like the State, in a Generic Unity, but if so, it is doubtful to what *κοινωνίαι* he refers. For the meaning of this term, see Metaph. Δ. 6. 1016 a 24 sqq.: 1016 b 31 sqq. Just as men, horses, and dogs are one in kind, for they are all animals, so the members of a State are one in kind, for they are all *κοινωνοί*. One in kind, not merely one *ἀναλογίᾳ*: cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 4. 1096 b 27.

and animals among them, are used occasionally to throw light on the structure of the State (e. g. 1. 5. 1254 a 2 sqq.). The individual man, composed of soul and body, beyond all other members of the class—not, as Plato thought, the soul of the individual—affords an instructive analogy to the State, for he is, like it, a moral agent (4 (7). 1. 1323 b 33 sq.). Still, even here the parallel is not complete; for the State is essentially a plurality of human beings (2. 5. 1263 b 36), and far more self-complete than the individual (2. 2. 1261 b 11). The State, however, as we have seen, resembles the individual in being a Whole constituted by nature.

To understand a thing, however, it is necessary to trace it to its four causes, and especially to discover its matter and its end.

We have thus ascertained the genus of things to which the State belongs, but we must ascertain much more than this about it, before we can claim to understand what the State is. Aristotle knew more clearly than any of his predecessors how much an answer to the old Socratic inquiry, what this or that thing is, involved. The definition of a thing is the statement of its causes: it involves the tracing out of all the causes which make it what it is; but, above all, it involves a knowledge of its end. To understand a thing is not to understand what it is made of, or what it looks like[1], but to understand its living operation; and if we are to understand this, we must above all, know its end. It is thus and thus only that we penetrate into its inmost being. This holds of the State, as of other things, though, as we have already seen, Political Science does not speculate about the State with a purely speculative aim, but with the aim of regulating human action.

In every object not devoid of Matter, the source of its being, or cause, which first attracts attention, is the mat-

[1] Cp. de Part. An. 1. 1. 640 b 29 sqq., *εἰ μὲν οὖν τῷ σχήματι καὶ τῷ χρώματι ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν τε ζῴων καὶ τῶν μορίων, ὀρθῶς ἂν Δημόκριτος λέγοι· φαίνεται γὰρ οὕτως ὑπολαβεῖν. φησὶ γοῦν παντὶ δῆλον εἶναι οἷόν τι τὴν μορφήν ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὄντος αὐτοῦ τῷ τε σχήματι καὶ χρώματι γνωρίμου· καίτοι καὶ τεθνεὼς ἔχει τὴν αὐτὴν τοῦ σχήματος μορφήν, ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος.*

rial out of which it is made. Ex nihilo nihil fit. How this material came to exist, how the Potential was brought into being, Aristotle does not attempt to explain. It is evident that his account of Becoming leaves Matter unexplained: it deals only with the later stage of the process, not with its earliest moments. He held Matter, in fact, to be eternal. Starting, however, from this point, we see that, if we wish to refer a statue to its causes, the bronze or marble of which it is made takes a first place among them. Apart from this, it would not be in existence at all. *Ἕνα μὲν οὖν τρόπον αἴτιον λέγεται τὸ ἐξ οὗ γίνεταί τι ἐνυπάρχοντος, οἷον ὁ χαλκὸς τοῦ ἀνδριάντος καὶ ὁ ἄργυρος τῆς φιάλης*: Phys. 2. 3. 194 b 23. In this case the material is material in our sense of the word—it is body: in other cases it is not so—in fact not sensible, but intelligible: cp. Metaph. Z. 10. 1036 a 8, *ἡ δ' ὕλη ἄγνωστος καθ' αὑτήν· ὕλη δ' ἡ μὲν αἰσθητή ἐστιν ἡ δὲ νοητή, αἰσθητὴ μὲν οἷον χαλκὸς καὶ ξύλον καὶ ὅση κινητὴ ὕλη, νοητὴ δὲ ἡ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ὑπάρχουσα μὴ ᾗ αἰσθητά, οἷον τὰ μαθηματικά*[1]. But whether body or not, matter is always a *substratum* in things susceptible of change; cp. Metaph. H. 1. 1042 a 32, *ὅτι δ' ἐστὶν οὐσία καὶ ἡ ὕλη, δῆλον· ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς ἀντικειμέναις μεταβολαῖς ἐστί τι τὸ ὑποκείμενον ταῖς μεταβολαῖς.* Thus cold air becomes warm air or warm air becomes cold air: there is a transition from one contrary affection to another: but this, and any other change, implies the existence of a *tertium quid* in addition to 'cold' and 'warm,' a thing neither cold nor warm in itself, but capable of becoming cold or warm—this is 'air.' Air, then, is in this example the matter and *substratum* (*ὕλη* and *ὑποκείμενον*). *Ἀνάγκη ὑπεῖναί τι τὸ μεταβάλλον εἰς τὴν ἐναντίωσιν· οὐ γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία μεταβάλλει*, Metaph. Λ. 1. 1069 b 6. The characteristic, then, of matter is its capability of becoming this or that—its 'potentiality' (*τὸ δυνάμει ὄν*), in a word. 'Matter is the potential, imperfect, inchoate, which the supervening Form actualizes into the perfect and complete, a transition from half-reality to entire reality or act. The Potential is

[1] Quoted by Grote, Aristotle, 2. 185.

the undefined or indeterminate—what may be or what r not be—what is not yet actual, and may perhaps ne become so, but is prepared to pass into actuality when energizing principle comes to aid' (Grote, Aristotle, 2. 1 Aristotle's account of Matter varies from time to ti according as he finds himself obliged to read more or fe attributes into the primitive *οὗ οὐκ ἄνευ* or *ἐξ ὑποθέ ἀναγκαῖον*. Taken at the lowest, this must possess a cer amount of spontaneous power—a capability of favou by its suitability or marring by its defects the process f Potentiality to Actuality. Aristotle, however, as we h seen[1], occasionally treats it as almost an efficient ca Indeed, as the *πρώτη ὕλη* and the *ἐσχάτη ὕλη* are bot them Matter, its nature must inevitably vary greatly.

Evidently, then, though Matter is for certain things indispensable condition of their being, it is neverthe insufficient by itself fully to account for their existe *Ἐκ γὰρ χαλκοῦ ἀνδριάντα γίγνεσθαί φαμεν, οὐ τὸν χαλκὸ ἀνδριάντα*, Phys. 1. 7. 190 a 25. If bronze is to becom statue, the form of a statue must be impressed upo Thus (Phys. 2. 3. 194 b 26) *ἄλλον [τρόπον αἰτία λέγεται εἶδος καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ τ εἶναι καὶ τὰ τούτου γένη* (the kinds or genera under w the species and specific form falls). If a saw is to be a it must not only have a correct Material Cause (be mad iron), but also assume a correct Form (have teeth). then that the Potential passes into Actuality. 'In way of putting the antithesis, the Potential is not so n implicated with the Actual as merged and suppresse make room for the Actual; it is as a half-grown passing a full-grown; being itself essential as a preliminary sta the order of logical generation. The three logical divis —Matter, Form, and the resulting Compound or Con (*τὸ σύνολον, τὸ συνειλημμένον*)—are here compressed two, the Potential and the Actualization thereof. Actu (*ἐνέργεια, ἐντελέχεια*) coincides in meaning partly with Form, partly with the resulting Compound; the Form b

[1] P. 17, where de Gen. An. 2. 6. 742 a 19 sqq. was referred to

so much exalted, that the distinction between the two is almost effaced' (Grote, Aristotle, ibid.).

But, however we conceive the process by which Matter receives Form—whether as a growth of one into the other or as a combination of the two (*σύνθεσις*)—in either case a further power is necessary, whether to assist the growth or to effect the combination. This is the 'source of change' (*ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις*)—the efficient cause (Phys. 2. 3. 194 b 29 sqq., *ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς ἡ πρώτη ἢ τῆς ἠρεμήσεως, οἷον ὁ βουλεύσας αἴτιος καὶ ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ τέκνου καὶ ὅλως τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ ποιουμένου καὶ τὸ μεταβάλλον τοῦ μεταβαλλομένου*). But what is the efficient cause of a thing? A house is built by a man: but then it is built by the man *qua* builder; and he is a builder so far as he is possessed of the art of building. *Ἄνθρωπος οἰκοδομεῖ ὅτι οἰκοδόμος, ὁ δὲ οἰκοδόμος κατὰ τὴν οἰκοδομικήν· τοῦτο τοίνυν πρότερον τὸ αἴτιον* (Phys. 2. 3. 195 b 23). The art of building, then, we find, is the efficient cause of the house. But then—still observing the same rule of following the chain of causation up to the highest cause (*δεῖ ἀεὶ τὸ αἴτιον ἑκάστου τὸ ἀκρότατον ζητεῖν*, Phys. 2. 3. 195 b 21)—the art of building a house is insight into the Form of a house, possession of the Form (*ἡ γὰρ τέχνη τὸ εἶδος*, Metaph. Z. 9. 1034 a 24): it is the presence in the mind of the conception, the type (*τὸ παράδειγμα*, Phys. 2. 3. 194 b 26): thus both in Nature and in Art like produces like, a man produces a man, a house a house, and so forth. We might even expect that Aristotle, like Plato (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 1. 439. 3, 2nd edit.), would absorb the Efficient Cause wholly in the Formal, but this he does not do: a place is left by him for the efficient cause and a part for it to play (cp. de Gen. et Corr. 2. 9. 335 b 7 sqq., *δεῖ δὲ προσεῖναι καὶ τὴν τρίτην, ἣν ἅπαντες μὲν ὀνειρώττουσι, λέγει δ' οὐδείς* (the efficient cause) . . . . *εἰ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν αἴτια τὰ εἴδη, διὰ τί οὐκ ἀεὶ γεννᾷ συνεχῶς, ἀλλὰ ποτὲ μὲν ποτὲ δ' οὔ, ὄντων καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν ἀεὶ καὶ τῶν μεθεκτικῶν;*). Thus with him the art of building or the builder remains the efficient cause of the house, though we see that the Form must not only be ultimately im-

pressed on the Matter, but must be pre-existent to the whole operation.

Nor yet is it sufficient that the Form of the thing should be complete if it cannot fulfil the end for which it is designed. A hand is not a hand if it does not fulfil the end of a hand: a stone hand, for instance, is not a hand at all, except in name. *Πάντα τῷ ἔργῳ ὥρισται καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, ὥστε μηκέτι τοιαῦτα ὄντα οὐ λεκτέον τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι ἀλλ' ὁμώνυμα* (Pol. 1. 2. 1253 a 23). It is in the end, and the end alone, that the whole evolution finds rest and completion. This is its term, and it is, if we look well into the matter, the deepest and most determining cause throughout the movement. *Ὅμοιον δ' ἔοικε τὸ λέγειν τὰ αἴτια ἐξ ἀνάγκης κἂν εἴ τις διὰ τὸ μαχαίριον οἴοιτο τὸ ὕδωρ ἐξεληλυθέναι μόνον τοῖς ὑδρωπιῶσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν οὗ ἕνεκα τὸ μαχαίριον ἔτεμεν* (de Gen. An. 5. 8. 789 b 12). The End masters, as it were, every other agency—Form, Efficient Cause, Matter—and bends it to its service. It determines the Form the thing must assume: the saw is intended to saw—therefore it must have teeth (its Form). It sets in motion the efficient cause, the worker in iron and his tools. It also produces, or chooses, or adapts for its purpose, the material out of which the saw is to be made. It must be made of iron: why? Because its end is to saw. The End is thus, in truth, the Beginning. It is a fixed point at the commencement and termination of a process (*ἐστὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις*, Metaph. Λ. 7. 1072 b 1). To seize and determine this fixed point is always possible, and till this has been done, the cause of the thing cannot be said to have been ascertained. *Ἐπεὶ πλείους ὁρῶμεν αἰτίας περὶ τὴν γένεσιν τὴν φυσικήν, οἷον τήν τε οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὴν ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως, διοριστέον καὶ περὶ τούτων ποία πρώτη καὶ δευτέρα πέφυκεν. φαίνεται δὲ πρώτη, ἣν λέγομεν ἕνεκά τινος· λόγος γὰρ οὗτος, ἀρχὴ δ' ὁ λόγος ὁμοίως ἔν τε τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην καὶ ἐν τοῖς φύσει συνεστηκόσιν· ἡ γὰρ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἢ τῇ αἰσθήσει ὁρισάμενος ὁ μὲν ἰατρὸς τὴν ὑγίειαν, ὁ δ' οἰκοδόμος τὴν οἰκίαν, ἀποδιδόασι τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ο*

τοιοῦτον ἑκάστου, καὶ διότι ποιητέον οὕτως (de Part. An. 1. 1. 639 b 11 sqq.)[1].

In the foregoing statement of a familiar doctrine Teichmüller's clear and concise exposition (Kunst, pp. 63–78) has been especially followed.

So nearly related, in Aristotle's view, are the formal, efficient, and final causes, that the four causes are often treated by him as, in fact, two only: e.g. de Part. An. 1. 1. 642 a 1, εἰσὶν ἄρα δύ' αἰτίαι αὗται τό θ' οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης: Phys. 2. 8. 199 a 30, ἐπεὶ ἡ φύσις διττή, ἡ μὲν ὡς ὕλη ἡ δ' ὡς μορφή, τέλος δ' αὕτη, τοῦ τέλους δ' ἕνεκα τἄλλα, αὕτη ἂν εἴη ἡ αἰτία ἡ οὗ ἕνεκα. We come back, then, to the Dualism of influences—Matter, and the Good or the End—which our examination of Necessity, Spontaneity, Nature, and Human Agency disclosed to us[2].

This doctrine, it will be observed, does more than merely enumerate and classify the agencies, whose operation makes a thing what it is: it asserts that everything into the composition of which matter enters, bears traces of a process, and it announces the law of this process—or motion, in the wide Aristotelian signification of the word—which is, that it begins in the Potential and ends in the Actual. The most diverse things can all of them be traced back to an ἐξ οὗ, or material cause: 'not only the statue to the metal of which it is formed, but the tree to seed, the conclusion to its premisses, moral virtue to desires implanted by nature, the octave to its component notes, these notes to the instrument which gives them utterance, words to syllables or sounds[3]': and the ἐξ οὗ is always the Potential.

[1] This does not exclude occasional assertions that 'scientiae natura ac virtus in formali potius quam in finali causa cognoscenda ponitur' (Bonitz), such as that in Metaph. Z. 6. 1031 b 6, ἐπιστήμη γὰρ ἑκάστου ἐστὶν ὅταν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἐκεῖνο γνῶμεν (cp. 20). Contrast Metaph. A. 9. 992 a 29, οὐδὲ δὴ ὅτερ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις ὁρῶμεν ὂν αἴτιον, διὸ καὶ πᾶς νοῦς καὶ πᾶσα φύσις ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ ταύτης τῆς αἰτίας ἦν φαμεν εἶναι μίαν τῶν ἀρχῶν, οὐδὲν ἄντεται τὸ εἶδος.

[2] Aristotle's theory of the four causes did not long remain unchallenged, for the Stoics recognized only two, the material and the efficient causes (Zeller, Stoics Epicureans and Sceptics, p. 136).

[3] J. E. Erdmann, Geschichte der Philosophie, 1. 125.

The Matter of the State.

If we now turn to the πόλις or City-State, we
hat it also originates in an appropriate ἐξ οὗ, o
ause (Pol. 4 (7). 4. 1325 b 40 sqq.). It is not q
whether we are to reckon as part of its Matter, i
to a population suitable in numbers and quality, a
suitable in character and extent: but perhaps
be Aristotle's meaning. The Matter of the St
prises not only things tangible and 'material' (in
of the word), such as the soil of the territory
physical frames of the population, but also, as we
a subsequent chapter (4 (7). 7), those gifts of
character (τὸ ἔνθυμον, τὸ διανοητικόν), which are t
to be characteristic of the Hellenic race, in contra
to other European races and to the races of Asia.

The End of the State.

But to understand what the State normally is,
ascertain its true End. Without a knowledge of t
the State, we cannot decide what Matter it must
what external goods must be at its command and
are to be distributed, what 'activities' it presup
to whom they are to be assigned—we cannot, in
a single step in the exploration of the field o
Science.

We see that to Aristotle the two central qu
Political Science were: 1. What is the end of th
not the universal end of things, but the end of the
call a State? 2. What Matter and organization w
it to realize this end?

The method of inquiry in Politics to which Plato's philosophical principles point.

The aim of Plato[1] had been less to explain
world, than to find a region of realities which wo
a firm foothold to Science. 'His whole philosop
the outset directed far less to the explanation of
than to the consideration of Being: the concept
sized in the Ideas represent to us primarily tha
permanent in the vicissitude of phenomena, not

[1] I have followed Zeller mainly in this brief reference to the Platonic metaphysics, but I am aware that the subject is sti
vestigation.

of that vicissitude. If Plato conceives them as living powers, this is only a concession forced from him by the facts of natural and spiritual life. But it is antagonistic to the main current of his system, and cannot be harmonized with his other theories respecting Ideas[1].' He is thus led, in theory at all events[2], to throw aside much as unworthy of his study and greatly to contract the field to which he directs his scrutiny[3]. The phenomenon is merely a shadow (Rep. 515): it is to be used merely as a starting-point (Rep. 511 B, 508 D): Dialectic must keep as far as possible on the level of the Ideas and must limit to the utmost its contact with the sensible world (Rep. 511 B, 532 A: Phileb. 58 A). His effort is to reach 'what is purest' (*τὸ καθαρώτατον*) in each thing (Phileb. 55 C), to arrive at the abstract (Phileb. 56 D–E): thus the study of 'matters relating to the sensible world, its origin, its affections, and its action on other things' will be eschewed as concerned with things involved in a process of change (*τὰ γιγνόμενα καὶ γενησόμενα καὶ γεγονότα*, Phileb. 59 A); or else tolerated as 'a source of recreation not involving repentance' (Tim. 59 C, *τἆλλα δὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν ποικίλον ἔτι διαλογίσασθαι τὴν τῶν εἰκότων μύθων μεταδιώκοντα ἰδέαν ἣν ὅταν τις ἀναπαύσεως ἕνεκα τοὺς περὶ τῶν ὄντων ἀεὶ κατατιθέμενος λόγους, τοὺς γενέσεως πέρι διαθεώμενος εἰκότας ἀμεταμέλητον ἡδονὴν κτᾶται, μέτριον ἂν ἐν τῷ βίῳ παιδιὰν καὶ φρόνιμον ποιοῖτο*: cp. Tim. 29 C–D: Rep. 508 D). Plato seems even to regard this department of physical study as possessing less exactness (*ἀκρίβεια*) than Ethics and Politics: we may contrast, at least, his hesitating, almost apologetic, tone in the Timaeus (e. g. 29 C, 59 C) with his positiveness in the Republic and the Laws.

But to this view he could not adhere. He could not turn away from the phenomenal world, just at the moment when he had, as he thought, obtained a clue to its comprehension. He subjects the sphere of 'sensible things' to examina-

[1] Zeller, Plato, E. T. p. 269.

[2] 'Aristotle does not employ that purely conceptual method, which Plato inculcates on the philosopher, although he himself has attempted it only in special instances and incompletely' (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 173).

[3] See Zeller, Plato, E. T., p. 147.

tion, and finds that the Ideas stand related to it as ca
Thus, in the Meno (98 A, cp. Tim. 51 D–E), the c
tion of cause (*αἰτίας λογισμός*) is made the characte
of Science: in the Phaedo the Ideas are viewe
'the proper and only efficient causes of things' (Z
Plato, Eng. Tr. p. 262 sq.): and further, the Idea of
is to Plato the highest efficient and the highest
cause (Rep. 508 C, 517 C: Tim. 28 C sq.: and Phae
B sqq., 100 B: Rep. 540). 'In Plato's mind the co
tion of knowledge and truth, the conception of obj
reality or essence, and the conception of a syste
order or cosmos, alike implied the conception
'good,' which cannot be identified with any of them,
the condition or logical *prius* of them all[1].' Ari
asserts, in a well-known passage (Metaph. A. 6. 988 a 8
cp. A. 9. 991 a 20: 992 a 29), that Plato employed onl
kinds of cause, the formal and the material, but, as
has pointed out (Plato, p. 76), this does not appear
altogether true. His treatment, however, of the ef
and final causes seems to leave much to be desir
respect of clearness and completeness. 'It was a di
problem to conceive classes as self-existent substances;
was far more difficult to endow these unchangeable e
with motion, life, and thought' (as appears to be dc
Soph. 248 E); 'to conceive them as moved, and yet as i
able and not subject to Becoming; as powers, in sp
their absoluteness, operating in things' (Zeller, Plato, p.
So again, side by side with the Universal End, the Id
Good, though far below it, we discern specific ends, or *ἔ*
individual things (e.g. Rep. 352 D sqq.): and if the conn
between the two is traceable[2], it hardly seems suffic

[1] Mr. R. L. Nettleship in 'Hellenica,' p. 176.

[2] 'A thing is what it is in virtue of its position in such an order. As in the physical organism the character of each organ depends upon its relation to the whole, and has no existence apart from that relation (Rep. 420 D); as in the larger whole of the Stat member only preserves h individuality, so long as h his proper place in the organ of labour, and loses it w ceases to do so (Rep. 42c A: cp. 417 B, 466 B); so universal order of existenc constituent not only is unde

worked out. 'The teleology of Plato preserves in the main the external character of the Socratic view of Nature, though the end of Nature is no longer exclusively the welfare of men, but the Good, Beauty, Proportion, and Order. The natural world and the forces of Nature are thus referred to an end external to themselves' (Zeller, Plato, p. 340). Thus to him the causes of things were not their immanent tendencies, but entities external to them—the Ideas and, above all, the Idea of Good—which alone can be said fully to exist, and whose uncongenial union with Matter generated a world of secondary and derivative reality. Plato's view, in fact, is found to involve the existence of a third power—a World-Soul or a δημιουργός—to wed Ideas with Matter. It is, indeed, true that Matter itself is not, with Plato, wholly passive; for he recognizes in things 'a kind of existence that cannot be derived from the Idea' (Zeller, Plato, p. 333); a power which the Idea cannot wholly master, the power of Necessity immanent in Matter, which may co-operate with or thwart the Idea. Still, on the whole, the one cause stands to the other as the indispensable condition stands to the actual and operative cause, for such is the Idea. The true Atlas which holds the world together is the Idea (Phaedo, 99 C).

It is for this reason that the genuine lawgiver and ruler is the philosopher, whose gaze is fixed on 'ordered and unchanging things, neither wronging nor wronged by each other, but all keeping order and obedient to Reason,' and who has learnt from them lessons of a godlike orderliness and freedom from change. His business will be to look at 'that which is naturally just and noble and temperate' and then at the corresponding elements in man[1], to glance repeatedly from one to the other, and, mingling the two, to create by appropriate modes of life 'the true human image[2]'

but subsists, only so far as it remains true to its place in the order, and as that place is determined by the ruling principle, end, or "good" of the order, it is to this ultimately that it owes what it is' (Mr. R. L. Nettleship, 'Hellenica,' pp. 176–7).

[1] Stallbaum compares Rep. 597 B, ἡ ἐν τῇ φύσει οὖσα κλίνη and ἣν ὁ τέκτων εἰργάσατο: and Phaedo 103 B, οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν ἐναντίον οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει.

[2] Prof. Jowett's Translation, 2. 335 (edit. 1).

(midway between the two?), 'taking a hint from that which Homer called divine and godlike in man: he will erase one feature and paint another in, till he has made human character as far as possible agreeable to God[1].'

The method to which Plato's philosophical principles point would seem to be open to objection on the following grounds:—

1. it gives less prominence than Aristotle's to the necessity of a careful and minute study of the concrete thing:

2. it affords less of definite guidance to the investigator. It fails to point out with equal clearness the path he is to follow: it is also less easy to say what contributes to the realization of the Idea of Good than what contributes to the realization of the specific end of a given thing, always supposing that that end can be determined:

3. it supplies no philosophical reason for allowing weight to the opinions of men possessing experience but devoid of philosophy:

4. in Politics, it points to the absolute rule of the few who know (i.e. have vision of the Ideas).

How far is this method followed by Plato?

How far does the method thus indicated appear to be employed in the political investigations of Plato? It is possible, with Zeller (Plato, p. 466), to find the central fact which determines the structure of the Republic in the principle that philosophers (or those who are conversant with the Ideas) are to rule: yet it is on a review of men's varied wants, and on a distribution of the task of supplying them in conformity with the principle of Division of Labour, that the organization of the State in three great classes—a point of critical importance—is made to rest (Rep. 369–376). The parallel of the soul of the individual human being also counts for much; nor is the example of

[1] See Rep. 500 B–501 C, esp. 501 B–C. I add the Greek, not feeling confident of the correctness of my own interpretation:—*ἔπειτα, οἶμαι, ἀπεργαζόμενοι πυκνὰ ἂν ἱκανῶς ἀποβλέποιεν πρός τε τὸ φύσει δίκαιον καὶ καλὸν καὶ σώφρον καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο αὖ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐμποιοῖεν ξυμμιγνύντες τε καὶ κεραννύντες ἐκ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων τὸ ἀνθρείκελον, ἀπ' ἐκείνου τεκμαιρόμενοι, ὃ δὴ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐκάλεσεν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐγγιγνόμενον θεοειδές τε καὶ θεοείκελον.*

the Lacedaemonian State without influence. The method actually followed in the Republic seems, therefore, to correspond only imperfectly with that announced by Plato[1]. If this is true of the Republic, it is still more conspicuously true of the Laws. The State of the Laws evidences a closer attention to the facts of human nature, a fuller consciousness of its weaker side. The rulers must be less trusted and less autocratic—the ruled must be flattered with a semblance of political power. The specific end of the State—the production of virtue in its citizens—is more largely taken into account: institutions must tend to produce virtue, or they have no *raison d'être* (Laws, 770 D, 771 A). The best Hellenic experience is more fully drawn upon.

The method actually followed by Aristotle stands in a closer relation to his philosophical principles. To him the world is to be explained, not by the fact of a mysterious intermingling[2] of two strongly contrasted things, the non-existent and the existent, but by the rise of the semi-existent into the existent. What the world evidences is not a conjunction, but an universal process of growth. The lowest and earliest term of the process contains the potentiality of the highest and last: the evolution is homogeneous from beginning to end, and must be studied as a whole. In place of the non-existent and the existent, we have the Potential and the Actual, means and an end; and it is no longer possible to say that the one term of the process must be studied to the exclusion of the other. The end, again, being to Aristotle the specific end of the concrete thing, not an universal and extrinsic Idea, could only be ascertained, and its working traced, by means of a careful study of the concrete thing. When once identified, how-

The method to which Aristotle's philosophical principles point—ascertainment of the specific end.

[1] In the view of Mr. H. Jackson (*Journal of Philology*, No. 19, p. 149), the true, or highest, method is confessed by Plato both in the Phaedo (100 A sq.) and in the Republic (509 D sqq.) to be 'an unrealized aspiration.'

[2] The Stoics returned to the notion of an intermingling (*κρᾶσις*) evidenced in the relation of the soul to the body, of property to subject-matter, of *φύσις* to *φυτόν*, of God to the world (Zeller, Stoics, E. T., p. 133, note 2), but to them the things intermingled were alike material.

ever, it afforded real guidance to the investigator[1]. The process, further, was one which had been striving to realize itself in the past—with imperfect success, no doubt, in the sphere of things human (πολλαὶ γὰρ φθοραὶ καὶ λῦμαι ἀνθρώπων γίνονται, Eth. Nic. 10. 5. 1176a 20), but still the world, or at all events the Hellenic world, had not gone altogether astray. The Household had passed into the Village, and the Village into the City-State; and now it only remained to make the City-State all that it should be. It was not reserved for philosophy in the fourth century before Christ to impress for the first time the Idea on the phenomena of politics: what was needed was to assist Nature in achieving her own already half-executed design[2]. Political Science is not called upon, as a *deus ex machinâ*, to bring passive matter to intermingle with the Ideas: on the contrary, it finds a natural process already in action, and its business is to study this process, to assist it and amend it. Aristotle's principle, in its application to Political Science, did not, indeed, amount to a metaphysical justification of History in general, or even of the History of the best-endowed race or races, but it suggested an acceptance of the best Greek experience, whether recorded in institutions or opinion, as the rough ore of truth, needing to be sifted and purged from dross, but capable of yielding, in skilful hands, much that was of permanent value.

To Aristotle the world of concrete existence was not

[1] Cp. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1. 4. 1097a 8 sqq., ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τί ὠφεληθήσεται ὑφάντης ἢ τέκτων πρὸς τὴν αὑτοῦ τέχνην εἰδὼς αὐτὸ τἀγαθόν, ἢ πῶς ἰατρικώτερος ἢ στρατηγικώτερος ἔσται ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν αὐτὴν τεθεαμένος· φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν ὑγίειαν οὕτως ἐπισκοπεῖν ὁ ἰατρός, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀνθρώπου, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τὴν τοῦδε· καθ' ἕκαστον γὰρ ἰατρεύει. On this, however, see Ramsauer's note on Eth. Nic. 1. 4. 1097a 12, who contrasts Rhet. 1. 2. 1356b 28, οὐδεμία δὲ τέχνη σκοπεῖ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον, οἷον ἡ ἰατρικὴ τί Σωκράτει τὸ ὑγιεινόν ἐστιν ἢ Καλλίᾳ, ἀλλὰ τί τῷ τοιῷδε ἢ τοῖς τοιοῖσδε (τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἔντεχνον, τὸ δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον ἄπειρον καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστητόν).

[2] Cp. 4 (7). 10. 1329b 25–35, where the argument is that the world and mankind have existed from everlasting, and that the business of the philosopher is not so much to discover something wholly new, as to accept what men have been obliged by necessity or enabled by leisure long ago to discover, and to add the finishing touch where anything has been overlooked. See also 2. 5. 1264a 1 sqq.

a mere world of 'copies,' or, at best, of derivative reality, from which one should escape and pass on as rapidly as possible to the world of complete reality; it was thoroughly real[1], if not the only reality[2], and deserved the closest study. That which Plato, starting from the Ideas, had viewed as a gratuitous or unexplained decadence, Aristotle, starting from the opposite pole, regards as an upward movement, an ὁδὸς εἰς φύσιν. Where Plato had traced a dilution or obscuration of real existence, Aristotle finds the process by which real existence is achieved. The world of change, which Plato approached with half-averted eyes, was exactly the subject to which Aristotle was most drawn, for he claimed to have discovered the law of all change. It was not to him in itself the most knowable of subjects, but it was perhaps that of which we know most. Physical study, for example, which Plato had been inclined to eschew, and which, in fact, occupies only a subordinate position in his writings, claimed a larger share of Aristotle's attention than any other subject; and the greater part of his works as we possess them has to do with this subject (Zeller, Plato, p. 146). It is not to him, as it had been to Plato, in comparison with the study of things eternally existent, a pastime or recreation, or 'a source of pleasure not involving repentance' (Tim. 59 C); it is a part of Theoretic Science, linked by this common title to Mathematics and the First Philosophy.

Aristotle had already taken an important step in extending and accentuating the recognition previously given by Plato to the Material Cause. Matter to him is something more than a subordinate power which may assist or impede,

[1] Cp. Categ. 5. 2 a 11, οὐσία δέ ἐστιν ἡ κυριώτατά τε καὶ πρώτως καὶ μάλιστα λεγομένη, ἣ μήτε καθ' ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται μήτ' ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τινί ἐστιν, οἷον ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος ἢ ὁ τὶς ἵππος, and see Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 305 sqq.

[2] Cp. Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 339: 'In addition to corporeal entities, Aristotle recognizes in the Deity, the spirits of the spheres' (as to these, see Zeller, ibid. p. 455), 'and the rational part of the human soul incorporeal entities not encumbered with Matter, which we must likewise regard as individual entities.' See also Heyder, Vergleichung der Aristot. und Hegel'schen Dialektik, i. p. 186, n.

something more than a mere ἐξ οὗ, or οὗ οὐκ ἄνευ, or a m
Potential in a passive sense; it is the source not only of
accidental concomitants of a thing, but also of some wh
enter deeply into its essence and help to constitute
specific form, such as the difference of sex, the conti
of man and brute, the distinction of the transitory
variable from the eternal and invariable. It is, apparen
even the source of individuality in things falling under
and the same *infima species*, for it marks off Socr
from Callias. It is, above all, the source of the evoluti
which, wherever change and movement find a place, car
the particular thing on to the realization of its specific e
It is susceptible of affection, and, it would seem, of af
tion for the highest of objects (for God 'causes motion
an object of love'—κινεῖ ὡς ἐρώμενον, Metaph. Λ. 7. 107
3), though it reaches the highest only by realizing, as
of a Compound Whole (σύνολον), the specific end of
Compound Whole. Even the 'First Matter' (πρώτη ὕλη
the furthest point to which we penetrate in stripping
attributes, the *substratum* in its most naked form—
something active in its Potentiality. Trace things back
far as we may, we come to nothing purely passive.
defect in the composition of the Material Cause distorts
outcome of the evolution, without, however, depriving i
the reality which always attaches to the concrete th
or justifying its neglect by the inquirer. In the Poli
as we have seen, the defective forms of the πόλις, if
the πόλις type is attained, are held to deserve most car
study.

It was, however, a far more important step to make
specific end the key to Science. But in what sense
things said to have a specific end? In the broadest
most general interpretation of the term, the specific
is that for the sake of which the species exists to which
thing belongs (τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα). But this phrase is suscep
of many meanings. We are told, for instance, in
Politics, that the worse exists always for the sake of

[1] On the foregoing, see Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 336–344.

better (*αἰεὶ τὸ χεῖρον τοῦ βελτίονός ἐστιν ἕνεκεν*, 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 21). This implies, not only that the worse elements in the individual thing exist for the sake of the better, but also that the thing itself exists for the sake of that which is better than it. So plants and animals exist for the sake of man (Pol. 1. 8. 1256 b 15 sqq.); and we seem to be on the high road to a purely external teleology [1], like that of Socrates, a creed which adds this to its other disadvantages, that the end it assumes throws no light on the nature of the thing. For how do we learn the nature of animals by learning that they exist for the sake of man? The prevailing view of Aristotle, however, is very different from this. He does not hold that man exists for the sake of the State, though the State is better than man, or for the sake of the heavenly bodies, though these are far diviner than man (Eth. Nic. 6. 7. 1141 a 34 sqq.), nor even for the sake of God. And so again, man is only in a sense the end of the things to which he is an end (*πως τέλος*, Phys. 2. 2. 194 a 35).

We obtain a clearer view of the true nature of the specific end, when we conceive it as the term of a movement. Movement exists and needs explanation: it becomes explainable if it has a term. There are four kinds of movement, or change—change in essence (generation and destruction), change in quantity (increase and diminution), change in quality (alteration), change in place (motion). Aristotle's theory implies a likeness between the terminal point of a movement and the aim of a change; and indeed a likeness between movement and the act of 'striving after' (*τὸ ἐφίεσθαι ἀγαθοῦ τινός*, Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1094 a 2). Both analogies seem somewhat strained. If we ask, what is this terminal point to which each thing is supposed to move —which appears as the goal of movement, the aim in change, the object of desire—the answer is 'Actuality.' The Actualization of the Potential is always the end. In what does this consist? 'That is always most desirable

[1] See Eucken, Methode der Aristot. Forschung, pp. 83–7: p. 98, for the traces in Aristotle's writings of this point of view.

for every one which is the highest attainable by him' (Pol. 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 29): or, as we are elsewhere told, 'that which is special to each thing (ἴδιον) is the end for which it came into being' (de Gen. An. 2. 3. 736 b 4). The Potential becomes actualized, when the given thing is found to discharge its highest attainable function, or the function which is specially its own. Thus the end of the natural slave is to do the best thing he can do (Pol. 1. 5. 1254 b 17 sqq., *διάκειται δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ὅσων ἐστὶν ἔργον ἡ τοῦ σώματος χρῆσις, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν βέλτιστον*); and the same thing is true of the State. Aristotle, in fact, identifies 'that which is best for each thing' with 'the best which it can do' (*τὸ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ βέλτιστον*, or, as it is usually expressed, *τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον βέλτιστον*). The relation of the specific end to the Supreme End—God—is left obscure, but we gather that the true way to the latter lies through the realization of the former.

In this immense generalization, which views everything as having a single *raison d'être*, and this assignable by man, a thousand minor distinctions between things seem to vanish. The law holds of things inanimate and things animate—of movement (or change), of growth, of the action of brutes, of moral action, of thought. An end is viewed as equally an end, whether pursued unconsciously or consciously, by an inanimate object or by man, with an exercise of Moral Choice or without it. Moral action (*πρᾶξις*) and movement (*κίνησις*), though usually distinguished (e.g. Metaph. Θ. 6. 1048 b 21), agree in obeying this law.

We need not wonder that Aristotle himself feels the principle to be more applicable to some things than to others. As we go upward in Nature, the end discloses itself more distinctly (*ἀεὶ δὲ μᾶλλον δῆλον ἐπὶ τῶν ὑστέρων καὶ ὅλως ὅσα οἷον ὄργανα καὶ ἕνεκά του . . . ἧττον δ' ἐπὶ σαρκὸς καὶ ὀστοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα δῆλα. ἔτι δ' ἐπὶ πυρὸς καὶ ὕδατος [καὶ] γῆς ἧττον· τὸ γὰρ οὗ ἕνεκα ἥκιστα ἐνταῦθα δῆλον ὅπου πλεῖστον τῆς ὕλης*, Meteor. 4. 12. 389 b 29: *καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς ἔνεστι τὸ ἕνεκά του, ἧττον δὲ διήρθρωται*, Phys. 2. 8. 199 b 9: both pas-

sages are referred to by Eucken, Op. cit., p. 70). Compare the noble passage in the Metaphysics (Λ. 10. 1075 a 11 sqq.), *πάντα δὲ συντέτακταί πως, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως, καὶ πλωτὰ καὶ πτηνὰ καὶ φυτά· καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει ὥστε μὴ εἶναι θατέρῳ πρὸς θάτερον μηδέν, ἀλλ' ἐστί τι· πρὸς μὲν γὰρ ἓν ἅπαντα συντέτακται, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν οἰκίᾳ τοῖς ἐλευθέροις ἥκιστα ἔξεστιν ὅ τι ἔτυχε ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα τέτακται, τοῖς δὲ ἀνδραπόδοις καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις μικρὸν τὸ εἰς τὸ κοινόν, τὸ δὲ πολὺ ὅ τι ἔτυχεν· τοιαύτη γὰρ ἑκάστου ἀρχὴ αὐτῶν ἡ φύσις ἐστίν.* Even in organic life preferences of Nature can be traced not contributing to the end (Eucken, p. 79. 2); nor yet to the preservation of the particular animal or species (ibid. p. 83. 1, 3). If the end eludes us at the lower pole of the scale of being, can we trace it at the opposite pole? Has the Supreme End an end? And where the teleological relation most clearly manifests itself, we ask how it is that each object exists for only one, or one chief, end? Why has it not twenty ends, all on a level? Is it true, again, that the end of a thing is not the sum of the functions it fulfils, or ought to fulfil, but the highest of them only? And how is the highest to be identified?

The teleological method in Politics, and the use made of it by Aristotle.

We are here, however, concerned with Practical Science, and in Practical Science the teleological method may be more applicable than in relation to other subjects. It is obvious that the question, 'what a thing is for,' may be a far more fruitful question in relation to some things than to others. It may result in little when we raise it in relation to a plant or an animal, and be full of instruction when we raise it in relation to a State. 'In purely physical science there is not much temptation to assume the ulterior office' of deciding whether the ends pursued 'are such as ought to be pursued, and, if so, in what cases and to how great a length'; 'but those who treat of human nature and society invariably claim it; they always undertake to say, not merely what is, but what ought to be. To entitle them to do this, a complete doctrine of Teleology is indispensable[1].'

[1] J. S. Mill, System of Logic, 2. 524 (ed. 3). See also Mr. Herbert Spencer's remarks in *Mind* for Jan. 1881, p. 82 sqq.

It is necessary to know what the State is to do before we can decide what it ought to be.

Yet is it possible to prescribe a single end to the State—one invariable end at all times and in all places—or even one chief end? The difficulty is increased when Aristotle identifies the end of the State with the end of social existence, and that with the end of human action; for the vast question of the end of human life is thus cast like a barrier across the threshold of Politics. The method, again, by which he seeks to determine the end of the State seems hardly adequate to such a problem. We look in vain for a careful historical investigation into what the State *can* do: what it *tends* to do, is indirectly considered in the chapter (Pol. 1. 2) which treats of the origin of society; but even this question can hardly be said to receive sufficient consideration. Yet these are points which should be investigated before we inquire what the State ought to do. Aristotle seems to rest his solution of this latter problem on Opinion (that of οἱ ἀκριβῶς θεωροῦντες, Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 28), so far as he does not rest it on a rather ideal historical retrospect (Pol. 1. 2). He himself sees that the true end of society only discloses itself after the State has existed a certain time, for at its first appearance its end is mere life, not good life; yet he believes that in his day experience was sufficiently complete to justify an absolute conclusion on the subject. In reality, however, his view of the end of the State stands in close connexion with his general conception of the end of organic life. Good life is the end of man in a higher degree than of animals and plants[1], and as the State is a collection of human beings, it must be the end of the State.

Even, however, when the end is ascertained, we are not in possession of a means of determining once for all the true structure of the State. The concrete interpretation of the

[1] Cp. de Part. An. 2. 10. 656 a 3 sqq., τὰ δὲ πρὸς τῷ ζῆν αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα πολυμορφοτέραν ἔχει τὴν ἰδέαν, καὶ τούτων ἕτερα πρὸ ἑτέρων μᾶλλον καὶ πολυχουστέραν, ὅσων μὴ μόνον τοῦ ζῆν ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν ἡ φύσις μετείληφεν· τοιοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος· ἢ γὰρ μόνων μετέχει τοῦ θείου τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων ζῴων ἢ μάλιστα πάντων.

end may vary[1]. One and the same end, again, may be reached by different paths under different circumstances. Aristotle, it is true, does not recognize this, for he conceives that the end which he assigns to the State can only be fully realized by a single type of social and political organization. But he allows that the instances are few in which the 'best State' can come into being (6 (4). 11. 1295 a 25 sqq.), and he seems to make but little use of the end of the State in his inquiries respecting the imperfect constitutions[2], under which, nevertheless, nine-tenths of those who reach the πόλις stage of society must expect to live. The durability of the constitution, rather than its favourableness to good life, seems here to be the aim he keeps in view. Nor can the institutions of even the best State be nakedly deduced from its end. The means of realizing the end (τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος)—in other words, the organization of the State—have to be otherwise ascertained. For this purpose, the 'social functions' (ἔργα) necessary to the πόλις are enumerated, and as it proves on inquiry that they ought not to be indiscriminately opened to all the denizens of the State, the creation of γένη—a term under which classes, trades, and departments of the State are included without distinction—follows of necessity[3]. In the whole inquiry it is evident that the institutions of actually existing societies, and especially of Hellenic societies, are present to Aristotle's mind, the End being used as a standard by which to correct the data thus gained. The End is kept in view in selecting the Matter of the State and in improving it by education and law: it serves as a measure of rights within the State, for the just is relative to the End (3. 9: 3. 12–13): it helps us to determine the true size of the State, and the limits within which the participation in ἀγαθά it implies is to be confined:

[1] Compare, for instance, Aristotle's interpretation of τὸ εὖ ζῆν with Cicero's (de Rep. 4. 3. 3: 5. 6. 8).

[2] So far at least as the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Books (the old Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth) are concerned, for the true end of the State is evidently often present to Aristotle's mind in his criticisms of the Lacedaemonian, Cretan, and Carthaginian constitutions.

[3] Pol. 4 (7). 8–10.

it regulates the creation and accumulation of wealth; but it will not supply the place of a knowledge of human nature, or of political experience, or of historical information.

The application of the teleological method by Aristotle is further qualified by an occasional resort to principles not special to Political, or even to Practical, Science. He not unfrequently accepts a kind of evidence which he terms 'the evidence of reasoning' (*ἡ τῶν λόγων πίστις*), and which is distinguished by him from proof based on principles special to a given science (*ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων ἀρχῶν*)[1], and from proof based on detailed knowledge and experience[2]. He recognizes, in fact, more roads than one to the truth; and thus, when in the Politics (4 (7). 4) he investigates the true size of the State, he finds that the evidence of reasoning—broad reasoning from the universal conditions of order (*τάξις*)—leads him to a true conclusion; and indeed, not only the evidence of reasoning, but that of observed facts, and in particular, the fact that no reputedly well-constituted State is indefinitely large.

It is thus evident that the teleological method is not applied by Aristotle in its purity. He could not approach the problem, how best to adjust the State to its end, without a consciousness that the State is not an unique thing, or a thing capable of being severed from other things, and dealt with by itself. On the contrary, it belongs, in his view, to a whole class of things—the class of things into which Matter enters; it is, consequently, subject to the play of Potentiality and Actuality: it is, further, a *κοινωνία* and a *κοινωνία* issuing in a Natural Whole. We are not, therefore, at liberty to determine the mode in which it is to achieve the end for which it exists, without reference to the

[1] e.g. de Gen. An. 2. 8. 747 b 28, *λέγω δὲ λογικὴν (ἀπόδειξιν) διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι ὅσῳ καθόλου μᾶλλον, σαφεστέρα τῶν οἰκείων ἐστὶν ἀρχῶν.*

[2] e.g. de Gen. et Corr. 1. 2. 316 a 5 sqq., *αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ ἐπ' ἔλαττον δύνασθαι τὰ ὁμολογούμενα συνορᾶν ἡ ἀπειρία· διὸ ὅσοι ἐνῳκήκασι μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς, μᾶλλον δύνανται ὑποτίθεσθαι τοιαύτας ἀρχὰς αἱ ἐπὶ πολὺ δύνανται συνείρειν· οἱ δ' ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν λόγων ἀθεώρητοι τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ὄντες, πρὸς ὀλίγα βλέψαντες, ἀποφαίνονται ῥᾳον· ἴδοι δ' ἄν τις καὶ ἐκ τούτων ὅσον διαφέρουσιν οἱ φυσικῶς καὶ λογικῶς σκοπούντες.* See on this subject Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 171. 2.

general laws which govern all cases of genesis. We cannot deal with Political Science apart from the Science of Being and Becoming. Nor can we deal with it without the guidance of the best attainable Experience and Opinion. In well-constituted individuals and races, things tend to work themselves out right, and we must take the history and institutions of such races into account.

We see, therefore, that Aristotle approached the subject of Politics with some prepossessions: on the one hand, he brought to its study a metaphysical creed, which led him to expect the State to conform to the laws of structure and working which he traced in things in general; on the other, he was biassed in favour of Hellenic institutions. He was thus led on from the assertion of a single and invariable end for the State to the far more questionable doctrine, that the State can only achieve this end by the adoption of one unvarying type of structure, which it is possible to map out in considerable detail[1]. Nor was the end which he assigned to the State one that was likely to suggest a satisfactory structure. The end of a thing is, in his view, as has been said, not the sum of the functions discharged by it, but the highest of them only. If that highest function can only be discharged by a part of the Whole, then that part becomes, in fact, the Whole. To it all other parts become mere means; they exist for it and are merely subsidiary to it. The State thus came to be, as we shall hereafter see, not only an union of unequals, which may very well be its character, but an union of classes which are mere means with a class which is related to them as their end. The mutual relation of the component elements of the State was thus distorted and denaturalised. Aristotle's 'best State' is exactly the kind of State to which a Teleology such as his pointed. The classes of which it is composed are remorselessly distributed into means and ends. Two thirds

[1] Cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 5. 1106 b 28, τὸ μὲν ἁμαρτάνειν πολλαχῶς ἐστίν (τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι εἶλαζον, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου), τὸ δὲ κατορθοῦν μονα-χῶς. We need not here pause to consider, how far Aristotle's error, if such it is, has been repeated, even down to our own day.

of them fall under the former head, one third under the latter. Since, further, the particular type of social and political organization, which Aristotle held to be the only true one, was nowhere even approximately realized, a shadow of illegitimacy was cast on the actual State; it did not, perhaps it could not, fulfil the true end, or distribute social functions and social advantages in accordance with true justice or true expediency; and a doubt might well arise whether it possessed any real claim to the obedience of the citizen, or, at all events, to his active participation in its concerns. Its authority was weakened, and a sanction indirectly given to that detachment from politics, which Aristotle probably desired to combat[1], but which was the growing tendency of the age; and not only to detachment from politics, but to political indifference and disaffection.

On the other hand, his emphatic reference of the State to an end had its advantages. There had been a time when the State itself had been viewed as the end of human life[2]; and if Socrates, Xenophon, and Plato had already 'taught the existence of a virtue of man as man, not limited in its exercise to action on behalf of the State, and had treated the State only as a means for the realization of virtue, not as the ultimate moral end[3],' Aristotle's more systematic reference of the State to an end was a welcome confirmation of their view. It seemed to provide a definite standard, the application of which would rob political inquiry of its arbitrariness and uncertainty, would supply it with a criterion of right and wrong, and raise men above those 'media axiomata,' among which in these subjects they

[1] We may perhaps infer this from the general tenour of the Politics. Aristotle not only insists that the individual is a part of the State (1. 2. 1253 a 18 sq.) and belongs to the State, not to himself (5 (8). 1. 1337 a 27 sq.), and that the active virtues contribute to the enjoyment of leisure (4 (7). 15. 1334 a 16 sq.), but he also presses the improvement of actual constitutions on the attention of political inquirers, and declares that this is as much the business of Political Science as the portraiture of an ideal State (6 (4). 1. 1289 a 1 sqq.).

[2] Zeller, Gr. Ph. 1. 61 (4th edit.): cp. Plato, Meno 73 A: 73 C.

[3] Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 1. 33 (ed. 2).

usually move. If a knowledge of the End was useful in departments of science where we cannot hope to modify phenomena but only to understand them, it was likely to be doubly so in Practical Science—a field in which imperfection seemed to arise more easily, and almost more legitimately, than elsewhere; where the material cause was more commonly defective or treacherous, where error or oversight was more fatal, and 'deviation from the true path' (*παρέκβασις*) was especially frequent[1]; and where, at the same time, we might hope to effect amendment, for though the best State might lie beyond the reach of almost all, there were (so Aristotle held) fairly satisfactory forms of social and political organization, of which this could not be said. For one important lesson, at all events, we may probably thank Aristotle's teleological treatment of Politics. It tended to negative in advance the many theories, which, from century to century, down to our own day, have claimed for some one social element—whether King, people, or Pope—an indefeasible right of sovereignty irrespective of contribution to the general welfare. Power falls of right, in Aristotle's view, to those who, be they many or few, are qualified by intrinsic merit and command of material resources to contribute effectually to the end for which the State exists.

Aristotle's error lay, not in seeking to discover the end of the State, for he was right in accounting this to be the first step in Political Science, but in imposing on it one unvarying end, in giving too narrow an interpretation to that end, and in holding that it could only be fully attained through one type of society.

[1] Communities are liable to *ἀκρασία* no less than individuals (Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 18); and Political Science, in Aristotle's hands, is evidently far more tolerant of the faultier constitutions than Ethical Science is of the faultier types of character. We have only to read the book of the Politics which treats of Revolutions, to see how easily the constitution may slip from one form to another: the configuration of its territory, accident, as at Athens (Pol. 2. 12. 1274 a 12), a want of vigilance on the part of the holders of power, facts in the past history of the State, may all avail to bring about a change.

The end assigned by Aristotle to the πόλις examined.

If we pass on to examine the end assigned by Aristotle to the πόλις, we shall find that here he diverges to a certain extent from the Socratic tradition, to which both Xenophon and Plato adhered. The office of the Statesman, according to Socrates, was to make the citizens better (Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 32: 2. 6. 13 sq.). Xenophon contrasts the ideal Persians of his romance, who 'seek to secure that the citizens of their State shall be as good as possible' (Cyrop. 1. 2. 5), with the Assyrians, whose State aimed at the production of wealth (ibid. 5. 2. 20). So again, Plato holds that the end of the πόλις is to make the citizens happy by making them virtuous[1]. Aristotle describes the end of the πόλις somewhat differently: its end is not merely the production of virtue in its citizens, but the production of virtuous action; it not only makes men good and happy, but gives the action of men already good and happy its full natural scope and character. It produces virtue and developes virtuous action in those who are not yet virtuous, but its end is to afford the virtuous and happy a field for the exercise of their virtue and happiness. It comes into being 'for the sake of life,' but exists 'for the sake of good life'; or, if this is an end common to it with other things, it exists for the sake of noble action (τῶν καλῶν πράξεων), or still more definitely, for the sake o 'life perfect and complete in itself' (Pol. 3. 9. 1281 a 1) As the Christian is said to be 'complete in Christ[2],' so th individual is said by Aristotle to be complete in the πόλις Not completeness as a whole (for this includes 'complete ness in respect of necessaries' as well as 'completeness i respect of good life'), but completeness in respect of goo life is the end of the πόλις. Its end is, however, some times stated to be 'noble action' (καλαὶ πράξεις)—unde which term, in the Politics (4 (7). 3. 1325 b 16 sqq.), thoug not in the Ethics (10. 7. 1177 a 21), the exercise of th speculative faculty is included. Aristotle, in fact, thoug he still stands firmly in the Politics by his view of th

[1] Gorg. 515 B: Laws 631 B: and other passages referred to by Zeller, Plato, E. T. p. 464, n. 1.

[2] Coloss. 2. 10.

superiority of the virtues exercised in leisure, which include those concerned in speculation, shows nevertheless an inclination which he had not shown in the Ethics, to dwell on the features common to speculative and practical activity. In the Ethics they are parted by the interval which separates the divine in man from the human, and *σοφία* from *φρόνησις*. Aristotle is there, perhaps, still under the impressions which were present to his mind when he described the 'creative reason' (*νοῦς ποιητικός*) in the De Anima: he may have seen the matter in another light when he looked at it from the more social, less psychological point of view which prevails in the Politics.

It should be observed, however, that the end of the *πόλις* is not to promote good life in mankind generally, but only in those within its own pale who are capable of it; and also that the *πόλις* must not only set itself to foster good life, but all that is contributory thereto. The *πόλις*, it may be added, will not achieve good life or happiness, unless some or all of its members achieve it. The happiness of the Whole will be achieved through the happiness of its parts, and thus we find the happiness and even the pleasure of the individual more considered by Aristotle than by Plato. See (e.g.) Pol. 2. 5. 1263 b 5: 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 17 sqq.: 2. 5. 1264 b 17 sqq. The sense must further be noticed which Aristotle attaches to good life. He construes it as bound up with the pursuit of politics and philosophy. As we shall see, not all ages nor both sexes are held by him to be capable of rising to this kind of life; nor are all callings compatible with it.

Aristotle's account of the end of the *πόλις*, or City-State, involves three separate assertions:

Three propositions implied in Aristotle's account of the end of the *πόλις*.

(1) That the State is, or rather may be and should be, not only the negative condition, but the positive source of virtuous action in individuals:

(2) That it is an all-sufficient source of virtuous action (*αὐτάρκης πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν*) in them:

(3) That virtuous action is its end.

Examination of these propositions—the first.

(1) So far as the first of these assertions is implied in his view, Aristotle would not probably feel that he was departing in any degree from the best opinion current among his countrymen. The Hellenic State began in a group of tribes and clans, and was itself, like a tribe or clan, an unity based on common worship and consecrated by common festivals. It was thus a common life, as much as an union for protection against foes, or the redress of injuries, or the making of laws. The State was the centre and guide of social existence: Delphi early taught the citizen to worship the gods which the State directed him to worship and in the manner which the State prescribed: the institutions and the laws, written and unwritten, which every Greek felt had made him what he was, were traced back by popular belief to some lawgiver commissioned by the State. Even in barbarous communities, the laws, whether written or unwritten, were observed to be commonly directed to the production of military virtue[1]; and the end to which their rude legislation was addressed was sought more scientifically and successfully by the laws of the Lacedaemonian State. The devotion of the Three Hundred at Thermopylae was an homage to law:

Ὦ ξεῖν', ἀγγέλλειν Λακεδαιμονίοις, ὅτι τῇδε
κείμεθα, τοῖς κείνων ῥήμασι πειθόμενοι[2].

Each little community, like Israel, drew its moral inspiration and its moral atmosphere from its laws. The State was 'the rock whence' each man 'was hewn' and 'the hole of the pit whence he was digged[3].' Lysias had said: *ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οἶμαι πάσας τὰς πόλεις διὰ τοῦτο τοὺς νόμους τίθεσθαι, ἵνα, περὶ ὧν ἂν πραγμάτων ἀπορῶμεν, παρὰ τούτους ἐλθόντες σκεψώμεθα ὅ τι ἡμῖν ποιητέον ἐστίν*[4]: and Aristotle takes it

[1] Pol. 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 5 sqq.

[2] *Ῥήμασι* is here explained as *=νομίμοις*. If this is the meaning, cp. Thuc. 1. 84. 3.

[3] Probably the same thing might be traced in the early Teutonic community, and would have been still more easily traceable in it, if the Christian Church had not relieved the State of many of its prerogatives. Rude early communities do not trouble themselves over-much to draw sharp distinctions between sin and crime.

[4] Lys. 1. 35, quoted by L. Schmidt, Ethik der alten Griechen, 1. p. 199, who also refers to Demosth. 23. 141 (p. 202). See L. Schmidt's remarks on the above subject, pp. 198–203.

for granted that the aim of every lawgiver is to make men good: *μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν· οἱ γὰρ νομοθέται τοὺς πολίτας ἐθίζοντες ποιοῦσιν ἀγαθούς, καὶ τὸ μὲν βούλημα παντὸς νομοθέτου τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ὅσοι δὲ μὴ εὖ αὐτὸ ποιοῦσιν, ἁμαρτάνουσιν· καὶ διαφέρει τούτῳ πολιτεία πολιτείας ἀγαθῆ φαύλης* (Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 b 2 sqq.)[1]. But the influence of the Hellenic State asserted itself through other channels than that of the law, written or unwritten: both Isocrates and Aristotle dwell on the influence exercised by the example of the rulers of the State[2], and Plato (Rep. 492 A) contrasts the small effect produced by a few sophists in comparison with the influence on the individual of a whole people gathered in its assemblies or law-courts or theatres. The distinctive characteristic of a *πόλις* according to Aristotle—that which marks it off from an alliance—is to be found in the benevolent care of each citizen for the virtue of all belonging to the State (Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 1 sqq.). In every way the saying of Simonides—*Πόλις ἄνδρα διδάσκει*[3]—held good. It is true that another view of the State had been put forward by the sophist Lycophron, who treated it as merely a 'security to the citizens against mutual wrong' (*ἐγγυητὴς ἀλλήλοις τῶν δικαίων*, Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 10); and that the sophist Hippias, as has been said, acknowledged only those laws which are universally accepted to be divinely authorized: but we note in other sophists a tendency to accept as just whatever the strongest element in each State held to be for its own interest (Plato, Rep. 343), and thus to assert the ethical authority, not merely of a well-ordered State, but of any and every State in which the strongest element ruled.

No doubt, the Hellenic State had not always, or even generally, made full use of the position thus accorded to it: it failed, we are told, even to give its members a training

[1] The peculiarity of the Lacedaemonian lawgiver lay in this, that he sought to regulate the rearing and habits of his citizens (Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 a 24 sqq.), not in his seeking to produce virtue. His aim was the same as that of others, though his methods were more effectual.

[2] Aristot. Pol. 2. 11. 1273 a 39: Isocr. ad Nicocl. § 31: Areopag. § 22: Nicocl. § 37.

[3] Plutarch, An seni sit gerenda respublica, c. 1.

appropriate to the constitution (Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 12 sqq.); and if it failed in this, we need not wonder that it failed, except in one or two places, to train them systematically to virtue (Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 a 24 sqq.). Its laws were a chaos, directed to no special aim, or, if to any, to success in war (Pol. 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 5): its guidance of religion was imperfect, its chastisement of heresy fitful: it allowed education to fall into the hands of men who travelled from State to State, detached from State-allegiance, or who sought inspiration from sources other than the laws and traditions of the State[1]. Its authority was still further impaired, or even made harmful, by falling into the hands first of one faction, and then of another (3. 3. 1276 a 8 sqq.). Yet those who questioned it were probably the few, rather than the many; and even Isocrates (de Antid. §§ 295–6) could claim that culture at Athens was virtually the product of the State. It was easy to forget how much in the Athenian character, for instance, was due to other than indigenous influences; how the philosophy of Athens, its metres and its music, its rhetoric and its triremes, and, above all, its Homer, came to it from outside. The springs that fed the moral and intellectual life of an Athenian were gathered from a wider area than that of the Athenian State.

It was on this foundation of common sentiment that the philosophers built up their conception of the office of the State. Plato, indeed, was not unaware that the State could not afford to rely exclusively on its own spiritual resources (Laws 950 A sq.: 951 A sqq.), though he subjects communications with other States to strict regulation: and if Aristotle speaks more emphatically of the self-completeness of the single State (e. g. Pol. 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 23 sq.), he can hardly have intended to go beyond Plato in this matter. Still both seem inclined to recur to the long-past time, if indeed there ever was such a time, when each Hellenic

[1] To Plato men seem to speak not without plausibility when they make out Circumstance to be the real legislator of the State (Laws 709 A).

State was its own spiritual counsellor and oracle, not drawing life from the central stem of Hellas, but finding the 'light of the city' in its own law. The self-contained Lacedaemonian State was, notwithstanding Leuctra, the model constantly before the eyes of both. Why should not a nobler State of this kind be possible? They seem to have thought that moral influence was not a thing which could be expected to travel far from its source; the conception of a world-wide Church was alien to their ideas; men could not be spiritual guides to each other without knowing each other, without belonging to, and living in, one and the same city; nor could spiritual authority be effectual without coercive power behind it. Everything, in their view, pointed to the City-State. They forgot that it may be more within the power of the State to communicate what the Lacedaemonian State had communicated to its citizens than what they wished to be communicated to theirs. They did not ask themselves whether a State can make men philosophers, or give them moral wisdom, as easily as it can inspire a readiness to die for it.

We must remember that the moral life of a Greek community would not seem beyond the control of its authorities and its law: not only was it small, and its life passed mainly in public, but the popular mind had hardly perhaps as yet been stirred as deeply as it was stirred by the rise of Christianity under the Roman Empire, and by the Reformation and the French Revolution in later days. The forces with which the State has to deal seemed far more docile than they really are. Even Aristotle fails to comprehend the possibilities of popular enthusiasm. In his view, the masses are well content to be left to their daily struggle for a livelihood, and are little inclined to press for office, unless they are wronged or outraged, or unless they see that office is made a source of gain (7 (5). 8. 1308 b 34): their aim is rather profit than honour (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 16 sqq.). Passionate loyalty, or patriotism, or religious feeling, passionate enthusiasm for an idea of any kind, find no place in his notion of the popular mind.

The world had not yet drunk deep of the creeds which, more than aught else, have made men fanatics and robbed the lawgiver and the statesman of their command over things; nor did it then know much even of those non-religious popular movements ('national' movements, for example), which have so often proved beyond the control of statesmanship.

Aristotle, like Plato before him, thought he saw his way to making the influence of the State more of a reality. Let it be so organized as to become to the individual all that the popular voice assumed it to be already. Let it regulate man's existence from the cradle to the grave—regulate marriage and education, property, production and trade, art, poetry and religion. Statesmanship was not statesmanship unless it was equal to this overwhelming mission: the statesman must be capable of guiding, and indeed of leading, the whole culture of the community. It is thus that πολιτική is described as supreme over the sciences, as determining which are to exist within the State and which are not, as adjusting to her end the arts of war, of household management, of rhetoric, and prescribing through legislation what men ought to do and to abstain from doing (Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1094 a 28–b 7).

The whole action of the State in relation to the individual is apparently conceived by Aristotle (except in the case of a παμβασιλεία) to be governed by law. He seems to be aware that there are some things which law is too general to regulate aright or indeed at all (Pol. 3. 15. 1286 a 24 sqq.)[1]: but its limitations are hardly so present to him as they are to Plato in the Laws (e.g. 788 B: 807 E: 822 D), though it is true, on the other hand, that he looks to the educational influence of Law for much that Plato had sought in the Republic to achieve by laws abolishing the Household and Several Property (2. 5. 1263 b 37 sqq.). Law is a means not only of protecting men's rights, or of preventing or punishing criminal acts, but of promoting

[1] The writer of the Eudemian Ethics excepts from the sphere of law our relations to friends (Eth. End. 7. 1. 1235 a 2).

right action and developing virtue—of developing the right motive of action. We must not measure the operation of Law in the State by the operation of the law-court: law finds its true function in distributive rather than in corrective justice: it assigns to each individual his true position and work: it speaks through the constitution: it regulates the relation of the lower vocations to the higher: it regulates education, property, the household, citizenship, the daily life of the individual in the syssitia and festivals of the State. 'Institutions,' to use a modern word, are the product and creature of Law, and whatever they achieve—whatever, for example, such an institution as that of the monogamic household achieves—is the achievement of Law. In full accord with the popular view, Aristotle includes even 'unwritten laws' under Law and ascribes them to a legislator[1]. Much, therefore, of what we term the influence of Public Opinion, so far at least as it rests on tradition and custom, would apparently be brought under the head of Law. Armed with this powerful weapon, *πολιτική* need not fear to undertake the immense mission assigned to her.

Aristotle's conception of the office of the State unquestionably possesses elements of truth. It is true that the State exercises a vast moral influence on the individual, however narrowly it may construe its functions. The society of which a man forms a part contributes largely to the formation of his character. Mere temporary residence, for instance, in the United States is sufficient, as we say, to 'Americanize' the German or Irish immigrant, and the active discharge of a citizen's duties must greatly deepen

[1] Cp. Pol. 8 (6). 5. 1319 b 38, *ἐκ τούτων πειρᾶσθαι κατασκευάζειν τὴν ἀσφάλειαν, εὐλαβουμένους μὲν τὰ φθείροντα, τιθεμένους δὲ τοιούτους νόμους καὶ τοὺς ἀγράφους καὶ τοὺς γεγραμμένους κ. τ. λ.* Herein he follows Plato (Polit. 295 A, 298 D, Laws 793 B–C, referred to by L. Schmidt, Ethik d. alten Griechen, 1. 202). Contrast the language of Plato and Aristotle on this subject with that of Dio Chrysostom, Or. 76. p. 648 M (quoted by C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 2. § 1. 9), *ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἔθος γνώμη μὲν τῶν χρωμένων κοινή, νόμος δὲ ἄγραφος ἔθους ἢ πόλεως ... εὕρημα δὲ ἀνθρώπων οὐδενός, ἀλλὰ βίου καὶ χρόνου.* Aristotle himself occasionally uses expressions which distinguish *ἔθη* from *νόμοι* (e. g. Pol. 2. 5. 1263 b 39, *τοῖς ἔθεσι καὶ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις*).

the impression. The small mass gravitates to the large mass: the individual accepts the point of view, the moral estimate of men and things, which he finds prevailing around him. This is the general rule, though Plato himself notices that the 'divine men whose acquaintance is beyond all price' (Laws 951 B: cp. Meno 99) spring up as much in ill-constituted States as in well-constituted ones, and it is evident that character cannot always be traceable to Society or the State, for otherwise how could a Socrates arise in the defective society of Athens? Even, however, if we admit to the fullest extent that the character of the individual in nine cases out of ten takes its impress from that of the society of which he is a part, the question still remains, how far, where that is so, the laws of the society have contributed to the character thus communicated. If it is possible to exaggerate the influence of the State on character, it is still more possible to exaggerate the influence of law and Statesmanship on character; and Aristotle's doctrine is not merely that morality insensibly adjusts itself to the State as the whole which it has to sustain and keep in healthy working, but that it is in a more positive way its product as being the offspring of its Law.

To a certain extent constitutions—for example, the democratic constitution of the United States—do reflect themselves in character. De Tocqueville and others have sufficiently proved this. Law does far more than protect men's persons and property, or even the whole sum of their rights: it would do so even if it designedly confined its aims within this limit. Even then it would incidentally develope a type of character (ἦθος), or at all events would modify in some degree the predominant motives of action. Laws such as that which enforces monogamy, or those which regulate the devolution of property, whatever the motive with which they may be imposed, exercise a powerful influence on character; they not only enforce certain outward acts, but they create dispositions. The members of a polygamic household are ethically different from the members of a monogamic household. If, again, as Aris-

totle holds, the State can devise and work a system of education which will not only develope the intelligence, but train the moral sympathies, the law by which it effects this will prove itself a moral influence of no ordinary kind.

But the influence of the lawgiver may be overrated. He contributes something to the character of the society for which he legislates, but does not circumstance or race contribute more? are not a thousand nameless influences more potent than he? It is the rarest thing in the world when some lawgiver—Mahomet, for example—subdues society to his will. Aristotle himself sees that the character of a community depends to a large extent on matters beyond the control of the legislator—the nature and situation of the territory, the initial qualities of the population, the turn fortune gives to its history. He did not, however, recognize all the causes which tend to limit the legislator's influence: he did not know how little religion, or science, or the distribution of wealth, or the relative prominence of particular occupations in a State can be controlled by law. However favourable the initial Matter of the State may be, it is only in the world's best moments, when some great Teacher has won men to him, that Law can assume the position which Aristotle assigns to it; and it is precisely at these moments that law and organization are least needed and least in place. When an idea is 'in the air' as a pervading influence, it does not need to be embodied in institutions; these arise later, and seek, usually in vain, to preserve for posterity something of its fugitive greatness. Aristotle[1] ascribes an extent of authority and influence to the Statesman which is hardly ever his, and also invests him with attributes of spiritual leadership which he hardly ever possesses. He is in part misled by the notion of a 'best State' immobile and exempt from change, or at all events travelling in a groove traced for it by its founder. He did not see that society lives by incessant renewal, and that the fresh ideas which reinvigorate it will seldom owe their birth to the statesmen

[1] Plato no doubt in the Republic went even further in this direction than Aristotle.

at its head. It is not to them that we look for the first word of Progress: we are content if they adopt and protect a movement in advance, when already originated by others. Still more is this true of Law. Law is usually the last to register an accomplished advance[1]. Nor again must we set down to Law all that it regulates. It regulates the household; it may regulate the Church: but we need not assume that either of these institutions owes its existence, or its influence, to Law. There are beliefs (the belief in God, for example) which are not traceable with certainty to the influence of social life, much less to Law—they seem rather to be, as it were, self-sown—yet which have done as much, or more, for civilization than any others. Certainly, the Law cannot 'prescribe what men ought to do and abstain from doing.' Even in the best State, the lawgiver can hardly be the source of unwritten law. To us Aristotle seems to call the State to functions too spiritual for it. We know what law is and what statesmen are: we see the State constantly doing, not that which it holds to be right, but that which is dictated by political necessity—constantly studying in its policy its own security rather than the broad interests of morality, and while we quite agree that the State is in some sense a spiritual power, we hesitate to recognize in it the true and only adequate guide to right action or the appointed nursing-mother of science and philosophy.

The second.

Still, to whatever extent we may conceive that Aristotle overrated the influence of the State, and especially of its Law, as positive sources of virtuous action, it seems clear that his view contains an element of truth. He was on less solid ground when he asserted that the State is all-

[1] Or indeed a decline. Plato sees this, as we shall find if we read his picture of the way in which a change in *μουσικῆς τρόποι* gradually affects society (Rep. 424 sqq.)—*ἡ παρανομία αὕτη ... κατὰ μικρὸν εἰσοικισαμένη ἠρέμα ὑπορρεῖ πρὸς τὰ ἤθη τε καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα· ἐκ δὲ τούτων εἰς τὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ξυμβόλαια μείζων ἐκβαίνει· ἐκ δὲ δὴ τῶν ξυμβολαίων ἔρχεται ἐπὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ πολιτείας.*

sufficient for good life (*αὐτάρκης πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν*)[1]. Perhaps in making this assertion he is thinking only of the best State; still, as has been said, he seems to forget that the citizen of a Greek State was not a product of that State alone, but in part of influences originating in other States. The influence of the common festivals of Greece, of its poets, philosophers, and historians, overleapt the barriers between State and State, and Greece would not have been what it was, if civilizing influences originating outside the State had not, for the most part, been allowed full play. It is very probable that, notwithstanding his expressions with regard to the self-completeness of the State, Aristotle would willingly admit all salutary influences from outside, but he seems hardly as alive to the value of such influences as we should expect.

The third.

We next come to the question, is good life, in the sense which Aristotle attaches to it of perfect and self-complete life, not only a thing which the State is capable of producing, but the end for which it exists?

If we take it for granted that one unvarying end is to be set before every State, whatever its environment or circumstances, there is much to be said in favour of Aristotle's conclusion. We may wish that he had construed the end of the State as the production not only in those within the State, but also in those outside it, of the maximum amount of virtuous activity attainable by them: yet the view that the State does not exist for the indefinite increase of its wealth or population or trade, or for conquest and empire, but that these aims are to be subordinated to considerations of moral and intellectual wellbeing, is one which has by no means lost its value or applicability at the present day.

Some may hold it to be too comfortable a doctrine, that the State, whose development often seems to us to follow laws of its own, not always, apparently, conducive to the

[1] He adds *ὅτι ἕνεκα εἶναι*, Pol. 1. 2. 1252 b 28.

welfare or happiness of men, is really a thing to be shaped as may best suit men's moral and intellectual interests; and may think that if it subserves this aim, it does so in its ultimate tendencies and in the long run, rather than directly. We seem often to notice that institutions and classes, to which every statesman wishes well, disappear in the torrent of social change, unable for some reason or other to maintain their footing. We see the State half the champion, half the victim of some over-mastering idea which drives it onward, often to its own destruction. We see it existing, not for its own happiness, but to play some critical part in history—to 'wander in the gloomy walks of Fate.' Others, again, may feel that ends which Aristotle hardly notices—such as that of self-preservation—more largely influence the structure and action of the State, than the nobler end to which he subordinates them—the end of good life: and it may be true that this latter aim, though never lost sight of by the State, is commonly so thrown into the background by the difficulties which beset every State, as to be unable to assert itself with persistency and effect. Here, as elsewhere, he may have been misled by the mirage of an ideal State, exempt (*ex hypothesi*) from the embarrassments from which no State is in reality exempt. Others may insist that the chief duty of a State—the duty it can least afford to neglect—is the protection of men's life and property and freedom of action; or may urge that the moral and intellectual advancement of the members of a State is an end to the attainment of which the Statesman can directly contribute but little, and that, consequently, it can hardly be the end of the State. Others, again, may plead that different States may legitimately have different ends. The end which Aristotle sets before the State may be the highest, and yet a given State may be right in adjusting its organization to another end. The individual State—and this Aristotle forgets—is usually a member of a group, and should address itself to the work for which the characteristics of its territory and population fit it, leaving that which others can do better to be done by

them[1]. It is not necessary that the civilization of each separate State should be absolutely complete. Occasionally, indeed, the circumstances of a State leave it no choice but to be predominantly military or commercial or industrial. Even in these cases, however, the spirit of Aristotle's teaching, if not its letter, may be observed. The State may do its utmost to secure that its legislation and its action shall be in the interest of civilization, rightly understood.

It is when Aristotle descends into detail and interprets good life as inseparable from the pursuit of politics or philosophy that we feel least inclined to agree with him. This doctrine of his forces him to view the less noble vocations as existing only for the sake of the highest. Good life is not, in his view, capable of realization in various degrees by all men; it is the appanage of certain vocations. There was nothing in his formula which compelled him to interpret it thus. He was misled, partly by the general sentiment of his race and age, which exaggerated the contrast of vocations; partly by his own Teleology, always too ready to classify things as means and ends.

We must not, however, forget that the conception of the office of the State which Plato and Aristotle were led to form was the expression of a profound social need. There was pressing need of a power capable of taking the spiritual direction of Greek society. In practice, the poets had long held spiritual sway, and Plato with perfect justice objected to them as religious and moral guides (e.g. Laws 801 B: 941 B): to such guides as he held many of the sophists to be, he objected still more: he longed, as is evident from page after page of the Laws[2], for an authoritative religious and moral revelation, such as that which the modern world possesses, and Greece and Rome did not: the City-State was to be the depositary of this revelation, and to do what the City-State alone could do; by

[1] 'If Great Britain has turned itself into a coal-shed and blacksmith's forge, it is for the behoof of mankind as well as its own' (*Times*, August 27, 1885).

[2] e.g. Laws 887 sq. The remark is one which I owe to Mr. Shadworth Hodgson, to whom it was suggested by a perusal of the Laws.

the regulation of marriage and education, by law, written and unwritten, coercive and suasory, it was to build up a people with whose very being the revelation would be interwoven and who would find in it the principle of their life. The distinction of Church and State, if the thought of it could ever have occurred to him, would probably have struck him as likely to imperil the spiritual influence for which he sought to find a place in society. It would do so, even if the Church were made supreme over the State—the only relation of the two powers which we can imagine him approving—for the Church even then would not have in its own hands the means of enforcing its teaching: and besides, the very distinction of matters spiritual from matters temporal would seem to him to imply forgetfulness of the fact that even the most temporal of temporal matters has spiritual issues of its own, and is in some sense a spiritual matter, to be dealt with on spiritual grounds.

Aristotle, with some variations, followed in Plato's footsteps. Their conception of the State interests us because it forms one of the earliest indications (outside Jewish history) of a feeling that society needs a spiritual authority: the subsequent rise of a Christian Church within the State is sure evidence that they did not err when they craved something more of organized spiritual influence than the actual Greek State offered. So far Plato and Aristotle were moving in the right direction. But when they sought to make the City-State an oracle of spiritual truth, and seemed to aim at providing every man with a kind of parochial Sinai, they greatly erred. If we are to have a Pope, we instinctively wish him to be Oecumenical. Men's conceptions of the office of the State may possibly have come to be somewhat more contracted than they should be, since it has been able to devolve a part of its burden on the Christian Church; and it may be true that if we were to imagine Christianity absent from the scene, it might be necessary for the State, its law and its authorities to play a different part: but even then it would hardly be to the City-State of Plato and Aristotle that

the world would entrust its spiritual fortunes. Its well-proportioned minuteness and Hellenic delicateness of articulation would alone suffice to rob it of its authority over modern minds, which ask for somewhat more of vastness and mystery.

One remark, however, applies to all attempts to determine the abstract end of the State. The thing which it is important that every State and nation should make perfectly clear to itself, is, not what the office of the State in general is, but what is the work which it is individually called to do. There can be little doubt that the work marked out by circumstances for the Greek race and for every Greek State was not only the realization of the maximum of good life, but also the diffusion of Hellenic civilization among the barbarians round about Hellas, and especially among those who bordered on its Northern frontier. The two aims were quite reconcileable, and the latter of them deserved recognition at Aristotle's hands. It seems, however, to have been little, if at all, present to his mind; and even in Alexander's it was probably an afterthought.

A definition of the πόλις has now been arrived at: it is a κοινωνία issuing in a Whole and formed for the end of perfect and self-complete life. How must the πόλις be organised to attain its end? The answer given in the

We have now arrived at our definition of the πόλις, for we have ascertained the *genus* to which it belongs, and have discovered its *differentia* in its end. It is a κοινωνία issuing in a Whole, and formed for the end of perfect and self-complete life.

The next question evidently will be—and here we face the central problem of Political Science, as understood by Aristotle—how must this κοινωνία be organized in order to fulfil this end? This is substantially the question that Aristotle puts to himself, though it frequently appears in other forms. He asks, for instance, in the First Book of the Politics, what organization of Slavery or of Supply is in accordance with Nature; and in the Third he discusses the question of the Supreme Authority from the point of view of Justice. These inquiries, however, ultimately pass into

portraiture of a 'best constitution'—merits and defects of this mode of dealing with the subject.

the other: the natural is that which contributes to the End, and the just cannot be determined without reference to the End.

The answer is given in the portraiture of a 'best constitution[1].' Aristotle tacitly implies, that it is possible for the inquirer to discover once for all the form of κοινωνία best adapted for the attainment of the end, and, under certain not hopelessly unrealizable conditions, to bring it into existence.

It was not his view that the office of Political Science is simply to register the phenomena of society, and to refer them to their laws—to watch and to understand a process which defies modification—or to inquire what are the conditions which tend to predominate in the future, and to adjust society to them: it must work hand in hand with Ethics—ask of Ethics what type of character it should aim at producing, and then construct the State, if possible, in such a way as to produce it. The path of Political Science lies, in his view, rather through Ethics than through History. It is not enough to watch the tendencies of History and to accept what it brings. History is the record of a process which is partly for the best, and partly not—partly the work of Nature, partly of causes, such as Fortune, which may bring the opposite of the best. There is nothing fixed or infallibly beneficent about the historical process. When the City-State evolves itself out of the Household and Village, we trace the hand of Nature in History; but even in well-constituted races, the dominant tendency of things may be quite other than Natural. The tendency of constitutional development in Greece, for instance, so far from being in the direction of the best constitution, was in the direction of democracy[2]. History, therefore, must be brought to the bar of Ethics, and its natural tendencies discriminated from the rest. Its outcome has a legitimate

[1] Plato had done more: he had thought himself called on to display in the Critias and the projected Hermocrates the 'actual working and manifestation' of 'the political scheme of which the Republic had described the constituent elements' (Grote, Plato 3. 302).

[2] Pol. 3. 15. 1286 b 20 sqq.

claim on our acceptance, only so far as it satisfies a teleological test. The ethical point of view must be our guiding light in the historical wilderness: it alone can enable us to choose the right path.

Holding, again, the belief that it is possible to assign one legitimate end to the State, whatever its circumstances, Aristotle also held that this end could be fully realized only through one form of social organization. He had not asked himself the question which Cicero was perhaps the first to ask[1], whether it is not beyond the power of any single inquirer to discover this one form. Cicero (de Rep. 2. 1. 1–3) ascribes to Cato the Censor the striking view, that the construction of a best State is beyond the power not only of any single individual, however able, but even of the united wisdom of humanity at any single moment of time, and can be accomplished only by the combined wisdom and good fortune (de Rep. 2. 16. 30) of a number of individuals spread over a series of generations and centuries, so that, according to him, a State glides (de Rep. 2. 16. 30: cp. 18. 33) into its 'perfect form' (optimus status) 'naturali quodam itinere et cursu.' In one respect, however, Aristotle is wiser than Cicero. Cicero apparently hopes to have an 'optimus status civitatis' revealed to him in this way, which will be suitable to all possible communities. Aristotle is aware that his 'best constitution' can only be suitable to a few.

The quest of a 'best constitution' was a tradition of political inquiry in Greece, and Aristotle fully accepts it. The question, what constitution is the best, was apparently first raised in Greece by practical statesmen (Aristot. Pol. 2. 8. 1267 b 29): it was thus, perhaps, that Herodotus came to imagine a group of Persian grandees discussing the claims of monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy to be the best (Hdt. 3. 80 sqq.). It was a later idea that a combina-

[1] Cp. de Rep. 2. 11. 21: nos vero videmus et te quidem ingressum ratione ad disputandum nova, quae nusquam est in Graecorum libris. The germ of Cicero's view, however, is no doubt to be found in the Greek conception of Time as the Discoverer, which Aristotle fully adopts (Eth. Nic. 1. 7. 1098 a 23: Pol. 2. 5. 1264 a 1 sqq.).

tion of all three, such as some thought they found in the Lacedaemonian constitution, was the best (Aristot. Pol. 2.6.1265b 33 sq.). When the question was taken up by men unversed in political life, like Hippodamus, fancy went farther afield. Plato was the first to find out that one may discover a 'best constitution' without in so doing discovering a generally available remedy for political ills. He saw, at all events in the later years of his life[1], that his earlier ideal of the Republic had been pitched too high for men, and was only suitable for 'gods or the sons of gods.' Aristotle went further in this direction, and studied the question why a given constitution is applicable to one community and not to another. Not only moral causes, but social or economical circumstances, or the character of the territory, may place a particular constitution beyond the reach of a particular community. The best constitution, for example, is unrealizable without exceptional virtue and exceptionally favourable circumstances (6 (4). 11. 1295 a 26). In sketching it, therefore, Aristotle is aware that he is doing what will be useful only to a few.

We may wonder that under these circumstances he made the portraiture of an ideal State the chief task of the Politics. He has not stated the reasons which led him to do so, and we can only guess what they were. Perhaps he found it hard to break with a well-established tradition of political inquiry. Apart from this, however, he would probably feel, that if the Politics was to 'complete' the Ethics, it must contain a sketch of the 'best constitution'—the constitution most favourable to virtue and happiness. He would also feel that if the 'best constitution' were only for the few, those few were the best. The παμβασιλεία was the rarest, if the divinest, of possible forms; yet he describes it with the rest. To omit to tell the Statesman what sort of State he should construct when everything was in his favour would be to leave the best moments of Statesmanship without guidance. The main object of Political Science is to con-

[1] See Laws 739 D: 853 C: 691 C, and other passages from the Laws collected by Susemihl (Sus.[2], Note 191).

struct a State which will develope, not mar, man's nature—which will call forth virtuous action and form a fit home for virtue. The best State is the State; it is the only form which can in strictness be said to be the State as Nature willed it to be, the normal product undistorted by defects of character or fortune or legislative skill.

We can see that the practice of depicting a best State was not without its advantages. It taught the political inquirer not to rest content with suggesting isolated reforms, but to view them in relation to Society as a whole. It obliged him to construct a more or less consistent and coherent whole, in which each element should match the rest. Territory, national character, the economical and social system, the political organization, must all be such as to work together harmoniously for the common good. Nor could we in any other way have obtained so full a revelation in so small a compass of the political views of Plato and Aristotle.

Yet this practice was a misleading one. It accustomed the student of politics to imagine the legislator in a position which he practically never occupies—to imagine him with a *tabula rasa* before him, free to write on it whatever he pleases. It implied that the supreme task of Political Science is to construct a State 'in the air'—without a given historical past, without given environing circumstances. We can better understand Plato depicting a 'best State' than Aristotle, for Plato believed that in sketching the States of the Republic[1] and Laws he was sketching States not hopelessly beyond the reach of the actual States around him, but Aristotle knows that his best State is realizable only by a very few. His ideal is pitched too high for most States. His citizen-body is to consist of men of full virtue (σπουδαῖοι ἁπλῶς)[2], and they are to possess exactly the right

[1] No doubt, when he wrote the Laws, he had come to see that the State of the Republic made too great demands on human nature to be suitable to men.

[2] Pol. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 32 sqq. Dio Chrysostom would seem to have Aristotle's ideal State in view when he says (Or. 36. 443 M)—ἀγαθὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἁπάντων ἀγαθῶν πόλιν οὔτε τις γενομένην πρότερον οἶδε θνητὴν οὔτε ποτὲ ὡς ἐσομένην ὕστερον ἄξιον διανοηθῆναι, πλὴν εἰ μὴ θεῶν μακάρων κατ' οὐρανόν.

measure of external and bodily goods. Nor is his best State apparently conceived as likely to be of use as a guide to reformers of actual societies. When Aristotle turns to the task of making actual constitutions as tolerable as possible, we do not find that he makes much use of his sketch of a best constitution[1]. Its value seems to be this, that it shows how much the State may be to men. It is the 'new garment,' not intended to be used for 'patching' an old one, but rather as a foil to it and to show what the State ought to be and naturally is.

The Cynics and Stoics were apparently the first to hit on the notion of an ideal State which might be superadded to the actual State, and which a man might regard as his true home, though he belonged also to an actual State[2]; and in a somewhat similar spirit Christianity taught men to look up to a 'kingdom of heaven,' to which the kingdoms of the world were to be as far as possible approximated by the Church. Aristotle's conception of the relation of the ideal State to the actual State is wholly different: the actual State seems to profit but little by the projection of the ideal State, which is apparently of use only to the fortunate few who are in a position to realize it.

The attempt to portray a 'best State,' again, led Aristotle to encumber the broad outlines of his political teaching with much transitory detail. Lessons of permanent value come thus to be mixed up in the Politics with recommendations of institutions like that of common meals, which the world has long outgrown. Every philosophy, and still more every political philosophy, is 'the child of its time,' and bears unmistakable marks of its origin, but the Greek method of portraying a best State made the ephemeral element in political inquiry larger than it need have been.

[1] In criticising the Lacedaemonian, Cretan, and Carthaginian constitutions he is careful to note any points in which they deviate from the ἀρίστη τάξις. But we hear little or nothing of the ἀρίστη τάξις in the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Books.

[2] To Marcus Aurelius, at all events, the actual State is as it were a household within the true or universal State (Comm. 3. 11. πολίτην ὄντα πόλεως τῆς ἀνωτάτης, ἧς αἱ λοιπαὶ πόλεις ὥσπερ οἰκίαι εἰσίν).

One thing, however, is evident: the vision of an ideal State did not make Aristotle indifferent to the problems and difficulties of the actual State. The age which dreams of ideal States is often on the point of losing its interest in politics; but this was far from being the case with Aristotle, who is perhaps all the more unwearied in suggesting practicable amendments of the actual State[1], because he has learnt from the study of the best State how rarely it can be realized. We even seem to gather from his language in the Politics that the main service which Political Science can practically render to the world is that of limited amelioration. It cannot make things right, but it can make them bearable.

How, then, is the best State to be constituted?

How, then, is the best State to be constituted? We must first ask fit Matter of Nature and Fortune.

The beginnings of the State are in the hands of Nature and Fortune (4 (7). 13. 1331 b 41). These powers must supply the founder of the State with appropriate raw material; otherwise his labour will be in vain. This raw material (ὕλη, 4 (7). 4. 1325 b 40 sq.: χορηγία πολιτική, 1326 a 5: χορηγία τυχηρά, 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 28) must be such as may be fashioned into a community seeking happiness rather in virtue than in external or even bodily goods. Place in the founder's hands the potentiality of a noble society—a population and a territory possessing the fit initial qualities—and he will call one forth in act. We shall later on study more closely the characteristics for which we must look in the primitive nucleus of the State, but a few of them may be at once noticed. The human beings composing it must, first, be neither too many nor too few: next, they must possess aptitudes not always found in combination—the spirited nature which gives warmth of heart and the will to be free, intelligence which gives organizing power. Singly, these qualities will not generate the best State. The territory must be just large enough to sustain them in a mode of life removed alike

[1] Pol. 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 5 sqq.

from meanness and luxury; and it must be of such a nature as to aid the healthy development of the State—to favour, in fact, both freedom and organization, and make the community independent of foreign commerce.

Conditions of the formation of this Matter into a State: 1. Common locality; common life; common aim; common ethical creed expressed in a constitution.

The next thing is to vitalise this Matter into a State.

We have already seen that a *κοινωνία* is composed of dissimilar members united by a common aim and by common action. The same holds good of the State. The members of the State must participate in something, for otherwise the State would not be a *κοινωνία*: they must, to begin with, 'participate in locality'; they must inhabit one and the same spot[1]. But they must have more in common than this. They must unite in common gatherings and live a common life (3. 9. 1280 b 13 sqq.). But, above all, they must have a common aim (4 (7). 8. 1328 a 25 sqq., esp. 35–37: 3. 13. 1284 a 2), and a common ethical creed—a common view as to what gives happiness (4 (7). 8. 1328 a 40, cp. 4 (7). 13. 1331 b 26 sqq.), whatever this view may be. As the constitution is regarded as embodying the life preferred by the State (6 (4). 11. 1295 a 40), the *κοινόν τι* which constitutes the *κοινωνία* is, in one passage, said to be the constitution (3. 3. 1276 b 2).

2. Differentiation. A State implies a distribution of functions and an exchange of service.

This is one characteristic of State-life: another is differentiation. The mere fact that the State begins in need implies differentiation even at its outset. That which brings the slave into society is not the need of another slave, but of a master. He is in quest, not of his like, but of his complement or correlative. Some things, again, cannot be enjoyed by all the members of the State at the same moment—political authority (*ἀρχή*), for instance (2. 2. 1261 a 32)—and hence arises the inevitable contrast of rulers and ruled. On the other hand, there are things which may or may not be left to common enjoyment. Plato had proposed in the Republic, that women, children, and property should be held in common (2. 1. 1261 a 2 sqq.). The same question of several allotment, or the reverse, may be raised as to the various 'activities' (*ἔργα*, 4 (7).

[1] Pol. 2. 1. 1260 b 40, *καὶ πρῶτον ἀνάγκη τοῦ τόπου κοινωνεῖν.*

8, or πράξεις), of which the State is a co-ordination. There is the work of the cultivator, the artisan, the soldier, the man of capital, the priest, the judge, the statesman. Here, again, the question arises, 'whether every one is to share in all these functions' (4 (7). 9. 1328 b 24): that is to say, whether every individual is to be cultivator, artisan, soldier, judge, and statesman at once, or whether we are to allow some of these vocations to be united in the hands of one and the same individual, and not the whole, or what arrangement is to be adopted. Democracy, which in its extreme form (8 (6). 4. 1319 b 2) drew no line between the artisan and the statesman[1], solved this question in one way: other constitutions in another. But if in some communities there will be less differentiation than in others, it will exist to some extent in all. It is not only the secret of efficient work, but in every whole the indispensable condition of its unity. Aristotle finds differentiation even in a bee-hive (de Gen. An. 3. 10. 760 b 7 sqq.). Not indeed that any and every scheme of differentiation will secure unity: to do so, it must be based on principles of justice; and, as has been said, the differentiated members, or the chief of them, must be animated by a common aim, must be men of full virtue (σπουδαῖοι)[2]. We may compare the words of Milton in his 'Areopagitica[3]': 'Neither can every piece of the building be of one form; nay rather, the perfection consists in this, that out of many moderate varieties and brotherly dissimilitudes that are not vastly disproportional, arises the goodly and the graceful symmetry that commends the whole pile and structure.' Milton, however, has differences of opinion here mainly in view, and these, if on vital points, would hardly be welcome in the Aristotelian, any more than in the Platonic State.

In adopting the principle that the unity of the State rests on differentiation, Aristotle returns in a measure to the conception of Pythagoras and Heraclitus of a harmony

[1] 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 32, *ἐν μὲν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις μετέχουσι πάντες πάντων.*

[2] Eth. Nic. 9. 6. 1167 b 4 sqq.

[3] Prose Works 2. 92, ed. Bohn.

resting on contrast, if not on seeming or actual conflict[1]. Plato had not expressly done so, though the distinction of classes in his ideal Republic is apparently viewed by him as a condition of its unity. His conception of the world, indeed, often seems at variance with the idea of contrasted elements working in combination for the best: the element of Matter is in his view at best passive, and sometimes unruly and disturbing. Aristotle could adopt the idea with less of metaphysical inconsistency.

The Stoics, on the other hand, often speak as if the resemblance between men as rational beings were an adequate guarantee of political unity, and rest on this basis their great conception of a World-State[2]. They were led, in fact, even to include the gods as citizens of the World-State. Aristotle rests the State both on the resemblances between its members and on their dissimilarities. But for the latter, they would be unable to satisfy each other's needs. The State implies an exchange of service by dissimilars. 'Aristotle,' says Auguste Comte[3], 'laid down the true principle of every collective organism, when he described it as the distribution of functions and the combination' (rather the exchange) 'of labour.' Without exchange of service, mere similarity forms no basis for a State. There are, no doubt, other conditions of the existence of a State besides differentiation and resemblance —for instance, a care on the part of the citizens for each other's moral well-being[4]—but these are among its primary conditions.

Another remark of Comte's[5] deserves to be mentioned here. 'The institution of Capital,' he says, 'forms the necessary basis of the Division of Labour, which in the dawn of true science was considered by Aristotle to be the

[1] Heraclitus, however, had spoken of *ἐναντία* (Eth. Eud. 7. 1. 1235 a 25 sqq.) where Aristotle speaks of *διαφέροντα*.

[2] Marcus Aurelius, Comm. 4. 4, *εἰ τὸ νοερὸν ἡμῖν κοινόν, καὶ ὁ λόγος καθ' ὃν λογικοί ἐσμεν κοινός· εἰ τοῦτο, καὶ ὁ προστακτικὸς τῶν ποιητέων, ἢ μή, λόγος κοινός· εἰ τοῦτο, καὶ ὁ νόμος κοινός· εἰ τοῦτο, πολῖταί ἐσμεν· εἰ τοῦτο, πολιτεύματός τινος μετέχομεν· εἰ τοῦτο, ὁ κόσμος ὡσανεὶ πόλις ἐστί.*

[3] Social Statics, E. T. p. 234.

[4] Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 1 sqq.

[5] Social Statics, E. T. p. 135.

great practical characteristic of social union. In order to allow each worker to devote himself to the exclusive production of one of the various indispensable materials of human life, the other necessary productions must first be independently accumulated, so as to allow the simultaneous satisfaction of all the personal wants by means of gift or exchange. A closer examination, therefore, shows that it is the formation of Capital which is the true source of the great moral and mental results which the greatest of philosophers attributed to the distribution of industrial tasks.'

We see then that while a certain amount of social differentiation is incidental to the State, it rests with the State to say how far it is to be carried. One State, for instance, will place the work of an artisan and that of a statesman in the same hands, while another will not.

The State is, in fact, a distributor. It distributes 'advantages' (*ἀγαθά*)[1]: it distributes 'functions' (*ἔργα* or *πράξεις*)[2]: it makes possible by its distribution of advantages that exchange of services (*πράξεις*) which is the initial fact of society. Aristotle seldom, if ever, goes behind the services, the exchange of which constitutes society, to the rights which are implied in that exchange: still less has he realized the importance of such questions as 'what is a right?' or 'how do rights come into existence, and why?' But if we follow his ideal sketch of the creation of the best State in the Fourth (old Seventh) Book, we shall find him allotting functions (c. 9) and possessions (*κτήσεις*, c. 9. 1329 a 17 sqq.) as the first step in its construction.

The principle on which the State makes this allot-

[1] Eth. Nic. 5. 5. 1130 b 30, *τῆς δὲ κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνης καὶ τοῦ κατ' αὐτὴν δικαίου ἓν μέν ἐστιν εἶδος τὸ ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς τιμῆς ἢ χρημάτων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα μεριστὰ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας.* Cp. Pol. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 15 sq. where a distribution of *κάλεσις* and *τιμωρία* seems to be implied. The boundaries of distributive and corrective justice, and indeed also of justice in exchange, seem hardly to be definitely fixed.

[2] 4 (7). 9.

The distribution of advantages and functions within a State is regulated by its constitution, which should be just—i.e. should distribute them with a view to the true end of the State, and should take account of all elements which contribute to that end.

ment is expressed in its πολιτεία[1] or constitution, for this embodies the end which the community sets before itself as the end of its common life (Pol. 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 15, *πολιτεία μὲν γάρ ἐστι τάξις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἡ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, τίνα τρόπον νενέμηνται καὶ τί τὸ κύριον τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τί τὸ τέλος ἑκάστης τῆς κοινωνίας ἐστί*)[2]: thus the constitution is said to be the course of life which the State marks out for itself (cp. 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 40, *ἡ πολιτεία βίος τίς ἐστι πόλεως*, which is explained by Plutarch, de Monarchia, Democratia, et Oligarchia, c. 1, *καθάπερ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου βίοι πλέονες, ἔστι καὶ δήμου πολιτεία βίος*). This course of life may be that which is really most preferable (4 (7). 1. 1323 a 14 sq.), or it may be 'in a mean' in a sense other than that in which the best life is so (6 (4). 11. 1295 a 37), or it may be still lower in the scale, a life in extremes (*καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ἢ ἔλλειψιν*).

When the constitution wins its rule of distribution from a correct appreciation of the end of the State and from a correct estimate of the relative contributions of different individuals to that end, it is said by Aristotle to be just. It must place both the functions and the advantages it has to distribute in the hands in which it is most conducive to the end of the State that they should be placed. Nature entrusts the instruments she has at her disposal to those who are capable of using them (de Part. An. 4. 10. 687 a 10,

[1] The πόλις is hardly a πόλις, if it is too large to have a πολιτεία (4 (7). 4. 1326 b 3), though it may have a πολιτεία—for instance, a δυναστεία or an extreme democracy or a tyranny—which scarcely deserves the name. This passage of the Fourth Book seems to treat the ἔθνος as hardly susceptible of a πολιτεία, though we gather from other passages that Kingship, and even παμβασιλεία (3. 14. 1285 b 32), may find a place in the ἔθνος.

[2] See Sus.², Note 466. Aristotle inherits his view of the nature of a πολιτεία from Plato and also from Isocrates. Isocrates regards the πολιτεία as distributing ἀρχαί and ἔργα (Areopag. §§ 20–23): his Busiris, as the author of 'a constitution and laws,' distributes the population into distinct vocations (Isocr. Busir. § 15). He twice calls the πολιτεία the ψυχὴ πόλεως (Areopag. § 14: Panath. § 138). Like Prudence in the individual, it is the deliberative element in the State, guarding and preserving all good things and warding off ill: it is the model into accordance with which all laws, all advisers of the State (οἱ ῥήτορες), and all private men must be brought. Compare with this Aristot. Pol. 3. 4. 1276 b 30: 3. 11. 1282 b 10.

ἡ δὲ φύσις ἀεὶ διανέμει, καθάπερ ἄνθρωπος φρόνιμος, ἕκαστον τῷ δυναμένῳ χρῆσθαι), and the State should do the same.

Distributive justice—the term itself is not used in the Politics—is the primary virtue of a State and Constitution[1]. A correct distribution of duties and advantages, and, above all, of political authority is essential, and no distribution can be correct which is not just. Cicero went even farther than Aristotle and brought justice into the very definition of the State (de Rep. 1. 25. 39, cp. Augustin. de Civ. Dei, 19. 21). In his view, the 'deviation-forms' of State, being unjust, are not 'respublicae' at all. A constitution may, indeed, be just without being the best constitution. The conditions of the best constitution are seldom present. It presupposes the rule of 'virtue fully furnished with the means of virtuous action' (ἀρετὴ κεχορηγημένη, 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 32).

It is thus in justice, and particularly in distributive justice, that Aristotle finds the true basis of the State. Distributive justice needs, indeed, to be completed by other kinds of justice: (1) by justice in exchange, which is occasionally conceived by Aristotle as not merely confined to the commercial relation (ἀλλακτικὴ κοινωνία) and the exchange of commodities, but as regulating even the interchange of offices between free and equal citizens[2], whereas elsewhere[3] the distribution of offices is viewed as the sphere of distributive justice. It is especially in its more comprehensive sense that justice in exchange is said to be the secret of safety and union in States[4].

(2) By corrective justice (διορθωτική), the justice of the judge or juror, remedying a faulty exchange, and thus incidentally redressing crime, which Aristotle brings under this head[5].

[1] Cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 9. 1241 b 13, αἱ δὲ πολιτεῖαι πᾶσαι δικαίου τι εἶδος· κοινωνία γάρ, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν πᾶν διὰ τοῦ δικαίου συνίστηκεν.

[2] Pol. 2. 2. 1261 a 30 sqq.

[3] Eth. Nic. 5. 5. 1130 b 31.

[4] Pol. 2. 2. 1261 a 30, τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς σώζει τὰς πόλεις: Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1132 b 33, τῷ ἀντιποιεῖν ἀνάλογον συμμένει ἡ πόλις.

[5] Is the function of the law-court conceived by Aristotle to be summed up in this? Is its task completed, when an unjust withdrawal of advantages allotted to an individual by Distributive Justice has been made good by a restoration at the expense of the

But both these forms of justice presuppose a correct original award to individuals, which must be maintained intact through all processes of exchange. It is the task of distributive justice to make this original award.

Distributive justice is not, indeed, the sole security for the cohesion and equilibrium of the State, for the natural passiveness of the masses will be a sufficient support for an oligarchy which abstains from insulting or plundering them (6 (4). 13. 1297 b 6 sq.) and from robbing the State (7 (5). 8. 1308 b 34 sqq.)[1], and democracies are made durable by mere populousness (8 (6). 6. 1321 a 1, *τὰς μὲν οὖν δημοκρατίας ὅλως ἡ πολυανθρωπία σώζει· τοῦτο γὰρ ἀντίκειται πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν*). But it is the best security: 'for if a constitution is to last, it should take its stand on equality proportioned to desert and on giving men their due' (7 (5). 7. 1307 a 26). A just constitution realizes the main condition of durability, which is that 'none of the parts of the State even desires a change in the constitution' (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 38 sqq.).

An attempt to effect an equipoise between contribution and requital is thus imposed on the State and its founder. It must, however, be borne in mind that, in the best State at all events, the motive by which the citizens are actuated is love of *τὸ καλόν*; and that if requital is secured to them, they do what they do irrespectively of the requital they receive.

List of functions to be distributed.

Before we proceed to consider what distribution of functions is correct, we must first obtain a list of the functions which have to be allotted, or, which is the same thing, of the *γένη* which are to discharge them.

offender? If so, the law-court of Aristotle seems hardly adjusted to his conception of the end of the State, which is the promotion of good life. We look for a spiritual court from him, and find only a temporal court somewhat narrowly conceived. *Κολάσεις* and *τιμωρίαι* are, however, contemplated (Pol. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 11): and the corrective justice of the Fifth Book of the Ethics is not probably intended as a complete representation of the action of the law-court.

[1] The same thought is expressed by Isocrates, ad Nicocl. § 16.

Aristotle supplies us with two lists, which we will here set side by side:

A. Pol. 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 2 sqq.
1. γεωργοί
2. τεχνῖται
3. τὸ μάχιμον
4. τὸ εὔπορον
5. ἱερεῖς
6. κριταὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ συμφερόντων
7. τὸ θητικόν (not enumerated in its place, but incidentally mentioned as necessary in c. 9. 1329 a 36)[1].

B. Pol. 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 40 sqq.
1. γεωργοί
2. τὸ βάναυσον
3. τὸ ἀγοραῖον
4. τὸ θητικόν
5. τὸ προπολεμῆσον
6. τὸ δικαστικόν
7. τὸ ταῖς οὐσίαις λειτουργοῦν[2]
8. τὸ δημιουργικόν (official class)
9. τὸ βουλευόμενον καὶ κρῖνον περὶ τῶν δικαίων τοῖς ἀμφισβητοῦσι (where τὸ δικαστικόν is again mentioned by an evident slip).

The above are called μέρη τῆς πόλεως, 1290 b 38–40: μόρια τῆς πόλεως, 1291 a 32.

Of these lists, list A is drawn up for use in the construction of the best State: list B is intended to account for the variety of constitutions by exhibiting the full variety of classes in a State. The latter is thus the more complete. In list A τὸ ἀγοραῖον and also τὸ δημιουργικόν are omitted: list B omits the class of priests. Both lists reflect the very imperfect industrial and professional development of Greek society: perhaps indeed they fail to do justice even to it. Instructors of youth and physicians are absent from both lists. We hear nothing of fishermen, though fishing is included in the First Book among the natural modes of obtaining food. Sailors, it is true, are expressly denied a place among the parts of the State (4 (7). 6. 1327 b 7 sqq.), and fishermen perhaps among them. The oarsmen of the triremes are to be recruited among the serfs or slaves who till the soil, and the crews of the trading vessels employed in bringing the produce of the territory to the port (4 (7).

[1] We are surprised to find τεχνῖται and θῆτες existing in the best State, when in the First Book we find these vocations reckoned with the unnatural sort of χρηματιστική. The views there expressed on this subject seem, however, to be more uncompromising than those expressed elsewhere.

[2] Cp. Isocr. de Antid. § 145, τοὺς διακοσίους καὶ χιλίους τοὺς εἰσφέροντας καὶ λειτουργοῦντας.

5. 1327 a 7 sqq.) are probably to be obtained from the same source.

The lists recognize no distinction between trades (i.e. groups formed by similarity of occupation) and classes, or between either of these and organs of State-authority (e.g. the deliberative or judicial authority). All are brought under the comprehensive head of 'parts of the State[1]' (*μέρη τῆς πόλεως*), a term inherited by Aristotle from Plato, who includes under it (Rep. 552 A) 'horsemen, hoplites, traders, and artisans.' Terms to express the distinctions referred to had hardly as yet been developed, though we find the judicial, administrative, and deliberative organs of the State described (6 (4). 14) as *μόρια τῆς πολιτείας*. We learn from the same passage that it is on the constitution of these organs that the character of the *πολιτεία* depends (*ὧν ἐχόντων καλῶς ἀνάγκη τὴν πολιτείαν ἔχειν καλῶς καὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἀλλήλων διαφέρειν ἐν τῷ διαφέρειν ἕκαστον τούτων*, 1297 b 38 sq.)[2].

The problem is to organize these diverse elements in such a way as will accord with justice and prove conducive to the end of the State.

Are the lower functions to be committed to the same hands as the higher?

The first question for consideration is whether those who practise the lower social functions—husbandmen, artisans, day-labourers, and the like—are to be admitted to the higher social functions of legislation, administration, justice, and war. Most Greek States did admit them to these functions. Even in oligarchies, artisans were freely admitted to military service—they formed, it would seem, a large element in the forces of the allies of the Lacedaemonians[3]—and in all but the extremer forms of oligarchy, in which power went by birth[4], the rich artisan[5] or trader would be admitted to office. Many of the most famous early oligarchies of Greece—those of Aegina, Corinth, and Corcyra, for instance—were, like the Venetian, oligarchies of trade.

[1] This is so at least in Pol. 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 38-40: contrast however 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21 sqq.

[2] With regard to Aristotle's use of the phrase *μέρος τῆς πόλεως* in the Politics, see Appendix A.

[3] Plutarch, Ages. c. 26.

[4] 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 26 sqq.

[5] 3. 5. 1278 a 21 sqq.

Democracy went further—it tended to give these classes political supremacy; and democracy was coming more and more to prevail in Greece, for cities were growing larger and large cities tended to democracy. No doubt, even in the extreme form of democracy—the first form, apparently, in many cases to admit artisans and day-labourers to office[1]—persons directly concerned with what Aristotle terms 'necessary functions[2]' would not commonly, in all probability, be either 'State-orators' (*ῥήτορες*) or great executive officers of State; they would not often be strategi, for instance, at Athens: their power would rather be exercised collectively through the popular assembly and dicasteries. Still neither democracy nor oligarchy made a principle of interposing a barrier between the exercise of the minor social functions and the major. Even in the military city of Thebes the practice of the so-called 'sordid arts' or of retail trade only involved exclusion from office for ten years after retirement from business[3].

The Lacedaemonian State and the States of Crete stood almost alone[4] in ordering these matters differently. They set an example in relation to them which Plato and Aristotle held to be sound, but from which Greece tended every day to depart more widely. They 'sorted' the elements of the State, and forbade those who discharged the nobler social functions to meddle with the less noble.

Social estimate of agriculture, trade, and industry current in ancient Greece.

Even in States which admitted the industrial and commercial classes to power, popular sentiment held trade and industry cheap. 'Nowhere in Homer,' says Büchsenschütz[5], 'is contempt for any useful occupation ex-

[1] 3. 4. 1277 b 2: cp. 2. 12. 1274 a 18. This is not wonderful, considering that at one time those of the *βάναυσοι τεχνῖται* who were not slaves were mostly of alien origin, and that even in Aristotle's day a majority of them continued to be either slaves or aliens, 3. 5. 1278 a 6.

[2] Wealthy employers of slaves in manufacture, like Cleon, are of course not here referred to.

[3] 3. 5. 1278 a 25: 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 26 sqq.

[4] In some military States the citizens were forbidden to practise the *βάναυσοι τέχναι* (Xen. Oecon. 4. 3).

[5] Besitz und Erwerb, p. 258. It is doubtful, however, how far the Homeric pictures reflect the early social life of Greece Proper, at all events as a whole. Plato says in the Laws (680 C) that the mode of life Homer depicts is Ionic.

pressed.' But a change of feeling came, he thinks, at the epoch of the great migrations. 'The ruling class, in possession of wide domains and disposing freely of the labour of the subject populations and of the purchased slaves whose numbers begin from this time forward to increase, withdrew from all occupations connected with the supply of daily wants, and by leaving labour of this kind exclusively to the subject races stamped it as unworthy of a freeman. Accordingly, it is in States which maintained in some degree intact the traditions of that epoch—in the Lacedaemonian State and that of Thespiae, for instance—that we find these occupations forbidden to the citizen.' It was, on the other hand, in maritime and commercial cities like Corinth—the first, according to Thucydides, to 'cleave to the sea'—that handicrafts were least despised[1]. The oligarchies of early Greece, however, were less often oligarchies of trade than oligarchies of knights and warriors, and the prejudices of the oligarchs may well have spread to the average citizen. The attempts of the tyrants to relegate their subjects from the city to the country[2], to make peasants of them, and to divert their attention from politics to the useful arts may have had a contrary effect to that intended. But the prevailing scorn for trade and industry was probably more largely due to the wide diffusion of military aptitude and efficiency which came with the rise of the hoplite system of warfare, and which was so important a factor in the successful resistance of Greece to Persia.

Agriculture stood at the head of the lower occupations. In this, the healthiest, if not the oldest, of them, the drawbacks were absent which told against so many others. The work of the cultivator was not work merely for the body, like that of the day-labourer: it called for alert intelligence, for foresight and knowledge; it did not impair the physique like the sedentary arts; the keenness for gain, which was held to be incidental to the occupation of the

[1] Thuc. 1. 13: Hdt. 2. 167. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 3. § 41. 14.

[2] Pol. 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 13: 7 (5). 11. 1313 b 20 sqq.: and see C. F.

merchant and retail tradesman, was thought to be less marked here; above all, agriculture produced no inaptitude for arms. Thus the Peloponnesians tilled the soil with their own hands[1]: the *αὐτουργός* was to Euripides the true safeguard of the State[2]: Philopoemen combined farming with politics[3]. Yet there were two opinions even about agriculture, for while Tanagra was a town of cultivators[4], Thespiae held agriculture, no less than handicraft, to be a pursuit unworthy of freemen[5]. So one of Menander's characters says:

> *Ἐν τοῖς πολεμίοις [πολεμικοῖς?] ὑπερέχειν τὸν ἄνδρα δεῖ,*
> *τὸ γὰρ γεωργεῖν ἔργον ἐστὶν ἐλεύτου*[6].

Other pursuits, which demanded far more skill, capacity, and capital, but which were less favourable to military aptitude, were held in much lower estimation. The merchant (*ἔμπορος*) who purchased in the cheapest market a cargo which he conveyed, in a hired vessel or his own, for sale in the dearest, needed a thorough knowledge of the varying requirements of the different ports of the Greek world: yet, whatever may have been his position in trading cities such as Corcyra, Byzantium, Corinth, or the Pontic colonies, his vocation was for the most part abandoned at Athens to metoeci[7], citizens of good position

[1] Thuc. I. 141.

[2] Eurip. Orest. 892 (Bothe).

[3] Plut. Philop. c. 4, *πρωὶ ἀναστὰς καὶ συνεφαψάμενος ἔργου τοῖς ἀμπελουργοῦσιν ἢ βοηλατοῦσιν αὖθις εἰς πόλιν ἀπῄει καὶ περὶ τὰ δημόσια τοῖς φίλοις καὶ τοῖς ἄρχουσι συνησχολεῖτο.*

[4] Büchsenschütz, p. 297.

[5] Ibid. p. 258.

[6] Inc. Fab. Frag. xcvi. ed. Didot, quoted by Büchsenschütz, p. 258 n. 4.

[7] Thus Aristotle assumes that merchants will be *ἐν ἄλλοις τεθραμμένοις νόμοις*, 4 (7). 6. 1327 a 14: cp. Isocr. de Pace, § 21, *ὀψόμεθα δὲ τὴν πόλιν διπλασίας μὲν ἢ νῦν τὰς προσόδους λαμβάνουσαν, μαστὴν δὲ γιγνομένην ἐμπόρων καὶ ξένων καὶ μετοίκων, ὧν νῦν ἐρήμη καθέστηκεν*—a passage which mentions *ἔμποροι* in connexion with aliens, and also indicates that even at Athens the numbers of these classes varied from time to time considerably. In its judgment of *ἔμποροι* Greek feeling would probably somewhat differ from Roman. 'While the Romans disdained retail trade and manual labour, they had not the same dislike for commercial enterprise upon a larger scale' (Capes, Early Empire, p. 194). Still it is evident from Rhet. ad Alex. 3. 1424 a 28 sq. that the *ναύκληροι*, a section of the class of *ἔμποροι*, were more favoured by the writer than the *ἀγοραῖοι*.

preferring not to embark in commerce themselves, but only to lend money to merchants[1].

The body of τεχνῖται, again, included in its upper ranks sculptors, painters, architects, musicians, and singers of genius[2], some of whom, at all events, would possess a wide acquaintance with men and things in Greece, might be the favoured companions of tyrants (Pol. 7 (5). 11. 1314 b 3), or might even aspire to make a figure as philosophers (Plato, Rep. 495 C). Of the latter Hippodamus of Miletus was perhaps an instance[3]. Yet, according to Plutarch (Pericl. c. 2), 'no well-constituted (εὐφυής) Greek youth after viewing the Zeus at Olympia or the Hera of Argos would wish to be Phidias or Polycletus, their authors'; and Lucian (Somn. c. 9) puts the same remark in the mouth of Culture (Παιδεία), adding that no one would desire to be accounted 'a sordid craftsman living by manual labour.' The stigma, indeed, might be escaped, if the work was done, not for pay, but out of patriotism: so Polygnotus, we are told, 'was no mere ordinary craftsman, nor did he paint the portico for hire: he worked without reward, emulous to add to the splendour of the city[4].'

[1] Büchsenschütz, p. 510.

[2] Phidias is called a τεχνίτης, Strabo, p. 353: Praxiteles, ibid. p. 410: Parrhasius the painter is classed among οἱ τὰς τέχνας ἔχοντες, Xen. Mem. 3. 10. 1. Aristotle, however, in one passage, recognizes a distinction between arts which must exist of necessity and arts which contribute to luxury or τὸ καλῶς ζῆν (Pol. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 2).

[3] Socrates himself was said by some to have worked at his craft of sculpture before he became a philosopher, far as the thought of Socrates is from the mind of Plato in the passage referred to. A group on the Acropolis (three draped Graces) was imagined to be from his hand (see Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 1. 44. 4, ed. 2).

[4] Plut. Cim. c. 4: the passages quoted are given by C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 3. § 41. 15. We shall all approve the alleged reply of Albert Dürer to the Emperor Maximilian. 'The Emperor, in the attempt to draw something himself, found the chalk perpetually break in his hands, while Dürer had no such interruption; on which Maximilian asked Albert Dürer how it came that his chalk did not break, and the painter answered, smiling, "Most gracious Emperor, I should be sorry your Majesty were as skilled in this respect as I" (*Quart. Rev.* Oct. 1879, p. 404). The story, however, like many other good ones, is an adaptation from the Greek, for a similar anecdote is told of Philip of Macedon (Plut. Reg. et Imperat. Apophthegmata—Philippi patris Alexandri 29, 179 B). Cp. also Plato, Laws 769 B.

If occupations of this kind were held to be so little honourable, we need not ask what was the position of the useful arts. The handicrafts which fall under this head are very dissimilar to each other in character. Not all of them would be either sedentary or prejudicial to health. If the smith, working at a forge in a hot climate, suffered in health, the same could not be said of the mason or bricklayer, who wrought in the open air: yet no distinction seems to have been made between these trades and those of the carpenter, cook, shoemaker, dyer, and weaver, which might fairly be accounted sedentary[1]. Sedentary or not, those who practised them (and agriculturists no less, Pol. 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 41) were held to be forced by the necessity of the case to devote their whole time to their craft, and thus to lose that leisure which Socrates said was the sister of ἐλευθερία (Ael. V. H. 10. 14). Their work also involved that 'living at the disposal of another,' which was a mark of slavery (cp. Rhet. 1. 9. 1367 a 31, *καὶ τὸ μηδεμίαν ἐργάζεσθαι βάναυσον τέχνην* [*σημεῖον τῶν ἐπαινουμένων*]· *ἐλευθέρου γὰρ τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἄλλον ζῆν*: Pol. 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 17: 1. 13. 1260 a 33).

Still public sentiment at Athens favoured the artisan class more than the trading class (*τὸ ἀγοραῖον*) or the day-labourers (*τὸ θητικόν*). Many more citizens would be found among the former than among the latter (Büchsenschütz, p. 344–5, p. 511). A retail tradesman was often a resident-alien (Demosth. c. Eubulid. 30–34, referred to by Büchsenschütz, p. 511: yet see Xen. Mem. 3. 7. 6). The artisans probably sold their own manufactures to a large extent; and this must have contracted the dealings of the trading class strictly so called. The Peiraeus was perhaps their headquarters: at Athens much selling seems to have been done in temporary booths in the agora, probably in part by persons who came in from the country with their produce. The shops even at Pompeii 'indicate that the tribe of shopkeepers was very inferior in wealth and comfort to that of our own time and country' (Dyer's Pompeii, p. 302).

[1] See Xen. Oecon. 4. 2: cp. Plato, Rep. 495 D: Eurip. fragm. 636, Nauck.

The position of the θής, or hired day-labourer (μισθωτός), on the other hand, was all that extreme poverty could make it. If the most slave-like of occupations were those in which the bodily powers were most called into play (Pol. I. 11. 1258 b 38), then there was little to choose between the life of a day-labourer and that of a slave. The class of day-labourers was, however, one in which impoverished freemen often took refuge (Büchsenschütz, p. 344 sq.), mainly no doubt because the work done by this class required no previous training.

It is worthy of notice that the Greek estimate of these occupations passed with their civilization to the Jews, as we learn from the remarkable passage in Ecclesiasticus on the subject (38. 24–34). Here it is the want of leisure which is held to unfit these classes for high positions, and agriculture fares no better than the trades of the smith, potter, and carpenter[1].

There is little need to seek far for the origin of a feeling which has existed more or less in most ages and countries, occasionally indeed in an even less discriminating form and with less excuse than in Greece, and considerable traces of which, to say the least, are observable among ourselves. If Schiller has said[2],

'Euch, ihr Götter, gehört der Kaufmann: Güter zu suchen
Geht er, doch an sein Schiff knüpfet das Gute sich an,'

[1] A kindlier feeling for labour appears in connexion with the worship of Saturn and Ops, or rather their Greek equivalents (see Philochor. Fr. 13—Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. I. p. 386: 'Philochorus Saturno et Opi primum in Attica statuisse aram Cecropem dicit, eosque deos pro Jove Terraque coluisse, instituisseque ut patres familiarum et frugibus et fructibus jam coactis passim cum servis vescerentur, cum quibus patientiam laboris in colendo rure toleraverant: delectari enim deum honore servorum contemplatu laboris'). The feeling survived in old-fashioned regions like Arcadia, where slaves and masters gathered at entertainments round one table (Theopomp. Fr. 243). Seneca commends this kindly behaviour in his 47th Epistle, and advises a discreet observance of it. It is interesting to notice that the sceptic Pyrrho, who prided himself on his 'indifference' (ἀδιαφορία), drove pigs to market and sold them, or swept out his house with his own hands (Diog. Laert. 9. 66).

[2] In his poem, 'Der Kaufmann.'

Hobbes is credited with the saying that 'the only glory of a tradesman is to grow exceedingly rich by the wisdom of buying and selling[1]'; and Bacon, who holds that 'sedentary and within-door arts and delicate manufactures that require rather the finger than the arm have in their nature a contrariety to a military disposition,' advises States 'to leave those arts chiefly to strangers, which for that purpose are the more easily to be received[2].'

In ancient Greece, it is significant to observe, the feeling was strongest in the more military States[3]; but slavery, no doubt, contributed to lower the dignity of work performed to the order and for the convenience of another. To do manual work[4], even if the work were not sedentary and unfavourable to health or bodily strength, and especially to do manual work for pay, was to put oneself in a subservient relation[5], not only unfavourable to the independence and incompatible with the leisure of a freeman, but also the probable source of a mean and sordid spirit. Industrial and commercial life was thus held to begin by robbing the physique of strength or grace, and to end by degrading the character. We must remember that in the social life of Greece the spirit of trade was probably often presented to view in its narrowest and least attractive form and in sharp contrast to striking examples of public virtue. The inculpated occupations were mostly occupations engrafted on the primitive pursuits of Greek life, and were to a large extent, as they had been from the first, practised by aliens

[1] I cannot give the reference to Hobbes' Works: the passage is quoted in a note in Pope's Works, vol. 2. p. 243 (ed. 1767) on the well-known couplet (Moral Essays, Epist. 1)—

'Boastful and rough, your first son is a 'squire;
The next a tradesman, meek and much a liar.'

[2] Essay 29, Of the true greatness of Kingdoms and Estates (Works, 6. 448–9), referred to by C. Friedländer, de Francisci Baconis Doctrina Politica, p. 78. Bacon, however, does not feel the same objection to the crafts of the smith, mason, and carpenter, which he here terms 'strong and manly arts.'

[3] Xen. Oecon. 4. 3.

[4] So closely was the idea of *βαναυσία* connected with *χειροτεχνία* that even learning to play on a musical instrument was accounted *βαναυσία* — an exaggeration corrected by Aristotle, Pol. 5 (8). 6. 1340 b 40 sqq.

[5] Cp. *διακονίαν*, Plato, Laws 919 D.

and even Asiatics[1]. The mixture, or rather the intermingling, of races had already gone far, at Athens at all events; indeed, the more unchanging were men's ways and aptitudes in antiquity, the more necessary was the aid of some extraneous race or races to do what the indigenous population could not, or would not do[2]. Not only foreigners, but also slaves were largely employed on work of this kind, and free industrial labour was both lowered in estimation and cheapened by the competition of slave-labour. The autochthonous Athenian, or the descendant of immigrant Dorian conquerors looked down with not always ill-grounded contempt on the foreign and perhaps Asiatic artisan or trader, who would often differ but little in external appearance from a slave[3], and would be engaged on work often done by slaves.

So far, indeed, as this prepossession against industry and trade kept in check the eagerness for gain, which was one element in the Greek character, it exerted a favourable influence. A time came when the Greeks ranked the handicrafts higher, but it was at the expense of nobler, though less lucrative, vocations[4]. There is a real difference of ethical level between some vocations and others, though amidst the growing industrialism of our own day we may sometimes be tempted to forget this.

If the popular estimate of the industrial and trading

[1] Cp. Xen. de Vectig. 2. 3, Λυδοὶ καὶ Φρύγες καὶ Σύροι καὶ ἄλλοι πανταδαποὶ βάρβαροι· πολλοὶ γὰρ τοιοῦτοι τῶν μετοίκων.

[2] The same tendency to call in extraneous aid in some departments of industry is noticeable in modern Europe. Since 1850, according to a paper by M. Leroy-Beaulieu in *L'Économiste Français* (referred to in the *Times* of Feb. 8, 1883), the number of foreigners resident in France has grown at an increasing rate. It increased between 1851 and 1861 at the rate of 12,000 annually, but between 1876 and 1881 at the annual rate of 40,000. M. Leroy-Beaulieu appears to think that these immigrants often undertake rough work which French workmen gladly leave to others. In England and the United States the increase of the Irish population serves the same end.

[3] [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 10, ἰσόδικα γὰρ οὐδὲν βελτίω ἔχει ὁ δῆμος αὐτόθι ἢ οἱ δοῦλοι: and see C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 3. § 13. 19.

[4] Cp. Athen. Deipn. 1. 34, p. 19 b (quoted by Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 3. § 42. 15), τὰς γὰρ βαναύσους τέχνας Ἕλληνες ὕστερον περὶ πλείστου μᾶλλον ἐποιοῦντο ἢ τὰς κατὰ παιδείαν γινομένας ἐπιστήμας.

classes did not everywhere rise with their elevation in the political scale, and if, as not unfrequently happens, the political change was not accompanied by a corresponding change in social sentiment, a correction of the general feeling on the subject was hardly to be looked for from the philosophers. Already in the apologue of Protagoras (Plato, Protag. 321) the contrast of the 'wisdom necessary for the support of life' and 'political wisdom' appears, and we learn how insufficient is the former for the well-being of a State without the latter. Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, indeed, in the Euthydemus of Plato claim that a money-making life is quite compatible with the acquisition of the kind of wisdom they imparted[1]; but then this kind of wisdom was not worth much.

Opinions of Socrates, Xenophon, and Plato.

Socrates, though, in conformity with Athenian opinion[2], he seems to have held that in case of need there was nothing unbefitting in the practice of a trade[3], is represented in a conversation with Euthydemus, whom possibly he did not care to shock, as acquiescing in the ordinary Greek assumption that craftsmen such as smiths and shoemakers are, as a rule, slavish (*ἀνδραποδώδεις*), and know nothing of 'things noble and good and just' (Xen. Mem. 4. 2. 22). He probably felt that leisure was more conducive to the indescribable characteristic which the Greeks called *ἐλευθερία* (Ael. V. H. 10. 14), as it certainly was more conducive to the pursuit of knowledge in the colloquial Socratic fashion.

Xenophon drew a marked distinction between agriculture, which he panegyrizes (Oecon. cc. 5-6: cp. c. 15), and the handicrafts, which he condemns (Oecon. 4. 2). His praises

[1] Euthydem. 304 C, *οὔτε φύσιν οὔθ' ἡλικίαν ἐξείργειν οὐδεμίαν—ὃ δὲ καὶ σοὶ μάλιστα προσήκει ἀκοῦσαι, ὅτι οὐδὲ τοῦ χρηματίζεσθαί φασιν διακωλύειν οὐδέν—μὴ οὐ παραλαβεῖν ὁντινοῦν εὐπετῶς τὴν σφετέραν σοφίαν.*

[2] Thuc. 2. 40.

[3] Xen. Mem. 2. 7. 3 sqq. He was, indeed, charged with impressing on his disciples the lesson of Hesiod—

ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν ὄνειδος, ἀεργείη δέ τ' ὄνειδος,

in the sense that they should do anything, however unjust or disgraceful, for gain (Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 56 sqq.). This is corrected by Xenophon (ibid.), and by Critias himself, who was supposed to be a product of this kind of teaching, in the Charmides of Plato (Charm. 163 B-C).

of the former include both the actual tilling of the soil and the management of a farm (Oecon. 5). In this enthusiasm for agriculture he departs to some extent, we may notice, from his model the Lacedaemonian State, which forbade it to its citizens (Plato, Rep. 547 D)[1].

Plato has glimpses of a more favourable view of handicraft and even of retail trade. Thus, in Symp. 209 A, Phileb. 55 C sqq. (cited by Zeller, Plato, E. T. p. 222), he finds in the handicraft arts an early stage of philosophy, and is led, in fact, to range carpentering above music as more largely partaking in number and more exact (Phileb. 56 C). So again in the Laws he holds that retail trade has nothing intrinsically harmful about it (918 B); the retailer is a benefactor to his species, in so far as he measures by means of coin the comparative value of different commodities and sets them in a proportionate relation to each other; the hired labourer, the innkeeper do the same; indeed (918 D–E), if, which Heaven forbid, some one were to compel the very best men or women to act for a while as retail traders, we should learn to regard retail trade and kindred pursuits in the light of a mother or a nurse, and recognize how deserving they are of love and acceptance[2]. It is a relation of this kind that he designs in the Republic between his third class (*τὸ χρηματιστικόν*) and the two higher classes. The third class, no less than the remaining two, were to be citizens, and not only so, but the source of pay and sustenance (*μισθοδοταὶ καὶ τροφεῖς*) to the rest; they were to be their brothers (Rep. 415 A); they are joined with the military class in a common obedience to the first or ruling class, and thus the two lower classes are together called *τὸ ἀρχομένω* in contradistinction to *τὸ ἄρχον* (Rep. C 442 B). In the same way, though each of the two upper classes has a virtue of its own, temperance and justice are possessed by the third class, and apparently in a complete form; the possible transference of members from one class

[1] The same contrast of feeling appears between Cicero (de Offic. 1. 42. 151) and Sallust (de Conj. Catil. 4: see Jacobs ad loc.).

[2] Cp. Menand. Fragm. Inc. Fab. 279 (p. 80 Didot): *ἐλευθέρως δούλευε, δοῦλος οὐκ ἔσει.*

to another, in itself, softens the contrast between them. Moreover, the third class were, it would seem, to own the lands they tilled subject to a contribution for the maintenance of the other classes. The first sign, in fact, of the decline of the ideal Republic is said to appear in a conflict between its classes or races, the result of which is that severalty of property is introduced within its upper section, and the gold and silver races enslave their friends and maintainers whose freedom they had before respected, and make of them subjects and servants (Rep. 547 B–C). It is probably by design that Plato (Rep. 552 A) allows the title of 'part of the State,' the application of which was afterwards narrowed by Aristotle, to the commercial and artisan classes (*χρηματισταί, δημιουργοί*) no less than to 'horsemen and hoplites.' In the view of the former, in fact, the third class answered to a part of the soul[1], while in that of Aristotle the natural slave stands to the citizen as the body to the soul, and the whole class which has to do with 'necessary work,' whether free or slave, is related to the citizen-body merely as an instrument, or means, is related to the end it subserves; it stands outside the State, forming in strictness no part of it. It is true, however, that the title of citizen, which Plato concedes to the members of his third class (*χρηματιστικοί*), carries with it no share in political power, for he excludes this class from office, both military and civil. Indeed, in one passage of the Ninth book of the Republic (590 C–D), perhaps the source from which Aristotle derived his theory of natural slavery, he admits, notwithstanding what he has said in the passage from the Eighth (547 B–C) referred to above, that when 'the Best is weak within a man, so that he is unable to control the creatures within him and has to court them'—when he has not 'the divine principle of wisdom abiding in him,' but needs a ruling principle outside himself, then 'in order that he may be under the same rule as the best of men, we say that he ought to be the slave of that best of men, inasmuch as the latter has the divine ruling principle

[1] Τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν.

indwelling in him'; so that in a case like this slavery is expedient and just, and may find a place even within the ideal Republic. It may be doubted, however, whether he would have held with Aristotle that all those 'whose function is the use of the body, and this is the best that they can do' (Pol. 1. 5. 1254 b 17), are in need of an extraneous ruling principle—whether, in fact, to Plato the natural slave is not the morally weak or bad man, rather than the man of thews and sinews who is only fit for manual work[1].

In the Laws, perhaps because the type of society is lower, the relation between the governing class and the classes concerned with these lower occupations is otherwise conceived. They lose even the name of citizen, and become a dependent—in some cases, an enslaved—body. Those of them who are slaves have not the consolation of being slaves to 'the best of men' as in the Republic, for the citizens of the State described in the Laws are not an ideal or heroic class, like the guardians of the Republic, or the citizens of Aristotle's best State. Even agriculture, except perhaps in the sense of superintendence (Laws 842 D: cp. 806 D–E) is forbidden to the citizens; much more other occupations of an industrial or commercial nature (Laws 806 D–E: 741 E: 846 D: 919 D: 842 D). Plato's reason for these prohibitions is partly that the citizen has quite enough to do without practising any other art than his own (Laws 846 D–E, 807 C); partly, that *βαναυσία* warps the character of the freeman (Laws 741 E); even the very best men (*οἱ παντα χῇ ἄριστοι*, Laws 918 E), though in their hands vocations like that of the retail trader would assume a helpful and kindly aspect, suffer profanation by having to do with them (918 D). In the Laws, unlike the Republic, the industrial and commercial classes exist for the sake of the ruling class, stand wholly outside the State, and are adjusted in number and position to the needs of their social superiors. In this respect the society sketched in the Laws serves as a model for the 'best State' of

[1] Cp. Plato Polit. 309 A, *τοὺς δ' ἐν ἀμαθίᾳ τ' αὖ καὶ ταπεινότητι πολλῇ κυλινδουμένους εἰς τὸ δουλικὸν ὑποζεύγνυσι γένος.*

Aristotle; there is, however, this important difference, that the citizens of Aristotle's State are not only men of ideal excellence living an ideal life, dependence on whom might be a source of pride and moral advantage, but also are charged with the duty of caring for the virtue of their slaves at any rate, if not of other members of the subordinate classes; while the citizens in the Laws are not conceived as attaining to the same ethical level, nor have they apparently a similar duty imposed upon them. But then the Laws is admittedly a sketch of a second-rate society.

View of Aristotle.

Throughout Aristotle's treatment of this subject and also of slavery, it must be borne in mind that he has in view an ideal State, in which the citizen-body is composed of men of full virtue (*σπουδαῖοι ἁπλῶς*). If it is well for the artisan to accept a lowly position and for the slave to be even enslaved, it is so because the men on whom they are thus made dependent are men of noble character and high capacity, spending their lives in an arduous exercise of virtue, through serving whom they rise to an ethical level they could not otherwise attain. It is the 'best State' (or, at all events an 'aristocratic' State, Pol. 3. 5. 1278 a 18), that 'will not make the artisan a citizen' (3. 5. 1278 a 8): the less elevated and more attainable constitution described in the Eleventh Chapter of the Sixth (the old Fourth) Book (*ἡ κοινοτάτη πολιτεία—ἡ διὰ τῶν μέσων*) would not probably refuse a share of power to artisans (3. 5. 1278 a 24) or other well-to-do members of the industrial and commercial classes.

Aristotle fully accepts the traditional estimate of 'the sordid occupations' (*βάναυσα ἔργα*), and perhaps his account of them gives additional definiteness to the conception of *βαναυσία*. 'We must set down as sordid,' he says (Pol. 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 8 sqq.), 'any work or art or study which makes freemen unfit for the active exercise of virtue either in body or character or intelligence': the 'sordid arts' deteriorate the body, and 'trades plied for hire' (*μισθαρνικαὶ*

ἐργασίαι—a term of uncertain comprehension)—make the mind unfree (ἄσχολον) and abject (ταπεινήν). Βαναυσία, however, he adds, is not confined to the practice of 'sordid occupations,' for an over-exact study of some sciences not in themselves unworthy of a freeman—according to Susemihl (Sus.², Note 982), Gymnastic, Music, Drawing, and Painting are among the sciences meant—produces the same effect and deserves the same name[1]. But again, work of an unfree nature may be relieved of this stigma, if it is done not in the service of another, but for one's own sake or for the sake of friends or for the sake of virtue (δι' ἀρετήν)[2]. So in the Rhetoric (1. 9. 1367 a 31) it is implied that the βάναυσος, unlike the freeman, lives 'for the convenience of another' (πρὸς ἄλλον)[3]. The freeman (Metaph. A. 2. 982 b 25) is 'he who exists for his own sake and not that of another[4].' Both the life of the artisan and the life of the shopkeeper are forbidden to the citizens of Aristotle's best State (Pol. 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 37 sqq.), 'for those lives are ignoble and unfavourable to virtue[5].' This is not said of agriculture, which is, however, excluded on the ground that leisure is necessary both for the development of virtue and for political activity (1329 a 1). The life of a farmer is a life of incessant occupation in the country, which forbids even frequent attendance at the meetings of the popular assembly

[1] Thus the Indians of the territory of Musicanus were praised by the Cynic Onesicritus for not carrying the sciences (except medicine) to a high point of minute accuracy (Strabo 701, μὴ ἀκριβοῦν δὲ τὰς ἐπιστήμας πλὴν ἰατρικῆς).

[2] Cp. 5 (8). 6. 1341 b 10, ἐν ταύτῃ (sc. τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας παιδείᾳ) γὰρ ὁ πράττων οὐ τῆς αὐτοῦ μεταχειρίζεται χάριν ἀρετῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων ἡδονῆς, καὶ ταύτης φορτικῆς· διόπερ οὐ τῶν ἐλευθέρων κρίνομεν εἶναι τὴν ἐργασίαν ἀλλὰ θητικωτέραν· καὶ βαναύσους δὴ συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι. See also the story told of Antisthenes by Plutarch, Reipubl. Gerend. Praecepta, c. 15, and Plutarch's addition to it.

[3] His actions are διακονικαί, like those of the slave, 3. 4. 1277 a 36 sqq., with whom he is here for the moment identified.

[4] Thus it is the characteristic of the μεγαλόψυχος, πρὸς ἄλλον μὴ δύνασθαι ζῆν ἀλλ' ἢ πρὸς φίλον (Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1124 b 31).

[5] Their very friendship was of the interested kind which rests on utility (Eth. Nic. 8. 7. 1158 a 21, ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλία ἀγοραίων). Aristotle does not mention, though the fact may well have been present to his mind, that it was the determination with which these classes pressed their claims to complete political equality that was fast making democracy the prevailing constitution in Greece.

(8 (6). 4. 1318b 11 sqq.), much more anything like systematic political action. Aristotle's view of agriculture differs, in fact, so much from that put forward by Xenophon in the Oeconomicus, that he praises the States which marked off the military class from the cultivating class (4 (7). 10. 1329a 40 sqq.), whereas Xenophon, like the Romans later, viewed the work of the peasant as an excellent preparation for the life of a soldier. Aristotle, with whom Plato appears to concur, may have held that the peasant would have but little leisure, except in winter, for the constant gymnastic practice on which the efficiency of a hoplite must have depended far more than that of a modern soldier, or he may have desired to reserve the military service of the State for those who would in after years be its rulers; but he does not explain the grounds of his view, in which he had been anticipated, not only, as has been said, by Plato, but also by Hippodamus (Pol. 2. 8. 1267b 32).

It is from a different point of view that the various vocations falling under the Science of Supply are classified in the First Book, as natural or the contrary. They are here distinguished, not according to their effect on the agent, but according to their intrinsic conformity to the design of Nature. Measured by this standard, agriculture, the tending of animals, hunting, fishing, and the like stand on a very different level to the vocations of the artisan, day-labourer, merchant, and retail dealer. Even in the First Book, however, we are told (c. 11. 1258b 10), that the practice of the very best of them is unworthy of a freeman[1]. 'Necessary functions' as a whole, whether natura' or otherwise, appear so far to be liable to objection on two grounds: (1) they are unfavourable to the development of virtue and stand in the way of higher things: (2) they are practised for the convenience of another. Aristotle has, however, other reasons for his low estimate of them. They are 'necessary' (ἀναγκαῖαι), not 'noble' (καλαί). Necessary, in the first place, because concerned with things necessary for life, for that which provides things necessary is itself necessary.

Aristotle marks off 'necessary' from 'noble' functions.

[1] If I am right in thus interpreting this passage.

Necessary, again, as being an indispensable condition of 'noble' action—action which is desirable for its own sake and not for the sake of something else (*τὸ καθ' αὑτὸ αἱρετόν*). Thus the word *ἀναγκαῖον* is used in contradistinction to *αἱρετὸν καθ' αὑτό*, Eth. Nic. 7. 6. 1147 b 24, 29: it is used in connexion with *τούτου ἕνεκεν* and in contrast to *οὗ ἕνεκεν καὶ βέλτιον*, de Part. An. 3. 10. 672 b 23, and so in Pol. 5 (8). 3. 1338 a 13 we find some subjects of study marked off as 'desirable for their own sake' from others which are described as 'necessary, and desirable for the sake of something else.' Thus, just as the *βάναυσος* is held to exist for the sake of another man, all 'necessary functions'—not those of the *βάναυσος* only—are for the sake of other forms of activity which are desirable for their own sake. Hence the frequent contrast of the necessary and the noble, which indeed Aristotle inherited from Plato[1], though Plato is not perhaps equally faithful to this distinction as a standard for measuring the relative excellence of various paths in life.

It is not that, in Aristotle's view, these pursuits are not compatible with a certain type and level of virtue. They are, indeed, unfavourable to virtue of the higher kind (*ὑπεναντίοι πρὸς ἀρετήν*, 1328 b 40), but the slave, at all events, must possess some of the homelier virtues (industry and temperance, for instance, Pol. 1. 13. 1260 a 34), if he is to do his work well. Still the fraction of moral virtue which falls to the lot of the slave is not enough to give him any share in happiness (*εὐδαιμονία*), which presupposes a certain complex of attributes quite beyond his reach (cp. 4 (7). 5. 1328 b 33 sqq.). This view of happiness, if held by Plato, is not pressed by him to the same extent: he nowhere says that the third class in his Republic will not share in the general happiness of the State, whereas to Aristotle the free artisan or day-labourer seems to be still further removed from happiness than the slave, who shares the

[1] Cp. Plato, Rep. 493 C, *τἀναγκαῖα δίκαια καλοῖ καὶ καλά, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν, ὅσῳ διαφέρει τῷ ὄντι, μήτε ἰωρακὼς ᾖ μήτε ἄλλῳ δυνατὸς δεῖξαι.*

society of a master able to raise him to the level of virtue which he is capable of attaining.

Over against the large group of vocations concerned with 'necessary work,' Aristotle ranges those concerned with 'noble work.' What pursuits exactly fall under the latter head, we fail to learn in any detail. Politics and philosophy, if not practised for gain, evidently do so (Pol. 1. 7. 1255 b 36). A soldier's life does so too, though it is abandoned to those who are still under the age which qualifies for offices of State (4 (7). 9. 1329 a 2 sqq.): it is 'noble,' but it is not the supreme end (4 (7). 2. 1325 a 6). The management of a household, also, ranks as 'noble work,' though there are perhaps relations in life higher than the relation to wife or child, just as the care of wife or child is a higher thing than the care of slaves, which again is higher than the care of property (1. 13. 1259 b 18). The duties of a guardian or of an executor would rank, probably, with those of a householder. The cases of the poet, historian, and biographer, and generally of the writer, seem to escape consideration; but Aristotle can hardly intend an unfavourable judgment. Comedy, however, stands at a far lower level than tragedy or epic poetry; to witness a tragedy or to listen to music is a noble use of leisure (διαγωγή). The composition of music and even the writing of a tragedy are tasks which would hardly fall within the province of a true citizen, if done for pay. Instruction in 'noble work,' not rendered for pay, appears to rank among the chief duties of the father and the citizen. The work of the professional sculptor, painter, architect, musician, or physician, if done for pay, would probably be accounted unworthy of the citizen; indeed, the acquisition of skill of this kind, apart altogether from the terms of its exercise, would entail a closeness of application unbefitting a freeman (5 (8). 2. 1337 b 15 sqq.).

Necessary and noble functions to be placed in different hands.

Aristotle's first step, then, was to distinguish necessary from noble work. His next was to insist that, in the best State at all events, they must be placed in different hands. Necessary functions must not be assigned to natures capable

of noble functions, nor must the latter be assigned to natures only capable of the former.

It is easy to see why the higher functions should not be entrusted to the lower natures[1], but why should not necessary functions be shared in by those capable of noble ones? If this arrangement were adopted, the State would not need the presence of lower natures within its borders, while the higher need only be called on to give up a part of their time to necessary work. The reasons which weigh with Aristotle seem to be that—

1. The principle of entrusting one function only to one agent (*ἓν πρὸς ἕν*) should be observed, except where the functions are such as can be discharged without reciprocal embarrassment, which does not hold of necessary and noble functions.

2. Happiness does not lie wholly in the motive: a man is not happy, if he does necessary work even from the highest motive (*τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα*): happiness lies partly in motive, partly in the character of the action, which must itself belong to the class of noble actions (*πράξεις αἱρεταὶ καθ' αὑτάς*). It may be said that if eating, drinking, and sleeping are necessary functions, it is not possible altogether to release the higher natures from functions of this kind, but this is not present to Aristotle's mind. Aristotle defined happiness not as a habit (*ἕξις*), like Plato and the Platonists[2], but as an activity (*ἐνέργεια* or *χρῆσις*, Pol. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 9), and the more he insisted on this, the more important the subject-matter of the activity became. A life spent even in the distribution of 'things good under special circumstances' (*τὰ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως καλά*)—

[1] On the principle expressed in de Part. An. 4. 10. 687 a 10, *ἡ φύσις ἀεὶ διανέμει, καθάπερ ἄνθρωπος φρόνιμος, ἕκαστον τῷ δυναμένῳ χρῆσθαι.* The same illustration from *αὐλοί* is used in this passage as in the discussion on the distribution of power in the State, Pol. 3. 12. 1282 b 31 sq.

[2] Cp. Clem. Strom. 418 D (quoted by Zeller, Plato, E. T. p. 579, n. 62): *Σπεύσιππος τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν φησὶν ἕξιν εἶναι τελείαν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσιν· ἡ ἕξις ἀγαθῶν.* Contrast the emphatic statement (Pol. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 7): *φαμὲν δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς, εἴ τι τῶν λόγων ἐκείνων ὄφελος, ἐνέργειαν εἶναι (sc. τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν) καὶ χρῆσιν ἀρετῆς τελείας, καὶ ταύτην οὐκ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς.*

in the infliction, for instance, of just punishment beneficial to the offender—would not be a life of full happiness (4 (7). 13. 1332 a 10 sqq.); much less would a life spent in necessary work be so.

3. Even Plato, though he held that in the hands of the best men retail trade would assume a new aspect, and be recognized as a work of charity and beneficence, shrank from the idea of allowing them to meddle with such work[1]; and Aristotle holds that most functions of a necessary kind are *per se* enfeebling in their effect on the character. Even the learning of some arts, not in themselves unbefitting freemen, to the full professional limit of exactness made a man *βάναυσος* in Aristotle's opinion.

4. That which is appropriate (*τὸ πρέπον*) is always kept in view in the Politics (e.g. Pol. 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 33); and it would be a solecism to give any share in the lower functions to the higher natures.

It follows that a separate class or classes must exist in the State devoted to the discharge of the lower functions, and that the human beings employed for this purpose must be capable of nothing higher—otherwise there will be an infraction of justice, both wrong in itself and fatal to the harmony of the State. Aristotle does not appear to point out, in what we have of the Politics, the measures by which he proposes to secure that natures shall not be pronounced to be fit only for necessary work, which better rearing or training, or more favourable circumstances might possibly raise to the higher level. He seems also hardly conscious of the sadness of the view that the existence in adequate numbers of natures fit only for the lower functions is essential to the realization of the highest type of human society. If all men were capable of becoming men of full excellence (*σπουδαῖοι ἁπλῶς*), the 'best State' could not exist. The attainment by the higher natures of their true level has its accompanying shadow; it involves and implies the existence of lower natures who must remain beneath

[1] Laws 918 D, *ὃ μήποτε γένοιτο οὐδ' ἔστω.*

them. The State at its best breaks society into two sharply contrasted grades—those who can live for the highest ends and those who cannot; the parting of the one from the other is the first and most indispensable step towards its realization. It is of course true that the lower grade would, *ex hypothesi*, gain nothing by being called to the discharge of noble functions, and that it rises to a higher level of virtue and pleasure, when linked to the higher grade, than it could otherwise achieve.

Position in the State assigned by Aristotle to the classes concerned with necessary functions.

The relation of the classes discharging necessary functions to those discharging noble functions, as will readily be foreseen, can only be a dependent one. The latter fulfil the end of the State; they consequently are the State. The former exist within the State, because otherwise the latter could not exist; their existence is an unwelcome necessity. What numerical proportion these classes are to bear to the classes which form the State, we do not distinctly learn; but no more of them must find a place in the State than is necessary for the purposes of the higher grade. Those of them who are slaves must be recruited from populations submissive enough to accept a dependent position without giving trouble. It may be asked why all are not made slaves public or private. The answer is twofold. The slave by nature is conceived as one whose intelligence is of the lowest type and whose value lies in his thews and sinews, whereas the merchant or the artisan needs intellectual qualification of a higher kind. The slave is also viewed, especially in the chapters where the naturalness of slavery is discussed, as in the main an instrument of the household[1], whereas the artisan or the merchant could hardly be treated as an appendage of the household.

The position of the classes concerned with necessary work except indeed the slaves, seems to be but little studied in

[1] Though Aristotle provides for the existence of public slaves in his best State (4 (7). 10. 1330 a 30: cp. 2. 7. 1267 b 16), and includes in his definition of wealth *χρήματα χρήσιμα εἰς κοινωνίαν πόλεως*, 1. 8. 1256 b 29, he, at first at all events, treats the slave as an animate instrument of the household and the chattel of a *δεσπότης* (1. 3. 1253 b 1 sqq.). Aristotle refuses to follow Phaleas in making the *τεχνῖται* public slaves (2. 1267 b 13 sqq.).

what we possess of the Politics. We hear nothing of any provision for their education. In the picture of household life which is given us, the householder is conceived as belonging to the superior grade to which alone citizenship is accorded. No non-citizen is to own land in the best State. Not only are the classes in question excluded from office and from membership of the assembly and the dicasteries, but they are assigned a separate market-place, distinct from that of the citizens, while those of them who are merchants reside at the port. Unlike the slaves, who are brought within the household and consequently within the range of the ideal householder's influence, they are apparently abandoned to the deteriorating influences of necessary work without any counteracting safeguard.

Aristotle regards the State at its best as an union of men who are heart and soul purposed and qualified to live the highest life, and whose co-operation rests, not on force or fear, but on that temper of mind as its condition. The State is not fully a State whose members do right with any after-thought or secondary aim; they must love virtue and practise it for its own sake, not for the sake of the external goods it brings. It is useless and wrong to admit those to membership who cannot fulfil these conditions, and this is the case with those whose initial unfitness is increased by the practice of the lower kind of work. They cannot share in the common aim of living the highest life, or in the capacity for common action of the highest kind, both of which the best State presupposes. Not only, indeed, are they not to share in ruling, but the State is not to be ruled in their interest, except so far as this cannot be neglected without injury to the citizens[1].

Remarks on Aristotle's view and the considerations which led him to adopt it.

Aristotle's conception of happiness and his conception of

[1] The common advantage (τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον) which a State should study is the common advantage of the citizens (cp. 3. 13. 1283 b 40, τὸ δ' ὀρθὸν λεπτέον ἴσως· τὸ δ' ἴσως ὀρθὸν πρὸς τὸ τῆς πόλεως ὅλης συμφέρον καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τὸ τῶν πολιτῶν), and that of other classes, only so far as their advantage is bound up with that of the citizens (3. 6. 1278 b 32 sqq.). This is here said expressly of the slave; whether it holds also of the τεχνίτης, θής, etc., we are not told.

κοινωνία forced him to find in the classes which live for noble work the sole sharers in the true life of the State: what then could he say but that these were the State, and that if the Statesman is to rule for the benefit of the State, he must rule for their benefit? It must, however, be borne in mind that this holds good only of the best constitution; it is only where the citizens are men of full human excellence (σπουδαῖοι ἁπλῶς), and actually living the highest human life, that the doctrine applies. If the Few 'inherit the earth,' the Few, it must be remembered, are to live an arduous life of moral and intellectual greatness, toilsome though happy. Not a life of self-sacrifice for the sake of others, like that of Plato's guardians, for they live for themselves, and no other life would be so full for them of happiness and pleasure; nor an ascetic life, for besides the happiness and pleasure of the highest life, they are to possess its due external conditions and to share in the occasional recreation and relaxation which human nature demands; but a life making great demands on human energy, self-mastery, and intellect. Would the supply of the material necessities of men living a life of this kind be indeed a vocation unworthy of the lower natures? Is it an unsatisfactory destiny for such natures to be caught into the train of some heroic character and to be raised by his aid to the highest level attainable by them[1]? Perhaps not: but we feel that their subordinate position in the State should be the result of their original inferiority rather than of their participation in necessary functions. It is one thing, too, to follow the lead of a heroic class as freemen, though subordinate, and quite another to accept a relation of absolute dependence and even slavery. It is, besides, true that Aristotle provides no means for making the most that can be made of these classes, or indeed of any individuals belonging to them who are equal to higher things; so far as we can judge from what remains

[1] 'I can see my dear father's life in some measure as the sunk pillar on which mine was to rise and be built,' says Carlyle in his Reminiscences (I. 65); and Aristotle designs the life of these subordinated classes to serve a somewhat similar purpose.

to us of the Politics, he drops the arrangements which Plato had devised for the purpose of raising those who deserve it to a higher place in the State, and removing to a lower place natures ill-adapted to the higher.

The contrast of necessary and noble work is too sharply drawn by Aristotle: it is, besides, incorrectly drawn; and the effect of men's vocation on their character is also overrated. What a man is, cannot always be measured by the social functions which he is fit to discharge. To exclude the hardy peasant from the military service of the State was surely a mistake; and it can hardly have been necessary to forbid his access to all official functions, however humble. Aristotle will not allow him even to be a 'Warden of the Woods' (ὑλωρός). His best State reminds us of Menander's lines:

Ὥσπερ τῶν χορῶν
οὐ πάντες ᾄδουσ', ἀλλ' ἄφωνοι δύο τινὲς
ἢ τρεῖς παρεστήκασι πάντων ἔσχατοι
εἰς τὸν ἀριθμόν· καὶ τοῦθ' ὁμοίως πως ἔχει·
χώραν κατέχουσι, ζῶσι δ' οἷς ἔστιν βίος[1].

The individuals excluded by Aristotle, indeed, are not idle, or, in his view, cumberers of the ground, but essential conditions of the existence of the State.

Modern inquirers, while still drawing a distinction between the one class of vocations and the other, draw it in a less unqualified way. Thus to Hegel the activities which fall under the head of 'social life' (Gesellschaft) are marked off from those of political life by their primary aim being private, if their result is the general advantage. In industry or trade the individual acts for his own interest, and if at the same moment he in effect acts for the general advantage, this is no part of his aim[2]. In this sphere the Whole and its interest asserts itself as a Necessity or Compelling Force. Yet it does assert itself. For with the development of trade and industry comes the Division of Labour, which

[1] Menand. Ἐπίκληρος, Fr. 1 (p. 17, ed. Didot).

[2] Compare Mr. Herbert Spencer's contrast between industrial and governmental organization (*Fortnightly Review*, Dec. 1. 1880, p. 683).

while it facilitates supply and increases skill, also binds men closer to their fellows and makes each individual more dependent on the rest. Classes spring up, which gather men into large unities based on similarity of vocation, and impress on them the interest of the Whole. From this point of view the supposed antagonism of trade and industry to the higher life is softened down. These vocations present themselves rather as a not uncongenial preparatory stage. Our common life in the State ceases to seem marred and spoilt by the unwelcome participation of classes, alien in function to the general purpose of the State, but yet indispensable to its existence. The State comes to present the aspect of a self-consistent unity; its higher and lower elements no longer stand to each other in a relation of strong antithesis; one end and purpose is supreme throughout the whole. The bisected State of Aristotle is replaced by a 'city at unity with itself.'

It was not, however, entirely by considerations special to the πολιτικὴ ἐπιστήμη that Aristotle was led to his conception of the true social structure of the perfect State. More passages than one in the Politics imply that the phenomena of the State do but repeat the phenomena of the whole class of things to which the State belongs. If we find in the State the contrast of ruler and ruled, it is in part because this contrast is a constant phenomenon in every Whole composed of a plurality of members, whether continuous or discrete (1. 5. 1254 a 28 sq.). So again, the State belongs to the class of 'natural compounds' (τὰ κατὰ φύσιν συνεστῶτα, 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21), and Aristotle's study of this class of things prepared him to find a decided inequality to be the law of the State. Not only in the State, but in all natural compounds, the Whole is dependent for its existence on things which nevertheless are no part of it, and which stand to it in the relation of means to end. Thus, a house (for Aristotle takes his example from an object which does not strictly belong to the class of natural compounds) cannot exist without a builder and

instruments of building; yet these are no part of the house. And so the State cannot exist without property, and property is both animate and inanimate; yet even animate property is not a part of the State. In an animal, again (de Gen. An. 2. 6. 742 a 28 sqq.), we can distinguish three things: (1) the Whole (*τὸ ὅλον*), which is here conceived as the end or *οὗ ἕνεκα*: (2) the moving and generating principle, which is both part of the end, being a part of the Whole, and also a means to the existence of the Whole (or the attainment of the end): (3) 'parts which are useful to the Whole as instruments for certain purposes' (*τὰ ὀργανικὰ τούτοις μέρη πρὸς ἐνίας χρήσεις*). So in the human body (742 b 16 sqq.), 'the lower half exists for the sake of the upper half, and is neither a part of the End nor its generating source.' It is for the sake of the flesh that all the other homogeneous parts of an animal (bone, skin, sinew, bloodvessels, hair, etc.) exist (de Part. An. 2. 8. 653 b 30 sqq.). In any object into which Matter enters there is 'the fashioning element' (*τὸ δημιουργοῦν*), and there is Matter (de Gen. An. 1. 18. 723 b 29: 2. 4. 738 b 20). In the soul as in everything else there are two contrasted parts—the 'passive reason' (*νοῦς παθητικός*), answering to Matter, and the 'creative reason' (*νοῦς ποιητικός, ὁ πάντα ποιῶν*, de An. 3. 5. 430 a 10 sqq.). This duality runs through the entire universe of things (430 a 10). In an egg no less than in an animal or a State, two contrasted parts can be discerned—'that which is the principle of growth' (*ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχή*), and 'that which supplies nutriment' (*ὅθεν ἡ τροφή*, de Gen. An. 3. 1. 751 b 22). The same thing appears in a beehive (de Gen. An. 3. 10. 760 b 7 sqq., *εὖ δὲ καὶ τὸ τοὺς βασιλεῖς ὥσπερ πεποιημένους ἐπὶ τέκνωσιν ἔσω μένειν, ἀφειμένους τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἔργων, καὶ μέγεθος δὲ ἔχειν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τεκνοποιΐαν συστάντος τοῦ σώματος αὐτῶν· τούς τε κηφῆνας ἀργοὺς ἅτ' οὐδὲν ἔχοντας ὅπλον πρὸς τὸ διαμάχεσθαι περὶ τῆς τροφῆς καὶ διὰ τὴν βραδυτῆτα τὴν τοῦ σώματος· αἱ δὲ μέλιτται μέσαι τὸ μέγεθός εἰσιν ἀμφοῖν* (*χρήσιμοι γὰρ οὕτω πρὸς τὴν ἐργασίαν*), *καὶ ἐργάτιδες, ὡς καὶ τέκνα τρέφουσαι καὶ πατέρας*). Steps and gradations

within the State reflect the universal tendency to order (τάξις) in things which conform to Nature (de Gen. An. 3. 10. 760 a 31).

To Aristotle the study of nature meant the discrimination between the Conditionally Necessary and the Good —between the operation of the Material and the operation of the Final Cause. To distinguish what is necessary from what is noble—to mark off, for instance, the rule of a master over slaves from the rule of a citizen over his fellow-citizens, or of a king over his subjects—was as incumbent on the statesman as on the philosopher. If the State is not to exalt means into ends, it must know what vocations are necessary and what are noble.

Exclusion of women from political functions in the best State taken for granted.

The exclusion of women (and of course children) from political functions in the best State, unlike that of the classes concerned with necessary work, is taken for granted by Aristotle without discussion, notwithstanding that Plato had come to a different conclusion with respect to women. His silence on the subject is the more noticeable, inasmuch as he argues at length against Plato's abrogation (in the Republic) of the household and several property. The true place for women is tacitly taken to be the household, where indeed their service is indispensable (2. 5. 1264 b 1). Women possess the faculty of moral deliberation, but in a form in which it is not always capable of making itself obeyed [1]; it is therefore in subordinate co-operation with the ideal head of the household, that the female character best realizes the type of virtue which belongs to it (1. 13. 1260 a 20 sq.). This being the view of Aristotle, we might have expected that in his argument against Plato in defence of the household (Pol. 2. 1–4), the interest of women in its preservation and the loss they would incur through its abolition would be more conspicuously noticed. They are probably included among those who would be less cared for in the absence of the institution (2. 3. 1261 b 33), but no express reference is made to their interest in its main-

[1] Pol. 1. 13. 1260 a 13, τὸ δὲ θῆλυ ἔχει μὲν [τὸ βουλευτικόν], ἀλλ' ἄκυρον.

tenance. The exclusion of women from citizenship in the best State follows necessarily from the hypothesis that in it all citizens will be possessed of full virtue and happiness. Women have their share of virtue and enjoyment, but they are not held to possess the full virtue of a good man, which is required of all citizens there, nor consequently happiness (*εὐδαιμονία*).

The 'economic substructure' of Aristotle's State to be largely formed of non-Hellenic materials.

If we ask to whom, if not to citizens, necessary functions are to be assigned, the answer is that a separate population, distinct from that which we sought at starting from Nature and Fortune (p. 89) to serve as the raw material of the State, must be called in for the discharge of these functions. The cultivators of the soil will either be slaves, and consequently men of that low degree of intelligence which slavery, as Aristotle conceives it, presupposes, or else a dependent class non-Hellenic by extraction and not dissimilar from slaves (4 (7). 10. 1330 a 25 sqq.). The same class will serve as oarsmen in the triremes of the State (4 (7). 6. 1327 b 11 sqq.). There will thus be a considerable non-Hellenic element in the best State of Aristotle; its 'economic substructure,' if so we may term it, will be formed to a large extent of non-Hellenic materials. In this Aristotle departs, no doubt designedly, from Lacedaemonian precedents, for the subordinate working and trading populations of the Lacedaemonian State were Hellenic. The model he follows seems to be rather that of the more commercial States of Greece, the lower places in whose social systems were filled with aliens and imported slaves. Here the dependent classes were more under control and less formidable, and the infraction of justice was less[1]. An interchange of population had long been going forward on the coasts of the Aegean and the Euxine, resulting in the introduction of a non-Hellenic element within Hellenic communities for purposes of trade and labour, while Hellenes settled in the

[1] Cp. Levit. 25. 44: 'Both thy bondmen and thy bondmaids which thou shalt have shall be of the heathen that are round about you; of them shall ye buy bondmen and bondmaids.'

wild regions round about Greece, and implanted the first germs of civilization[1]. The scheme of Aristotle's best State involves a similar division of functions between the Hellene and the non-Hellene, though the alien element in it would be far more carefully controlled, kept apart, and limited in amount.

We see that the lower section of society—which in modern States includes perhaps four-fifths of the total population, though its relative numbers would no doubt be far less in the best State of Aristotle—is to form in extraction and character the strongest possible contrast to the upper section. It is designed to be submissive and serviceable; its vocation is to obey, rather than to co-operate with its superiors. Aristotle has apparently forgotten how often war, or disease, or famine made great gaps in the ranks of the citizens of Greek States, which could only be filled by drafts from the dependent classes, free or slave, for certainly the lower section of his State would be quite unsuited to recruit the ranks of the higher.

It is not, however, enough to sever the citizens of the State from necessary work:

Aristotle's commission of 'necessary work'[2] to a class thus constituted is, however, only a first step to a purgation of the commercial and industrial life of the State. The Science of Supply[3], which had degenerated into a Science of Profit, must be recalled to a sense of its true limits and

[1] Thus the low estimate of trade and industry, which prevailed among Greeks and Romans, helped in some degree to mingle races which might otherwise have held apart. Nothing would probably strike a modern observer more, if he could be transported to the streets of ancient Athens or to those of any other Greek city where resident aliens and imported slaves were numerous, than the magnitude of the Oriental and barbarian element of its population. In many parts of the Peloponnese, no doubt, the case was very different. Observe Aristotle's acceptance of this state of things as a matter of course (4 (7). 4. 1326 a 18, *ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἴσως ὑπάρχειν καὶ δούλων ἀριθμὸν πολλῶν καὶ μετοίκων καὶ ξένων*).

[2] Aristotle, we note, includes the work of the *τεχνίτης* and *θής* under the term *ἀναγκαῖαι πράξεις*, though not under the sound form of *χρηματιστική*. *Ἀναγκαῖος*, however, as thus used, is little more than a negative of *καλός*.

[3] I use the term 'Science' in relation both to *χρηματιστική* and to *οἰκονομική*, but the former is probably in strictness an Art or Productive Science, the latter a Practical Science, like *πολιτική*.

methods: measures must be taken to ensure that the lower social activities shall not overgrow and stifle the higher, and to still the unquiet and inventive spirit of gain, which springs from a misconception of the end of human life. Aristotle's wish is that as little 'necessary activity' as possible, and as much 'noble activity' as possible, shall find a place in his State. It is one of the functions of the Science of Household Management (*οἰκονομία* or *οἰκονομική*) to effect this by exercising a control over the Science of Supply. The household must be placed under the authority of a head who knows that the quest of commodities should be kept within the limits which the interests of virtue and happiness (*τὸ εὖ ζῆν*) impose.

the Science of Supply (*χρηματιστική*) must be purged, and recalled to a sense of its true limits and methods: it must be marked off from the Science of Household Management (*οἰκονομική*) and placed under its control.

He arrives at this conclusion by a long discussion of the question, how the Science of Supply (*χρηματιστική*) stands to the Science of Household Management (1. 3. 1253 b 12: 8. 1256 a 1 sqq.)—a question, at first sight, of purely scientific interest, but which is made the starting-point of a sweeping social reform. Some had held the Science of Supply to be the main element in Household Science (1. 3. 1253 b 13), while others had gone so far as to identify the two (1253 b 12), thus merging the head of the household in the provider of commodities. Who these were who went so far as to forget the husband and parent in the bread-winner, we do not know.

Aristotle, on the other hand, feels bound to ask whether the Science of Supply is a part of Household Science at all. He had, indeed, incidentally taken this for granted in an early chapter of the Politics (1. 3. 1253 b 12), but later on (1. 8. 1256 a 3 sq.), he seems inclined to recede from this hasty admission, for he suggests the question whether, after all, the former is not merely auxiliary (*ὑπηρετική*) to the latter. He asks, further, whether it is not the business of Household Science to use rather than to acquire. If this is so, it cannot be identical with the Science of Supply, whose object is to acquire; and we may doubt whether the latter science is not too distinct from the former to be even a part of it.

Aristotle's theory of the Science of Supply: its sound and unsound forms.

The first thing, however, is to ask what the Science of Supply is. Its business is to 'consider whence property may be acquired.' But then there are more kinds than one of property. One of them is food: is agriculture, then, or any other science connected with the acquisition of food, a part of the Science of Supply? Aristotle reviews the various modes of acquiring food—the pastoral, that of hunting, and that of agriculture—and the combinations of them to which men resort. These methods of acquiring food, he continues, have recourse for the purpose of sustenance to objects designed by nature to be so used—designed for the purpose just as much as milk is designed for the sustenance of the newborn animal, or as other provisions of a similar nature are designed to serve the same end. Plants and animals are to the adult what milk is to the infant—the provision of Nature for his support. We know them to be so designed, for otherwise they would exist for no purpose whatever (*μάτην*, 1256 b 21), and this is never the case with products of Nature. Nature has made plants for the use of animals, and the lower animals for the use of man, not merely indeed as food, but also to supply him with raiment and other commodities. We may even go farther and say that not only the capture of animals by hunting, but also the capture of men who, though designed by nature for slavery, are unwilling to be slaves, is a natural mode of acquiring commodities, and that consequently war, the means by which this is effected, falls, in one of its forms, within the natural form of the Science of Supply. But plants and animals cannot exist except on, or in, earth and water (1. 10. 1258 a 23); therefore Nature must provide earth and water, and from these man must obtain the commodities he needs[1]. Here Aristotle falls back on the teaching of Socrates, as recorded by Xenophon (Mem. 4. 3. 5–6)[2].

[1] Aristotle seems to forget that slaves, though *κτήματα*, can hardly be said to be obtained from earth and water.

[2] Dicaearchus, the pupil of Aristotle, seems in his sketch of the development of human society to have gone back, like Plato (Polit. 271 C sqq.), to an 'age of Cronus, 'quum viverent homines ex illis

One form of the Science of Supply, then, is naturally a part[1] of the Science of Household Management, for either it must exist, or the latter Science must itself provide that commodities shall be forthcoming necessary for life and useful for human society in household and State. Commodities of this nature constitute true wealth, for this kind of wealth is not open to the charge which has been preferred against wealth, that it does not belong to the class of 'things subject to a limit' (*τὰ πεπερασμένα*).

There is, however, another form of the Science of Supply, which is not natural. It arises thus:—Every article of property may be employed in one or other of two ways; it may be used or it may be exchanged. Both uses are natural. Exchange is perfectly natural, so far as it is used for the supply of the wants of the two parties to the exchange. The articles exchanged must, however, be used by the parties, or be intended to be used by them. This seems to be implied in Aristotle's language, and his principle evidently excludes an intermediary who buys to sell again. A perfectly legitimate step was taken when money was invented to facilitate exchange between distant or comparatively distant parties. It was, however, the invention of money—a commodity which invited by its

rebus quae inviolata ultro ferret terra.' This mode of existence was to him alone 'natural,' the pastoral life coming next in order of time and marking a decline, inasmuch as it brought with it the slaughter of animals for food, and also war: last of all, men took to agriculture (Dicaearch. Fragm. 1–5: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 230 sqq.). To Aristotle, on the contrary, the earliest age of the world is an age of Cyclopes, not an age of Cronus, and the pastoral and agricultural modes of life are equally natural. He would probably agree that the pastoral life is historically prior to the agricultural (cp. Pol. 4 (7). 10. 1329 b 14, if this passage is from Aristotle's pen: the life of the Cyclopes is also represented by Homer as pastoral).

We see that Dicaearchus, like Theophrastus, had come to entertain objections to the slaughter of harmless animals for food which are quite strange to Aristotle (see as to Theophrastus, Bernays, Theophrastos über Frömmigkeit).

Some Indian races were believed by Herodotus to subsist after a fashion which even Dicaearchus would admit to be natural (Hdt. 3. 100).

[1] Later on, this conclusion turns out to be only provisional, for we are taught to regard even the sound form of the Science of Supply as in strictness rather subsidiary to, than a part of, Household Science.

compactness its own indefinite increase, that carried exchange beyond the natural function of its earlier days—the provision for man's needs—and developed the other form of the Science of Supply, the mercantile form (*τὸ καπηλικόν*). This form errs in two ways: (1) it wins produce, not from earth and water, but from the process of exchange, or in other words, from fellow-men (*ἀπ' ἀλλήλων*): (2) its aim is not the supply of men's needs, but the acquisition of an indefinite amount of money; consequently, wealth loses for it the limited character which makes it natural. In fact, its procedure, if we analyse this still further, betrays a wrong conception of the end of life, which it conceives either as the mere preservation of existence (*τὸ ζῆν*), or if as good life, good life in the mistaken sense of bodily enjoyment[1]. This is the form assumed by the Science of Supply, when it is abandoned to itself and not controlled by Household Science, which knows the true end of life and should impress it on the Science of Supply.

Comments on this theory.

Aristotle apparently objects not merely to commercial dealing conducted with a view to unlimited gain, but to all commercial dealing in which the parties do not come together in order to provide themselves with articles for their own use. His principle might, indeed, be construed to involve an objection to commercial dealing in which the parties seek to provide themselves with articles not really necessary to life or to good life; but into this further question he does not go. The use of things for purposes for which nature did not intend them—the error as to the end of life which makes the indefinite heaping up of money an object of desire: these are the main grounds on which

[1] Aristotle finds it hard to understand the *χρηματιστικὸς βίος* (cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 3. 1096 a 5): and Plutarch speaks in the same way, Vita Catonis Censoris, c. 18, *οὕτως ὁ τοῦ πλούτου ζῆλος οὐδενὶ πάθει φυσικῷ συνημμένος ἐκ τῆς ὀχλώδους καὶ θυραίου δόξης ἐπεισόδιός ἐστιν.* Obviously a desire for unlimited gain may exist where there is neither any irrational anxiety as to subsistence nor any craving for sensual pleasure. Plato has a good passage (Rep. 330 C) on the love of money in men who have not inherited but acquired wealth. They love it not only for its usefulness, but also as a man loves his child—as being their own creation.

he censures the unsound form of the Science of Supply. The first objection applies especially to usury; for it is even more unnatural to make the barren metal breed money, than to win it from the process of exchange. Aristotle, it should be added, is conscious that other social functions besides that of exchange may be exercised with a view to unlimited gain—those, for example, of the general or the physician (1. 9. 1258 a 8 sqq.). The same thing might of course be said of agriculture.

He misinterprets the work of the intermediary between producers who purchases, not because he needs the thing for his own consumption or use, but in order to resell, and whose profit is in reality payment for a social service, not something filched from his neighbour[1]. It may well be true that there are elements in the organization of commerce and modes of commercial operation which represent no social service[2]; it might also be a gain to the world if commerce were confined within the limits which considerations of good life impose; but as to this Aristotle does not observe that some States may with advantage to themselves and to other States extend their production and exchange of products beyond the limit of their own needs, or, in other words, may trade and manufacture for other communities which are less favourably situated for carrying on trade and manufactures[3].

His principle that land and water are the true sources of wealth leads him a step further in c. 11[4], where he ranges among unsound sources of Supply labour rendered for

[1] Plato had, as we have seen, construed the social function of καπηλεία in a truer way (Laws 918 B–E).

[2] E.g. the practice of 'cornering,' which 'consists in buying up so much of a commodity as gives the buyers command over the market for that particular commodity' (*Times*, June 26, 1883). Aristotle seems to regard καπηλικὴ χρηματιστική as being little else than systematic cornering.

[3] He, in fact, forbids his best State to trade for others (4 (7). 6. 1327 a 27, αὐτῇ γὰρ ἐμπορικὴν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῖς ἄλλοις, δεῖ εἶναι τὴν πόλιν).

[4] In this chapter also he places the cutting of timber and quarrying or mining in a class apart as partaking both of the natural and the unnatural Science of Supply—which is strange, as he recognises the use of Nature's products not only for food, but for other services to man.

wages (*μισθαρνία*)—in other words, the acquisition of money through placing at the service of others for pay (i. e. exchanging) bodily or mental aptitudes. It is not easy to see why a man should not be allowed to exchange his labour, just as much as the produce of his vines, for any commodities he requires, even on Aristotle's own principle (*ὅσον γὰρ ἱκανὸν αὐτοῖς, ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀλλαγήν*, 1. 9. 1257 a 18). There need not be in 'labouring for hire' any such desire for an indefinite amount of coin as Aristotle connects with the unsound form of the Science of Supply. In the Ninth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics (9. 1. 1164 a 22 sqq.) the receipt of money from pupils appears to be contemplated and not objected to[1]. In the Fourth (the old Seventh) Book of the Politics (4 (7). 8. 1328 b 20 sq.: cp. 9. 1329 a 35) artisans and day-labourers (who are said to practise 'working for hire,' 1. 11. 1258 b 25) are held to be necessary to the State. He seems to have been lured back for the moment in the First Book of the Politics to an old doctrine of Socrates, which Plato had also accepted, though only in a cursory way and with a slight modification[2]. Aristotle, we must remember, has

[1] Compare the doctrine of the Epicurean Philodemus as to the best source of *κτητική* (Philodem. de Virtutibus et Vitiis, lib. ix.: see Schömann, Opusc. 3. 240, whose completion of the text is followed): *πρῶτον δὲ καὶ κάλλιστον ἀπὸ λόγων φιλοσόφων ἀνδράσιν δεκτικοῖς μεταδιδόμενον* (*μεταδιδομένων?*) *ἀντιμεταλαμβάνειν εὐχαριστο[τατα, οἷα] μετὰ σεβασμοῦ παντελῶς ἐγένετο Ἐπικούρῳ· λόγων δὲ ἀληθινῶν καὶ ἀφιλονείκων καὶ συλλήβδην εἰπεῖν ἀταράχων· [ἐπεὶ] τό γε διὰ σοφιστικῶν καὶ ἀγωνιστικῶν οὐδέν ἐστι βέλτιον τοῦ διὰ δημοκοπικῶν καὶ συκοφαντικῶν.* For the views of the Stoics as to the legitimate forms of *κτητική*, see Zeller, Stoics. E. T. p. 269 n. Columella (de Re Rustica, praefatio, § 10) comes to the conclusion—'superest unum genus liberale et ingenuum rei familiaris augendae quod ex agricolatione contingit.'

[2] Cp. Laws 842 C, *ἐκ γῆς γὰρ καὶ ἐκ θαλάττης τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐστὶ κατεσκευασμένα τὰ περὶ τὴν τροφήν· τούτοις δὲ* ('but for my citizens') *μόνον ἐκ γῆς.* Except in this respect, Plato approves of much the same sources of supply as Aristotle. His citizens in the Laws are to be *γεωργοὶ καὶ νομεῖς καὶ μελιττουργοί* (842 D, a passage which perhaps suggested Pol. 1. 11. 1258 b 12–20), and to have nothing to do with *ναυκληρικὰ καὶ ἐμπορικὰ καὶ καπηλευτικὰ καὶ πανδοκεύσεις καὶ τελωνικὰ καὶ μεταλλεία* (contrast Pol. 1. 11. 1258 b 27 sq. *καὶ δανεισμοὶ καὶ ἐπίτοκοι τόκοι.* Cp. also Menexen. 237 E sqq. Theophrastus held similar language about the earth, if Bernays is right (Theophrastos über Frömmigkeit, p. 92) in ascribing Porphyr. de Abstin. 2. 32 to him. W

here the ideal State in view; he does not seem in the Ethics to impose these limits on 'getting.' There is no hint, at any rate, in the account of the 'liberal man' there given, that his 'getting' (λῆψις) will conform to the standard here laid down. He will not be, like the man who lives only for gain (ὁ αἰσχροκερδής), a lender of small sums at usurious interest, or the keeper of a house of ill-fame, nor will he be a gambler, or a thief, or a robber (Eth. Nic. 4. 3. 1121 b 31 sqq.: 1122 a 7): on the contrary, 'he will win an income from legitimate sources, such as property of his own, and will regard the winning of an income, not as a noble thing, but as a necessity, if he is to have the means of giving' (1120 a 34). Not a word is said of his abstaining from lending money at moderate interest. Aristotle's language, in fact, implies that it is not illiberal to do this.

The Science of Supply to be subordinated to Household Science.

We now know what the Science of Supply properly is, and are in a position to settle its relation to Household Science. Even its sound form is not in strictness a part of Household Science: it is rather its condition—one of those ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ which form no part of the thing whose existence they make possible[1]. What it provides, Household Science uses. If the Science of Supply does much for Household Science, this in its turn does much for it—imposes a limit on its efforts and adjusts them to the true end. Household Science has higher functions to discharge in regulating the relations of husband and wife, father and child, but one of its functions is to act as the intermediary by whose agency the end of the State is impressed on the business of Supply. But for it, the Science of Supply might resort to false sources and false methods of supply, and fail to pause when the amount has been obtained which is most favourable to good life. Household Science is possessed of the true end of human life—is an ethical science, which the other is not.

find similar expressions in Oecon. 1. 2. 1343 b 1.

[1] The question raised in 1. 8. 1256 a 5, whether the Science of Supply provides 'instruments' (ὄργανα) or Matter (ὕλη), or both, is not distinctly settled.

It is subordinate to πολιτική (Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1094 b 2), if it is not, indeed, a part of the political section of πολιτική (Eth. Nic. 6. 8. 1141 b 31); in any case, its principles are in accord with those of πολιτική, from which it differs in the sphere of its action, not in aim.

One might, indeed, ask—seeing that the State, no less than the household, may mistake the true nature of the Science of Supply and obtain commodities from improper sources and to an unlimited extent—why the so-called Household Science is viewed as connected especially, if not exclusively, with the household; why it is not the concern of the statesman at least as much as the householder; why economy is not public as well as private. If the eleventh chapter of the First Book of the Politics is genuine, this question had already occurred to Aristotle (see 1259 a 2 sqq.). It is clear, however, from the so-called Second Book of the Oeconomics, that the side of Household Science which relates to the State had come to receive more attention by the time it was written.

Aristotle's aims in this inquiry.

Aristotle's aim evidently is, in the first place, to lead back the Science of Supply to nature. He had not, however, fully worked out his conception of nature, or freed it from inconsistency and obscurity. He reckons as natural, on the one hand, whatever contributes to that which is best for the given species—in the case of man, whatever contributes to good life; and if he had held to this point of view, he might have arrived at the broad and sound conclusion that trade and the other modes of Supply whose legitimacy is in question are natural, if and so far as they contribute to the end of the State (i.e. to civilization rightly understood). But he also regards as natural that which is coeval with birth (1. 5. 1254 a 23), primitive, ancient (cp. 4 (7). 10. 1329 a 40 sqq.); that which is 'given by nature herself' (1. 8. 1256 b 7); that which conforms to the primordial law of zoological sustenance, which prescribes that sustenance is to be won from 'the residue of the substance from which the creature springs' (1. 10. 1258 a 36)—in the case of man from earth and water; and again the necessary. From

these points of view, commerce in its more developed form and labouring for hire are both of them regarded as contrary to nature.

If Aristotle had consistently adhered to the view that the primitive is the natural, we might have found him denying the naturalness of the City-State in comparison with the household[1], and of the pursuit of good life in comparison with that of mere life. But this he fortunately does not do. His examination of the relative justifiability of the various methods by which human wants are supplied is an exception to his general treatment of political and social questions; a standard is applied which is quite other than the standard usually applied—the end of the State. The attempt to trace in the mode by which the nascent or infant animal is sustained the type of all natural sustenance seems especially fanciful[2].

He has, however, a further aim—to show that even the sound and natural form of the Science of Supply is not in strictness a part of Household Science[3], but a dependent science which accepts its guidance. It is true that just as the householder has to see that the members of his household enjoy health, so it is his business to see that they possess a due supply of necessary and useful commodities; but it is the business of the physician to produce health in them, and it is the business of the Science of Supply in league with nature, not of Household Science, to produce those commodities. Not only did the current view of householding, with which Aristotle himself seems occasionally to fall in (e.g. Pol. 3. 4. 1277 b 24: Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1094 a 9: cp. Oecon. 1. 1. 1343 a 8), teach a different lesson,

[1] He seems to approach this view in Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1162 a 16 sqq.

[2] It is just possible that this censure of καπηλική χρηματιστική was penned during the period (330-326 B.C.: Schäfer, Demosthenes 3. 2. 339) when, owing, as was thought, to the arts of the corn-merchants or the devices of huckstering officials in Egypt, corn was extremely scarce and dear at Athens. But popular feeling always ran high against the corn-dealers, as we see from Lysias' oration against them.

[3] The Stoics appear to have distinguished between οἰκονομική and χρηματιστική no less than Aristotle (Stob. Ecl. Eth. 2. 6. 6: p. 51 Meineke).

but writers like Xenophon had put the contrary opinio
the mouth of Socrates (Xen. Oecon. c. 6. 4: cp. c. 7.
and c. 11. 9) and others (Xen. Cyrop. 8. 2. 23, *οὐ
πλεῖστα ἔχοντας καὶ φυλάττοντας πλεῖστα εὐδαιμονεστά
ἡγοῦμαι . . . ἀλλ' ὃς ἂν κτᾶσθαί τε πλεῖστα δύνηται σὺν
δικαίῳ, καὶ χρῆσθαι δὲ πλείστοις σὺν τῷ καλῷ, τοῦτον
εὐδαιμονέστατον νομίζω*)[1]. Plato, however, had alre
declared against the unlimited pursuit of wealth (R
591 D–E): *οὐκοῦν, εἶπον, καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ τῶν χρημάτων κτ
ξύνταξίν τε καὶ ξυμφωνίαν; καὶ τὸν ὄγκον τοῦ πλήθους
ἐκπληττόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ τῶν πολλῶν μακαρισμοῦ ἄπειρον αὐξι
ἀπέραντα κακὰ ἔχων; οὐκ οἶομαι, ἔφη. Ἀλλ' ἀποβλέπων
εἶπον, πρὸς τὴν ἐν αὑτῷ πολιτείαν καὶ φυλάττων μή τι παρα
αὐτοῦ τῶν ἐκεῖ διὰ πλῆθος οὐσίας ἢ δι' ὀλιγότητα, οὕτω κυβε
προσθήσει καὶ ἀναλώσει τῆς οὐσίας καθ' ὅσον ἂν οἷός τ'*
With this Aristotle would agree, but he adds that acqui
lies, in strictness, altogether outside the province of
head of the household, as such, and that his functio
to use the commodities, for the provision of which
Science of Supply is responsible, though even this is no
highest function, which lies rather in the governmen
persons, and especially of free persons, than in the care
or use of things. Xenophon had already made it one o
duties of the head of the household to seek to teach
slaves justice (Oecon. c. 14. 4): Aristotle makes it
main duty to develope in all the members of the house
all the virtue of which they are capable.

The householder, as Aristotle conceives him, is b
means to be indifferent whether the household unde
charge does or does not possess an adequate suppl
things useful and necessary for good life: on the
trary, he is to see that this is forthcoming; but fu
than this he is not to go in quest of commodities.
certainly will not hold, with Cato the Censor, whose

[1] It should be noticed, however, that in the short treatise on the Lacedaemonian constitution Xenophon praises Lycurgus for his discouragement of money-making (c. 7).

[2] Cp. Laws 870 A, *ἡ τῶν
μάτων τῆς ἀκλήστου καὶ ἀ
κτήσεως ἔρωτας μυρίους ἐντί
δύναμις.*

on household management were as clearly pronounced as on public affairs, 'that the man truly wonderful and godlike and fit to be registered in the lists of glory, was he, by whose accounts it should at last appear that he had more than doubled what he had received from his ancestors[1]'; nor would he 'labour with his domestics, and afterwards sit down with them, and eat the same kind of bread and drink of the same wine[2]'; nor would it be said of him with truth, that he 'amassed a great deal and used but little[3]'. Aristotle would have found more to praise in Cato's untiring care for his son's due nurture and education, though he himself would commit the education of boys, when past a certain age, to the common schools of the State.

The limitations which Aristotle imposes on the Science of Supply remind us of a reflection of Wordsworth's in the Eighth Book of the Excursion:—

> 'I rejoice,
> Measuring the force of those gigantic powers,
> That by the thinking mind have been compelled
> To serve the will of feeble-bodied man;
> For with the sense of admiration blends
> The animating hope that time may come
> When, strengthened, yet not dazzled, by the might
> Of this dominion over nature gained,
> Men of all lands shall exercise the same
> In due proportion to their country's need;
> Learning, though late, that all true glory rests,
> All praise, all safety, and all happiness,
> Upon the moral law.'

Aristotle, however, goes far beyond Wordsworth, though the latter forgets no less than the former that the accumulation of capital in one country beyond its needs may well be useful in aiding the material and moral development of other communities. It can hardly have been true of commerce even in Aristotle's day, that it had passed far beyond its sound original function of supplying men's needs into an ingenious artificial contrivance which served only the pur-

[1] Plutarch, Cato Censor c. 21 (Langhorne's translation).
[2] Ibid. c. 3.
[3] Ibid., Comparison of Cato and Aristides, c. 4.

pose of enriching its practitioners indefinitely at the expense of each other or of other men; but, at any rate, his censure of labour for hire and of lending money at interest is wholly mistaken. So far as he asserts the principle that commodities are made for man, not man for the multiplication of commodities—that the pursuit of wealth, which so easily masters and moulds society to its purpose, is to be governed by the true interests of civilization, or, as Wordsworth says, 'the moral law,' he is on solid ground; but in his application of this principle, and indeed in his combination of it with others of more doubtful authority, he has been led into error. We may trace, perhaps, in the background the influence of prejudices which he shared with his age and nation, and which made a dispassionate examination of this subject unusually difficult for him. He appears to understand better the true nature of Wealth than the laws of its production or the office of Capital. Political Economy almost originated with him, and the clearness of his economical vision in some directions is balanced by blindness in others. He is besides too much inclined to cut all societies after the same pattern. Some States seem marked out by nature for industry and commerce, others for agriculture; and the world would be a loser if one and the same career were enforced on all.

Status of those concerned with necessary work—some to be free, some to be slaves.

So far we have studied the classes concerned with trade and production in the best State of Aristotle rather with respect to the source from which they are to be recruited, the services they are to render, and the limitations under which they are to act, than with respect to their place in the State-system, or the connexion between them and the other agencies of the State. We possess, indeed, but few data as to a large section of these classes—that which comprises the merchant (ἔμπορος), the artisan, the day-labourer, the shopkeeper[1]. On the other hand, the cultivator of the soil and the domestic attendant have their

[1] How near all χερνῆτες, and among them the βάναυσος τεχνίτης, come to slaves, we see from 3. 4. 1277 a 37 sqq.

lot pretty clearly marked out. They are to be slaves—not all of them, indeed, private slaves, for the territory of the State is to be divided into two parts—whether equal or not, we are not told—the one to be retained in the hands of the State, and itself subdivided into two sections, devoted respectively to the maintenance of the worship of the gods and to the supply of the public meal-tables; the other to be allotted to individuals in several ownership. Both parts are to be cultivated by slaves; the public land by public, the private by private slaves. Dependent serfs (*περίοικοι*) of barbarian origin might be employed in the cultivation of the soil; but it was better to give this function to slaves (4 (7). 10. 1330 a 25 sqq.).

We observe, when we turn to the examination of the legitimacy of slavery contained in the First Book, that it is treated as entirely a domestic institution. The case of public slaves is left wholly out of consideration. It is not till the chapter on Phaleas in the Second Book (2. 7. 1267 b 16 sq.) that we get any hint of the arrangement adopted in the Fourth (the old Seventh) Book.

Slavery—its naturalness and justice impugned by some inquirers.

We do not know with certainty who were the impugners of the naturalness and justice of the institution of slavery referred to by Aristotle (1. 3. 1253 b 20 sq.)[1]. The distinction between nature and convention, which their view presupposes, is one recognized by many schools. A Sophist may well have struck the first blow. Some Sophists, indeed, denied that the Naturally Just exists; for them all right was based on convention only; but those who held this view cannot be referred to here, for in this passage we evidently have to do with men who accepted the existence of a Natural Justice, which slavery contravened. Others, however, did not go so far; and it may well be that in the general reference of existing institutions, and indeed of social order

[1] Were they the same as those who are mentioned in 4 (7). 2. 1324 a 35, as maintaining that the exercise of despotic rule over neighbours involves the greatest injustice, while the exercise of *πολιτικὴ ἀρχή* over others interferes with the ruler's felicity?

as a whole, to custom and tradition, or even compact, as opposed to nature, which marks the Sophistic epoch, the institution of slavery did not escape without challenge. The Sophist Lycophron denied the reality of the distinction between the noble and the ill-born[1], a distinction nearly related to that between slave and free (Pol. 1. 6. 1255 a 32 sqq.). Gorgias praised Rhetoric as the best of all arts in words that remind us of Aristotle's language here—because it 'made all other things its slaves, not by compulsion, but of their own free will' (Plato, Phileb. 58 A–B). The Cynics, again, might be referred to, were it not that they were more given to asserting the 'indifference' of positive institutions than to attacking them[2]. We can trace among the followers of the Cynic Diogenes, however, one opponent of slavery—Onesicritus, who accompanied the Oriental expedition of Alexander; for Strabo (15. p. 710), in mentioning an authority who affirmed that the Indians had no slaves, adds—'but Onesicritus alleges that this was the case only in the territory of Musicanus, and regards the absence of slavery as an excellent thing: he finds, in fact, many other excellent institutions in that region and describes it as especially well-ordered.' It appears from Strabo, p. 701, that in the part of India referred to, it was the custom for the young to render similar services to those elsewhere rendered by serfs, such as the Cretan Aphamiotae and the Helots of the Lacedaemonian State.

Apart, however, from the movement of philosophical opinion, much had happened, and was happening every day in Greece, to suggest doubts in the minds of men respecting the institution. Dio Chrysostom (Or. 15. 239 M) refers to the many Athenians who, in consequence of the defeat at Syracuse, had to serve as slaves in Sicily and the

[1] Aristot. Fragm. 82. 1490 a 10.

[2] Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 1. 230 (2nd edit.): cp. 208. 8: 238. 5, where the language of Antisthenes and Diogenes seems to imply that the wise man is not only not a natural slave, but not a slave at all. Diogenes, we are told, was especially given to distinguishing between τὰ κατὰ νόμον and τὰ κατὰ φύσιν (Diog. Laert. 6. 71): so far as this goes, therefore, he might be referred to here.

Peloponnese, and to the case of the Messenians (242 M), who after long years of slavery became again free citizens; and he notices how narrowly the whole body of slaves at Athens missed enfranchisement, when the Athenians offered them freedom after Chaeroneia on condition of their serving against Macedon, and would have given it if the war had continued (240 M). It was just the facility of the transition from slavery to freedom, and from freedom to slavery, and the dependence of men's status on accident and superior force and the will of men (cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1133 a 30: Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 14), that would give rise to the view that it was based on convention, not nature. A fragment from the Ἀγχίσης of Anaxandrides (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Graec. 3. 162) gives expression to what must have been a common feeling:—

> Οὐκ ἔστι δοῦλων, ὦ 'γαθ', οὐδαμοῦ πόλις,
> τύχη δὲ πάντα μεταφέρει τὰ σώματα,
> πολλοὶ δὲ νῦν μέν εἰσιν οὐκ ἐλεύθεροι,
> εἰς ταῦριον δὲ Σουνιεῖς, εἶτ' εἰς τρίτην
> ἀγορᾷ κέχρηνται· τὸν γὰρ οἶακα στρέφει
> δαίμων ἑκάστῳ.

So again Philemon, Fr. 39 (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Graec. 4. 47):—

> Κἂν δοῦλος ᾖ τις, σάρκα τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει,
> φύσει γὰρ οὐδεὶς δοῦλος ἐγενήθη ποτέ·
> ἡ δ' αὖ τύχη τὸ σῶμα κατεδουλώσατο.

According, again, to the Scholiast on Aristot. Rhet. 1. 13, the saying 'God made all men free: nature has made no man a slave' (ἐλευθέρους ἀφῆκε πάντας θεός· οὐδένα δοῦλον ἡ φύσις πεποίηκεν) occurred in the 'Messenian Oration' of the orator Alcidamas. It is, perhaps, to these words of Alcidamas that Aristotle refers in the passage we are considering (1. 3. 1253 b 20)[1]. It is certain, at all events, that

[1] So think Henkel (Studien, p. 124, n. 11) and Susemihl. Zeller, however, thinks (Gr. Ph. 1. 1007. 2) that Aristotle is not 'referring to Alcidamas specially' in this passage of the Politics: he holds that though Alcidamas may well have used in this oration the expression ascribed to him by the Scholiast, he can hardly have gone so far as to assail the institution of slavery, when seeking to

the restoration of Messenia to independence must have brought the question prominently before men's minds. Many who did not go so far as to impugn the naturalness of the institution as a whole, appear to have contested the justice of enslavement through war. Thus Callicratidas, when pressed on the capture of Methymna to sell the citizens as slaves, declared that, while he was in command, no Greek should be enslaved if he could help it, though he nevertheless sold the Athenian garrison as slaves the day after (Xen. Hell. 1. 6. 14–15). Agesilaus gave utterance to similar sentiments (Xen. Ages. 7. 6)[1]. Epaminondas and Pelopidas are said by Plutarch to have enslaved no captured cities (Pelop. et Marcell. Inter se Compar. c. 1, Μάρκελλος μὲν ἐν πολλαῖς πόλεσιν ὑποχειρίους γενομέναις σφαγὰς ἐποίησεν, Ἐπαμεινώνδας δὲ καὶ Πελοπίδας οὐδένα πώποτε κρατήσαντες ἀπέκτειναν οὐδὲ πόλεις ἠνδραποδίσαντο). The severities of this nature practised by Philip of Macedon indicate, therefore, a decided retrogression in international policy.

Even those who defended enslavement through war did so only in a qualified way, for they condemned the enslavement of Greeks through war (1. 6. 1255 a 21 sqq.). Enslavement for debt had been abolished at Athens by Solon[2], though elsewhere it may have been legal[3]. The law itself both at Athens and in other States drew a tacit distinction between the slave by birth (ὁ φύσει δοῦλος γενόμενος) and the slave not descended from slave-parents by making the former incapable of becoming a citizen (Dio Chrys. Or. 15. 239 M)[4]. Dio Chrysostom, in his Fifteenth Oration, mentions a general feeling that the slave by birth was a slave in the truest sense, but then he goes on to reason

win from the Lacedaemonians the recognition of Messenian independence. As to the oration in question, see Vahlen, der Rhetor Alkidamas, p. 14 sqq.

[1] Plato declares against the enslavement of Greeks in wars between one Greek State and another (Rep. 471 A).

[2] It survived in a single case only (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 3. § 58. 15).

[3] Ibid. § 58. 20.

[4] There seems to have been a special name for the slave by birth, or δουλόδουλος. He was called σίνδων (Athen. Deipn. 267 C).

that slaves by birth are descended from those who have been enslaved through war, and that this form of slavery, 'the oldest and that which has given birth to all the rest[1],' is 'very weak in point of justice' (242 M); and thus he arrives at the conclusion (243 M) that the true slave is the man who is unfree and servile in soul—a conclusion possibly suggested by Aristotle's examination of the subject, though arrived at in a different way.

If we add that the form which slavery assumed in the Lacedaemonian State gave rise to an especial amount of debate (Plato, Laws 776 C), we shall see that the institution was undergoing a rigorous examination, in the course of which one form of it after another was being weighed in the balance and found wanting, and that first enslavement for debt, then the enslavement of Greeks[2], then enslavement through war, were successively being eliminated, so that a total condemnation of the institution might well seem to be at hand. Hence a careful investigation of its true basis, such as that which Aristotle made, was especially timely.

Reinvestigation of the basis of slavery by Aristotle.

Both Xenophon and Plato furnished him with some hints on the subject. Xenophon had insisted that rule should, if possible, be so exercised as to win willing obedience from the ruled, and had shown how the master might be a means of developing virtue in his slaves. Plato had, in one and the same dialogue (the Republic), made it a distinguishing feature of the ideal State not to enslave the class which provided it with necessary or useful commodities (τὸ χρηματιστικόν)[3], and also pointed to the man in whom there is a natural weakness of the higher principle as a

[1] He overlooks the fact that slavery originating in voluntary surrender and slavery for debt could not be said to have developed out of war.

[2] Cp. Levit. 25. 44: 'Both thy bondmen and thy bondmaids which thou shalt have shall be of the heathen that are round about you; of them shall ye buy bondmen and bondmaids.' I have already quoted this passage for another purpose.

[3] Rep. 547 C. This class (the third) is probably conceived as Hellenic, like the two higher classes, and the fact that it is not a slave-class in the ideal State of the Republic does not necessarily imply the non-existence of slavery in this State: on the contrary, slavery is here and there tacitly implied to exist in it (e.g. Rep. 549 A).

being designed by nature to be enslaved to another who can supply that deficiency (Rep. 590 C–D: cp. Polit. 309 A). This view of the institution, which, as has been remarked, probably suggested Aristotle's doctrine of natural slavery, seems, however, to be lost sight of in the Laws, where little, if any, attention appears to be paid to the ethical interests of the slave.

Aristotle defends, but reforms slavery.

It is on these foundations that Aristotle builds. He consents to retain the institution in his best State on condition of a complete reform, which would restore the willingness of the relation by making it advantageous both to master and slave. Natural slavery presupposed, according to him, not only a low intellectual level in the slave, but high moral and intellectual excellence in the master. The *raison d'être* of slavery was to make a noble life possible for the master, and if the master could not, or did not, live such a life, slavery failed to achieve the end of its existence. Aristotle would not have been satisfied to incorporate in his best State a relation which, though necessary, was not advantageous to both the parties to it. Indeed, it is less on the social necessity of slavery than on the benefits which it confers on master and slave, that he insists. Thus, while he argues in the First Book (1. 4. 1253 b 23 sqq.) that the slave is a necessity to Household Science, he allows in the Fourth (the old Seventh) the substitution of serfs for slaves, so far as the cultivation of the soil is concerned (4 (7). 10. 1330 a 25 sqq.). The necessity of slavery to ancient society has perhaps been somewhat overrated. 'Coloni' seem to have served its purpose in the later days of the Roman Empire as well as slaves. The submissiveness of the 'hewers of wood and drawers of water' was the important thing, and this was rather a matter of nationality than of civil status. If they were not submissive, we know from a variety of instances that the status of slavery was but a poor security for their obedience or tranquillity.

v. E. Meyer, Die Sklaverei im Altertum; Kl. Schr. p. 169

Aristotle has already in the Second Chapter of the First

Book recognized as the constituent elements of the household the relations of husband and wife and master and slave, and treated the one relation as equally necessary and natural with the other, the master's intelligence and the slave's bodily strength being mutually complementary and indispensable, just as the union of male and female is necessary for the purpose of reproduction. The naturalness of slavery is thus already established, and it may be asked why the question should be again taken up in c. 3. The answer probably is, that in c. 2 Aristotle deals with the question of slavery only in course of proving the naturalness of the State, and that in conformity with his usual practice he is not content to dispense with a special examination of this particular question apart from all others, which he conducts wholly without reference to the result already hastily reached.

In tracing the course of the investigation respecting slavery in c. 3 (1253 b 14 sqq.), it must be borne in mind that Aristotle is testing not one opinion but two—not alone the view of those who asserted that slavery is contrary to nature (which is the more interesting of the two contentions to us), but also the view of the Platonic Socrates, who had said that rule over slaves is a science and identical with the rule of the householder, statesman, and king. It is thus as much his purpose to show that the rule over slaves is nothing exalted—and this he shows by his definition of the slave (c. 4. 1253 b 23–1254 a 17) and by occasional hints later on (1254 a 24 sqq.: 1255 b 33 sqq.)—as that there is a natural kind of slavery.

His first inquiry is, what is the nature and function of the slave?—his next, is such a being forthcoming? He deals with the former question first, and starts from two propositions, which for the moment he assumes as true, though he will later on see reason to modify them—1. that Property is a part of the Household: 2. that the Science of acquiring property (in the sense of things necessary for living and living well) is a part of the Science of Household Management (*οἰκονομία*). He then proceeds to say that just as arts with

some single definite end stand in need of instruments fo the accomplishment of that end, so does Household Science though it is not, strictly speaking, an Art, and its end i broader. The slave, he goes on to show, is one of th animate instruments which Household Science needs an an article of household property, but he is an exceptiona kind of instrument, an instrument prior to other instrument and an instrument of action, not of production; and bein an article of property, he stands to his master in a peculiarl close relation—he is a part of him and wholly his.

The next question is—is any human being so constitute by nature? As nature always does that which is best fc each thing and that which is just, this question resolve itself into another—is any human being in existence fc whom it is best and also just that he should be placed i this position? We have here a question of fact, and on would have expected it to be answered by a direct appe to facts, and by that alone. But Aristotle says (5. 1254 20), that it is one which it is not difficult to answer, wheth by process of reasoning (τῷ λόγῳ), or by noting actual fac (τὰ γινόμενα). The thing both must be, if something quit contrary to analogy is not to take place, and it also, as matter of fact, is.

Ruling and being ruled is not only a necessary but a advantageous thing; and in some cases a destination f the one position or the other appears immediately on birt A ruling element and a ruled appears wherever a Whc proceeds from the union of a plurality of elements; ar thus it is not surprising that there are many different kin of ruling and ruled elements, varying in excellence accordir to the function which ruler and ruled unite to discharg We need not reject slavery as unnatural, because we c not rank the relation of master and slave with the ru of the householder, or the statesman, or the king. We c trace a kind of rule even in things inanimate; we c trace ruling and ruled elements in an animal; here we fi both the despotic and the political form of rule, the ru of the soul over the body being of the former kind, that

the rational over the appetitive part being of the latter; and in both cases, the relation is natural and advantageous. The same thing appears in the relation of man to the other animals. The tame are better than the wild, and it is advantageous to them to be ruled by man; what holds of the better, however, is natural. So again, the male sex is naturally stronger than the female; consequently, the male rules, the female is ruled. The same thing holds between one human being and another, irrespective of sex. The naturalness of rule does not depend on its being of the highest type, but on its adjustment to the interval between ruler and ruled. If there are human beings who are as far inferior to others as the body is to the soul, or as the lower animals are to man, then the relation of rule which obtains between soul and body, and man and other animals, will be properly applicable to them and will be natural and for their good. This is the case with human beings whose best function is the use of the body. They are fit only to belong to another; they are but little above the lower animals: the only psychological difference between them and the lower animals is that they can listen to reason, though they have it not, whereas animals follow passion. In use and, where Nature succeeds in her aim, in bodily aspect, they differ little from tame animals; their strength and their stoop are points of resemblance. In their case slavery is advantageous to the slave and just.

The question then arises, how it is that so many deny the justice and therefore the naturalness of slavery. The reason is that there is a kind of slavery which rests only on convention. A law exists, not based on Nature, but only on agreement, which confers on victors in war a property in the vanquished and all they possess. The justice of this law is impugned by many who occupy themselves with law; and it is true that it cannot be seriously defended except on the ground that superiority in force implies superiority in virtue. This is the common premiss from which the disputants on either side must start, if their arguments are to have any weight; and it is on superiority of virtue that

Aristotle bases natural slavery. His view is confirmed by t
tacit agreement of the disputants on this point and on t
point only. But there is another view put forward. So
claim that this kind of slavery is just, simply because it
allowed by law. To them the legal is the just. But then t
particular application of the law may not be just, for the w
may have been begun unjustly, or again persons may
enslaved in this way who are incapable of becoming slav
like the heaven-descended Hecuba. And this would
admitted by these inquirers. Thus, by this path also
arrive at the conclusion that the true test of just freed
and just slavery is to be found in relative goodness a
badness. Aristotle, in fact, finds his view of slavery co
firmed by Common Opinion; but instead of basing Natu
Slavery, as most did, on the extraction of the pers
enslaved, or the circumstances of their enslavement,
bases it on their nature and the nature of their enslavers

We see that the objections to slavery current in Ar
totle's day were objections based on its alleged unfairness
the slave rather than on the interest of the communi
That the captive taken in war should be enslaved seem
hard to many, especially if he were a Greek: the right
enslave was too exorbitant a privilege to be granted
those who could only boast a superiority of force; if t
was the basis of the right, it had no more to say for its
than tyranny[1], which met with universal condemnati
Others passed the same criticism on the whole institut
of slavery, however it originated. Force and injustice
at its root. Thus slavery was attacked, not on the grou
of its social or economical inexpediency, but on the grou
of justice and the right of human beings to have th
interests considered, and not to be forced to be partie
an one-sided bargain[2].

Aristotle's defence of slavery and his reform of it

[1] Cp. Pol. 7 (5). 10. 1313a 9, ἂν δὲ δι' ἁπάντων ἀρξῇ τις ἡ βίας, ἤδη δοκεῖ τοῦτο εἶναι τυραννίς.

[2] Compare the use of δου Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1133a 1: δοῦλος, Pol. 2. 12. 1274a 18.

designed to meet objections of this nature. He is too fully convinced of the expediency of the remodelled institution in the interest of the slave to make any point of its indispensability to society; on this he touches only incidentally while seeking to ascertain the definition of the slave. To learn what a slave is and then to ask whether there are those to whom such a position brings advantage, is all that is necessary for the full treatment of the question of the naturalness of slavery. If the slave is a gainer, society, it is taken for granted, cannot be a loser. Aristotle's object is to show that slavery, rightly constituted, is not an one-sided bargain for the slave at all. The natural slave has not that part of the soul (*τὸ βουλευτικόν*), which is necessary to make moral virtue complete. He gains, therefore, by being linked to some controlling force possessing that which he lacks. Aristotle does not pause to examine whether this defect of nature could be mended by education; he implies, however, that it could not. The human being designed by nature for slavery, unlike the brute, can apprehend and listen to reason, but he does not possess reason (1. 5. 1254 b 22)[1]. Yet he possesses a kind of moral virtue—the kind which enables him to do his work in subordination to his master—the moral virtue, in fact, of a subordinate confined to humble functions, and itself of a humble type. How any form of moral virtue can subsist in the absence of the deliberative faculty, Aristotle does not explain, nor how the use of the body is the best that comes of the slave (*τὸ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ βέλτιστον*, 1. 5. 1254 b 18), if virtuous action is not beyond him. There are, indeed, other indications that it was not possible for Aristotle wholly to reconcile the two aspects of the slave, as a man and as an instrument or article of property. In the First Book of the

[1] Though Aristotle's tone in this passage in regard to the distance between man and brute differs much from his tone in a previous chapter of the same book (1. 2. 1253 a 9 sqq.), he says nothing here that conflicts with what he has said there. He had there allowed to men in contrast with brutes a perception of the good and bad, the just and unjust, and here he allows even to the natural slave a perception of reason.

Politics the slave, though the mere animate chattel of his master, is nevertheless conceived as forming a *κοινωνία* with him (cp. 1. 2. 1252b 9, *τούτων τῶν δύο κοινωνιῶν*: 1. 5. 1254a 29, *ἔν τι κοινόν*: 1. 13. 1260a 40, *κοινωνὸς ζωῆς*), and as united to him by a dependent friendship (1. 6. 1255b 13); but in the Fourth (the old Seventh) Property, and consequently, it would seem, the slave, is implied to be no part of the household (4 (7). 8. 1328a 28 sqq.)[1], and *κοινωνία* appears to be pronounced impossible between those whose aim is the best life and those who have no such aim, unless indeed the *κοινωνία* of the State is alone here referred to. The distinction between the slave *qua* slave and the slave *qua* human being, which, whether it be a satisfactory distinction or not, serves in the Nicomachean Ethics to make the contradictions inherent in the position of the slave a little less glaring, does not appear to be used in the Politics. The same inconsistency is evident, if we examine Aristotle's conception of the office of the master in relation to his slave. He is charged in the First Book with the task of developing in the slave all the moral virtue of which he is capable, and thus the relation between them is adjusted to the aim of good life, and becomes a relation not unworthy of the husband and father or unfit to find a place in the household and the State; but then we find in the Third Book that the aim of the master in his rule over the slave is primarily his own advantage and only accidentally that of the slave. If this is so, and the slave feels it to be so, one may doubt whether the affectionate reverence and sense of common interest, which Aristotle hopes to create in the mind of the slave, would be found in reality to exist, however high the character of the master might be, and however great the moral benefits conferred by him. Aristotle's arguments may perhaps prove that a human being of the stamp of his 'natural slave' should be subjected to a strict rule; they do not prove that he should be made an article of property.

[1] Aristotle is here insisting on the contrast between the higher and lower elements of the State, whereas in the First Book he is making the most he can of the position of the slave.

The ambiguity of the word δεσπόζειν, which was used to denote both the relation of an absolute ruler to his subjects and that of a proprietor to his property, concealed from his view the vast difference between the two propositions. From absolute rule (δεσποτικὴ ἀρχή) to ownership (δεσποτεία) is a great and momentous step. We may feel that his 'natural slave' would be all the better for being ruled by a man of full virtue (σπουδαῖος ἁπλῶς), but not for being his chattel[1].

Aristotle approached the subject under the influence of a scientific reaction both against the views of those who, like some of the Sophists, were inclined to challenge the claims of every existing institution, and against the views of those who, like Plato, had dealt very freely with some institutions of great importance. His bias was in favour of accepting and amending the institutions to which the collective experience of his race had given birth, rather than sweeping them away. He pleaded against Plato for the continued existence of the parental and conjugal relations, and he was led on to find good in the relation of master and slave.

He deserves, however, to be remembered rather as the author of a suggestion for the reformation of slavery than as the defender of the institution. The slavery he defends is an ideal slavery which can exist only where the master is intellectually and morally as high as the slave is low. Aristotle would find in the Greek society of his own day as many slave-owners who had no business to own slaves as slaves who had no business to be enslaved. His theory of slavery implies, if followed out to its results, the illegitimacy of the relation of master and slave in a large proportion of the cases in which it existed. In how many instances

[1] The Stoics appear to have distinguished slavery in the sense of subjection from slavery in the sense of possession and subjection —Diog. Laert. 7. 122, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἄλλην δουλείαν (besides the *ipso facto* slavery of the bad) τὴν ἐν ὑποτάξει, καὶ τρίτην τὴν ἐν κτήσει τε καὶ ὑποτάξει, ἣν ἀντιτίθεται ἡ δεσποτεία, φαύλη οὖσα καὶ αὐτή. Aristotle regards the δεσποτικὴ ἐπιστήμη as φαύλη, but hardly δεσποτεία, when exercised over natural slaves. It is natural and a means of virtue to the slave, and would hardly be said by him to be φαύλη.

would not the master, if judged by his rules, be found unfit to be a master and the slave unfit to be a slave! This would be so even in Greece; among the barbarians, if we may judge from a passage in the First Book (1. 2. 1252 b 6), natural slavery could not exist, for there that which is marked out by nature for rule (τὸ φύσει ἄρχον) is wanting. The limitations Aristotle imposed on slavery would probably attract more attention and comment from most of his contemporaries than his recognition of slavery subject to those limitations. He confined it to a relatively small class of human beings—to those whose vocation was rude physical labour, the exercise of mere muscle and sinew. Human beings fit for no higher work than that—whether Greek or barbarian, and they would commonly be barbarians—were to be slaves. His plan seems to be to limit the incidence of slavery rather than to lighten its yoke. He allows, though reluctantly, the substitution of serfs (περίοικοι) for slaves in agriculture. He recommends that all slaves shall have the hope of freedom held out to them, as a reward for good conduct[1] (4 (7). 10. 1330 a 32 sq.), but we are not distinctly told whether the master is to have the right of manumission, nor do we learn whether he is to have the right to sell, or bequeath, or give away the slave. There is no indication, however, that Aristotle was inclined to depart greatly from the general practice of Greece in relation to the rights of the master over the slave.

All the economical objections to slavery would apply to the reorganization of it which Aristotle designed. Agriculture would not prosper in the hands of slaves. Indeed, in recommending that the cultivators of the soil in his best State should be slaves, Aristotle extended slavery to a class which in contemporary Greece was frequently free. On the other hand, we must bear in mind that he proposes to limit the number of the slaves in a State to that which is imperatively requisite for its well-

[1] Yet obviously a natural slave would *ex hypothesi* lose by being set free: we infer, therefore, but are not distinctly told, that a natural slave can be fitted by slavery for the enjoyment of freedom.

being, just as he applies the same limit to Property and 'instruments' and 'necessary work' generally; that he brings even the slaves of the farm within the household (except of course such as are public slaves), herein true to the old-fashioned conception of the slave as *οἰκέτης*[1]; and that he is against the employment as slaves, not merely of those who are not natural slaves, but also of members of courageous and high-spirited races, like those which inhabited the barbarous portions of Europe. Thrace, for instance, would probably be no longer drawn upon for slaves, and many fine races would escape degradation[2]. The free population would thus have no cause to feel that they were oppressing a body of men who deserved, or at least wished, to be free. They would have been saved the consciousness of injustice, the terror, suspicion, and consequent tendency to cruelty which comes of such a situation—results with which Greece was familiar in the instance of the Lacedaemonian State. The adoption of Aristotle's reform would have left but few Hellenic slaves, no slaves possessed of capacity, none certainly of that gifted or learned sort of which we hear much in Greece and still more in the Roman Empire[3]. It is curious, indeed, to notice that Theophrastus, the disciple of Aristotle, had a slave of philosophical capacity: 'sed et Theophrasti Peripatetici servus Pompylus, et Zenonis Stoici servus qui Persaeus vocatus est, et Epicuri cui nomen Mys fuit, philosophi non incelebres vixerunt' (Gell. 2. 18, quoted by Menage on Diog. Laert. 10. 3). But, if this Pompylus is the Pompylus

[1] Cp. Seneca, Epist. 47: ne illud quidem videtis quam omnem invidiam majores nostri dominis, omnem contumeliam servis detraxerint? Dominum patrem familiae appellaverunt; servos (quod etiam in mimis adhuc durat) familiares.

[2] There is a striking description in Strabo (p. 224) of the conduct of some refractory Corsican slaves, which shows that in these European races mere 'brutishness' (*τὸ θηριῶδες καὶ τὸ βοσκηματῶδες*) was no security for willing slavery.

[3] Some of these learned slaves discharged an useful function in Roman society, for they were largely employed in copying MSS. 'The place of the press in our literature was taken by the slaves' (Schmidt, Denk- und Glaubensfreiheit, p. 119, quoted by Guhl and Koner, Life of the Greeks and Romans, E. T., p. 529).

mentioned in Theophrastus' will (Diog. Laert. 5. 54), he is there referred to as 'for a long time past free.' Theophrastus had not retained as a slave one who was in no sense a natural slave. The system of keeping skilled slaves for the profit to be got from their work (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 3. § 13) would vanish with the unsound form of the Science of Supply. The class of slaves, by losing all its intelligent members, would well nigh lose all chance of influencing or corrupting the free population. The position of the free labourer or artisan would still be lower, as it always is, than in a society where slavery does not exist; but slavery would do far less harm in a community like the best State of Aristotle, sound in tone and studiously secured against its influence, than it did in most Greek States.

Aristotle was probably not aware how much evil and misery would be caused in the slave-producing regions of Asia and Africa by the wars which he sanctions for the purpose of capturing natural slaves[1]. Nothing can have tended more to demoralize barbarian society in the countries round about Greece than the demand for slaves in Greece itself, and it may well be doubted whether the moral influence even of Aristotle's ideal householder on the slave would have been an adequate compensation for the perennial disturbance and degradation of the races from which slaves were to be sought. On the other hand, Aristotle's reform would have done much to soften the customs of war waged between Hellenes, or between Hellenes and civilized non-Hellenes. The indiscriminate enslavement of the population of cities taken by storm would cease. Only those who were natural slaves would be enslaved; the rest would be ransomed. Wars of one Greek State with another, or of Greeks with some non-Hellenic States would have entailed hardly any enslavement. The many Greek cities which after the time of Aristotle experienced this fate would have escaped. The decrease of population in Greece, which became more and more

[1] 1. 8. 1256 b 23 sqq.: 4 (7). 14. 1334 a 2.

marked as time went on[1], had probably already begun in Aristotle's day; and one of its causes, at all events, would have been removed if enslavement through war had been abandoned in the case of those who were not slaves by nature. The ransom of captives in war was, it is true, already permitted in most cases; it was not, however, in all, and the lesson which Aristotle taught was one which none needed to learn more than Philip of Macedon. Potidaea and Olynthus with the neighbouring Chalcidian cities endured enslavement at his hands[2]. If Stageira was destroyed by Philip and its inhabitants sold as slaves (Plutarch, Alexander c. 7), its fate may well have been present to Aristotle's mind in this discussion. Epirus was permanently ruined by the enslavement of 150,000 of its population after the subjugation of Perseus by Rome. It is evident that in his investigation of the subject of slavery Aristotle raised questions of vital importance to the future of Greece.

We may wish that he had dispensed altogether with slavery in his State. If he does not do so, the reason is that while he sees rude manual labour to be necessary to society, and holds such labour cheap, he also holds that the worker must not be too good for his work, on pain of being deteriorated by it, and that the humble type of worker appropriate to work of this kind must find a suitable social niche ready for his reception, in which whatever good there is in him may be developed. That Aristotle's premisses did not logically compel him to make a worker of this type the property of a master, we have already seen.

In the result, slavery long escaped both abolition and reform. There was much in Stoicism that might have led to a condemnation of slavery. The idea of the natural

Slow decadence of Slavery.

[1] See Thirlwall, History of Greece, 8. 460–7.

[2] See A. Schäfer, Demosth. 2. 40. See also Polyb. 8. 11, where Polybius complains that Theopompus, after praising Philip as the greatest man Greece had ever produced, went on to depict him as most vicious, and 'as having enslaved and captured through treason with fraud and violence more cities than any other man.'

equality of men was familiar to many adherents
school. The Stoics drew a stronger line of demarcat
Aristotle had drawn between man and the lower
They did not probably rate the influence of a man's
on his character, or its importance as a source of ha
as high as Aristotle. Cleanthes was not the less
man' for his labours as a 'drawer of water.' Slav
therefore, no longer necessary to save the higher
from deterioration; and slavery lost its Aristotelia
d'être. The wise man's virtue and happiness wer
the mercy of social conditions; they were the
conviction and self-discipline rather than of social
ments. The Stoics did not absolutely teach t
structure of society was an indifferent matter, for t
their preferences on the subject—their favourite
tions and the like; but the general tendency of thei
ing, was, in contrast to that of Plato, to trace virtue
like Socrates, they identified with knowledge, to
phical training apart from social habituation an
guidance[1]. Epicureanism ranked slavery, with we
poverty, among the things

> Quorum
> Adventu manet incolumis natura abituque:
> Haec solitei sumus, ut par est, eventa vocare[2].

Christianity itself, whatever its ultimate tendenc
made it its aim rather to mitigate, than to put an en
institution. Its earliest view is expressed in the
'Let every man abide in the same calling, wherein
called. Art thou called being a servant? care no
but if thou mayest be made free, use it rather. For
is called in the Lord, being a servant, is the Lord's fr
likewise also, he that is called being free is Christ's
Ye are bought with a price; be not ye the ser
men[3].' 'Servants, obey in all things your masters a

[1] Cp. Cic. Acad. Post. 1. 10. 38 (quoted by Zeller, Stoics, E.T., p. 238): cumque superiores non omnem virtutem in ratione esse dicerent, sed quasdam virtutes natura aut more perfe (Zeno) omnes in ratio bat.

[2] Lucr. 1. 456.

[3] 1 Cor. 7. 20-23.

to the flesh, not with eye-service as men-pleasers, but in singleness of heart, fearing God; and whatsoever ye do, do it heartily as to the Lord and not unto men; knowing that of the Lord ye shall receive the reward of the inheritance, for ye serve the Lord Jesus Christ. But he that doeth wrong shall receive for the wrong which he hath done; and there is no respect of persons[1].' The master and the slave were thus alike required to do their duty—the master, inasmuch as he also had 'a Master in heaven' (Col. 4. 1.): the slave, inasmuch as he was the servant of Christ. Between the slave, who was 'the Lord's freedman,' and the master, who was Christ's servant, a spiritual, though not a social, equality was thus established, and if this did not apply to slaves who were not Christians, at all events a door of approach was thrown open to all. As time went on, however, and slave after slave was admitted to Orders in the Christian Church, the whole class of slaves probably gained somewhat in general estimation; and though sees and monasteries felt no scruple in exercising proprietary rights over slaves, they did much, in conformity with St. Paul's injunction, to set the example of a milder treatment of them; till the abbot Theodore Studita, who died in 826, condemned in his will the owning of slaves by monks or monasteries on the ground that the slave no less than the freeman is made in the image of God, and the synod of Enham in 1009 forbade the sale of Christians as slaves because Christ had redeemed slaves as well as freemen by the shedding of His blood[2]. Long ere this, serfage had, for secular reasons, taken the place of predial slavery in the Roman Empire: still the institution has lingered on into modern times. 'So recently as the reign of James the Second, political prisoners of our own kith and kin were sold as slaves to toil and die in the tropics of the

[1] Col. 3. 22-5.

[2] See on this subject Schiller, Lehre des Aristoteles von der Sklaverei, pp. 1-3, from whom the above facts are taken. A fuller treatment of the subject will be found in Wallon, Histoire de l'Esclavage, tome 3: see especially p. 409 sqq. As to this provision of Theodore Studita's will, see Finlay, Byzantine Empire, 1. 261 (ed. 2).

West Indies. The maids of honour of the Court of J
the Second (not 200 years ago) received present
Englishmen condemned for treasonable offences[1].' L
would seem to accept slavery in his Treatise on
Government[2]. 'There is another sort of servants,' he
'which by a peculiar name we call slaves, who
captives taken in a just war, are by the right of nature
jected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power of
masters. These men, having, as I say, forfeited their
and with it their liberties, and lost their estates, and
in the state of slavery, not capable of any property, ca
in that state be considered as any part of civil soc
the chief end whereof is the preservation of property.'
this view he goes beyond Aristotle, who is far from acco
ing as natural slaves all 'captives taken in a just war.'

Plato's scheme of a community in women and children, and also in property, rejected by Aristotle: his grounds for rejecting it considered.

The slave is a member of the household and als
object of property; and the transition is natural fro
part to the whole, from the slave to the Household
Property. And here we find Aristotle overtly impug
the teaching of Plato without the preliminary apologi
the well-known chapter in the Nicomachean Ethics.
was perhaps impossible for him even nominally to f
the Theory of Ideas on Socrates as here he does the Pla
Communism[3]. His rehabilitation of the Household a
the right of Several Property is certainly more succe
than his attempted rehabilitation of Slavery.

Plato had sought in the Republic, for the sake of
of feeling among the members of his State, to extend
sphere of 'the common' to the utmost possible limit.
had noticed that when some piece of good or ill fo
befel individual members of an ordinarily constituted S

[1] Sir S. Baker, Rede Lecture on Slavery and the Slave Trade, *Macmillan's Magazine*, July, 1874, p. 187.

[2] 2. § 85.

[3] Pol. 2. cc. 1–6 *passim*. Contrast the most doubtfully authentic part of c. 12 of the same b Πλάτωνος δ' ἥ τε τῶν γυναικ παίδων καὶ τῆς οὐσίας κοινότης (1274 b 9). In 2. 7. 1266 b certain provisions in the are ascribed to Plato, and the Athenian Stranger.

some of their fellows sympathized with them, while others did not; and he seems to have ascribed this disharmony of feeling to the existence of separate households and separate rights of property[1]. Carry the element of 'community' further till the distinction of *meum* and *tuum* ceased to exist in relation to women, children, and property, and the whole society would feel as one man. This was the end he had in view. If in the Republic he appears to confine his communistic scheme to the upper section of his State[2], he affirms in the Laws with the utmost emphasis that the best form of the State is that in which the saying, 'Friends have all things in common,' holds of the entire State in the highest possible degree; in which women, children, and property are common, and 'the private and individual is altogether banished from life, and things which are by nature private such as eyes, and ears, and hands, have become common, and in some way see and hear and act in common, and all men express praise and blame, and feel joy and sorrow, on the same occasions,' and the laws do their best to make the State as much one as possible[3]. It is evident from this passage that to Plato the society in which the household and several property do not exist offers the true type of social organization, though for some reason he applies his principle in the Republic only to the upper section of the State. His view apparently is that if the upper section of the State is so organized as to be at one with itself, then the whole State will be so too (cp. Rep. 545 D, *ἢ τόδε μὲν ἁπλοῦν ὅτι πᾶσά πολιτεία μεταβάλλει ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔχοντος τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅταν ἐν αὐτῷ τούτῳ στάσις ἐγγένηται; ὁμονοοῦντος δέ, κἂν πάνυ ὀλίγον ᾖ, ἀδύνατον κινη-*

[1] Rep. 462-3.

[2] His aim is, in the Third Book of the Republic, to secure that 'the guardians shall be as good as possible and shall not wrong the other citizens' (3. 416 C): in the Fifth it is rather to secure the harmony of the whole State by securing the internal harmony of the guardians (5. 465 B, *τούτων μὴν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς μὴ στασιαζόντων, οὐδὲν δεινὸν μή ποτε ἡ ἄλλη πόλις πρὸς τούτους ἢ πρὸς ἀλλήλους διχοστατήσῃ*). The latter aim is far more prominently put forward than the other, and it is that with which Aristotle is pre-occupied. It is clearly implied in Tim. 18 B that the plan of Communism applies only to the upper section.

[3] Laws 739 B-D (Prof. Jowett's translation 4. 258).

θῆναι;). Throughout the Republic, in fact, he seems to avoid spending time over the arrangements respecting the third class, and to treat this class as of little moment (Rep. 421 A).

Most modern forms of communism—those in which there is community of property without community of women and children—would in no way satisfy Plato: It is the existence of the household to which he especially objects; he would object to it, even if the household were supported out of a common stock[1]. My wife—my children—my relatives—my clan, phratry, or tribe—to these terms used in any exclusive sense he objects. He retains the words 'father,' 'son,' 'brother,' but expands their application, so that all exclusiveness of meaning would practically pass from them. He seems to hope that relationship would thus be rendered powerless for harm. 'The guardians,' he claims (Rep. 464 D), 'will be free from those quarrels of which property, or children, or relations are the occasion.' His language here evidently betrays a consciousness that all causes of disharmony would not be removed, and it is obvious that even in the ideal State of Plato a guardian would feel the misfortunes of a friend far more than those of one who was not a friend.

Aristotle, however, does not pause, as he might have done, to point out that Plato's remedy for sectional feeling is after all only a partial one, even from his own point of view. He argues the question on its merits, which is, no doubt, the most instructive way of treating it.

His objections to the scheme of a community in women and children seem to be, in the main, the following:—

(1) He questions the end which Plato set before the State; and this on two grounds—

A. The State cannot be made as completely one as the individual, or it can be so, only at the cost of its own existence. The State is held together, not by contrivances

[1] This is the tenour of his language in the Republic; in the Politicus, however, he speaks of marriage and common offspring, as among, not indeed the divine, but the human guarantees of union for States (310 B).

for impressing on it the sort of unity which obtains in the individual, but by justice and virtue in its members (2. 2. 1261 a 30: cp. 2. 5. 1263 b 36 sq.), which must be called into existence by the lawgiver. Whether Aristotle quite appreciates the meaning with which Plato used the expression, 'the maximum unity of the State'—whether he is right in conceiving Plato to use it in a sense conflicting with the inevitable plurality in number and diversity in kind of the individuals composing the State, is another question. A little later on, as we shall see, he rightly construes Plato's 'unity' as equivalent to 'unanimity.'

B. Not the maximum of unity, but the maximum of self-completeness is the true end of the State. Here, again, we feel that unanimity in no way conflicts with self-completeness, though we also feel that Aristotle's dictum is a profound one, and more far-reaching than he was perhaps himself aware. It explains how the large national State of modern times has come to take the place of the small city-State of antiquity.

(2) He questions the means which Plato adopts to secure his end. Plato's citizens will indeed say 'mine' and 'not mine' of the same thing (ἅμα), but they will so speak collectively, not individually. When, for instance, all say of the same child 'this is my child,' they will only mean 'this is my child in a collective sense,' not 'this is my own child.' That is all that the scheme will secure, and that in no way contributes to unanimity (οὐδὲν ὁμονοητικόν). We note that here Aristotle understands the 'unity' spoken of by Plato as equivalent to 'unanimity' (ὁμόνοια), whereas in the preceding argument he had treated it as equivalent to mathematical unity[1].

(3) Leaving on one side the question of end and means, Aristotle goes on to advance other objections[2] to the

[1] We also note that Aristotle's only illustration of 'all saying "mine" and "not mine" of the same thing' is taken from children, whereas it would seem from Rep. 462–3 that Plato is thinking rather of events, joyful or the reverse, occurring to members of the community.

[2] See Cicero's apparent reproduction of them in de Rep. 4. 5. 5.

scheme of a community in women and children. It diminish the amount of care and attention given to th for things held in common receive less attention than tl held in severalty, and here too the very number of con children, and the citizen's uncertainty what indivi really stand in this relation to him, will add to the culty. It will also diminish 'closeness of conne (οἰκειότης) within the State, and make affection (φιλία) and watery; it will relieve relatives of their duties to other and lessen the chance of their getting help each other; it will leave no room for the exercise of perance (σωφροσύνη), in relation at least to women (P 5. 1263 b 9). Certain religious and moral difficultie also raised—such as the probability of incest, parricide, occurring between relatives not known by each oth be relatives[2], and no expiations (λύσεις) being forthcon as in similar cases at present[3]. Nor will Aristotle a the practicability of effectually concealing relation which will be betrayed by likeness, and also by the re tions of those who are charged by the State with transfer of children from one class to another.

Aristotle does not apply to the proposal of a comm in women and children one criticism which he passe that of a community in property—that it will take a source of pleasure—though this argument might cert be here too urged with truth, and no one would fe truth more than Aristotle[4]. In many of the critic which he does make there is much weight. It is prob true that warmth of affection would be impaired society which, though nominally united by ties of rela ship, would practically be an 'unitized' society. It course also true that things held in common receive

[1] Cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 b 11 sq.

[2] Plato probably hopes to prevent this by the regulations as to relationship, Rep. 461 D, which, however, would fail of their effect where the exact age was unknown.

[3] The thing was known to occur already: cp. Clem. Alex. Pa 3. p. 265 Potter (quoted by quardt, Röm. Alterth. 7. 1. παιδὶ νορνεύσαντι καὶ μαχ θυγατράσιν ἀγνοήσαντες πα μίγνυνται πατέρες, οὐ μεμν τῶν ἐκτεθέντων παιδίων.

[4] Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1162 a 2

attention than things not so held. Yet Aristotle himself proposes that the State shall own land and slaves, and that the education of boys shall be managed by State-officers as a matter of common concern. He does not explain how it is that in these matters he has no fear of 'neglect' occurring.

It is remarkable that the defence of the Household against Plato in the Second Book contains no reference to the statement of the First Book that the Household exists by nature, though one would have thought that if this is a fact, it ought to be decisive. The claims of the Household are rested in the First Book partly on its necessity, partly on its value as a source of virtue and good life in women, children, and slaves. If in the Second Book Aristotle adds a reference to its services in promoting affection in the State, the new point of view is suggested to him by Plato's error in considering it a source of discord. The value of Relationship apart from the Household is a topic that emerges only in the Second Book[1].

Aristotle's criticisms on the plan of a community of property are not very dissimilar from his criticisms on the plan of a community in women and children. He evidently feels, however, that there is more to be said for the former than the latter[2]. He wholly rejects the one, while he allows that the other has certain advantages[3]. But

[1] Aristotle approaches very near to, but does not perhaps actually use, an argument used by Burke in his Reflections on the Revolution in France (Works, 2. 467 Bohn). 'We begin our public affections in our families. No cold relation is a zealous citizen. We pass on to our neighbourhoods and our habitual provincial connexions. These are inns and resting-places... The love to the whole is not extinguished by this subordinate partiality. Perhaps it is a sort of elemental training to those higher and more large regards.'

[2] Cp. Cic. de Rep. 4. 5. 5: de patrimoniis tolerabile est, licet sit injustum; nec enim aut obesse cuiquam debet, si sua industria plus habet, aut prodesse, si sua culpa minus. Sed, ut dixi, potest aliquo modo ferri. Etiamne conjuges, etiamne liberi communes erunt?

[3] 2. 5. 1263 a 24, ἔξει γὰρ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ἀγαθόν· λέγω δὲ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τὸ ἐκ τοῦ κοινὰς εἶναι τὰς κτήσεις καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίας. He probably means that community of property would exclude the possibility of absolute want.

then these advantages can be secured in a less objecti
able way. For there are many objections to a commur
of property. First, it involves that community in all thi
human (*ἀνθρωπικὰ πάντα*), down to the smallest mat
and matters of everyday recurrence, which more than a
thing else tries men's temper and leads to quarrels[1]; n
it sacrifices that increase of efficiency, which results w
men are set to work at that which is their own (*πρὸς τ
ἑκάστου προσεδρεύοντος*, 1263 a 28)[2]. It thus effects
a great cost what can be effected at no cost at all; for
legislator, as the example of the Lacedaemonian and ot
States proves, can produce in the minds of his citiz
a readiness to make that which is severally owned av
able in use to others; and if he does this, he has d
all that community of property can do. A third
advantage is that there is a loss of pleasure when
are deprived of the right of calling something their ow
the pleasure is lost that results from the gratificatio
that natural and universal love of self which is only
sured when it is excessive, and also the pleasure
results from aiding and gratifying friends.

At this point (1263 b 7) Aristotle passes from critici
applicable to community of property only to others w
apply to both forms of communism, and we see from
language (1263 b 7, *τοῖς λίαν ἓν ποιοῦσι τὴν πόλιν*),
closely his objections to communism are connected
the attempt to intensify overmuch the unity of the St
The State is a *κοινωνία*, but it should not be a *κοινωνί*
all things human, in everything that can possibly be sh
(2. 1. 1261 a 2 sq.): the common element in a State,
learn elsewhere, is, above all, a constitution (3. 3. 12

[1] It is thus that small matters are often the occasion of civil disturbance (7 (5). 4. 1303 b 17).

[2] 'Sir W. Siemens said that if any invention lay in the gutter, it should be given to a separate owner, that he might have an interest in its furtherance and development' (Letter of *Times*, Jan. 23, 1884).

[3] Est aliquid quocunque
quocunque recessu,
Unius sese dominum fe
lacertae.
Juv. 3. 2

1 sq.), and a common constitution means a common plan of life (6 (4). 11. 1295 a 40: cp. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 35).

A few remarks, applicable to communism in both its forms, wind up Aristotle's discussion of the subject. Its superficial promise of peace is an illusion. If much that is evil would disappear with severalty of property, much that is good would also be lost. Life would not be worth living in Plato's State (1263 b 29). It was the choice of a false end for the State—the utmost possible unity—that led Socrates astray. The State must not be made 'one' at the cost of its essential characteristic of 'plurality' (πλῆθος); the unifying agency must be education. After an appeal to the evidence of history[1] against Plato's scheme, Aristotle adds that Plato would find, if he made the experiment, that a State cannot be brought into existence without tribal and other divisions incompatible with a too strictly constituted unity. The State, it is implied, is not a mathematical unit, but a Whole consisting of differentiated parts held together by virtue. Not the maximum of unity in the sense of community in everything, but virtue, is the end at which the legislator should aim. Unity will come with virtue, not otherwise. This is the burden of the chapters on Communism. It is evident that Aristotle's argument against Communism is primarily an argument against 'unitarian' Communism, though many of his objections apply to the Communism with which we are familiar.

Some of them would be more in place if Aristotle himself recognized no common property in his State. His shrewd anticipation of social discord in societies where property is held in common, seems hardly to be borne out by experience, if we may judge by recorded or existing cases of common ownership. To his argument that pro-

[1] Though Aristotle takes notice of various forms of Communism, or approximate Communism, in relation to land and its produce, prevailing among certain barbarian races, he is not aware how important a part the modified Communism of the Village Community has played in the history of mankind; still less is he acquainted with the story of its general, though gradual, rejection and abandonment.

prietary right ('the magic of property,' as we say) increas
the care devoted to things, it may be added that it stim
lates industry by the hope which it holds forth of
assured reward. A communistic society could not app
to hope to the same extent. The argument that so
pleasures, and opportunities for the exercise of some virtu
would cease to exist in a communistic society, is deservi
of notice. The test of the satisfactoriness of institutio
in the Laws of Plato had been their favourableness
virtue (705 E: 770 C–771 A: 836 D): it is interesti
to observe that Aristotle takes pleasure also into accoun
The question, indeed, may be raised, whether the m
fact that an institution is productive of pleasure, or of p
ticular kinds of virtue, is decisive in its favour. May
not fairly ask for proof that it is productive of more pl
sure or more virtue, than of the opposites to pleasure a
virtue, or of more pleasure or virtue than would ex
without it? Bull-fighting is no doubt productive of so
kinds of virtue; yet is this a decisive argument in
favour[2]? We discern, however, in the background
Aristotle's reasoning a principle of importance—that
institutions of the State should satisfy the permanent a
universal tendencies of human nature: it seems to be i
plied that these tendencies are sure to be sound, if k
within due bounds (1263 a 41 sq.). The legislator m
recognize and accept them, and find a place for them
his scheme; he must not try to eradicate them. The St
is intended to fulfil man's nature, not to do violence to
and just as the nature of the individual must be respec
so must the nature of the State. No attempt must
made to impress on it an uncongenial degree of un
The industrial value of the institution of several propert
the part it has played and is playing in the subjuga
of Nature by man—is, of course, not dwelt on by Aristo

[1] In the same spirit he makes the pleasurableness of music an argument in its favour (5 (8). 5. 1339 b 25 sqq.).

[2] It may also be argued that though certain forms of vi might disappear under a C munistic *régime*, they migh replaced by others of equa greater worth.

What is present to his mind is the influence of the institution on the individual, not on the fortunes of the race. The same defect appears in his view of the State, which he holds to exist, not in any degree for the benefit of mankind, but solely for the benefit of its members. So again, it is less the industrial, than the political and ethical, bearings of Communism that are present to his mind. Workers in modern societies sigh for some relief from crushing industrial competition and often seek it in Communism, but excessive competition is a social ailment of which Aristotle is altogether unconscious.

Nor does he anywhere recognize the undoubted element of truth contained in Plato's rejection of the Household and Several Property. He seems to hold that there are no drawbacks connected with either institution, which a correct system of rearing and education, acting on well-constituted natures, is not fully capable of obviating. His arguments against community of property, again, though directed against its fitness to form the base of an entire social system, are so unqualified that they might be employed against its use in minor societies within a State. It may well be, however, that Plato's error lay, not so much in his belief in the possibility and advantageousness of an union in which the individual life should be lost and merged in that of the whole, but rather in his setting it forth as the standard to which political society ought to conform, if possible, everywhere. The *régime* which is out of place in a State may be salutary in a monastic community.

It should be noticed also that the proprietary right which Aristotle defends is the bare right of several property, apart from the right of inheritance, which stands equally in need of explanation and defence. And then again, while he defends the institution of several property, he is apparently in favour of limiting the amount held by individuals, and he marks out with some care the ways in which property is to be acquired and used. We note, further, that in his best State the right of owning land is confined to the citizens—

men who have received a careful moral training and are likely to use it aright. Aristotle is as little an unqualified defender of the right of several property as he is of Slavery.

The question of Communism has never been discussed with a closer reference to the end for which human society exists. Communism is held by Aristotle to spoil and impoverish human life, to rob men of opportunities of virtuous activity and harmless enjoyment, and thus to diminish happiness: this is his main reason for rejecting it. In effect, he rests the institutions of the Household and Several Property on their true basis—their value to man as a means to perfect life, or, in modern language, as a means of civilization.

Sketch of the Greek household as Plato and Aristotle found it.

Aristotle, then, declares in favour of the Household. The Greek household does not, however, escape without some modification at his hands. It will be best first to cast a hasty glance at the Greek household as Aristotle found it, before we go on to study his conception of what it ought to be.

In the view of the Greeks, a man's first duty to his household was to perpetuate it by marriage. The gods of the family must not lose their worship; the ranks of the clan (γένος), phratry, tribe, and State must not be thinned. Indeed, the begetting of offspring was, for the father himself, a means of immortal existence[1]. Views of this kind may often have been a source of over-population, and thus of pauperism and even of political danger, in ancient Greece, for the prejudices of the Greeks made the practice of many branches of industry and trade distasteful to them, while emigration involved the loss of the valuable rights of a citizen. It is easy to understand how the poorer citizens, in States in which they were the masters, often came to quarter themselves on the public revenues to a considerable extent. It is easy, again, to understand how the exposure of children

[1] Cp. Plato, Laws 721 B–C: 773 E: and Aristot. de Gen. An. 2. 2. 731 b 31 sqq. See Stallbaum's note on the first named passage.

and especially of female children, was not uncommon; and how at length, at Athens, Antipater found that out of 21,000 citizens only 9000 possessed property in excess of the value of 2000 drachmas[1]. The first problem, then, in reference to the household was how to adjust its rate of reproduction to the interests of the community.

Another common view as to the household made the main function of its head the increase of its substance. Many, as we have seen, almost or altogether identified the Science of Supply with the Science of Household Management, and Xenophon in the Oeconomicus had gone so far as to put this view into the mouth of Socrates. *Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐπιστήμης μέν τινος ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν ὄνομα εἶναι ἡ οἰκονομία· ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη αὕτη ἐφαίνετο, ᾗ οἴκους δύνανται αὔξειν ἄνθρωποι· οἶκος δὲ ἡμῖν ἐφαίνετο ὅπερ κτῆσις ἡ σύμπασα* (Xen. Oecon. 6. 4). It is true that Xenophon is here rather interpreting the word *οἰκονομία* than attempting to determine which of the functions of the head of the household is the highest and most truly characteristic; elsewhere he fully recognizes the educational responsibilities of the parent (Oecon. 7. 12). Still he not only tolerates but commends that unlimited quest of wealth which Aristotle condemns—at any rate he does so, when an unselfish and liberal use is made of what is acquired. His Cyrus says in the Cyropaedia (8. 2. 20 sqq.): *ἀλλ' εἰμὶ ἄπληστος κἀγὼ ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι χρημάτων· τῇδέ γε μέντοι διαφέρειν μοι δοκῶ τῶν πλείστων, ὅτι οἱ μέν, ἐπειδὰν τῶν ἀρκούντων περιττὰ κτήσωνται, τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν κατορύττουσι, τὰ δὲ κατασήπουσι, τὰ δὲ . . . φυλάττοντες πράγματα ἔχουσιν . . . ἐγὼ δ' ὑπηρετῶ μὲν τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ ὀρέγομαι ἀεὶ πλειόνων· ἐπειδὰν δὲ κτήσωμαι, ἂν ὦσι περιττὰ ὄντα τῶν ἐμοὶ ἀρκούντων, τούτοις τάς τ' ἐνδείας τῶν φίλων ἐξακοῦμαι, καὶ πλουτίζων καὶ εὐεργετῶν ἀνθρώπους εὔνοιαν ἐξ αὐτῶν κτῶμαι καὶ φιλίαν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων καρποῦμαι ἀσφάλειαν καὶ εὔκλειαν*[2].

[1] Diod. 18. 18.

[2] See L. Schmidt, Ethik der alten Griechen, 2. 380, who compares Xen. Oecon. 11. 9. The passage quoted in the text makes it abundantly clear that Cyrus' object in acquiring is to give away; some of his friends, in fact, say of him (Cyrop. 8. 4. 31)—*οὐχ ὁ Κύρου τρόπος τοιοῦτος οἷος χρηματίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ διδοὺς μᾶλλον ἢ κτώμενος ἥδεται*: and Cyrus says

Apart, however, from prepossessions as to the main
tion of the household, its constituent relations, th
husband and wife, father and child, master and
tended to vary considerably. It was only, indeed, i
barian communities that the wife was commonly the
(Pol. 1. 2. 1252 b 5), or else the tyrant (2. 9. 1269 b 2
of her husband, or that the father's authority over h
became a despotism (Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 27, *ἐν Πέρ*
ἡ τοῦ πατρὸς τυραννική· χρῶνται γὰρ ὡς δούλοις τοῖς υἱέσι
even in Greek States these relations were far from bei
same under different constitutions or even in different
of society. In oligarchies the sons and wives of the
class were greatly over-indulged (7 (5). 9. 1310 a 22:
15. 1300 a 7); in the tyranny and extreme democra
'domination of women and over-indulgence of slaves'
κοκρατία καὶ δούλων ἄνεσις, 7 (5). 11. 1313 b 32 sq.) a
to prevail[1]: at Sparta also, though for quite other re
women were over-powerful (2. 9. 1269 b 31), and the
dowries which were the natural concomitant of this s
things added in their turn to the evil. In household
the poorer class, again, the wife and children were
sarily employed as attendants (*ἀκόλουθοι*), no slaves
kept (8 (6). 8. 1323 a 5); and here the wife coul
possibly be confined to the house (6 (4). 15. 130
The whole aspect of the household consequently alte

In the average household of the better class at A
the wife was often married at the age of fourteen or
(Xen. Oecon. 7. 5), after a maidenhood spent in the r
of her father's house, from which, in the city at all
she only rarely emerged[2]; robbed as a girl of h
share of air and exercise, white-complexioned besi
sunburnt father and brothers who spent their lives
open air, or even beside women and girls of the
class, delicate in comparison with the strong-limbed m

himself to his friends (ibid. 8. 4. 36)—*ταῦτα, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἅπαντα δεῖ ὑμᾶς οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἐμὰ ἡγεῖσθαι ἢ καὶ ὑμέτερα κ.τ.λ.*

[1] Cp. Plato, Rep. 563 B.

[2] In Lysias c. Sim. c
daughters of the speake
had been so quietly and de
brought up that they blush
to be seen by their relatio

of Sparta; taught to weave and to command her appetite[1], and perhaps also to read, write, and cipher[2], but necessarily relying much on her husband (as we see from Xenophon's Oeconomicus) for any real assistance in the development of her character and intelligence. The natural quickness of the race, however, would make a little experience go a long way.

In matters of property, the Attic law was not unkind to females, for though the sons alone inherited where sons there were, daughters often received liberal portions or dowers, and these remained available for their support[3], if on the death of the husband the widow preferred to leave his house, which she sometimes did even when there were children of the marriage[4], while, if she did not, she had a claim for alimony on her sons[5]. The dower was also returned by the husband, if he put away his wife. The husband, on receiving it at the time of the marriage, gave the family of his bride some tangible security for it[6], the revenues of which he continued to receive, though he must no doubt have been unable to alienate it without their consent. As the husband could divorce his wife at a moment's notice

[1] Xen. Oecon. 7. 6.

[2] Xenophon makes no mention of Ischomachus' wife having been taught these things, but Oecon. 9. 10 (a passage to which Mr. Evelyn Abbott has drawn my attention) seems to imply that she could at any rate read an inventory. Göll (Kulturbilder 3. 328) holds that girls' education did just reach this point. 'Kept out of the way of all public instruction, and pent within doors which seldom opened for them, the girls learnt from their mothers and nurses the arts of spinning, weaving, and sewing, and that of cookery in its higher forms, adding to these accomplishments at the utmost a rudimentary knowledge of reading and writing.' Perhaps they were not always taught reading and writing, for we find Theophrastus insisting that girls should be taught these subjects, though not beyond the limit of household exigencies (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 864. 3).

[3] The dower in this case reverted to the *κύριος* of the wife, and he was bound to support her.

[4] Demosth. in Boeot. de Dote p. 1010. The remarriage of widows appears to have been common at Athens. Plato recommends, on the contrary, that 'when a man dies leaving a sufficient number of children, the mother of his children shall remain with them and bring them up,' unless 'she appears to be too young to remain fitly unmarried' (Laws 930 C).

[5] [Demosth.] in Phaenipp. p. 1047.

[6] Where the dowry was large, this cannot have been possible unless the bridegroom had at least equal means.

by simply turning her out of the house, dowers were almost a necessity of married life at Athens. The position of a dowerless wife was so precarious that it was little better than that of a concubine. But then the system of dowers, no doubt, gave additional facilities to divorce, and when the dowry was considerable, the wife was commonly thought to be likely to be overbearing and the husband to be unduly subservient (Plato, Laws 774 C). For this and other reasons Plato thinks it best to abolish dowries (Laws 742 C: 774 C sq.), and to reserve the right of divorce for the State (Laws 929 E sqq.).

The dowry system, as practised at Athens, and very probably in Greece generally[1], evidently tended to maintain a connexion between the wife and her father's family; her entrance into her husband's house was not irrevocable, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus has good ground for the contrast which he draws[2] between Greek wedlock and wedlock as he describes it in the earlier days of Rome, when both dower and wife passed irrevocably to the husband, marriage being indissoluble, and the dower not reclaimable by action at law. The wife, in fact, in early Rome became once for all a member of her husband's family, 'a complete participant both in property and sacred rites' (*κοινωνὸς ἁπάντων χρημάτων τε καὶ ἱερῶν*), and inherited from her husband just as a daughter would.

After marriage, the care of the children, the supervision of the slaves, and the general management of a household in which much that we buy was probably made at home, would leave but little spare time to the wife. She would now be freer to pass the threshold of the house, accompanied, no doubt, by one or more female slaves—would appear at marriage feasts and the family gatherings which answered to our christenings, take part in funeral processions, and be present at some State festivals, especially at festivals confined to her sex. But the husband would be

[1] Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Ant. Rom. 2. 25) seems to have the Greek household in view generally, and not to be thinking of the Attic household only.

[2] Ant. Rom. 2. 25.

much away from home during the day[1], and both for this reason and because the only servants were slaves, it was well that the wife should leave the house but little—indeed, apart from this, the proper place for the wife was felt to be the home. Many women seem to have hugged their fetters; Plato speaks of the sex in the Laws (781 A, C) as loving darkness and seclusion, and anticipates some difficulty in prevailing on women to come forth into the light of day. The poorer sort of women were comparatively free from these disabilities, and it was a social distinction to be subject to them. The men, with their heads full of politics and war, would feel that if they were themselves not domestic in their tastes, others must be so for them, and that the indoor life of Greek women was the natural complement of the outdoor life of Greek husbands and fathers; but the race was too aspiring to do full justice to a woman's life, especially after the improvement in male education and the increase in the interest of Greek politics which mark the fifth century before Christ. It was seldom that Greek wives, elsewhere than in the Lacedaemonian State (Pol. 2. 9. 1269 b 31), invaded the men's domain and made their influence felt in the political field, though tyrannies and extreme democracies seem sometimes to have found it worth their while to court their good will (7 (5). 11. 1313 b 32 sqq.); more often they consoled themselves by indulging in religious enthusiasm[2], to the dismay of men like Menander's Misogynist, who complains (Misog. fr. 4 and 5):

> Ἐπιτρίβουσιν ἡμᾶς οἱ θεοὶ
> μάλιστα τοὺς γήμαντας· ἀεὶ γάρ τινα
> ἄγειν ἑορτὴν ἐστ' ἀνάγκη,

[1] Xen. Oecon. 3. 12, ἔστιν ὅτῳ ἄλλῳ τῶν σπουδαίων πλείω ἐπιτρέπεις ἢ τῇ γυναικί; Οὐδενί, ἔφη. Ἔστι δὲ ὅτῳ ἐλάσσονα διαλέγῃ ἢ τῇ γυναικί; Εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ πολλοῖς γε, ἔφη.

[2] Cp. Plato, Laws 909 E; Plutarch, Praecept. Conjug. c. 19. Plutarch's picture of the interior of a γυναικωνῖτις is not a very cheerful one—ἔπειτα καὶ ψεῦδός ἐστι τὸ εἰθυμεῖν τοὺς μὴ πολλὰ πράσσοντας· ἴδοι γὰρ εἰθυμοτέρας εἶναι γυναῖκας ἀνδρῶν, οἰκουρίᾳ τὰ πολλὰ συνούσας· νυνὶ δὲ ὁ μὲν βορέας διὰ παρθενικῆς ἀπαλόχροος οὐ διάησιν,

ὡς φησιν Ἡσίοδος· λύπας δὲ καὶ ταραχὰς καὶ κακοθυμίας διὰ ζηλοτυπίας καὶ δεισιδαιμονίας καὶ φιλοτιμίας καὶ κενῶν δοξῶν, ὅσας οὐκ ἂν εἴποι τις, εἰς τὴν γυναικωνῖτιν ὑπορρέουσιν (De Tranq. Animi, c. 2).

and again:

> Ἐθύομεν δὲ πεντάκις τῆς ἡμέρας,
> ἐκυμβάλιζον δ' ἐντὰ θεράπαιναι κύκλῳ·
> αἱ δ' ὠλόλυζον.

On the other hand, the wife had often to complain
husband's unfaithfulness, which escaped with little c
in a society based on slavery[1]. If we may judge, ho
from Aristotle's testimony to the prevalence of 'fe
ascendency' and the 'over-indulgence of wome
extreme democracies, which is borne out by that of
(Rep. 563 B: cp. Laws 774 C), the Athenian wife w
often the oppressor as the oppressed. It was the f
to give considerable dowries[2], and consequently th
had her husband a good deal in her power,
divorce entailed the withdrawal, not only from hin
also apparently from the children, of revenues
they could in many cases ill afford to lose. A cha
the position of the wife may well have come abo
L. Schmidt points out[3], in the period which comm
with Alexander, when the loss of political freedom
tributed with other causes to divert men's minds in
degree from politics and to give increased prominen
family life. The old traditions would also be less po
in the great new cities, which now became the mos
spicuous centres of Greek life[4].

As to the relation of parent and child, Dionysi
Halicarnassus tells us that in Greece 'children were
guilty of unseemly conduct to their fathers[5]'; he
satisfied with the temporary authority which was al
Greek custom conceded to the father, ceasing wit
second year after puberty or at marriage or with enro

[1] See L. Schmidt, 2. 194 sqq. Even Plutarch's language on this point is not quite what we should expect (Conj. Praec. c. 16).

[2] See Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, E. T. pp. 483 and 514.

[3] 2. 426.

[4] L. Schmidt contrasts the freedom with which Gorgo and Praxinoe, in the 15th I Theocritus, find their way Alexandria, with Athenian (2. 427).

[5] Ant. Rom. 2. 26, πο Ἕλλησιν ὑπὸ τέκνων εἰς δυσχημονεῖται. Compare Plat 562 E.

in the public registers, nor again with the comparatively moderate penalties for disobedience which Greek law permitted the father to inflict, such as expulsion from the home or disinheritance. He prefers a fuller paternal authority, more nearly resembling the Roman *patria potestas*. Greek law, it is true, regarded the father rather as 'the natural guardian and administrator of the common property of the household[1],' than as its absolute owner, but the powers it conferred on him were not perhaps insufficient, and the remedy was probably to be sought in an improvement of the training of the parents, and especially of the mother, and in making her more of a spiritual force in the household. Loved and honoured she was already:

> Οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν μητρὸς ἡδίον τέκνοις·
> ἐρᾶτε μητρός, παῖδες, ὡς οὐκ ἔστ' ἔρως
> τοιοῦτος ἄλλος, οἷος ἡδίων ἐρᾶν,

says one of Euripides' characters in a fragment of the Erechtheus preserved by Stobaeus (Floril. 79. 4); but another says,

> Ἀλλ' ἴστ', ἐμοὶ μὲν οὗτος οὐκ ἔστω νόμος
> τὸ μὴ σὲ σ', μῆτερ, προσφιλῆ νέμειν ἀεὶ
> καὶ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τόκων τῶν σῶν χάριν·
> στέργω δὲ τὸν φύσαντα τῶν πάντων βροτῶν
> μάλισθ'· ὁρίζω τοῦτο, καὶ σὺ μὴ φθόνει,
> κείνου γὰρ ἐξέβλαστον· οὐδ' ἂν εἷς ἀνὴρ
> γυναικὸς αὐδήσειεν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πατρός[2].

And thus, while Xenophon, in his kindly Oeconomicus, fully recognizes her as the colleague of the father in the education of the children[3], the writer of the (so-called) first

[1] C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 3. § 11. The Attic father had, however, the right to renounce his son by proclamation through a herald and so to disinherit him—a right which Plato in the Laws makes over to the whole kith and kin on the father's proposition (928-9); and his unchecked power of gift would be an additional security for his authority over his children. Plato's reform of the paternal renunciation anticipates in some degree the change in the law, which, in Lucian's day, permitted the renounced son to appeal against his father's decision to a dicastery (see Lucian's Ἀποκηρυττόμενος, c. 8).

[2] Stob. Floril. 79. 27.

[3] Oecon. 7. 12. Plato in the Laws is for adding to the powers of the mother: see Stallbaum's note on Laws 774 E.

book of the Oeconomics falsely attributed to Aristotle, thoughtful as he is, appears to leave her only the function of rearing the child, and to claim for the father the task of educating it (Oecon. 1. 3. 1344 a 7). On the whole, she was hardly one of the heads of the household (except when the accident of a great dowry made her too potent), and its only real head was for a large part of the day an absentee. The gentler influence for good in the household is often not the least powerful, but it had no proper place made for it in Greece. Greek civilization did not give women an adequate training, or call for enough from them: these were more serious faults than its contraction of their rights or of their freedom. The most glaring defects of the actual Greek household, in Aristotle's view, were, however, probably the insufficient preparation of its head for his functions and its 'Cyclopic' freedom from State-guidance (Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 a 24 sqq.). Each household was allowed to make of itself exactly what it liked, and to train its subordinate members in its own way, as if it did not matter to the State what training they received.

It was unfortunate that in the Lacedaemonian State, in which women appear to have been least controlled and most powerful, they were, in the view of Aristotle at all events, worst. Lycurgus was believed to have tried to train the Lacedaemonian women in the same hardy habits as the men, but to have been foiled by their resistance[1]: at any rate, their life was in complete contrast to that of the men—luxurious and abandoned to every kind of vice (Pol. 2. 9. 1269 b 22). Aristotle does not distinctly mention the fact that they shared in youth the gymnastic training of the boys, but he may well be referring to it when he implies that they were trained to be 'fearless'

[1] Pol. 2. 9. 1270 a 6 sq.: cp. Plato, Laws 781 A, *ἐξαρτος τοῦ νομοθέτου*. Both Xenophon (de Rep. Lac. 1. 3–4) and Plato (Laws 806 A) speak of the girls of this State as receiving a gymnastic training—Plato, indeed, adds that they were also trained in 'music' (*μουσική*)—but this does not prevent the latter from regarding the women (with Aristotle) as 'unregulated by law,' the result being that 'many laxities had crept in (*πολλὰ παρέρρει*) which law might have mended' (Laws 781 A).

(θρασύτητος, 1269 b 35); their fearlessness, however, he says, was of no use in household life, and broke down in war, as their conduct during the Theban invasion of Laconia showed. On the other hand, the Lacedaemonians, like many other military races, were very submissive to feminine influence; they gave their daughters large dowries, which the law left it in their power to do; nor did the State retain any control over the disposal of orphan heiresses in marriage. The result was that wealth came to be concentrated in a few hands, that the number of proprietors and also of citizens dwindled, and that the greed for wealth, which was a feature of the Lacedaemonian character, was intensified in the few remaining citizens by the desire to provide the women with the means of lavish living. So great, in fact, was the power of the women that their influence made itself felt even in the administration of the shortlived Lacedaemonian empire.

Aristotle's criticism of the institutions of this State in relation to women illustrates his remark (1. 13. 1260 b 15 sq.) as to the importance of training women to virtue, and to the kind of virtue most in accordance with the given constitution, for in this instance the defects of the women were among the causes which led to the deterioration of the men and the enfeeblement of the State. He seems to imply that the women should have been trained to temperance, and their habits of life better regulated. Whether he wished that women should have any further intellectual training than Greek women usually enjoyed in his day, we do not know; but he seems to have been in favour of giving them, probably through the medium of their fathers and husbands, some sort of moral education and also of regulating their habits of life within the household. The Lacedaemonian household, he evidently feels, was more actively prejudicial than any other form of the household known to Greece[1].

[1] Plutarch's lives of Agis and Cleomenes refer to a generation a century later than that of which Aristotle speaks, but they show that the wealth and power of the Lacedaemonian women remained

Plato abolishes the household in the Republic and reconstructs it in the Laws, leaving it even there only a somewhat shadowy existence.

We may now turn to the question, how Plato and Aristotle respectively deal with the Household. In the Republic, as we have already seen, Plato abolished the household. In the Laws he retains it, but makes considerable changes in its arrangements, some of which are improvements, while others, such as the institution of public meal-tables for women and girls no less than for men and boys, would have impaired its intimacy and probably its influence. His plan, stated briefly, is to set not only women but also girls free from their enforced seclusion, and to call them forth into the light of day; to educate girls in much the same way as boys, though after six years of age apart from them[1]; to open office in the State to women or, at all events, any offices for which they have a special fitness; to admit them in some degree even to military service; to postpone the age of marriage in the case of girls, so that they may be the fitter to be mothers; to forbid dowries, both as tending to place wife and husband in a false relation to each other and as leading to the union of fortunes and the over-enrichment of a few; to treat marriage as instituted less for the comfort or pleasure of the individuals composing the household, than for the end of providing the State with offspring fit in mind and body to become its citizens; and to make succession to the citizen

unbroken up to that time, and so far bear out Aristotle's account; they reveal to us, however, some noble characters among them, not unworthy of the influence they possessed, and 'spiritual forces' in the fullest sense of the word. These lives are probably based on the history of Phylarchus, who took the side of Cleomenes and the Lacedaemonians against Aratus and the Achaeans (Polyb. 2. 56), and was perhaps somewhat given to writing for effect; but there may well have been women at Sparta to whom Aristotle's general judgment would not apply, both in his days and later.

[1] Both sexes are to be trained in the following studies, taken successively: — Riding, military exercises, and the use of warlike weapons; wrestling, dancing under arms, recitation, and singing; reading and writing, the use of the lyre, the rudiments of arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy. Plato knows, however, that the male and female character are not the same (802 D–E), and he will have different songs composed for the two sexes: males are to learn songs expressive of *τὸ μεγαλοπρεπὲς καὶ τὸ πρὸς τὴν ἀνδρείαν ῥέπον*, females songs in which *τὸ κόσμιον καὶ σῶφρον* predominates.

lots of land follow the rule of Unigeniture, in order that these may remain undivided, permission being given to the father to choose the son who is to succeed him, and care being taken that the other sons shall not want[1]. Plato's language in Laws 909 D sqq. is wide enough to include the abolition of the domestic worship of Hestia at the household hearth and of other household gods: *ἱερὰ μηδὲ εἷς ἐν ἰδίαις οἰκίαις ἐκτήσθω· θύειν δ' ὅταν ἐπὶ νοῦν ἴῃ τινί, πρὸς τὰ δημόσια ἴτω θύσων, καὶ τοῖς ἱερεῦσί τε καὶ ἱερείαις ἐγχειριζέτω τὰ θύματα, οἷς ἀγνεία τούτων ἐπιμελής· συνευξάσθω δὲ αὐτός τε καὶ ὃς ἂν ἐθέλῃ μετ' αὐτοῦ ξυνεύχεσθαι.* He appears to make the public places for sacrifice the only places for sacrifice, and the public priests and priestesses the only sacrificers. But this is not probably his intention, for in other passages of the Laws he evidently contemplates the continued existence of private rites (717 B: 785 A): his wish is to prevent the household becoming what it seems often to have been, the secret nursery of superstitious worships (909 E: 910 B); he probably does not mean to meddle with old-established cults, like those of Hestia and *Ζεὺς ἑρκεῖος* or *ἐφέστιος*.

Plato is eager to flood the recesses of the Greek household with the light of day, and partly with this end in view institutes public meals not only for the men and boys but also for the women and girls (*ξυσσίτια δὲ κατεσκευασμένα εἴη χωρὶς μὲν τὰ τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ἐγγὺς δ' ἐχόμενα τὰ τῶν αὐτοῖς οἰκείων, παίδων τε ἅμα θηλειῶν καὶ τῶν μητέρων αὐταῖς*, 806 E)[2]. The members of the household described in the Laws would apparently be but little alone with each other, and not probably often at home except at night, for their meals would be taken in the public halls, the women and girls sitting apart from the men and boys[3]. The household

[1] Plutarch (Comment. in Hesiod. c. 20) attributes a similar preference for Unigeniture to Lycurgus—*μήποτε δέ, φησὶν ὁ Πλούταρχος, καὶ Πλάτων ἕπεται τῷ Ἡσιόδῳ καὶ Ξενοκράτης καὶ Λυκοῦργος πρὸ τούτων· οἱ πάντες ᾤοντο δεῖν ἕνα κληρονόμον καταλιπεῖν.*

[2] It is curious that Plato takes no notice of the architectural arrangements of the Greek dwelling-house, which reflected so conspicuously the contrast between male and female life. One would have expected him to insist on its reconstruction.

[3] Sir T. More adopts in his Utopia the plan of common

would thus cease to be a body of persons supplied from a common store of their own (δμοσίτιοι), and the relations of husband and wife and of parent and child would probably suffer some relaxation. Plato's pretty ideal picture (Laws 931 A) of the parents seated by the hearth like sacred statues among children who half worship them would perhaps hardly be realized in so scattered an unity as the household of the Laws. The State appears to take upon itself not only the physical and intellectual, but also the moral training of young and old, and to leave little for the household to do, except indeed to bring 'fools' into the world and 'suckle' them[1]. It would seem to escape abolition only to be condemned to a somewhat shadowy existence.

Aristotle's view of the household and its true organization.

With Aristotle's views as to the true organization of the household we are only imperfectly acquainted. We get many separate glimpses of them, but no continuous and systematic statement. He glances at its structure in the Fifth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics, and again in the Eighth Book; but Justice is the subject with which he is more immediately concerned in the former book, and Friendship in the latter. In the First Book of the Politics the question before him is not so much what is the true constitution of the household as who is the true householder; and we penetrate into the subject only far enough to ascertain the true relation of the head of the household to wife, child, and slave. Even this topic is not fully treated, and cannot be so till the constitution is dealt with (1. 13. 1260 b 8 sqq.). In the Second Book we are as much

meals, but ranges men and women along opposite sides of the same table (Utopia, lib. ii. p. 90, ed. Bas. 1518).

[1] Even mere babies of three years old, girls and boys alike, are to gather at the village-temples, and to be formed into ἀγέλαι for games, under the control of women appointed by the State (Laws 794 A). They are not even to play in families or under their mother's eye, when once over three. In fact, as mothers in the State of the Laws were to engage in the same pursuits as men and to take their meals at public meal-tables, some arrangement of this kind was almost necessary.

concerned with the family relation as with the household, and the whole question is approached from a different point of view. Then there is a chapter or two in the Fourth Book on the age of marriage and the management of young children. We have also the so-called First Book of the Oeconomics, which can hardly have been written by Aristotle, and the *νόμοι ἀνδρὸς καὶ γαμετῆς* preserved only in a Latin translation (Val. Rose, Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus, p. 644 sqq.), of the Greek original of which the same thing may be said. On the two latter documents, therefore, we cannot venture to rely. It is not, however, difficult to trace the general tendency of Aristotle's views.

According to him, the household, like the State, comes into being for one end and exists for another. It begins in the impulses of reproduction and self-preservation, perhaps also in the impulse of sociality (*ἄνθρωπος γὰρ τῇ φύσει συνδυαστικὸν μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτικόν*, Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1162 a 17); but, when thus brought into existence, it rises above these aims and exists for better things. It is not a mere means of recruiting the population; still less is it a mere means of heaping up wealth. If in the De Generatione Animalium (2. 1. 731 b 31 sqq.) Aristotle regards reproduction as the path, for men no less than other animals, to immortality, this point of view disappears in the Politics. The household is, in its definitive form, a sort of younger sister of the State; good life is its aim, no less than it is that of the State; it is, like the State, a *κοινωνία*, though a less comprehensive and less noble *κοινωνία*; it is at once a group of friends, a body of rulers and ruled, and a school of moral training. It is a group of friends, ruled by the head of the household for their good, and especially for their growth in virtue; varying in the degree of their inequality, but all unequal, and some not even 'proportionately equal.' For the child and the slave are hardly subjects of right, and the latter is in strictness no member of the *κοινωνία*. This varying inequality among the components of the household—this variation of the distance at which they respectively stand from the head—is a characteristic feature of the society,

and Aristotle insists on nothing so much as th
differences must be respected in its organizatio
wife is not to be ruled as the child, nor the chil
slave.

The tendency of the household is to inequality
the State to equality, absolute or proportionate (P
11. 1295 b 25, *βούλεται δέ γε ἡ πόλις ἐξ ἴσων εἶναι κ*
ὅτι μάλιστα). The household is ruled by a king,
the rule of a king is of rare occurrence in the fully d
State[1]. The household is at once a less self-c
(2. 2. 1261 b 12), and a more intimate, society
State. In it everything is common (1. 9. 1257 a
so in the State. On the other hand, the h
resembles the State in not existing for some na
transitory end, but as an aid to human life (Eth. N
1162 a 20 sq.: cp. 8. 11. 1160 a 14–25). It is
household that the future citizens of the State firs
light (Pol. 1. 13. 1260 b 19) and receive their earli
ing, which often exercises a decisive influence
subsequent life[2]; it is here that women and sla
the moral guidance they need. Obedience here is
all the more willingly for being rendered to a rela
a benefactor (Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 b 5); and per
things are all the better attended to for being att
individually (1180 b 7). The household lightens th
of the State by taking off its hands, to some e
all events, the care of women, children, and slav
if on the principle that 'the better the persons r
better is the rule exercised' (Pol. 1. 5. 1254 a 25).

[1] Marquardt (Handbuch der Römischen Alterthümer, 7. 1. 1) attributes to the Romans the feeling that 'not only is the Family a condition of the State, but the constitution of the Family is also the basis and the prototype of the constitution of the State.' Aristotle would admit this of the early State, but not of the State in its definitive form. Even the rule of the husband over the wife, though a *πολιτικὴ ἀρχή*—which said of the rule over c slaves—differs in som from most types of *πο* (Pol. 1. 12. 1259 b 4).

[2] The sixteenth and s chapters of the Fourt the Politics show what i Aristotle, following in t Plato (Laws 765 E), a the earliest epoch of hu ence and even to its em

of the household stands on a lower level than that of the State, in which rule is exercised over citizens, it is nevertheless fit work, in Aristotle's opinion, for the man of full virtue (σπουδαίου).

Aristotle omits to treat of some important questions in relation to marriage. He does not pause to prove that the household should be a monogamic household, but takes this for granted. We do not learn his views as to divorce; he does not mention the subject of prohibited degrees of relationship. We must remember that we are not in possession of his whole mind. On the other hand, he raises questions which seem rather startling to us. Are men and women of any and every age, if only of adult years, to be allowed to marry, and, again, to become parents[1]? Greek inquirers, with their characteristic combination of logic and audacity, insisted that the interests of the State made a negative answer necessary[2]. The Lacedaemonian State required that marriage should take place in the prime of physical vigour on both sides (Xen. Rep. Lac. 1. 6), and both Plato and Aristotle fix an age for marriage. The former, in the Republic, allows unions (marriage does not exist) to take place between men from 25 to 55 years of age and women from 20 to 40 (Rep. 460 E). In the Laws the arrangement is that a man is to marry not earlier than 25 (772 D) or 30 (721 A: 785 B), and not later than 35—a woman not

Aristotle, like Plato before him, requires the State to fix limits of age for marriage.

[1] The question does not seem to have been raised whether a hereditary disease or predisposition to disease should be a bar to marriage.

[2] Mr. Mahaffy observes, with much truth (Old Greek Education, p. 117 sq.), that 'there is no valid reason why the physical production of the race should not receive infinitely more attention than it does, within the bounds of our present social arrangements.... If even now there are civilized countries and classes of people who openly profess prudential reasons as the best for marrying, it will only require a better education of public opinion to enable men to advance to the position that the physical and mental vigour of the resulting children is a motive to be consciously considered in the selection.' Plato and Aristotle, it is true, went a step farther: they were not content with advising their citizens to keep these considerations in view, but recommended that the State should see that they did so. See on this subject Prof. Jowett's interesting remarks in his Introduction to Plato's Republic (Translation of Plato, 3. 168, ed. 2).

earlier than 16[1] or later than 20; and that the beget of children is to continue only for 10 years (784 B). T latter period would thus close at least ten years ea than in the Republic; but the reason of this is tha the Republic the interests of the State are secured giving the magistrates an absolute control over unions Rep. 460 A, τὸ δὲ πλῆθος τῶν γάμων ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄρχουσι π σομεν, ἵν' ὡς μάλιστα διασώζωσι τὸν αὐτὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν ἀνδρ

Considerations kept in view by Aristotle in relation to this matter.

Plato's main aims in dealing with this subject appea be to save both the family and the State from the e connected with over-population and to secure a healthy vigorous progeny. Aristotle thinks that other considerati also need to be taken into account. He recommend difference of 20 years between the ages of husband wife, or, more precisely, the difference between the age 37 and 18. One of his reasons for this recommendatio that the procreative powers of women cease at 50, twe years before those of men, and that if account is not tal of this fact, the harmony of the union may be impai by inequalities in this respect. The disadvantages wh attend a too great nearness or difference of age betw the father and the child will also be avoided. For children, if born, as may naturally be expected, at no l interval after marriage, will be reaching years of discret while their father is still vigorous and able to help the nor will their return for the care taken of them in ch hood come too late to be of any use[2]; while, on the ot hand, they will not be near enough in age to their fathe lose reverence for him or to embarrass his managem of the household. The father, it is evident, will be j

[1] 785 B. Susemihl (Note 940) notices that the age of 18 is mentioned in 833 D. For Hesiod's counsel on this subject, see Opp. et Dies, 695 sqq.

[2] Plutarch (de Amore Prolis, c. 4) laments the fate of most fathers in dying before their children have done great deeds, or even attained their full moral stature—ἀνθρώπου δὲ ἡ μὲν ἐκτροφὴ πολύπονος, αὔξησις βραδεῖα· τῆς δὲ ἀρ μακρὰν οὔσης, προαποθνήσκουσι πλεῖστοι πατέρες· οὐκ ἐπεῖδε Σαλαμῖνα Νεοκλῆς τὴν Θεμιστοκλ οὐδὲ τὸν Εὐρυμέδοντα Μιλτιάδης Κίμωνος, οὐδὲ ἤκουσε Περικλ Ξάνθιππος δημηγοροῦντος, οὐδὲ ρίστων Πλάτωνος φιλοσοφοῦν κ.τ.λ.

beginning to need help when his children are ready to give it, and thus neither mutual helpfulness nor parental control will be sacrificed. The household will be firmly knit together by mutual needs and the interchange of service, and will be a scene of harmony instead of discord, for it will be based on the common advantage (*τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον*). Another gain will be that the father will be well stricken in years and the sons just at the commencement of their prime (30 years of age, Rhet. 2. 14. 1390 b 9 sq.), when the latter take the place of the former (Pol. 4 (7). 16. 1335 a 32–35). Above all, these ages give the best prospect of well-developed offspring, likely to produce children of the male sex. The physical well-being of husband and wife is also thus consulted. It seems to have been a common opinion that, in the case of the male, over-early marriage was prejudicial to physical growth, while in that of the female, it added to the perils of labour and involved some moral risks besides (1335 a 22)[1].

We see that Aristotle, in dealing with this subject, keeps other aims in view, besides those which were present to the mind of Plato—the well-being of husband and wife, their full harmony, the establishment of a due relation of helpfulness and respect between the father and the child. His remarks are fresh and interesting; they call attention to points which often escape notice, and evidence a thoughtful study of the facts of household life. Montaigne says (Essais, Livre 2. ch. 8: vol. 2. p. 179, Charpentier): 'je me mariay à trente-trois ans, et loue l'opinion de trente-cinq, qu'on dict estre d'Aristote': and a little further on (p. 180), 'un gentilhomme qui a trente-cinq ans, il n'est pas temps qu'il face place à son fils qui en a vingt': and again, 'il ne nous fauldroit pas marier si jeunes, que nostre aage vienne quasi à se confondre avecques l'aage de nos enfants' (p. 178). We see that difficulties as to the succession (*διαδοχή*) of the children were familiar enough to him. All will approve

[1] We know from Aristoxenus (Fr. 20: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 278), that this was an opinion ascribed to Pythagoras in the Pythagorean school.

Aristotle's postponement of the female age of marriage to 18; but we shall hardly admit that the disparity of years between husband and wife need be as great as he thinks: obviously a man does not require to be nearly 40 years older than his eldest child to possess a due authority over his children. Lasaulx (Ehe bei den Griechen, p. 60, n. 190) quotes a vigorous utterance of W. von Humboldt to the effect that an ideal union begins for both husband and wife in comparative youth; that husband and wife should pass the days of their youth together and have common memories of the most enjoyable period of human life[1]. Still, even if we think that Aristotle has not hit upon the ideally best age for the husband and father, it remains true that he should neither be too near in age to his children nor too far removed from them. It was natural, that, resting as he does far the larger part of the weight of the household on the father's shoulders, Aristotle should attach special importance to his maturity in mind and body. According to him, the acme of man's physical development is reached between 30 and 35, the acme of mental development not till 49[2]. This accounts for his choosing a somewhat late age; but he may also have remembered that, till about the time he names, his citizens would be much occupied with military duties hardly perhaps compatible with married life.

Τεκνοποιία to cease after 17 years of married life.

He is not, however, content with merely fixing an age for marriage. Like Plato, he sees that parents may be too old to give birth to a vigorous offspring[3], and he requires

[1] 'The freshness of youth is the true foundation of happy wedlock (die wahre Grundlage der Ehe). I do not for a moment say that the happiness of wedlock ceases with youth; what I say is that husband and wife should carry into later life the memory of a youth enjoyed together, if their happiness is to be perfect, and not to lose the distinguishing characteristic of wedded bliss' (Briefe an eine Freundin, 2. p. 176). We are conscious here of a touch of sentiment which is altogether modern.

[2] Aristot. Rhet. 2. 14. 1390 b 9 sqq.: cp. Solon, Fragm. 27. Solon places marriage in the fifth septennial period of man's life (aet. 28-35), the physical acme in the fourth, the mental in the seventh and eighth (aet. 42-56). Plato (Rep. 460 E-461 A) makes the years between 25 and 55 the *ἀκμὴ σώματός τε καὶ φρονήσεως*.

[3] We are little accustomed to look at these things from Aris-

that after seventeen years of married life (when the husband is 54 years old and the wife 35), the married couple shall cease to become parents (4 (7). 16. 1335 b 26 sqq.). Plato had named in the Laws an even shorter term—ten years. Aristotle thus divides the period of marriage into two epochs—the epoch of τεκνοποιία and that in which no children are to be brought into the world.

Only a certain number of children to be begotten during the 17 years: means by which this rule is to be enforced.

Nor does he stop even here. He names, in conformity with Greek custom[1], the winter-season as the best for contracting marriage, and insists that a limit must be set to the begetting of children even during the seventeen years' term (1335 b 21 sq.), so that the begetting of more than a certain number shall be prohibited (2. 6. 1265 b 6 sq.). It may be thought, he hints (1335 b 21 sq.), that infractions of this rule will occur, and that the only possible remedy for them will be the exposure of the surplus children; but this is not so[2]: he apparently regards the exposure of living children as not 'holy' (ὅσιον)[3], and suggests in preference abortion at an early stage of pregnancy. The practice of abortion had already been sanctioned by Plato in the Republic (461 C) without this limitation, in the event of unions outside the legal limits of age proving fruitful; and in case of its failure, exposure. Aristotle appears to be more opposed to exposure and to abortion in advanced

totle's point of view, and I know not whether any physiologist has inquired statistically, what limits of age in the parents seem most favourable to vigorous offspring.

[1] Not Attic only, apparently, for he refers to the practice of οἱ πολλοί (1335 a 37). The month Gamelion (January–February) was the marriage-month at Athens. See Hist. An. 5. 8. 542 a 26–b 1. Plutarch is pleased with animals for pairing at one particular season only, and that the most favourable (de Amore Prolis c. 2). Pythagoras had prescribed the winter (Diog. Laert. 8. 9: Diod. 10. 9. 3).

[2] I follow the interpretation of 1335 b 21 sqq. given by C. F. Hermann (Gr. Antiqq. 3. § 11. 8):—'but not, on the ground of an over-great number of children, if there is a regulation against an over-great number, to expose children.'

[3] Except in the case of defective offspring (πεπηρωμένον, 1335 b 20). Compare with 1335 b 23–26, de Gen. An. 5. 1. 778 b 32 sqq.: Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1170 a 16. See Thonissen, Droit Pénal de la république athénienne, p. 258, on the question whether abortion was a crime by Attic law. It seems to have been common among slave-mothers (Dio Chrys. Or. 15. 237 M).

stages of pregnancy than Plato. On the other hand, Plato does not appear to authorize abortion, as Aristotle does, in the case of unions within the prescribed limits of age. It is also to be remarked that he drops these provisions in the Laws.

Aristotle's object evidently is to avoid both exposure and abortion, but he regards the latter, if effected at an early period of pregnancy, as unobjectionable in comparison with the former, which he prohibits in all cases but one, that of an imperfect growth. It would have been a great gain to the ancient world to be rid of infanticide, which Polybius 'specifies among the causes of the dwindling numbers of the Greeks[1],' but whether this result was not too dearly purchased at the cost of permitting abortion may well be doubted. It may easily be imagined how often the process prescribed by Aristotle would probably be resorted to in a State which delayed the marriage of all males till the age of 37, and which confined the begetting of children to a period of seventeen or eighteen years.

Aims of Aristotle in relation to these matters.

Aristotle evidently feels, even more strongly than Plato, the necessity of preventing the household from becoming a source of over-population and pauperism. He is not satisfied with the arrangements in the Laws on the subject of population (Pol. 2. 6. 1265 a 38 sqq.). Plato's plan of Unigeniture makes it more than ever essential that there shall not be too many sons in a household; and yet he takes insufficient means to secure this result. Hence the extraordinary strictness of Aristotle's regulations on the subject. He will not even trust to the remedy of founding a colony, which Plato keeps in view (Laws 740 E): the prevention of over-population is better than its cure. Yet the world has gained much by the foundation of Greek colonies, and these could not have existed if there had not been a surplus population to people them. Aristotle seems to forget, in his care for the internal harmony of his best State, that a large part even of the then known surface of the earth was unoccupied, and that, if

[1] Capes, Early Roman Empire, p. 205. See Polyb. 37. 9. 7.

it was not peopled in time from the civilized world, it might, as it afterwards did, receive immigrants likely to be formidable to civilization. He is familiar enough with the view that the State should be constituted for the advantage, not of a section of its citizens, but of the whole; that the Greek State and the Greek race had a duty to fulfil to the world outside, he is no more aware than any of his contemporaries.

Another aim which Aristotle has before him in dealing with the household, is that of making it the nursery of a race healthy and vigorous in mind and body. Much can be done within it to make or mar the physique of the future citizen (1334 b 29), and to render it what for the sake of the character (1334 b 25 sqq.) we should desire it to be, or the reverse. We know from the Nicomachean Ethics how closely moral virtue is connected with the passions, and these with the body (Eth. Nic. 10. 8. 1178 a 14). He also makes it his object (and here, as we have seen, he was in a less degree anticipated by Plato) to secure order, harmony, and mutual helpfulness within the household. But he no doubt also remembers that the city-State must not exceed a certain size, and desires to prevent its population outgrowing the limits imposed by him in the Fourth Book.

The head of the ideal household of Aristotle in his relation to his wife, children, and slaves.

We have already noticed some of the arrangements which he adopts with a view to the well-being of the household, but he evidently finds the main security for its well-being in the character of its head. The husband and father, in Aristotle's ideal household, is not only of mature age, but one whose happy natural endowment of an union of intelligence, spirit, and affectionateness (4 (7). 7. 1327 b 29 sqq.) has had full justice done to it by rearing and education, whose childhood and youth have been spent amid ennobling influences, and who has undergone both the rude discipline of a military life and the full scientific training of a philosopher. His wife will not have received the varied education which Plato designed for girls no less than boys, but she will have been trained in the virtues

which fit her to be his help-mate and right hand for household matters (Pol. 1. 13. 1260 a 21 sq.), and he will make of her a not unequal comrade: to his children he will be a kind of god, a full head and shoulders above them, and rightly so, for the father is a king, not the elder brother of his children[1] (Pol. 1. 12. 1259 b 10–17). His life will not be what Montaigne calls 'une vie questuaire.' He will have learnt to obtain the commodities necessary for the use of his household from natural sources and in natural ways, and to rest content with just that amount of them which is the essential condition of a satisfactory life, counting the provision of inanimate property and the care for it a matter of less moment than the care of slaves, and this again a small matter in comparison with the rule over wife and children and the development of their virtue. He will entrust the education of his boys after the age of seven to the officers of the State, and will leave the full command of the internal affairs of the house to his wife, making this her province in which she is to be supreme, except so far as the moral training of children and slaves is concerned, for this is to be his own affair. We may doubt whether his frequent absence on public business and at the syssitia, where he will take his meals, would not make it difficult for him to watch over his family—whether it would not interfere with that closeness of the household relation, on which Aristotle himself remarks (1. 2. 1252 b 14, *οἶκος ... οὓς Χαρώνδας μὲν καλεῖ ὁμοσιπύους, Ἐπιμενίδης δὲ ὁ Κρὴς ὁμοκάπους*).

[1] Contrast the relation of Charles James Fox to his father. 'As long as Charles would treat him like an elder brother (a point on which the lad indulged him without infringing on the strictest filial respect, or abating an atom of that eager and minute dutifulness which he exhibited in all his personal relations) he was welcome to do as he pleased with his own time and his father's money' (G. O. Trevelyan, Early History of C. J. Fox, p. 289). The household as Carlyle knew it in his early years (Reminiscences, p. 55) comes nearer to the Aristotelian type, but is still very different. It is noticeable that Aristotle describes his *παμβασιλεία*, in which the king is of transcendent virtue and greatness in comparison with his willing subjects, as *τετιμένη κατὰ τὴν οἰκονομικὴν* (Pol. 3. 14. 1285 b 31).

His relation to his wife is the best relation in the household, and, except that between brothers and sisters, the least unequal one—the relation in which justice fills the largest place (Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 b 15 sq.); for it is a weak point in the household that its relations are mostly so unequal as to rest less on right than on love. The head of the household will discriminate his relation to his wife from his relation to his children, and that again from his relation to his slaves. There are some things which the wife can do better than he can (Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 32 sqq.: cp. 8. 14. 1162 a 22 sq.), and which he will be wise to hand over to her: the advantage of wedlock lies in its making a common stock of contrasted aptitudes (1162 a 23): at least this is its utilitarian side, for it has another; it may become not only a friendship for utility and for pleasure, but also a friendship of the highest type—a friendship for virtue (Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1162 a 24 sqq.)[1]. It may not perhaps attain to the moral level of a friendship between two men of full virtue (*σπουδαῖοι*)—Aristotle would hardly be a Greek if he thought it did—but then it is a form of friendship and something more—a co-operative union of especial closeness and permanence for the highest ends. Man and wife are not only 'friends,' but sharers in a common work.

The wife, however, will be 'silent' before her husband, no less than the children before their father (Pol. 1. 13. 1260 a 28 sq.); in other words, will refrain from opposing him, so long, we conclude, as he does not encroach upon her domain. Plutarch, in whose time the wife counted for more in the household, still retains in his Conjugal Precepts the doctrine of conjugal silence (cc. 31, 32: c. 37), but makes it rather a silence to strangers, and a readiness to allow the husband to speak for her, than a silence before him. Adultery on the part of either husband or wife is

[1] There is nothing in the Politics inconsistent with this, though the use of the word *ὑπηρετική* of the virtue of the wife (Pol. 1. 13. 1260 a 21 sq.) might seem to imply a general and not a partial subordination on her part. The division of spheres between husband and wife is, however, implied in Pol. 2. 5. 1264 b 2.

to be visited with condign punishment during the peric
of τεκνοποιία, and to be treated as disgraceful through
the whole term of marriage (4 (7). 16. 1335 b 38 sqq
If the authenticity of the fragment on the relations
husband and wife, which we possess in a Latin translatio
were less doubtful[1], a few touches might be added fro
that source. It makes the wife supreme over all th
passes within the house, reserving to the husband the rig
of deciding who are to be allowed to cross its threshol
and even the right of conducting all negotiations for t
marriage of the children[2]: it draws largely on Homer
show with what reverence and respect the husband shou
treat his wife; they will be rivals in working for the go
of the household, each in a special sphere, and this will
the only rivalry between them.

The relation of a father to his child—that of mother an
child is not counted among the three constituent relations
the household enumerated in Pol. 1. 3. 1253 b 5 sq.—is,
has been said, regarded by Aristotle as resembling that
a king to his subjects. The language of Eth. Nic. 5.
1134 b 8 sqq., indeed, treats the child up to a certain age
ἕως ἂν ᾖ πηλίκον καὶ μὴ χωρισθῇ—as 'part and parcel'
his father, and, one would think, hardly distinct enou
from him to be even his 'subject'; yet we learn in E
Nic. 8. 8. 1158 b 21 sqq. that not only is their relati
one of friendship, but that the friendship between the

[1] 'Quid quod hunc ipsum librum ab Aristotele quidem quam maxime alienum, Perictionae autem libro περὶ γυναικὸς ἁρμονίας (Stob. flor. 85, 19, cui similes sunt Phintys et Pempelus, Platonis hic leges exscribens, cf. Ocellus c. 4) et methodo qui praeceptoris est et sententiis et ut credo aetate similem, latina versione servatum Aretinus videtur recepisse' (Val. Rose, de Aristot. librorum ordine et auctoritate, p. 61). L. Schmidt, on the other hand, accepts the Latin fragment as embodying 'important remains in a greatly altered form' of Aristotle's w on this subject (Ethik d. al Griechen, 2. 187). The com sition of the treatise from wh this translation was made m well have been suggested to so follower of Aristotle by Eth. N 8. 14. 1162 a 29 sq., and Pol. 1. 1260 b 8 sqq., just as that of so-called Second Book of Oeconomics was probably s gested by Pol. 1. 11. 1259 a 3.

[2] They are conducted by two fathers in Terence's And 3. 3. 6–42.

though unequal, may be 'durable and based on virtue, when the children render to their parents what is due to those who gave them being, and parents to sons what is due to children.' Aristotle's whole conception of youth perhaps accentuates its contrast with manhood; he does not follow out in detail the variations of the filial relation at different ages; he probably conceived it as ceasing to exist when the child attained years of discretion (cp. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 2. 26). In describing the relation of father and child as a kingly relation, his object is to contrast it, on the one hand, with the rule of the husband over the wife, which is like that of one citizen over another, except that there is no interchange of rule (Pol. 1. 12. 1259 b 1 sqq.)[1], and on the other with the despotic rule of the master over the slave. In the two former relations rule is exercised for the advantage of the ruled or of both parties, whereas in the last it is exercised primarily for the advantage of the ruler and accidentally only for the advantage of the ruled (Pol. 3. 6. 1278 b 32–1279 a 8). The master is, however (Pol. 1. 13), to make his rule over the slave a source of moral improvement to him—a means of placing him in contact with that rationality which he does not himself possess (Pol. 1. 13. 1260 b 5: 1. 5. 1254 b 22). He must not, therefore, in his relations with his slaves, confine himself, as Plato would have him do, to the language of blank command, but must also use that of admonition. Slaves should be encouraged to behave well by the prospect of receiving their freedom as a reward for good conduct (4 (7). 10. 1330 a 31 sq.). Aristotle intended to deal fully with the subject of the treatment of slaves, but does not do so in what we have of the Politics (4 (7). 10. 1330 a 31).

The differences between Aristotle's ideal household and

[1] Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 32, ἀνδρὸς δὲ καὶ γυναικὸς (κοινωνία) ἀριστοκρατικὴ φαίνεται· κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἄρχει καὶ περὶ ταῦτα ἃ δεῖ τὸν ἄνδρα· ὅσα δὲ γυναικὶ ἁρμόζει, ἐκείνῃ ἀποδίδωσιν.

The ideal household of Aristotle contrasted with the average Athenian household.

the average Athenian household seem to be mainly these. It would be endowed with an adequate, and not more than adequate, measure of worldly goods, and thus be equally removed from the over-wealthy type in which obedience was unknown (Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1295b 13–18), and from the over-poor type in which the wife and children had to supply the place of slaves (8 (6). 8. 1323a 5); its predominant aim would be the increase of virtue, not the increase of wealth; its head would be older and better prepared for his duties; his supremacy would not be usurped by his wife, while, on the other hand, his relation to her would be more equal and friendly than was often the case at Athens, and adultery on his part would be more severely dealt with; his married life would be largely controlled by the law in his own interest and in that of his wife and children, no less than in that of the State; his functions as head of the household would be exercised more or less under the control of the *γυναικονόμοι* and *παιδονόμοι* appointed by the State, just as they were probably exercised in the early days of Athens under some control from the Council of the Areopagus[1]; he would not be allowed to choose for himself what kind of education should be given to his sons, but would have to send them to the public schools of the State from the age of seven onwards. Lastly, he would be even more of an absentee from the home during the day-time than the average Attic husband, for he would take his meals at the public meal-tables[2].

[1] Gynaeconomi existed at Athens, their existence, however, dating in Boeckh's opinion from the administration of Demetrius Phalereus (Dict. of Antiquities s. v.: Gilbert, Griech. Staatsalterth. 1. 154): if this was so, their introduction may have been due to Aristotle's commendation of the institution, like other points in the *régime* of Demetrius Phalereus. Cicero disapproves of it: nec vero mulieribus praefectus praeponatur qui apud Graecos creari solet, sed sit censor qui viros doceat moderari uxoribus (Cic. de Rep. 4. 6. 6). Dionysius of Halicarnassus claims that the authority of the Roman censor, unlike that of any magistrate at Athens or Sparta, penetrated within the household. See the striking fragment from the Antiquitates Romanae (20. 13), where he depicts the way in which the household was controlled by this great office of State. Aristotle could not have asked more.

[2] Aristotle's remark at the close

Aristotle is evidently strongly impressed with the importance of the household. The children it brings into the world are the future citizens of the State, and it may easily saddle the State with an over-numerous or unsatisfactory progeny. It has to do with the future citizen in the earliest and most impressible years of life, years during which the character receives its permanent bent. Hence it is that Aristotle commits it to the charge of a head of mature age, worth, and capacity, and not content with that, subjects his rule to the supervision of State-officers. It is impossible to say that the course he takes is not a logical course, even if we may think that it would be better to leave the head of the household more freedom and responsibility.

Aristotle intends the household to be a reality.

The household, however, as he conceives it, is far from being a mere shadow, like that of the Laws; it is a real home, for though its head will often be absent, and though his action is in part regulated by the State, he is charged with the moral guidance of wife, child, and slave, and is evidently credited with the power to do much for their growth in virtue. The mere fact that the household needs to be adjusted to the constitution of the State shows that it is to be a reality.

Divorce.

On one important subject connected with the organization of the household, that of divorce, we have no express intimation of Aristotle's views. Plato in the Laws (929 E sqq.) allows of divorce for incompatibility of temper, though not without the intervention of the State, but his whole conception of the household implies the view that wedlock is normally a life-long union. This is still more true of Aristotle. Locke thinks that 'there is reason to inquire why the compact of marriage, where pro-

of the First Book that the virtue of husband and wife and father and child, and the way in which they should consort with each other, cannot be definitively depicted, nor the right standard in these things indicated, until they have been considered in connexion with the various political constitutions to which the household must be adjusted, prepares us for a systematic study of the organization of the household relations under each constitution, which we do not find undertaken in the Politics.

creation and education are secured and inheritance taken care for, may not be made determinable either by consent or at a certain time, or upon certain conditions, as well as any other voluntary compacts, there being no necessity in the nature of the thing nor to the ends of it, that it should always be for life[1].' Aristotle would probably reply, that the wife needs her husband's protecting care and affection to the last, that the relation of husband and wife is a relation of friendship, which deserves to be kept in being whether the interests of the children require its continuance or not, and that the husband and wife in their old age might, if parted, lose the aid of their grown-up children. The dissolution of an ill-matched or unsatisfactory union would, nevertheless, be probably recognized by him as occasionally necessary.

Aristotle and the clan, phratry, and tribe.

In modern communities the household has long come to be the only recognized society based on the tie of blood. Among ourselves even the 'conseil de famille' is unknown to the law. But there was once a time when the household was only one of a number of similar societies. The clan, the phratry, and the tribe stood at its side, larger, though less intimate, unities of the same type. It might be thought to rest on no surer basis than they. History has taught us otherwise. Time has spared the household, but the clan, tribe, and phratry have long passed away. They found themselves assailed both from within and from without. The individual outgrew them and shook himself free from them; armed with adoptive and testamentary power, men were able, if they chose, to defeat the succession-rights of the clan; the rise of classes and parties in the State tended to break them up; religious change was fatal to their religious basis. Nor was the State probably sorry to substitute purely local unions for societies which cherished immemorial traditions of independence and hierarchical pride[2]. Assailed by the individual and

[1] Civil Government, 2. § 81.

[2] We learn from Aristotle (7 (5). 4. 1304 a 35) that the tribe was sometimes a prime mover in

the State at the same time, it is no wonder that these societies succumbed, while the household, which went counter to neither, survived.

To Aristotle, however, the clan (*γένος*), phratry, and tribe were still indispensable elements in the State[1], though he says but little about them. The clan, indeed, with him assumes the local form of the village (Pol. 1. 2. 1252 b 16 sq.), just as at Athens it had passed into the deme in many cases; but in that form it is treated as existing by nature and as a permanent element in the State. If the household aids in the maintenance of good feeling and good fellowship among the members of the community, so do the tribe, phratry, and clan (2. 4. 1262 a 12: cp. 3. 9. 1280 b 33, 40). What other social functions these unities were to fulfil in Aristotle's State, we do not learn in what we have of the Politics.

Contrast between the Aristotelian conception of the household and modern conceptions of it.

We need not dwell on the many points of contrast which distinguish the household as Aristotle conceives it from the household of modern times. One remark, however, may be made on this subject. To Aristotle the head of the household is the one source from which all its spiritual influences appear to proceed. The wife contributes services which she is better fitted to render than any one else, but there is no sign that her husband is to derive any moral stimulus or guidance from her[2].

στάσις. He notices (8 (6). 4. 1319 b 19 sqq.) the bold and remarkable steps by which Cleisthenes at Athens put an end to the previously existing associations, and sought to bring men together and to break down the distinctions of worship and grouping which held them apart. In the Peloponnesus the clans seem to have been long the mainstay of oligarchy, and the only way to diminish their power was to gather a number of villages (i.e. clans) into a considerable city. The creation of Megalopolis, for instance, would tell, and was doubtless intended by Epaminondas to tell, in favour of democracy and against the Lacedaemonians.

[1] Pol. 2. 5. 1264 a 6 sq.

[2] Even in Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1162 a 25 sq. all that is said is that a friendship for virtue—the highest type of friendship—may exist between husband and wife, if they are good, for each has virtue and the husband may feel pleasure in the wife's virtue. But then we are told in the Politics (1. 13. 1260 a 21) that the wife's virtue is subordinate and minis-

Aristotle would hardly say with Trendelenburg[1] that 'the two parties (husband and wife) stand in need of each other, in order by their union to elevate and ennoble their individual lives.' The view of Comte that the function of the household is 'to cultivate to the highest point the influence of woman over man[2],' would of course be utterly incomprehensible to him.

Aristotle's teaching as to Property—its due amount and the true mode of acquiring and using it.

Just as, after defending the household, Aristotle sketches an ideal household which differs much from the household as it actually existed, so after defending the right of several property, he lays down principles as to the acquisition and use of property which leave proprietary right and proprietary duty, so far at least as the citizens of the State are concerned[3], a very different thing from what he found them.

The ideal household, as we have already seen, is not to be maintained in communistic fashion out of a public stock, but is to have a definite area of land assigned to it from which the householder is to win the means of subsistence for his household, or rather to have them won for him. Its extent will be such as to favour a mode of life at once temperate and liberal. A due supply of the goods of fortune—for Aristotle follows the traditional use of the Greek language in treating fortune as the source of wealth (e. g. 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 27)[4]—is a condition of some kinds of virtuous action and a condition of happiness (4 (7). 13. 1332 a 10–29). Virtue must be possessed of an adequate supply

terial (ὑπηρετική), and that the deliberative element in her nature is unable to assert itself with effect (1260 a 13). Aristotle was well aware of the contrast of character in men and women (see, for instance, Hist. An. 9. 1. 608 a 35–b 16), whether we think that he draws the contrast correctly or not.

[1] Naturrecht, § 123.

[2] Social Statics, E.T., p. 171.

[3] The ownership of land is to be confined to citizens (Pol. 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 17 sqq.); but the artisans and day-labourers who are to find a place in the best State, must be intended to hold property, though we hear no more of their proprietary rights than we do of the organization of the households in which we must suppose them to live.

[4] Contrast the language used in 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 40, ὁρῶντας ὅτι κτῶνται καὶ φυλάττουσιν, οὐ τὰς ἀρετὰς τοῖς ἐκτός, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνα τούτοις.

of external and bodily goods, if it is to rise into happiness; it needs instruments (*ὄργανα*) just as a harpist needs a good lyre (1332 a 25). Plato had designed for his citizens in the Laws a simply 'temperate' life (737 D): Aristotle objects to this description as rather vague and open to misinterpretation (2. 6. 1265 a 28 sqq.); it might, he thinks, be construed to point to a pinched, hard existence, which is not what he would himself approve. He is not, like Milton, an encomiast of that 'spare Fast,' which, according to the poet,

> 'Oft with gods doth diet,
> And hears the Muses in a ring
> Aye round about God's altar sing':

but he is still less in sympathy with those who found in luxury a school of valour and greatness of mind[1]. Aristotle connected with extreme wealth and luxury unwillingness to submit to be ruled, or to rest content with anything short of absolute rule, just as he connected incapacity for ruling and for aught but servile subjection with extreme poverty (Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 13)[2]. The life of his citizens is to strike a happy mean between the two extremes. The ideal distribution of property is thus, in Aristotle's view, that in which every citizen has enough for virtue and happiness, and none have more[3]. His acceptance of the institu-

[1] Heracleides Ponticus appears to have said in his popular work on Pleasure—*ἅπαντες γοῦν οἱ τὴν ἡδονὴν τιμῶντες καὶ τρυφᾶν προῃρημένοι μεγαλόψυχοι καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς εἰσιν, ὡς Πέρσαι καὶ Μῆδοι· μάλιστα γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων τὴν ἡδονὴν οὗτοι καὶ τὸ τρυφᾶν τιμῶσιν, ἀνδρειότατοι καὶ μεγαλοψυχότατοι τῶν βαρβάρων ὄντες* (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 200 n.). The paradox is reproduced by Agatharchides, a Peripatetic of the second century before Christ, who says of the Aetolians—*Αἰτωλοὶ τοσούτῳ τῶν λοιπῶν ἑτοιμότερον ἔχουσι πρὸς θάνατον, ὅσῳπερ καὶ ζῆν πολυτελῶς* [*καὶ*] *ἐκτενέστερον ζητοῦσι τῶν ἄλλων* (ap. Athen. Deipn. 12. 33. 527 b).

[2] Luxury meant more to the Greeks than it means to us; it was in their view closely allied with *ὕβρις* and not unconnected with political untrustworthiness: cp. Plutarch, Lycurg. c. 13, *ὅπερ γὰρ ὕστερον Ἐπαμεινώνδαν εἰκεῖν λέγουσιν ἐπὶ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ τραπέζης, ὡς τὸ τοιοῦτον ἄριστον οὐ χαρεῖ προδοσίαν, τοῦτο πρῶτος ἐνόησε Λυκοῦργος.* The Greeks always conceived the 'tyrant' to be not only fond of unlimited power, but generally unlimited in his desires (Plato, Rep. 573 A sqq.: Theopomp. Fr. 129, 204).

[3] Compare the saying of Gibbon (Decline and Fall, c. 2): 'It might perhaps be more conducive to the virtue as well as happiness of mankind, if all possessed the ne-

tion of several property is not indeed expressly coup
with this limitation and equalization of its amount;
we note that he deprecates those extremes of wealth
poverty which have in practice proved the almost inse
able concomitants of this institution. When he allow
place to wealth among the necessary elements of the S
(4 (7). 8. 1328 b 22: cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 33), we must s
pose that he has in his mind moderate, not great, wealt

The virtues connected with property have to do b
with its acquisition and with its use, but with the la
more than with the former (Eth. Nic. 4. 1. 1120 a 8 sqq.).
we have seen, Aristotle accentuates the distinction betw
Household Science and the Science of Supply: it is
householder's duty rather to see that the commodities
cessary or useful to the household are forthcoming, t
himself to take part in acquiring them, just as it is his busi
to see that the members of his household enjoy he
though he leaves it to the physician to produce it.
householder is to be neither improvident nor a lover of g
Aristotle seems, as we have noticed, scarcely to admit
the love of money is as primary an instinct of human na
as the love of pleasure; he sometimes resolves the for
into the latter. He desires that the landowners of
ideal State shall be men whose main pre-occupatio
will be to rule over their households, to rule and be r
as citizens of the State, and to engage in philosopl
speculation, and who will gladly delegate to others
task of acquiring the commodities necessary for the sup
of their households—men who, without forgetting to se
that these commodities shall be forthcoming, will c
the care of property less noble than the exercise of
over the members of the household, and who will n
it in use available for others. Plato had already sai
his Laws (740 A) that the possessors of the various
are to feel that their lots are each of them the com

cessaries and none the superfluities of life.' Aristotle, however, speaks only of his ideal citizens, and allows them a good more than the bare 'necess of life.'

property of the whole State (*κοινὴν τῆς πόλεως ξυμπάσης*); but the expression *κοινὴ χρῆσις* is apparently adopted by Aristotle from Isocrates' ideal picture of Athens under the sway of the Areopagus (Areopag. § 35), and it gives increased definiteness to the doctrine[1]. Aristotle had in his mind the open-handed fellowship of Pythagorean friends, and, still more, the Communistic ideal of Plato, and he seeks while retaining in his State the right of several property, to ensure that it shall not imperil the 'public-heartedness' of his citizens or the sense of brotherhood in the community. The Xenophontic Cyrus, who recommends the acquisition by just means of as much as possible in order that the acquirer may have the more to use nobly[2], took a different view; but the stress which Xenophon, no less than Plato and Aristotle, lays on the duty of using property aright, deserves especial attention in these days, in which, as L. Schmidt says, 'one of the most important tasks the peoples of Europe have before them is to moralize in an increasing degree the institution of private property' (Ethik der alten Griechen, 2. 390)[3]. Gorgias had said of Cimon that he 'acquired in order to use and used in order to be honoured' (Plutarch, Cimon, c. 10): Aristotle's ideal householder is to value property for this, that it makes possible a life of virtuous activity and happiness, and to desire no more than contributes to this end; and he is to use it, not with the view of reaping honour, but in such a way as to give full expression to his virtue and friendliness of heart.

[1] Xenophon himself had, as we have seen, put into the mouth of his hero Cyrus words which express the Pythagorean doctrine *κοινὰ τὰ φίλων—ταῦτα, ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἅπαντα δεῖ ὑμᾶς οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἐμὰ ἡγεῖσθαι ἢ καὶ ὑμέτερα* (Cyrop. 8. 4. 36). He is addressing his friends. But to make what one has the common property of oneself and one's friends is not the same thing as making it the common property of all citizens.

[2] See L. Schmidt, 2. 380, who refers to Xen. Cyrop. 8. 2. 20–23. Cp. also Plutarch, Cimon c. 10, *Κριτίας δὲ τῶν τριάκοντα γενόμενος ἐν ταῖς ἐλεγείαις εὔχεται*

Πλοῦτον μὲν Σκοπαδῶν, μεγαλοφροσύνην δὲ Κίμωνος,
νίκας δ' Ἀρκεσίλα τοῦ Λακεδαιμονίου.

[3] The readers of Comte's Positive Polity will be familiar with language to the same effect.

The Greeks were probably far more open-handed in th use of property than the Romans of the Republic. Po bius, at any rate, after describing the munificence of Scip adds (32. 12)—'now an act of this kind would be not reasonably thought noble everywhere, but at Rome it positively marvellous, for there no one of his free will gi any one anything whatever belonging to him.' Not ev rich Athenian, indeed, like Cimon, threw his fields and g dens open to the passer-by, and allowed all men freely take of their produce, or kept open house, or gave the g ments from the backs of his slaves to poor men whom met in the streets—far from it—but many gave dowries the daughters of impoverished citizens, or paid funeral penses, or ransomed captives, or subscribed to ἔρανοι for relief of friends in distress[1]. Aristotle would proba find as much to amend in the methods of the priv charity of his day as he did in those of its public cha (8 (6). 5. 1320 a 29 sqq.): still he gives high praise to liberality with which the Spartans treated each otl and the rich of Tarentum treated the poor (132 9 sqq.: 2. 5. 1263 a 30 sqq.). He demands, however, his ideal proprietor far more than this. He expects l not only to be free-handed in giving, but also to all others much freedom in using that which he does not g away[2].

We do not know even in outline what powers of deal with his property were to be possessed by the propri in Aristotle's State. The lot of land, indeed, as Susem points out[3], he apparently intends to be inalienable

[1] See Schmidt, 2. 387–8, from whom I take these facts.

[2] Friedländer points out (Sittengeschichte Roms 3. 98) that 'the rich and great of the Roman Empire were expected not only to use their surplus revenues for the relief of poverty—a purpose especially served by the institution of clientship—but also to allow the poor to share freely in their enjoyments, and to place within their reach advantages and g fications of all kinds, from wh they are for the most part exclu in the modern world.' It is however, the munificence open-handedness of a *grand neur* that Aristotle asks of ideal proprietor, but a readi to place whatever he possesse the disposal of others, whe equals or inferiors.

[3] Sus.², Einleitung, p. 26.

indivisible[1], and to descend to one son only. Would he allow the father to choose this son, as Plato did? Does he intend, again, like Plato, to abolish dowries? It would seem from 2. 9. 1270 a 25, that he would either abolish them or limit their amount. In default of children, is the proprietor to be allowed to adopt an heir? What powers, again, is he to possess over property other than the lot? Is the law, that property is to pass by inheritance and not by gift, which Aristotle recommends to oligarchies (7 (5). 8. 1309 a 23) as the best means of diffusing and equalizing property, to be adopted in the best State also? It would be easy to mention other points, as to which we are not fully informed.

Transition from the industrial and household life of the State to its political life.

So far we have had to do with preliminary matters. We have been sketching the organization of Supply and of the Household under the best constitution; we have not yet studied the central subject of Political Science, the political as distinguished from the industrial and household life of the best State. The constitution of the State, we started by saying, allots advantages and functions, and we have seen to whom the best constitution will allot the functions connected with the supply of necessaries and also those connected with the Household: we have not yet seen to whom it will allot the higher functions, and among them political functions.

The investigations of the First Book of the Politics have hitherto been our main guide, and the First Book treats the subjects with which it deals from the point of view of Nature, which cannot be far from that of the best constitution. It asks, who is the natural slave, what is the natural form of the Science of Supply, who is the true householder; and it is precisely under the guidance of Nature that Aristotle constructs the best constitution (see e. g. 4 (7). 14.

[1] We may probably infer this from the arrangements respecting the land made in 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 14 sqq. We also find that Aristotle approves (2. 9. 1270 a 19) of the discouragement by Lycurgus of the sale of land, and regrets that he did not impose some checks on gift and bequest.

1332 b 35 sq.). It is true of Political Science, as it is true of Art, that it 'partly brings the work of Nature to completion, partly imitates Nature' (Phys. 2. 8. 199 a 15).

Preliminary lessons learnt in the Second Book.

The Second Book still keeps the ideal point of view in sight (cp. 2. 1. 1260 b 27 sqq.), though, like the First Book and indeed the whole treatise, it seeks to draw attention, not only to 'that which is normal and correct,' but also to 'that which is useful' (cp. 1. 3. 1253 b 15 sq.). Apparently critical and negative, it really is something more: it so conducts its review of constitutions as to suggest by its indication of their defects the true principles on which society should be organized. It thus forms a good introduction to the sketch of the best constitution in the Fourth Book, and its teaching is in full harmony with the teaching of that part of the Politics. A brief reference to its main conclusions will illustrate this.

The State, we learn, though a *κοινωνία*, is not a *κοινωνία* in everything that can be shared, but only in those things which can be shared with advantage to virtue and to friendship; self-completeness, not the maximum of unity, is the aim which should be kept in view in constructing it; its institutions should satisfy, not run counter to that moderate and reasonable love of self which nature has implanted in man; education is the truest and most whole some means of promoting harmony in the State, for it does not lessen, like some other specifics, the opportunities of virtuous action, but on the contrary produces virtue which is the secret of concord; and again, if a State is to be happy, some part at any rate of its population must be in possession of happiness, for if no part of it is happy, it cannot be happy as a whole. Aristotle keeps this last principle in view in constituting his ideal citizen-body. He surrounds its members with the means of virtuous and happy activity, and makes their happiness give happiness to the State.

From the criticism on Phaleas of Chalcedon we learn not to expect too much from legislation equalizing land property, apart from an improvement in the moral tone

the community. The equalization of landed property, or even of property in general, which Phaleas forgot to equalize, is an insufficient preventive by itself of civil discord (στάσις). To make it effective for this purpose, a limit must be imposed on reproduction, properties must not only be equalized but made of that amount which is most favourable to virtue, and the laws of the State must secure to each man an education which will moderate his desires. Equality of property will not do much to prevent civil disturbance originating among the Many, but it will wholly fail to touch movements caused by a desire for superior distinction on the part of the Few. It will, at the utmost, only remove one cause for the commission of wrong (ἀδικία)—absolute want of the necessaries of life; but men commit wrong even when their immediate necessities are fully supplied, for the sake of the gratification which they derive from superfluities, and it is thus that the greatest wrongs come to be committed. If these wrongs are to be prevented, men must be taught to be temperate, and to seek even 'painless pleasure,' not in forms which presuppose power over their fellows, but in philosophy, which derives the pleasure it confers from sources lying wholly within ourselves. Nor must the amount of wealth which it is desirable that the members of the State should possess, be settled without reference to the security of the State from external perils. Phaleas confines his attention to dangers arising within the State. On the whole—it is thus that Aristotle sums up one of the most successful of his criticisms—equality of property will be of some avail in preventing civil discord, but not of much, for it will not pacify the more aspiring spirits, nor will it in the long run satisfy the Many, for these live for the satisfaction of desire, which is in its nature unlimited, and soon tire of the 'two obols,' which were enough for them at first. The only real security against internal perils is to make the better natures indisposed to commit injustice, and to see that the worse are at once too weak in numbers to do so, and are not provoked to it by wrong. The criticism on Phaleas, then,

like that on Plato, arrives at the conclusion that education is the best guarantee for concord in the State; and it points to an education favourable at once to morality and philosophical aptitude, coinciding fully with the fourteenth and fifteenth chapters of the Fourth Book (compare, for instance, 1334 a 28–34).

Aristotle's division of the land of his ideal State into public and private land was perhaps suggested by a provision in the constitution of Hippodamus, though Aristotle does not use the public land for the maintenance of the soldiers of the State. He anticipated Aristotle also in the distinction of the military from the agricultural class.

From the Lacedaemonian State Aristotle learnt much, though rather in the way of warning than of example. He learnt the necessity of organizing the slave-system of his State with care; he learnt not to leave the life of the women unregulated, nor property very unequally distributed; the citizen's lot of land should be inalienable by sale or gift, and indivisible, and a check should be placed on the increase of population. The syssitia should be put on an improved footing, so that no citizen need cease to be a citizen for want of the means of paying his contribution to them. It was a good point in the Lacedaemonian constitution, that all elements of the State —kings, upper classes, and people—found something in it to satisfy them, and Aristotle would not disturb the popular basis of the ephorate, but he would reform the mode by which ephors were elected, so as to get better men, would not allow them to act as judges in important trials without any laws to guide them, and would make the supreme control which they exercised over other magistracies something different from what it was. Membership of the senate, again, should not be for life, for the mind grows old as well as the body. The arrangements respecting the senate are designedly such as to stimulate a love of distinction, which is unwise, for it is one of the main sources of wrong-doing. The way in which senators are selected is unsatisfactory, and the same thing may also be said of the

kings. The Lacedaemonian lawgiver aims at producing one kind of virtue only, military virtue, which finds no employment in leisure, and therefore was of little use to the community when victory had been won, and its wars were over (cp. 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 15–15. 1334 b 5); and, which is worse, he teaches his citizens to value virtue as a means to external goods, or in other words, to value these more than virtue.

The upshot of the whole chapter is, that in the Lacedaemonian State we find a small and dwindling body of citizens, surrounded by hostile Hellenic slaves; trained only for war, not for pacific rule, and taught to count wealth and distinction greater goods than even the military virtue they prize; organized ill both in State and in household, for not only are their rulers selected by an unsatisfactory method, and often superannuated or inferior, though charged with great responsibilities, but the hard life imposed on the citizens stands in strong contrast to the disorderly lives of their wives. We shall find that Aristotle takes pains in constructing his State to avoid every one of the defects which he here signalizes.

From Crete he learns less, but he learns the true use of the public land (2. 10. 1272 a 17 sq.: cp. 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 11 sq.), a better organization of the syssitia than the Lacedaemonian, and the necessity that law and not human caprice shall be supreme, if a real constitution, or indeed a real State, is to exist. In the Carthaginian as in the Lacedaemonian State he finds that all classes of society are content with their position—a rare circumstance in Greece—but that the contentment of the Carthaginian people with their political lot is based, not, like that of the Lacedaemonian, on a participation in one of the great offices of state, but on their share in the advantages derivable from the imperial position of Carthage, and consequently rests on a less secure basis. The Carthaginian constitution also was too ready to admit wealth to a share of the homage which is due to virtue, and thus tended to mislead the popular judgment and to teach it to give more

honour to external goods than they deserve. Besides, to make the two greatest magistracies purchaseable was to imperil the good government of the State.

We see, however, that under both the Carthaginian and the Lacedaemonian constitutions virtue tended to fill a larger place in the government and life of the State than under most others, and that it will be Aristotle's aim so to organize his best State and its education as completely to realize the ideal which these two constitutions vaguely and not very successfully 'felt after.'

Third Book of the Politics—distribution of rights of citizenship and of rule.

We pass at this point from the Second to the Third Book of the Politics, from the criticism of certain proposed or existing constitutions to an attempt to determine how the rights of citizenship and of rule—in other words, the higher social activities—should be distributed by the constitution; and Aristotle's plan appears to be, first to discuss how a normal (*ὀρθή*), or just, constitution will distribute them, next to set forth how they will be distributed in the best State[1]. The distribution of these functions, as distinguished from the lower or necessary ones, is, in fact, usually stated to be not merely the chief, but the only problem which the constitution has to solve. So we read (Pol. 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 15 sqq.: cp. 3. 6. 1278 b 8 sqq.)—*πολιτεία μὲν γάρ ἐστι τάξις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἡ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, τίνα τρόπον νενέμηνται, καὶ τί τὸ κύριον τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τί τὸ τέλος ἑκάστης τῆς κοινωνίας ἐστίν.* It is the course taken by the constitution in this matter that determines its character: constitutions differ because they allot the right of ruling, or in other words supreme authority in the State, to different persons or groups of persons. It is evident, however, if we refer to passages such as 2. 6. 1264 b 31 sqq., that the constitution

[1] We seem to observe a similar transition in Plato's Republic, for at the beginning of the fifth book, Socrates, looking back at the State sketched in the second, third, and fourth, says: *ἀγαθὴν μὲν τοίνυν τὴν τοιαύτην πόλιν τε καὶ πολιτείαν καὶ ὀρθὴν καλῶ καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τοιοῦτον, κακὰς δὲ τὰς ἄλλας καὶ ἡμαρτημένας, κ.τ.λ.* In the fifth and later books, on the other hand, we are conscious of some heightening of the ideal.

also regulates, or may regulate, the whole position of the classes concerned with 'necessary functions,' the position of women, and the educational organization of the State. It is thus that the little treatise of Xenophon which bears the title *Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτεία*, concerns itself as much with the 'pursuits of the Spartans' (c. 1. init.), their 'mode of life' (c. 5), their enforced abstinence from money-making (c. 7), as with the political organization of the State. Still the policy which a constitution follows in all these matters will be determined by the course it takes with regard to the central subject of its competence.

Importance attached by the Greeks to the constitution: the constitution the 'mode of life chosen by the State'—influence ascribed to it over the life and character of those living under it.

Here we commence that which was to a Greek the central inquiry of Political Science. The Greeks ascribed to the constitution a far-reaching ethical influence. Demosthenes repeats the saying of an earlier orator[1], that the laws are regarded by all good men as 'the mind and will of the State' (*τρόποι τῆς πόλεως*), and we have already seen (above, p. 94, note 2), how Isocrates speaks of the constitution. To Plato and Aristotle the constitution is a powerful influence for good or evil: it is only in the best State, says the latter, that the virtue of the good man and the virtue of the citizen coincide, whence it follows that constitutions other than the best require for their maintenance some other kind of virtue than that of the good man. In the vaster States of to-day opinion and manners are slower to reflect the tendency of the constitution: in the small city-States of ancient Greece they readily took its colour[2]. It was thus that in the view of the Greeks every

[1] *Ὁ γὰρ εἰπεῖν τινά φασιν ἐν ὑμῖν, ἀληθὲς εἶναί μοι δοκεῖ, ὅτι τοὺς νόμους ἅπαντες ὑπειλήφασιν, ὅσοι σωφρονοῦσι, τρόπους τῆς πόλεως εἶναι* (Demosth. adv. Timocr. c. 210, quoted by A. Schaefer, Demosthenes 1. 293. 1). Cp. Aeschin. adv. Timarch. § 4, and Plato, Rep. 544 D.

[2] Cases no doubt occurred in which the sentiments and habits of society were not adjusted to the constitution, as we learn from a remarkable passage of the Politics (6 (4). 5. 1292 b 11–21); but the language of Aristotle implies that this disharmony was commonly only temporary, and occurred for the most part when the authors of a revolution after effecting a constitutional change did not at once proceed to alter the pre-existing laws, but contented themselves for a time (*τὰ πρῶτα*) with the bare possession

constitution had an accompanying *ἦθος*, which made itse
felt in all the relations of life. Each constitutional for
exercised a moulding influence on virtue; the good citize
was a different being in an oligarchy, a democracy, and a
aristocracy. Each constitution embodied a scheme of lif
and tended, consciously or not, to bring the lives of tho
living under it into harmony with its particular scheme.
the law provides that the highest offices in the State sha
be purchaseable or confines them to wealthy men, it i
spires *ipso facto* a respect for wealth in the citizens (2. 1
1273 a 35 sqq.). Thus Plato and Aristotle are true to Gre
feeling when they speak of the constitution as a 'life' (*βίο*
or 'the imitation of a life' (*μίμησις βίου*)[1]. Expressions n
very dissimilar have been used by modern writers who ha
studied the change produced in France and in Europe b
the French Revolution. 'The plain fact is,' says a writer
the *Saturday Review* (July 8, 1882, p. 57), 'that the ide
of '89 involved not so much a new departure in politics
like (e. g.) the English Revolution of a century earlier,
the almost contemporary American one—as a new meth
of interpreting life altogether, or, as De Maistre express
it "a new religion[2]."' Aristotle would trace a similar cha

of power. Contrast the promptness with which Timoleon after his victory over the tyrants proceeded to recast the laws, even those relating to contracts, in a democratic sense (Diod. 16. 70).

[1] Cp. Plato, Laws 817 B, *πᾶσα ... ἡμῖν ἡ πολιτεία ξυνέστηκε μίμησις τοῦ καλλίστου καὶ ἀρίστου βίου*: Aristot. Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 40, *ἡ πολιτεία βίος τίς ἐστι πόλεως*: 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 14, *περὶ πολιτείας ἀρίστης τὸν μέλλοντα ποιήσασθαι τὴν προσήκουσαν ζήτησιν ἀνάγκη διορίσασθαι πρῶτον, τίς αἱρετώτατος βίος*: 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 41, *ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον καὶ δι' ἄλλων ἕκαστοι τοῦτο* (sc. *εὐδαιμονίαν*) *θηρεύοντες τούς τε βίους ἑτέρους ποιοῦνται καὶ τὰς πολιτείας*. Thus too the State, which is said to be a *κοινωνία* of citizens in a constitution in 3. 3. 1276 b 1 sq., is described in 3. 9. 1280 b 40 as *ἡ γενῶν καὶ κωμῶν κοινωνία ζωῆς τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκους*. Plato is m to say in Epist. 5. 321 D, *ἔστι δή τις φωνὴ τῶν πολιτειῶν ἑκάστη καθαπερεί τινων ζῴων, κ.τ.λ.*

[2] Compare Burke, Thought French Affairs (Works 3. Bohn): 'the present Revolu in France seems to me . . bear little resemblance or ana to any of those which have brought about in Europe principles merely political. *a revolution of doctrine and retic dogma.* It has a much gr resemblance to those cha which have been made upo ligious grounds, in which a of proselytism makes an esse part. The last revolution of trine and theory which has pened in Europe, is the Refo tion.'

in every transition from one constitution to another. We are familiar enough with the fact that some homogeneity of opinion and character is essential in those who are to work harmoniously together as fellow-citizens of the same State. 'Our ideal of life is not the Irish ideal, our standard of duty is not theirs' (*Times*, Dec. 25, 1883); to this in part the friction between the two sections of the United Kingdom is sometimes set down. 'The mischief to be dealt with is that a nation united under one government and living on a narrow and strictly limited area is at this moment dangerously heterogeneous in its tastes, habits, and general ways of regarding life' (*Times*, May 29, 1884).

It is not surprising that Aristotle found the identity of the State in its constitution (3. 3. 1276 b 9). It was perhaps in part because changes of constitution meant so much, that they were so frequent in ancient Greece and so keenly fought over. To be an oligarch living under a democratic constitution, or *vice versa*, must have been a painful experience and one from which most men were glad to escape as soon as possible.

Plato and Aristotle may perhaps rate the influence of the constitution too high, but it is a merit in them, that they never lose sight, as many modern inquirers have done, of the full significance of the State and its organization. They see it to be an ethical influence for good or ill.

The popular classification of constitutions.

The question how many different ways there are of allotting supreme authority was one which popular opinion in Greece found no difficulty in answering. According to the prevailing view, there were only three possible constitutions—monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy—the rule of one man, or a few, or the many[1]. Under monarchy

[1] So Herodotus (3. 80–82); Aeschines (adv. Timarch. § 4), who reckons τυραννίς in the place of monarchy; the eulogists of the Lacedaemonian constitution in Aristot. Pol. 2. 6. 1265 b 33 sqq.; Isocrates (Panath. § 132), who, however, admits two forms of each, a better and a worse; οἱ πολλοί, according to Plato, Laws 714 B; Plutarch, de Monarchia et Democratia et Oligarchia, c. 3. Kingship and Tyranny were probably often confounded in common parlance: cp. Philochor. fragm. 5 (Müller, Fragm. Hist.

would fall the two forms, Kingship and Tyranny: aristocracy, or the government of the best, would either be considered as identical with oligarchy (Thuc. 6. 39: cp. Aristot. Pol. 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 36 sqq.), or as a species of it (Isocr. Panath. § 132: Aristot. Pol. 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 16). Some, however, made aristocracy a constitution by itself, thus counting four (Pol. 6 (4). 7. 1293 a 35 sqq.: Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 29), while others brought all constitutions under two heads, oligarchy and democracy. Others, again, made up four constitutions by adding to monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy a form compounded of all three, which they also held to be the best (Pol. 2. 6. 1265 b 33 sqq.). This was an idea which had a great future before it.

Principles of Socrates and Plato.

The philosophers were not content with a classification of constitutions resting on this numerical basis. A constitution was to them an ethical force, and it was by their ethical consequences that constitutions were to be classified. Thus the classification which Xenophon ascribes to Socrates implied that constitutions should be distinguished not by the number of the depositaries of power, but by their attributes and by the character of their rule. He marked off Kingship from Tyranny, rule being exercised in the former constitution over willing subjects and in accordance with law, not so in the latter; he distinguished aristocracy as the form in which offices are filled 'from the ranks of those who fulfil the behests of the law' (*ἐκ τῶν τὰ νόμιμα ἐπιτελούντων*: cp. Aristot. Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 34 sq.), plutocracy as that in which there is a property qualification for office, democracy as that in which office is open to all (Xen. Mem. 4. 6. 12). He also held that the true king or statesman is marked off from the counterfeit by the possession of knowledge, but he does not appear to have adjusted his classification of constitutions to this view.

Plato adopts different classifications in different di-

Gr. 1. 385), *οἱ οὖν Ἀθήνησι ῥήτορες, ὡς ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ πολιτευόμενοι, ἔθος ἔχουσι τοὺς βασιλέας τυράννους λέγειν.*

indivisible[1], and to descend to one son only. Would he allow the father to choose this son, as Plato did? Does he intend, again, like Plato, to abolish dowries? It would seem from 2. 9. 1270 a 25, that he would either abolish them or limit their amount. In default of children, is the proprietor to be allowed to adopt an heir? What powers, again, is he to possess over property other than the lot? Is the law, that property is to pass by inheritance and not by gift, which Aristotle recommends to oligarchies (7 (5). 8. 1309 a 23) as the best means of diffusing and equalizing property, to be adopted in the best State also? It would be easy to mention other points, as to which we are not fully informed.

Transition from the industrial and household life of the State to its political life.

So far we have had to do with preliminary matters. We have been sketching the organization of Supply and of the Household under the best constitution; we have not yet studied the central subject of Political Science, the political as distinguished from the industrial and household life of the best State. The constitution of the State, we started by saying, allots advantages and functions, and we have seen to whom the best constitution will allot the functions connected with the supply of necessaries and also those connected with the Household: we have not yet seen to whom it will allot the higher functions, and among them political functions.

The investigations of the First Book of the Politics have hitherto been our main guide, and the First Book treats the subjects with which it deals from the point of view of Nature, which cannot be far from that of the best constitution. It asks, who is the natural slave, what is the natural form of the Science of Supply, who is the true householder; and it is precisely under the guidance of Nature that Aristotle constructs the best constitution (see e. g. 4 (7). 14.

[1] We may probably infer this from the arrangements respecting the land made in 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 14 sqq. We also find that Aristotle approves (2. 9. 1270 a 19) of the discouragement by Lycurgus of the sale of land, and regrets that he did not impose some checks on gift and bequest.

1332 b 35 sq.). It is true of Political Science, as it is true of Art, that it 'partly brings the work of Nature to completion, partly imitates Nature' (Phys. 2. 8. 199 a 15).

Preliminary lessons learnt in the Second Book.

The Second Book still keeps the ideal point of view in sight (cp. 2. 1. 1260 b 27 sqq.), though, like the First Book and indeed the whole treatise, it seeks to draw attention, not only to 'that which is normal and correct,' but also to 'that which is useful' (cp. 1. 3. 1253 b 15 sq.). Apparently critical and negative, it really is something more: it so conducts its review of constitutions as to suggest by its indication of their defects the true principles on which society should be organized. It thus forms a good introduction to the sketch of the best constitution in the Fourth Book, and its teaching is in full harmony with the teaching of that part of the Politics. A brief reference to its main conclusions will illustrate this.

The State, we learn, though a *κοινωνία*, is not a *κοινωνία* in everything that can be shared, but only in those things which can be shared with advantage to virtue and to friendship; self-completeness, not the maximum of unity, is the aim which should be kept in view in constructing it; its institutions should satisfy, not run counter to, that moderate and reasonable love of self which nature has implanted in man; education is the truest and most wholesome means of promoting harmony in the State, for it does not lessen, like some other specifics, the opportunities of virtuous action, but on the contrary produces virtue which is the secret of concord; and again, if a State is to be happy, some part at any rate of its population must be in possession of happiness, for if no part of it is happy, it cannot be happy as a whole. Aristotle keeps this last principle in view in constituting his ideal citizen-body. He surrounds its members with the means of virtuous and happy activity, and makes their happiness give happiness to the State.

From the criticism on Phaleas of Chalcedon we learn not to expect too much from legislation equalizing land property, apart from an improvement in the moral tone

the community. The equalization of landed property, or even of property in general, which Phaleas forgot to equalize, is an insufficient preventive by itself of civil discord (στάσις). To make it effective for this purpose, a limit must be imposed on reproduction, properties must not only be equalized but made of that amount which is most favourable to virtue, and the laws of the State must secure to each man an education which will moderate his desires. Equality of property will not do much to prevent civil disturbance originating among the Many, but it will wholly fail to touch movements caused by a desire for superior distinction on the part of the Few. It will, at the utmost, only remove one cause for the commission of wrong (ἀδικία)—absolute want of the necessaries of life; but men commit wrong even when their immediate necessities are fully supplied, for the sake of the gratification which they derive from superfluities, and it is thus that the greatest wrongs come to be committed. If these wrongs are to be prevented, men must be taught to be temperate, and to seek even 'painless pleasure,' not in forms which presuppose power over their fellows, but in philosophy, which derives the pleasure it confers from sources lying wholly within ourselves. Nor must the amount of wealth which it is desirable that the members of the State should possess, be settled without reference to the security of the State from external perils. Phaleas confines his attention to dangers arising within the State. On the whole—it is thus that Aristotle sums up one of the most successful of his criticisms—equality of property will be of some avail in preventing civil discord, but not of much, for it will not pacify the more aspiring spirits, nor will it in the long run satisfy the Many, for these live for the satisfaction of desire, which is in its nature unlimited, and soon tire of the 'two obols,' which were enough for them at first. The only real security against internal perils is to make the better natures indisposed to commit injustice, and to see that the worse are at once too weak in numbers to do so, and are not provoked to it by wrong. The criticism on Phaleas, then,

like that on Plato, arrives at the conclusion that education is the best guarantee for concord in the State; and it points to an education favourable at once to morality and philosophical aptitude, coinciding fully with the fourteenth and fifteenth chapters of the Fourth Book (compare, for instance, 1334 a 28–34).

Aristotle's division of the land of his ideal State into public and private land was perhaps suggested by a provision in the constitution of Hippodamus, though Aristotle does not use the public land for the maintenance of the soldiers of the State. He anticipated Aristotle also in the distinction of the military from the agricultural class.

From the Lacedaemonian State Aristotle learnt much, though rather in the way of warning than of example. He learnt the necessity of organizing the slave-system of his State with care; he learnt not to leave the life of the women unregulated, nor property very unequally distributed; the citizen's lot of land should be inalienable by sale or gift, and indivisible, and a check should be placed on the increase of population. The syssitia should be put on an improved footing, so that no citizen need cease to be a citizen for want of the means of paying his contribution to them. It was a good point in the Lacedaemonian constitution, that all elements of the State —kings, upper classes, and people—found something in it to satisfy them, and Aristotle would not disturb the popular basis of the ephorate, but he would reform the mode by which ephors were elected, so as to get better men, would not allow them to act as judges in important trials without any laws to guide them, and would make the supreme control which they exercised over other magistracies something different from what it was. Membership of the senate, again, should not be for life, for the mind grows old as well as the body. The arrangements respecting the senate are designedly such as to stimulate a love of distinction, which is unwise, for it is one of the main sources of wrong-doing. The way in which senators are selected is unsatisfactory, and the same thing may also be said of the

controversialists have spent their efforts for centuries in the search for some indefeasible sovereign—Emperor, Pope, or People. Aristotle's doctrine is, that the true supreme authority is the One, the Few, or the Many, who can rule for the common good.

So far we have only the beginnings of a classification of constitutions: we have marked off the normal constitutions from the deviation-forms, but how are the three former, or again the three latter, to be distinguished from each other? As to the deviation-forms, Aristotle corrects at once the definitions of oligarchy and democracy which he has given: oligarchy is not the constitution in which the few rule for their own advantage, but that in which the rich rule for their own advantage; and so again in democracy it is not the many, but the poor, that hold sway and rule for their own advantage. The contrast between the holders of power in the two constitutions thus becomes, not a numerical, but a qualitative contrast. The account given of the remaining deviation-form (tyranny), however, remains unaltered; and as to the normal constitutions, we are allowed for the moment to conclude that the distinction between them is only a numerical one, except that we are warned (3. 7. 1279 a 39 sqq.) that the many who rule in a polity will not possess full virtue. But the succeeding discussions of the Third Book add a new point of contrast between the two classes of constitution. That which is for the common good is identified by Aristotle at the commencement of the Twelfth Chapter (1282 b 17) with that which is just, and thus we find that the deviation-forms are not only wrong in the aim of their rule, but are the outcome of injustice, for they mistake that which is partially just for the absolutely just (3. 13. 1283 a 26 sqq.). They sin not only against the common good but also against justice. We learn more clearly than ever that the difference between the two classes of constitution is a moral difference[1]. Even, indeed, within

[1] In Eth. Nic. 8. 13. 1161 a 30 sqq., another point of contrast between ὀρθαὶ πολιτεῖαι and παρεκβάσεις is noticed: in the latter there is

the normal constitutions a moral difference discloses its
the Absolute Kingship (*παμβασιλεία*) and the ideal A
tocracy are found to represent the 'rule of virtue f
provided with external means with a view to the n
perfect and desirable life' (3. 18. 1288 a 32–37 : cp. 6 (4
1289 a 32), and to be, in reality, a single form (6 (4
1290 a 24), standing at the head of the list of constitut
as the 'most normal constitution' (*ὀρθοτάτη πολιτεία*, 6
8. 1293 b 25), while the Polity is a deviation from
and the deviation-forms hitherto so termed are deviat
twice removed from the ideal original. This at lea
the teaching of the Sixth Book. In that book the
constitutions are no longer ranged three against thre
in the Third: on the contrary, they succeed each o
on a descending scale arranged on an ethical basis,
much like the descending scale in the Republic. Arist
has here, in fact, apparently almost come round to
view of Plato, that the only really normal constitu
is the Ideal Kingship or Aristocracy.

The best State in its two forms is thus not merely
best, but the most normal of the normal States: it is
State as Nature designed it to be. The others are fail
The earlier classification of constitutions into two contra
groups of three has been reconsidered, with the resu
clearing our views of the nature of each constitu
and also of placing the two ideal forms on a pinnacl
themselves.

We have gained fresh light as to the nature of
various constitutions as we have advanced from one ch
to another of the Third Book, and still more on pa
from the Third to the Sixth.

As to Kingship, we learn that it is not enough to
stitute a true Kingship that the single ruler should ru
the common good: he must possess a great super
over those he rules in virtue and resources (*ἀρετὴν κεχ*

nothing common between ruler and ruled; they are not united by a common aim for the common good: cp. Pol. 4 (7). 8. 13 sqq.

μένη)[1]. This is, in fact, the case in the Absolute Kingship (παμβασιλεία), and the Kingship which is subject to law is not really a separate constitution, for it may find a place in any and every constitution (3. 16. 1287 a 3 sqq.).

So again, Aristocracy is not simply a form in which a few rule for the common good, but one in which these few are men of full virtue (ἁπλῶς σπουδαῖοι), and possessed of a full complement of external means (6 (4). 2. 1289 a 32: 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 32), or in which the virtue of man and citizen coincide (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 5). The name, however, is also applied to constitutions which combine a recognition of the claims of the people and of the rich (6 (4). 8. 1294 a 24), or of the people only (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 16), with a recognition of the claims of virtue; or even, if the text is not corrupt or interpolated, to constitutions which, resembling a Polity, approach Oligarchy more nearly than the polity does (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 20). It should be observed that in these less genuine Aristocracies the virtue recognized is not that recognized by the true Aristocracy (the virtue of the good man), but 'virtue relative to the constitution' (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 5 sqq.).

So again, the Polity is not marked off merely by the aim with which its rulers rule: we learn, in fact, at the outset that the citizen-body in it will possess an imperfect type of virtue—military virtue[2]: the class which will be supreme in the Polity will be the hoplite class (3. 7. 1279 b 2), or, as we are told later, a mixture of the well-to-do and the poor (6 (4). 8. 1294 a 22), in which the 'moderately wealthy' (μέσοι) are strong (6 (4). 11).

We have already seen how much modification the original account of Democracy and Oligarchy receives immediately after it is given.

Thus the first description and classification of constitu-

[1] Cp. Pol. 3. 15. 1286 a 5: Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 3 (where for πληρωτὸς βασιλεύς, cp. Plato, Polit. 290 E, τῷ λαχόντι βασιλεῖ).

[2] The fact that virtue, though of an imperfect kind, is recognized in the Polity seems occasionally to be lost sight of, as for instance in 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 10, where it is implied that in a Polity virtue will not be the deciding consideration in elections to office.

tions (3. 7) is not only a mere outline, but it is tentative and provisional. A closer study of them reveals to us that they differ among themselves, not only in the aim and nature of the rule exercised in them, but in the qualities of the rulers, or in other words, the attributes to which they award supreme power. When once we apply this standard, the ideal Kingship and Aristocracy present the aspect of a single constitution, for they both award power to 'virtue fully furnished with external means'; and below them, the so-called Aristocracies, the Polity, Democracy, Oligarchy, and Tyranny are readily distinguishable from each other.

We arrive, in fact, at the following list of constitutions, each finding the characteristic by which it is defined (*ὅρος*) in the attribute, or group of attributes, to which it awards power:—

παμβασιλεία, true *ἀριστοκρατία*	*ὅρος*	*ἀρετὴ κεχορηγημένη*
so-called *ἀριστοκρατία*	„	*ἀρετή, πλοῦτος, ἐλευθερία,* or *ἀρετή, δῆμος*
πολιτεία	„	*πλοῦτος, ἐλευθερία*
δημοκρατία	„	*ἐλευθερία*
ὀλιγαρχία	„	*πλοῦτος.*

What the *ὅρος* of Tyranny is, we do not learn, though its end is said to be, like that of oligarchy, wealth (7 (5). 10. 1311 a 10): it is, indeed, hardly a constitution.

Aristotle's account of the causes of constitutional diversity.

We naturally ask how it happens that all actually existing constitutions diverge more or less from the true type—how it is that the best constitution in its two forms is not also the only existing constitution. This is a question which Aristotle answers in more ways than one.

His first answer is that the character and ethical level of a community determine its constitution. Thus the best constitution presupposes a certain degree and kind of virtue: the life lived in it is one for which most men are not adapted (6 (4). 11. 1295 a 25 sqq.). Plato had already traced constitutions to character (Rep. 544 D), and Aristotle echoes this view (Pol. 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 14, *τὸ ἦθος τῆς πολιτείας*

ἑκάστης τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ φυλάττειν εἴωθε τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ καθίστησιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, οἷον τὸ μὲν δημοκρατικὸν δημοκρατίαν, τὸ δ' ὀλιγαρχικὸν ὀλιγαρχίαν· ἀεὶ δὲ τὸ βέλτιστον ἦθος βελτίονος αἴτιον πολιτείας). The constitution expresses the creed of the community with regard to the life it should live, or, in other words, with regard to the sources of happiness (4 (7). 8. 1328 a 40 sq.). The laws embody the rule of life accepted by the State—a rule to which it may be unfaithful under pressure of temptation, just as the individual may (*εἴπερ γάρ ἐστιν ἐφ' ἑνὸς ἀκρασία, ἔστι καὶ ἐπὶ πόλεως*, 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 18). Some constitutions admit to power classes which seek happiness in things not really productive of it (4 (7). 8. 1328 a 40 sq.: cp. 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 29 sq.: 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 3 sq.)[1]. This view, however, seems not to be fully worked out, and the existence of more constitutions than one is commonly traced by Aristotle to a mistake, not as to the sources of happiness, but as to what is just. The less satisfactory constitutions are regarded on either hypothesis as the result of error (*ἁμάρτημα*, 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 25 sqq.: cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 9 sqq.), whether this error relates to the sources of happiness or to that which is just. If we take the latter view, the error is that of men, who, being judges in their own case (1280 a 14), not unnaturally err as to the extent of their claims: indeed, there is really some basis of justice for the claims they make. The claim of democracy is that those who are on an equality with the rest in one thing (*ἐλευθερία*) shall be accounted equal in all (i.e. shall receive an equal amount of the advantages distributable by the State)[2]: that of oligarchy is that those who are unequal in one respect (wealth) shall receive an unequal amount in the distribution.

So far the diversity of constitutions has been referred by

[1] The democratic classes would seek it in freedom, which they interpret as government by a majority and absence of control (8 (6). 2. 1317 a 40 sqq.): the oligarchical classes in wealth and birth.

[2] It does not seem to be quite true that Greek democracy expected absolute equality in all advantages distributable by the State; we do not find, for instance, that all offices were filled by lot even in the extreme democracy.

Aristotle to differences of ethical creed or varying versi
of justice. But already in the foregoing, differences
creed have been connected with differences of class: s
classes, we have been told, seek happiness in things
really productive of it, and their admission to power va
and vitiates the constitution.

In the Sixth and Eighth Books of the Politics cor
tutional variation is referred, not to ethical, but to sc
differences. It is referred to the preponderance in
community of a given social element (*ποσόν* or *ποιόν*, 6
12. 1296 b 17 sqq.), or of particular classes or occupati
or to the distribution of property, or again to variat
in the 'parts of the State' (*μέρη πόλεως*) and the cor
nations formed out of them. A populous city swarn
with artisans and traders, and still more a populous sea
full of fishermen like Tarentum and Byzantium, o
trireme-oarsmen like the Peiraeus, or of merchant-sai
like Aegina and Chios, was the natural home of democ
feeling (6 (4). 4. 1291 b 20 sqq.). The extreme oligar
on the other hand, found its natural home in commun
seated in great levels suitable for the action of ca
(like those of Thessaly), whose safety depended on
cavalry, and where the richest class were consequ
held in especial honour, while the more moderate
of oligarchy would exist where the safety of the
depended on the hoplites, and where the moderately
to-do class, to which the hoplites mostly belonged
strong (8 (6). 7. 1321 a 8 sqq.). The cause which ultim
determines the political organization of a community
thus often be the character of the territory, and we u
stand how it happens that much care is taken to
a satisfactory territory for the best State (4 (7). cc. 5

We see then that two distinct views of the cau
constitutional diversity find expression in different
of the Politics, which Aristotle does not attempt to
cile. They are not, however, perhaps irreconcilea
we bear in mind the hints which we have already ga
from the Fourth Book that ethical and social diff

do not lie far apart. We can readily understand that in Aristotle's view the predominance in a society of a defective ethical creed or a wrong conception of justice is due to the predominance of classes which in the best State either do not exist or are relegated to obscurity.

Still the Sixth and Eighth Books place the sources of constitutional imperfection in a light in which they are not placed in other Books of the Politics. We learn from them that the excellence of a State may depend in the long run on accidents of its geography or history, or in other words, on the favour of Nature and Fortune, and that its ethical character does not depend wholly on itself, but in part on the social organization which circumstances dictate to it.

Aristotle the first clearly to recognise the truth that the constitution of a State reflects to some extent its social conditions.

In tracing the constitution to social conditions, Aristotle gives explicit recognition to an important truth, which Plato had certainly not recognized with equal clearness, though the facts which pointed to it were familiar enough. The genesis of the constitution of a State was perhaps studied by Aristotle more closely and more successfully than it has been studied till recent times, for the 'social contract' theory, so long dominant in political science, tended to disguise the circumstances under which a State comes by its constitution. The pictures drawn under its influence of a people meeting together and selecting its government, as a man might select a house or an article of furniture, were of course consciously ideal, but they obscure our recognition of the fact which Aristotle had long ago pointed out, that the constitution of a State has its roots in what moderns term its social system.

The question may, however, be asked—does a change of constitution, then, always imply a profound ethical or social change? Aristotle does not seem to have thought so. The book on Constitutional Change illustrates in every page, how misconduct on the part of the holders of power, or want of vigilance, or conduct arousing feelings of envy, panic, or contempt in the minds of those excluded

from power, or the presence of heterogeneous and incohesive elements in the citizen body, or even mere accident[1] may cause a change of constitution. Still these are only the occasions of change. They would be powerless for harm, if social contrasts, involving ethical ones, did not exist within the ranks of the community.

A conflict between the ideas of different classes of men as to what makes for happiness and is just—this is, in brief, Aristotle's account of the causes which have brought more constitutions than one into being. Each constitution has an ἦθος of its own and embodies a distinct view of life. The difference between them is not a mere numerical difference, but a difference of faith, a difference of character.

What is the value of Aristotle's classification?

If we ask what is the value of Aristotle's classification of constitutions, it must of course be at once conceded that its significance for us is impaired by the changes which have occurred since his day. He classifies the constitutions which he found existing in Greece and among the neighbouring barbarian peoples. He never ventures to imagine that other forms of Kingship or Oligarchy or Democracy than those he knows are possible, though of course this was the case. With the constitution of Rome he was, unfortunately, not acquainted. It is true that the cities of the Hellenic world, stretching as they did from Massalia to the Palus Maeotis, offered an immense variety of constitutions to the investigations of the political inquirer—a far greater variety, probably, than could be found in contemporary Italy—and that a distinct stimulus was thus imparted to the study of politics; but we feel that Plato and Aristotle deserved better constitutions to review and analyse than those of Greece.

And then again, the plan of classifying constitutions by their ὅρος—in other words, by the attribute or attributes which confer supreme power in each—stands and falls with

[1] Athens came to be an extreme democracy διὰ συμπτώματος (2. 12. 1274 a 12).

the conception of the constitution as a 'life' (*βίος*)—as an ethical influence for good or evil. Aristotle's principle is—'things are made what they are by their function and their capability' (Pol. 1. 2. 1253 a 23). How can it be right, he would ask, to class Kingship and Tyranny together, because one man rules in each, when they differ so greatly in *ὄρος* and ethical influence, or to distinguish between the Absolute Kingship and the true Aristocracy, both of which rest on 'fully equipped virtue'? We hardly, indeed, understand how he was able to bring under the common head of Democracy or Oligarchy the strongly contrasted sub-forms of each which he enumerates in the Sixth Book.

The old classification of constitutions by the number of the rulers in each has, however, held its ground down to our own day, partly, no doubt, because the ethical significance of constitutions is no longer as prominent to us as it was to Plato and Aristotle, partly because the numerical difference is at once a conspicuous, and a really important and instructive, difference between constitutions. Still the principle of classification adopted by Plato and Aristotle has the merit of directing attention to the *ἦθος* and aim of constitutions as distinguished from their letter: we learn from it to read the character of a State, not in the number of its rulers, but in its dominant principle, in the attribute —be it wealth, birth, virtue, or numbers, or a combination of two or more of these—to which it awards supreme authority, and ultimately in the structure of its social system and the mutual relation of its various social elements. If they erred in their principle of classification, it was from a wish to get to the heart of the matter[1].

The Third Book an introduc-

We now pass to Aristotle's treatment of the question what a State should be, and especially what its constitution

[1] Heracleides Ponticus seems to have applied the same principle to the classification of *ἁρμονίαι*, which Aristotle himself often regards as offering a parallel to constitutions (e.g. Pol. 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 19 sqq.). Heracleides held that harmonies should be classified by *ἦθος* (Athen. Deipn. 624 c sqq., an interesting passage).

tion both to the inquiry as to the best constitution and to the study of constitutions generally. It traces the conditions of sound or normal government as a preliminary step to both these investigations.

should be; for this will determine what its citizen-body and its supreme authority will be. This is the main subject of the Third Book of the Politics (cp. 3. 1. 1274 b 32–41 6. 1278 b 6 sq.: 10. 1281 a 11). There is much in the language of the First and Second Books to lead us to expect an immediate transition at the close of the Second to the subject of the best State and constitution, but Aristotle prefers to rise gradually to this subject through a series of discussions, which form, like the ἀπορίαι respecting music in the Fifth Book, a kind of prelude (ἐνδόσιμος 5 (8). 5. 1339 a 13) striking the keynote of what is to follow, and which gradually conduct the inquirer from the study of the simplest element of the State, the citizen, upward to the study of the constitution, and through a variety of constitutions, first to the normal forms of constitution, and then to the best. The special task of the Third Book is thus to exhibit the broad conditions which every sound government must satisfy, and which the best constitution satisfies while it rises above them; to build a satisfactory platform, or pedestal, on which to rear the structure of the best State, and to depict at once the contrast of the normal constitutions and the deviation-forms and the transition from the normal constitutions to the best. It includes, in fact, something more than this, for its closing chapters bring the best constitution before us in one of its two forms, the Absolute Kingship. The Third Book stands at the parting of the ways, where the ideal and the more practicable forms of political organization separate; it serves as an introduction to the study both of the more generally attainable constitutions described in the Sixth and Eighth Books and of the form of the best constitution described in the Fourth and Fifth.

The State consisting of citizens, the first question to be asked is —What is a citizen?

To learn what the State is, Aristotle resolves it into its component elements. He had done the same thing at the outset of the First Book, in order to discover the difference between the householder and the statesman. This time, however, the component elements of the State are taken to be, not households, but citizens: the State is a defi-

number of citizens (πολιτῶν τι πλῆθος, 3. 1. 1274 b 41, explained in 1275 b 20 as πλῆθος πολιτῶν ἱκανὸν πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς). The State proper is here meant to be defined; not that broader State which includes women, children, non-citizens, and slaves—all, in fact, who exchange within its borders any sort of service—the πόλις referred to in 2. 9. 1269 b 14 sq., and said in that passage to fall into two sections, men and women.

What, then, is a citizen[1]? An Athenian would probably answer by pointing to the enactment carried by Aristophon in the famous year of Eucleides' archonship, which confined Athenian citizenship, in full conformity with the traditions of Solon and Pericles, to the children of Athenian parents —an enactment deprived of its retrospective operation by a decree moved shortly after by Nicomenes, but otherwise undisturbed, so that the law ran to this effect—μηδένα τῶν μετ' Εὐκλείδην ἄρχοντα μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως, ἂν μὴ ἄμφω τοὺς γονέας ἀστοὺς ἐπιδείξηται, τοὺς δὲ πρὸ Εὐκλείδου ἀνεξετάστους ἀφεῖσθαι[2]. Others went further, and denied the name of citizen to any one who could not prove descent from more generations than one of citizens. It was thus that citizen descent for three generations, both on the father's side and on that of the mother, was required in the case of archons and priests[3], and that in many colonies the descendants of

[1] One of the reasons which led Aristotle to make this question the starting-point of the inquiry as to the best constitution may well have been the fact that Plato had in the Republic made the χρηματιστικοί citizens of his ideal State. If he had studied the nature of the ideal citizen more closely, he might not have done so.

[2] See A. Schaefer, Demosthenes 1. 122 sqq., who thus reconciles the data as to Aristophon and Nicomenes. See also C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 1. § 118.

[3] See C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 1. § 149. 6. 'Men not only felt confidence in the devotion to the State which they held to be traditional in the old families, but also thought that the humiliations endured by non-citizens in consequence of the exclusiveness of the Attic law of citizenship could hardly fail to produce in their minds a bitter feeling, which was only too likely to be inherited by their descendants; we find, in fact, in an oration of Aeschines (3. 169) some expressions which are full of instruction on this subject' (L. Schmidt, Ethik d. alten Griechen, 2. 228). The origin of the regulation, indeed, may perhaps be sought in religious sentiment. It is worthy of notice that in [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 2. the reading of the MSS. is οἱ πολῖται

the earliest immigrants formed a class apart and long monopolized power (6 (4). 4. 1290 b 11 sqq.)[1]. As the Greek citizen often found himself for a long time together resident in States to which he did not belong, and whose members did not possess rights of inter-marriage in his own —whether as a cleruch, or an exile, or a mercenary soldier, or for purposes of trade or business—and might contract marriage during these periods of absence from home, or indeed while a resident in his native State, with one who was neither a fellow-citizen nor possessed of rights of inter-marriage, it is easy to see how a class would arise not of full citizen descent (*τὸ μὴ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πολιτῶν ἐλεύθερον*, 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 26)—a class to which even extreme democracies, like that of Athens, were not always kind, and which sometimes did not possess full rights of succession to property, even when citizenship was accorded to it[2]. No doubt, a distinction would be drawn, in feeling, if not in law, between an union with an alien citizen and an union with a barbarian or slave[3]. Antisthenes, the founder of the Cynic School, which was the first to lay stress on the unity of the human race and to start the doctrine of a World-State, was, like several other great Athenians, the son of a barbarian mother, and there are indications in Diogenes Laertius' biography of him that he was conscious of the slight put on his birth. It was thus that the ideas of *ἐλευθερία* (free, or perhaps citizen, birth) and *εὐγένεια* (noble birth) came to lie so near together in the view of the Greeks. The free-born citizen

καὶ οἱ γενναῖοι καὶ οἱ χρηστοί, though the editors commonly (*ex coniectura*) read *οἱ ὁπλῖται κ.τ.λ.*

[1] 'It is possible that in the original formation of German society the eorl represented the first settler in the waste, while the ceorls sprang from descendants of the early settler who had in various ways forfeited their claim to a share in the original homestead, or more probably from incomers into the village, who had since settled round it and been admitted to a share in the land and freedom of the community' (Green, Making of England, p. 178).

[2] C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 1. § 118: 3. § 57. 2: 1. § 52. 5. They are called *ξένοι* in Pol. 3. 5. 1278 a 26–28, but are distinguished in that passage from *νόθοι*.

[3] Cp. 3. 5. 1278 a 32.

and the noble were alike in this, that the circumstances of their birth made them what they were.

These strict views of citizenship were disposed of by the simple inquiry, how the citizen from whom descent was traced could be a citizen, if he was not descended from citizen ancestors; and a sharp saying of Gorgias was remembered, that the Demiurgi, or chief magistrates, of Larissa were 'demiurgi' (handicraftsmen) in every sense, for that they manufactured citizens of Larissa[1]. Aristotle, himself a resident alien, makes short work of these old-fashioned fancies, and defines citizenship by the possession of certain rights, not by extraction.

A citizen, according to him, is one on whom the State has conferred 'a right to share in office, deliberative or judicial' (*ἀρχῆς βουλευτικῆς ἢ κριτικῆς*, 3. 1. 1275 b 18), whether he exercises this right singly as a magistrate of the State, or collectively as a member of a political body—an assembly, for example, or a dicastery. In popular parlance, probably, citizenship was not thus limited: see 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 33, where 'citizens who share in the constitution' are referred to, as though all citizens did not necessarily do so, and the passage continues—'and in our State all the citizens share in the constitution.' Plato had given the name of citizens to all comprised in the three classes of the Republic, though only the first of these classes possessed political authority[2]; but Aristotle's intention evidently is to connect citizenship, not with merely social functions, such as the supply of necessary com-

A citizen is one on whom the State has conferred rights of access to office, judicial or deliberative.

[1] See Sus.[2], Note 450, which explains the full proportions of the *bon mot*, unless, with Mr. Ridgeway (Camb. Philol. Trans., 2. 135 sqq.), we deny it to be 'double-barrelled.' The aim of Gorgias, in any case, was to make out that the citizen is the handiwork, not of nature, but of man.

[2] He sees, however, in the Laws (768 B), that *ὁ ἀκουσάντων ἂν ἐξουσίας τοῦ συνδικάζειν ἡγεῖται τὸ παράπαν τῆς πόλεως οὐ μέτοχος εἶναι*: cp. Aristot. Pol. 2. 12. 1274 a 15–18, where much the same thing is said of *τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἱρεῖσθαι καὶ εὐθύνειν*, though, according to 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 21 sqq., something less than this sufficed the people in many States—indeed, if let alone and allowed to drudge and save, they would seem to have been commonly content with a merely nominal share of power (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 11 sqq.).

modities, nor even with military functions, apart from political, but with 'office, deliberative or judicial[1].'

To Aristotle, then, what makes a citizen is not the right to own land or to sue and be sued, or the right of intermarriage, or other similar rights, the possession of which sufficed, in the view of the Greeks[2], to constitute a citizen, but the right to share, and opportunities of sharing, in the exercise of official authority. He who did not participate in the life of the State did not seem to him to deserve the name of a citizen, and the life of the State was political and speculative activity—'noble,' not 'necessary,' functions. Spinoza defines citizens as 'homines qui ex jure civili omnibus civitatis commodis gaudent' (Tractat. Pol. 3. 1). Aristotle defines them rather by their functions than their 'commoda.'

His principle that the State is a body of citizens, taken with his account of citizenship, evidently points to a more or less popular form of State. In an absolute monarchy, as Schömann remarks[3], the king would be the only person possessing an underived right to rule, and therefore, if we construe Aristotle's view strictly, the only citizen; and a narrow oligarchy, in which a body (*πλῆθος*) of men possessed of the right to rule could hardly be said to exist, would also offend against his account of the State.

Are we then to say, when a turn of the political wheel has

But then—Aristotle goes on to ask, after rapidly dismissing the account of citizenship which bases it on birth, and not on the grant of certain rights by the State—is it not an objection to this definition of it, that it obliges us

[1] The meaning of *κρίσις* (3. 1. 1275 a 23: cp. *κριτικῆς*, 1275 b 19), as Schömann has pointed out (Gr. Alterth. 1. 107. 3, ed. 2), must not be too strictly confined to judicial work, for not only does *τὸ κρίνειν* include the review of the official conduct of magistrates (3. 11. 1281 b 31 sqq.), but it seems sometimes to be used in a still wider sense, as in the phrase *κριτὰς τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ συμφερόντων* (4 (7). 8. 1328 b 22): indeed in 6 (4). 15. 1299a 26 it is used of magistracies, and in 2. 11. 1273 a 11 of the popular assembly. Bernays, in fact, translates *ἀρχῆς βουλευτικῆς ἢ κριτικῆς* in 3. 1. 1275 b 18, 'ein berathendes oder entscheidendes Amt' (see also Schömann, *ubi supra*). Perhaps, however, the work of the judge (cp. 1275 a 26: b 13–17) is mainly referred to in the phrase *ἀρχῆς κριτικῆς*, as here used.

[2] Schömann, Gr. Alterth. 1. 107–8.

[3] Gr. Alterth. 1. 107.

to admit any one to be a citizen, on whom some momentary turn of the political wheel may confer citizenship? Are the aliens and slave metoeci[1], whom Cleisthenes introduced into the tribes after the expulsion of the Pisistratidae, to be accounted citizens? His first answer is that this *ἀπορία* raises a question, not of fact, but of justice: he sees, however, that a further question may be raised, whether one who is not justly a citizen is a citizen at all. But he insists that these persons must be accounted citizens, if they have the rights of citizens, and as to the question of justice, that runs up into the question already raised (3. 1. 1274 b 34), whether they owe their citizenship to an act of the State or not. For democrats would not always allow the act of a preceding oligarchy or tyranny to bind a democracy coming after it, or to be taken as an act of the State. Aristotle is probably referring, as Thirlwall has remarked (Hist. of Greece, 4. 235: cp. 204), to a well-known case of this at Athens, referred to also by Isocrates (Areopag. § 68) and Demosthenes (in Leptin.

conferred these rights on slaves and aliens, persons presumably unfit to possess them, that the State has conferred them and that these men are citizens?

[1] Δοῦλοι *μέτοικοι*, 1275 b 37. I take *μέτοικοι* to be the substantive, δοῦλοι the adjective. If I am right in this, Aristotle appears to intend to distinguish between free metoeci and slave metoeci—that is, metoeci of servile status or origin. There would probably be many such in the class of metoeci, and no doubt it would be felt to be a far stronger measure to admit metoeci of this type to citizenship than free metoeci like Aristotle himself (cp. 3. 5. 1278 a 32 sq.). The word δοῦλος, according to Chrysippus (Athen. Deipn. 267 b), was sometimes used in a sense inclusive of freedmen, and some of these 'slave metoeci' may possibly have been freedmen: runaway slaves or slaves attached to a foreign master may, however, also be referred to. It would have been a stronger measure still to give citizenship to slaves of Athenian masters. But to give citizenship to slaves of any kind stamped a man either as a tyrant (Xen. Hell. 7. 3. 8), or an extreme democrat (ibid. 2. 3. 48). If the true reading were, as has been suggested, *ξένους καὶ δούλους καὶ μετοίκους*, one would have expected the three substantives (as Thirlwall remarks, Hist. of Greece, 2. 74 n.) to be arranged in a different order (cp. 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 19). It is just possible that here, as elsewhere, two alternative readings (δούλους and *μετοίκους*) have together found their way into the text, but probably *δούλους μετοίκους* is correct. (Since the foregoing note was in print, I have observed that Bernays translates *πολλοὺς . . . ξένους καὶ δούλους μετοίκους* 'many aliens and freedmen (viele Insassen und Freigelassene).' See his Translation, p. 135, and his note in Heraklit. Briefe, p. 155, where he explains his view of the passage.)

c. 11 sq.), in which money had been lent by the Lacedaemonians to the oligarchical College of Ten to aid it in its struggle against the democrats under Thrasybulus, and the question was raised in the popular assembly, whether its repayment could be claimed from the restored democracy —whether, in fact, the State of Athens had contracted the loan. In this instance the sum was repaid by the State. Many, however, were disposed to contend, that oligarchies and tyrannies rested on force, and were not, like democracy, governments for the common good, and thus that their acts were not the acts of the State. Aristotle (1276 a 13) hints that the acts of a democracy would be just as impeachable on that score; but he passes on to consider a cognate question, what are the grounds on which we are to pronounce a πόλις to be the same or to have changed its identity. It will be noticed that the democrats just referred to did not claim that democratically governed Athens was a different State from oligarchically governed Athens: it was not on that ground that they repudiated the debt contracted by the oligarchy, but on the ground that the oligarchy was not the State. Aristotle does not accept this contention, and therefore prefers to argue the matter on a new basis. Is the πόλις the same, he asks, when its inhabitants have moved from the old site, and some of them live on one site, and others on another? This, he says, is a question of language: the word πόλις is used in more senses than one. Is a πόλις the same, so long as it is surrounded by the same walls? Why, a space surrounded by walls may be, as we see in the case of Babylon, so large as to be the abode of an ἔθνος, rather than a πόλις. Or is it the same so long as the stock of its inhabitants remains the same? No, the very same inhabitants, if differently combined, may become a different State, just as the same individuals may be successively formed into two or more different choruses. It is to the πολιτεία—the synthesis, not the individuals—that we must mainly look when we pronounce on the identity of the πόλις. But it does not follow, that when one constitu-

This question leads to an inquiry as to the identity of the State, which is found to reside mainly in the constitution, the answer implied (but not given) being that these men are citizens by the act of the State, though hardly perhaps the same State as existed before.

tion takes the place of another, or, in other words, when one πόλις is replaced by another, the new πόλις should refuse to fulfil the contracts of the old: whether it should do so, is a matter for separate consideration.

The conclusion suggested, though not drawn, for Aristotle has lost sight of the origin of the discussion in the nice investigation to which it has led him, is that the aliens made citizens by Cleisthenes are citizens by the act of the State, though perhaps not the same State as existed before the change of constitution: whether the State acted rightly in making them citizens or not, is a question on which further light is thrown in the succeeding chapters, and especially in c. 5.

When Aristotle finds the identity of the State mainly in the πολιτεία, his view is quite in harmony with his general conception of the importance of the πολιτεία as the expression of the end for which the State lives (6 (4). 1. 1289 a 15–18). Isocrates had said that the State is immortal (De Pace § 120, *αἱ δὲ πόλεις διὰ τὴν ἀθανασίαν ὑπομένουσι καὶ τὰς παρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τὰς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν τιμωρίας*). Cicero's view is not very different: 'itaque nullus interitus est reipublicae naturalis, ut hominis, in quo mors non modo necessaria est, verum etiam optanda persaepe: civitas autem, quum tollitur, deletur, exstinguitur, simile est quodam modo, ut parva magnis conferamus, ac si omnis hic mundus intereat et concidat' (de Rep. 3. 23. 34). Spinoza in his 'mortuo rege, obiit quodam modo civitas[1],' seems to go farther than Aristotle. Locke (on Civil Government, 2. § 211) distinguishes between the dissolution of the society and the dissolution of the government. 'The usual and almost the only way whereby this union' in one politic society 'is dissolved, is the inroad of foreign force making a conquest upon them; for in that case, not being able to maintain and support themselves as one entire and independent body, the union belonging to that body, which consisted therein, must necessarily cease, and so every one return to the state he was in before, with

[1] Tractat. Pol. 7. 25.

a liberty to shift for himself and provide for his own safet
as he thinks fit, in some other society.' According to th
the Norman Conquest of England was the beginning of
new society. The question is more familiar to us in rel
tion to the Church of England and the question of
continuity. A recent writer, whose book is reviewed
the *Saturday Review* for Dec. 9, 1882, holds that 'it is n
either from Christ and his Apostles, nor yet from t
period of the Reformation,' but from the passing of t
Act of Uniformity in the reign of Charles the Second, 'th
we must date the foundation of the present Establish
Church of England.' His reviewer dissents: 'the Natio
Church no more ceased to exist when its bishops w
expelled and its liturgy disused, a parochial church
more ceased to exist when a Presbyterian or an Anabap
preacher was thrust upon it as its pastor, than the State
nation itself ceased to exist, when it was ruled by a Cou
of State or a Protector, instead of a King.' Whate
may be the merits of this controversy, we see that
question raised by Aristotle is still one on which debat
possible[1].

What is the virtue of the citizen? Is it the same as the virtue of the good man? Significance of this discussion.

Aristotle, however, passes on to discuss a more im
tant question, to which the inquiries we have just not
lead up. The questior. whether slaves and aliens
legitimate citizens naturally suggests the further quest
what is the virtue of a citizen, and is it identical with
virtue of a good man? Aristotle will not deny the n
of a citizen to any one whom the State has invested
certain powers, but he thinks it worth while to inquire w
qualities the citizen ought to possess, and whether h
bound to possess all those which go to the making of a g
man. The investigation as to the virtue of a citizen rem
us of the investigation in the First Book as to the vi
of women, children, and slaves; here as there the Soc
doctrine of the unity of virtue comes up for discussion.

[1] See De Witt's Jefferson, E. T. p. 154, where various passages of Jefferson's works bearing on tions of this kind are referre

There were many probably who thought that to be a good citizen (that is, an useful member of the State, whatever its constitution) was to be a good man (cp. Thuc. 2. 42. 2 sq.). On the other hand, Socrates had said that it was impossible to be a good citizen without moral goodness (Xen. Mem. 4. 2. 11, *οὐχ οἷόν τέ γε ἄνευ δικαιοσύνης ἀγαθὸν πολίτην γενέσθαι*: cp. 4. 6. 14). Teaching as he did the unity of the various virtues[1], it was natural that he should also identify the virtue of the good citizen and the good man, and thus we find Plato in the Gorgias (517 B–C) merging political in moral virtue, for he makes the virtue of a citizen consist in the moral improvement of his fellows, not in adding to the material defences of the State[2].

Aristotle's object is to show that neither of these views is correct, and also to put forth a third view, which combines all that is of value in them. He accepts the first of them to this extent, that he allows a kind of virtue even to the citizen of a deviation-form; on the other hand, he agrees with Socrates that the virtue of the good citizen is in one case (that of the 'ruling citizen' (*πολιτικός*) in the best constitution) identical with that of the good man. His wish is to do justice to all forms and degrees of citizen-virtue, and at the same time to show that its highest form is alone to be identified with that of the good man. Here, as elsewhere, he seeks to mediate between opposing views, and to extract from them whatever element of truth they contain.

He begins by asking in what the virtue of a citizen consists, and finds it, not in that in which it had commonly

[1] He was followed in this view by the Megarians (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 1. 184. 4, ed. 2), the Cynics (ibid. 2. 1. 221. 3–4), and the Eretrian school (ibid. 2. 1. 200. 5). There was a standing feud between the Megarian school and Aristotle. This school struck at the root of Aristotle's system by disputing the distinction of *δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια* (Grote, Plato 3. 490: Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 1. 183. 2, ed. 2). On Eubulides, one of the leaders of this school in Aristotle's time, see A. Schaefer, Demosthenes 1. 295-6, who refers to Menage's note on Diog. Laert. 2. 109.

[2] Thucydides finds the characteristic of a good citizen in a desire to benefit his State (6. 9. 2: 6. 14. 1). Demosthenes speaks to somewhat the same effect (De Chers. cc. 68–72). Plato would quite approve, but then he would probably interpret this expression differently.

been taken to consist[1]—the qualities which win success or advantage for the State—but in those which contribute to the maintenance of the existing constitution, whatever it may be. Just as the virtue of the child is relative to his father (*πρὸς τὸν ἡγούμενον*), and that of the slave to his master (*πρὸς τὸν δεσπότην*), so the virtue of the citizen is relative to the constitution (*πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν*). It follows that there must be many forms of the virtue of a citizen, for there are many constitutions, and the virtue which upholds one will not be the same as that which upholds another; but the virtue of a good man is always one and the same, for it is complete virtue. The virtue of a citizen cannot, therefore, in all constitutions be identical with the virtue of a good man.

Is it so even in the best constitution? No: for (1) the State even there cannot be wholly composed of men entirely alike; hence not of good men[2]. But it must be composed of good citizens: hence the virtue of the citizen and the good man are not identical. (2) The State is composed of unequals, and the virtue of the leader of a chorus is not identical with that of the member who stands beside him. (The first of these arguments appears to be based on considerations of what is possible, and to be designed to show that the identity of the virtue of the citizen and the good man is impossible: the second appears to be designed to show that as a matter of fact, looking to the nature of the State, this identity does not exist.)

We see then that the absolute identity of the virtue of the citizen with that of the good man, which Socrates asserted to exist, does not exist, even in the best constitution. Even there the virtue of all citizens will not be identical with the virtue of the good man. But will the virtue of some citizens be so?

We commonly call the good ruler good and morally

[1] Xen. Mem. 4. 6. 14: 4. 2. 11.

[2] Aristotle seems to think otherwise in 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 36 sqq.: see Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 683. 4, who regards the view expressed in the passage of the Third Book before us as merely dialectical or aporetic, and not Aristotle's definitive view.

wise, and the man capable of ruling (πολιτικός) must needs be morally wise [for moral wisdom (φρόνησις) and political wisdom (πολιτική) are identical]. Then again, it is a common view that the very education of the ruler must be altogether different from that of the ruled. Are we to say then that the virtue of the ruler is the same as that of the good man? In that case we should have found what we have been seeking—some citizens whose virtue is the same as that of the good man. Perhaps Jason felt that the virtue of a ruler is one thing and the virtue of a citizen (who is both ruler and ruled) another, for he said that 'it was starvation to him not to be a tyrant,' implying that he did not know how to be a private individual [1]. But then we praise a man who is capable both of ruling and of being ruled, and the virtue of a citizen of repute is said to consist in a capacity for ruling and being ruled well. If then the virtue of the good man is that of a ruler only, and the virtue of a citizen includes both that of a ruler and that of one who is ruled, the two aptitudes which the citizen unites must be different in point of praiseworthiness (Aristotle hints that the citizen must in fact possess two different kinds of virtue). Since then we sometimes hold that a ruler and a person ruled should learn two distinct things and not the same thing, but that the citizen should know both what the ruler knows and what he who is ruled knows, and share both in ruling and being ruled, what follows from that is plain enough. We must first make it clear what kind of rule it is that the citizen should learn through being ruled to exercise. It is not the kind of rule which is exercised over slaves, or that which is concerned with necessaries, but that which is exercised over

[1] It was Jason, probably, who used the argument referred to in 4 (7). 3. 1325 a 35, that a man ought to make himself supreme master of his State at any cost of evildoing, inasmuch as it is only in that position that it is possible to perform the greatest number of noble acts (cp. Rhet. 1. 12. 1373 a 25, and Plutarch, Praec. Reip. Gerend. c. 24: De Sanitate Tuenda, c. 22). Anacreon had sung of a queen Callicrete as ἐπιστα-μένη τυραννικά ([Plato], Theages 125 E).

men like the ruler and free (πολιτικὴ ἀρχή)[1]. H made this clear, we may draw the conclusion th good citizen will possess two forms of virtue—the which fits a man to rule as a citizen rules his citizens, and the virtue which fits a man to be ru citizens are ruled by their fellow-citizens. And w go on and say the same of the virtue of the good This also will have two forms—the one that of the the other that of the ruled. The former is the co form, for it alone includes φρόνησις.

Thus the virtue of the citizen in its fulness is id with the virtue of the man in its fulness: so far S was right in identifying the two, but he was not r denying that there is such a thing as the virtue of a apart from that of a man. On the contrary, the vi the citizen in many constitutions is distinct from the man, and even in the best it is only in some citizens—those who are capable of ruling—that t coincide. How far the subordinate forms of the virt citizen and of a man coincide in the best constitution totle does not say. In other constitutions they evi will not coincide.

Aristotle perhaps has before him in this inquiry a p in the Laws (643 D–644 B), where Plato asks what true aim of education, and finds that it is to pro desire to become a 'perfect citizen, knowing how b rule and to be ruled with justice,' or, in other wo produce good men, for 'those who are rightly ed may be said to become good men' (644 A: compa Laws 942 C). Aristotle quite agrees that this is t of education in the best State, but then he allo existence of a form of citizen-virtue in the deviation

[1] Aristotle perhaps wishes tacitly to correct the strong expressions of Plato, Laws 762 E, δεῖ δὴ πάντ' ἄνδρα διανοεῖσθαι περὶ ἁπάντων ἀνθρώπων, ὡς ὁ μὴ δουλεύσας οὐδ' ἂν δεσπότης γένοιτο ἄξιος ἐπαίνου, καὶ καλλωπίζεσθαι χρὴ τῷ καλῶς δουλεῦσαι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ καλ κ.τ.λ. Plutarch repeats Pla guage in Praecepta Reip. c. 12, ὡς οὐδ' ἄρξαι καλῶς πρότερον ὀρθῶς δουλεύσαντ σιν ὁ Πλάτων, δυναμένους.

of State: thus he frequently insists that in them the citizens should receive an education suitable to the constitution.

These are the central lessons of the chapter, but its incidental teaching also is important. There were evidently those who regarded the virtue of the good man as concerned only with ruling. Themistocles had said, in his haughty letter of defence to the people of Athens, that 'he neither wished nor was fitted by nature to be ruled[1]'; and Gorgias is made in the Meno of Plato to identify virtue with the ability to rule[2]. But Aristotle insists that one form, though not the highest, of the virtue of the good man is concerned with being ruled, and that it is by learning how to be ruled (after the fashion of freemen) that the good man learns how to rule. Aristotle's conception of a good man is thus quite different from that of Gorgias. To obey is the beginning of virtue. Aristotle is here preparing the ground for the institutions of his best State, where this rule is followed (cp. 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 11 sq.).

On the other hand, there were those to whom political activity, and even political capacity, seemed no essential elements of virtue (4 (7). 3. 1325 a 18). This view also is tacitly corrected by Aristotle. He will not allow full virtue to exist where there is no capacity for rule. Thus the man of full virtue (*σπουδαῖος*) and the true statesman or king (*πολιτικὸς καὶ βασιλικός*) are identified (3. 18. 1288 b 1). *Φρόνησις* is a virtue peculiar to the ruler[3]. Already the Cynics and Cyrenaics—later on, other schools[4]—refused

[1] Plutarch, Themist. c. 23, *διαβαλλόμενος γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, πρὸς τοὺς πολίτας ἔγραφεν, ὡς ἄρχειν μὲν δεὶ ζητῶν, ἄρχεσθαι δὲ μὴ πεφυκὼς μηδὲ βουλόμενος, οὐκ ἄν ποτε βαρβάροις καὶ πολεμίοις αὐτὸν ἀποδόσθαι μετὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος.*

[2] Meno 73 C: ΣΩΚΡ. *Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ πάντων ἐστί, πειρῶ εἰπεῖν καὶ ἀναμνησθῆναι, τί αὐτό φησι Γοργίας εἶναι καὶ σὺ μετ' ἐκείνου.* MEN. *Τί ἄλλο γ' ἢ ἄρχειν οἷόν τ' εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρώπων;*—cp. ibid. 71 E, *αὕτη ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς ἀρετή, ἱκανὸν εἶναι τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν* (the answer of Meno), and 73 A.

[3] Cp. 1. 13. 1260 a 17, *διὸ τὸν μὲν ἄρχοντα τελέαν ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετήν (τὸ γὰρ ἔργον ἐστὶν ἁπλῶς τοῦ ἀρχιτέκτονος, ὁ δὲ λόγος ἀρχιτέκτων), τῶν δ' ἄλλων ἕκαστον, ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει αὐτοῖς.*

[4] The Stoics held that 'a philosopher who teaches and improves

to make governing or the capacity for governing a condition of virtue. Aristotle so far disconnects the two things as to allow the existence of a lower form of virtue in the case of persons who neither govern nor are capable of governing, but he makes *φρόνησις*, which includes a capacity for governing, essential to full virtue. Thus while he declines to deny all virtue whatever to those who are capable only of being ruled, he places the virtue of the good ruler on a pinnacle, as the characteristic excellence of the good man.

The whole inquiry illustrates the dependence of virtue on the constitution. The deviation-forms presuppose in their citizens a type of citizen-virtue, but an inferior type, and it is only in the best constitution that citizen-virtue rises into the full virtue of the good man. Here the ruling citizen, or statesman (*πολιτικός*), is identical with the man of full virtue (*σπουδαῖος*). The Fourth and Fifth Books of the Politics take this identification as the starting-point of their inquiries on the subject of education (4 (7). 14. 1333 a 11–16), and ask what education will produce men of full virtue, as the best way of discovering how to produce true statesmen.

Thus this chapter of the Third Book forms an important link in the inquiries of the Politics. It prepares us for the arrangement in the Fourth by which the younger men of the best State are not allowed to rule till they have learnt to obey, and have acquired the virtues of rulers through such subordination as befits freemen. How far its teaching agrees with that of 4 (7). 3, where it seems to be implied that a purely speculative life is an ideally complete one, is another question[1].

Are *βάναυσοι* (who do not share in office) citizens?

Aristotle has now nearly done with the subject of the citizen, but before he leaves it, he notices and discusses one other *ἀπορία* with regard to it, arising out of the

his fellow-men benefits the State quite as much as a warrior, an administrator, or a civil functionary' (Zeller, Stoics Epicureans and Sceptics, E. T. p. 305).

[1] See Appendix B as to some further points connected with this chapter.

account just given of the virtue of the citizen—partly, in all probability, because its discussion enables him to show that there are more forms of the citizen than one, and that the varieties of the citizen point to varieties of constitution, and thus leads up to the inquiries that follow: partly because he desires to draw attention to the fact that his definition of the citizen and of citizen-virtue does not hold good universally.

They are so in some constitutions, but not in others.

The *ἀπορία* is thus stated (3. 5. 1277 b 34)—*πότερον πολίτης ἐστὶν ᾧ κοινωνεῖν ἔξεστιν ἀρχῆς, ἢ καὶ τοὺς βαναύσους πολίτας θετέον*; The *βάναυσοι* have been said in the preceding chapter to be 'persons ruled as slaves are ruled,' and here it is assumed that they do not share in office[1]. Hence they will not possess the virtue of a citizen, which consists of being capable both of ruling and being ruled as citizens rule citizens. Are they then citizens?

An inquiry on this subject discloses that some constitutions admit those concerned with 'necessary work' to citizenship, while others do not. The *βάναυσος* is so far a citizen that he is a citizen 'under particular forms of constitution' (*ἔν τινι πολιτείᾳ*)[2]. He is often a citizen in oligarchies; and in many democracies not only is the *βάναυσος* a citizen, but even the alien and the bastard. This, however, occurs only in States in which genuine citizens have run short, and then only for a time, so that even these democracies recognize that some types of citizen are less authentic than others[3].

The whole discussion makes it manifest that there are various types of citizen, and that the truest citizen (*ὁ μάλιστα πολίτης*) is he who shares in office. The account given in c. 4 of the virtue of a citizen is thus shown to be maintainable, even if it does not hold good of all who are anywhere made citizens, and the close connexion of cc. 4

[1] Cp. 2. 12. 1274 a 21, *τὸ δὲ τέταρτον θητικόν, οἷς οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχῆς μετῆν.*

[2] Cp. *ἔν τινι βασιλείᾳ*, 3. 14. 1285 a 9.

[3] It is quite in Aristotle's manner to distinguish between different kinds of citizens; he distinguishes in the First Book (1. 7. 1255 b 27 sqq.) between different kinds of slaves.

and 5 is evidenced by a recapitulation of the result of c
added at the end of c. 5, the inquiries of the latter chap
having confirmed the conclusions of the former.

Aristotle had stated at the outset of the whole discuss
(3. 1. 1275 a 34 sq.), that things which have to do with
stand in relation to) objects differing in kind and in prio
have little or nothing in common, and that constituti
the object-matter to which the citizen is related, diffe
kind and in priority; whence it follows that the cit
under one constitution is different from the citizen u
another, and that we must not expect to find the va
types of citizen possessing much in common[1]. Wher
this is the case, no definition can be made to suit all
types of the thing equally well (1275 a 33).

The nature of citizenship proving to depend on the constitution, we naturally pass on to the constitution.

Throughout the inquiry as to the nature of the cit
our attention has constantly been drawn to the import
of the constitution: the citizen, we are told, varies
the constitution—the identity of the State is mainly
sought in the constitution; and the transition is na
from the subject of the citizen to that of the constitu
Aristotle, who is seldom content with incidental solu

[1] Bernays (Aristoteles' Politik, p. 132) and Bonitz (Ind. 799 a 15 sqq.) differ as to the interpretation of the passage, 3. 1. 1275 a 34 sqq. The interpretation of the latter, who explains τὰ ὑποκείμενα (35) as 'singulae πολιτεῖαι, ad quas refertur πολίτου notio,' would seem to be in all probability the correct one, and has been followed in the text. What is said here of constitutions, is also, apparently, true of χρηματιστική and its forms (cp. 1. 11. 1258 b 20, τῆς μὲν οὖν οἰκειοτάτης χρηματιστικῆς ταῦτα μόρια καὶ πρῶτα), and of βασιλεία (3. 14. 1284 b 40 sqq.), and also of the ἀρετὴ πολίτου καὶ ἀνδρός (3. 4. 1277 b 18). We must bear in mind the caution given to the reader of treatises dealing with πολιτική at the commencement of the Nicomachean Ethics (1. 1. 19 sqq.). But indeed in with all subjects Aristot little confidence in broad ral definitions: cp. De An 412 b 4, εἰ δή τι κοινὸν ἐπὶ ψυχῆς δεῖ λέγειν, εἴη ἂν ἐντ ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ νικοῦ: 2. 3. 414 b 22, γένοι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σχημάτων λόγο ὃς ἐφαρμόσει μὲν πᾶσιν, οὐδενὸς ἔσται σχήματος· ὁμ καὶ ἐπὶ ταῖς εἰρημέναις ψυχ γελοῖον ζητεῖν τὸν κοινὸν λ ἐπὶ τούτων καὶ ἐφ' ἑτέρων, ὃς ἔσται τῶν ὄντων ἴδιος λόγ κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ ἄρμο ἀφέντας τὸν τοιοῦτον . . . ἕ ἕκαστον ζητητέον, τίς ἑκάστ οἷον τίς φυτοῦ καὶ τίς ἀνθ θηρίου.

of important questions, raises for discussion (c. 6) the question whether there are more constitutions than one, though in every one of the preceding chapters of the Third Book an affirmative answer had been implied. 'We must inquire,' he says, 'whether there are more than one, and if there are, how many and what they are, and what distinctions exist between them' (c. 6. 1278 b 6). A constitution, he goes on to say, is 'an ordering of the magistracies of a State, and especially of the supreme authority'[1]; for in every State the governing individual or class (*πολίτευμα*) is supreme, and the constitution varies as this varies[2].

Distinction between normal constitutions and deviation-forms: Aristotle shows by a reference to the end of the State and by an inquiry as to the kind of rule which should be exercised over free persons, that normally government is for the common good.

The first broad distinction between constitutions—that between normal constitutions and deviation-forms—comes into view, when we ask what is the purpose for which the State exists, and what is the kind of rule which should be exercised in a State. In answering the first of these two questions, Aristotle—though he repeats his previous assertion (1. 2. 1253 a 7), that man is a social being and seeks to live in society with his fellows[3], even if he stands in no need of help from them—holds nevertheless that the State is formed to secure the general advantage, and to win for each individual as large a share of good life as he is capable of enjoying: not that men will not hold together in political society even if they gain from it less than this—if, for instance, they merely secure the continuance of a life not overladen with suffering and annoyances. The State, we see, is a *κοινωνία* not only or chiefly designed for social

[1] This seems to be the meaning of the words—*ἔστι δὲ πολιτεία πόλεως τάξις τῶν τε ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ μάλιστα τῆς κυρίας πάντων* (3. 6. 1278 b 8): cp. *τάξις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἡ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς* (6 (4). 1. 1289 a 15): *ἡ τῶν ἀρχῶν τάξις* (6 (4). 3. 1290 a 7): *τῶν τὴν πόλιν οἰκούντων τάξις τις* (3. 1. 1274 b 38).

[2] 3. 6. 1278 b 10, *κύριον μὲν γὰρ πανταχοῦ τὸ πολίτευμα τῆς πόλεως, πολίτευμα δ' ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτεία*: cp. 3. 7. 1279 a 25, *ἐστὶ δὲ πολιτεία μὲν καὶ πολίτευμα σημαίνει ταὐτόν, πολίτευμα δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κύριον τῶν πόλεων, ἀνάγκη δ' εἶναι κύριον ἢ ἕνα ἢ ὀλίγους ἢ τοὺς πολλούς*—from which passage it would seem that the *πολίτευμα* may be a single individual as well as a class, such as the Few or the Many.

[3] See Cic. de Amicitia 23. 87; but Aristotle claims that man is not only a *συνδυαστικόν* but a *πολιτικὸν ζῷον*.

pleasure, like such unions as those of θιασῶται or ἐρανισταί (Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 19: cp. Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 35–1281 a 4), but if in some degree for pleasure, in a higher degree for advantage, and advantage not of a passing kind but extending over the whole life (Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 21 sqq.). It combines in itself, like the conjugal relation, but in a higher degree, pleasure and advantage (Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1162 a 24).

Aristotle answers the second question—what kind of rule should be exercised in a State—by distinguishing, as he had already done in c. 4 (1277 a 33 sqq.), the rule exercised over slaves from the rule exercised over free persons. Of the latter he takes as types the rule of the head of a household over wife and children, or that of the master of an art—a gymnastic-master or a ship-captain—over those whom he directs[1]. This kind of rule is exercised primarily for the good of the ruled, for if the ruler has a share of the advantage, this comes to him accidentally (κατὰ συμβεβηκός); whereas the rule exercised by a master of slaves (δεσποτικὴ ἀρχή) is exercised primarily for the good of the ruler, and accidentally only for the good of the ruled[2]. That the rule exercised in a State belongs of right to the former category, may be inferred from the fact that when rulers and ruled are placed on a level, the former deriving no special benefit from ruling, men regard office as a public burden (λειτουργία, 1279 a 11) and claim to pass it from one to the other[3]. The mere fact of an interchange of rule being looked for under these circumstances shows that the State is normally for the common advantage, for if no interchange took place, and the rulers were always the same and ruled for the good of the ruled, they would be losers[4]. The general feeling that an inter-

[1] Compare the reasoning in Plato, Rep. 342 C.

[2] Plato, Rep. 343 B. Plato seems hardly to make this distinction as to δεσποτικὴ ἀρχή, Rep. 345 D-E (πᾶσαν ἀρχήν, καθ' ὅσον ἀρχή).

[3] Susemihl seems right in thinking that Aristotle has here Isocr. Areopag. § 24 sqq. in view.

[4] Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 a 35 sqq., διὸ οὐκ ἐῶμεν ἄρχειν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸν λόγον, ὅτι ἑαυτῷ τοῦτο ποιεῖ καὶ γίνεται τύραννος· ἔστι δ' ὁ ἄρχων φύλαξ τοῦ δικαίου, εἰ δὲ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ τοῦ ἴσου· ἐπεὶ δ' οὐδὲν αὐτῷ

change of rule is just where government is for the benefit of the governed, implies that the State exists for the common good.

The parallel between politics and the arts which Aristotle inherited from Socrates and Plato here suggests the inference that the relation between rulers and ruled so far resembles that between the master of an art and his pupils or assistants, as to be a relation primarily for the benefit of the side which receives, not that which gives, direction (cp. 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 29 sq., *ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιστήμαις τοῦτο ὁρῶμεν· οὔτε γὰρ τοῦ ἰατροῦ οὔτε τοῦ κυβερνήτου ἔργον ἐστὶ τὸ ἢ πεῖσαι ἢ βιάσασθαι τοῦ μὲν τοὺς θεραπευομένους τοῦ δὲ τοὺς πλωτῆρας*); it serves here, therefore, as it also does in 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 10 sqq. and 3. 12. 1282 b 30, as the basis of an important doctrine, notwithstanding that elsewhere Aristotle is careful to point out some differences between politics and the arts; he holds *πολιτική*, in fact, to be a Practical Science, not a Productive Science or Art. Thus he recognizes that written rule, or law, is more in place in the practice of Politics than in the practice of an art (3. 16. 1287 a 33 sqq.), and that the parallel of the arts must not be used to justify a frequent change of laws (2. 8. 1269 a 19 sqq.). Nor is government to him a mere matter of scientific knowledge; it presupposes virtue and correct moral choice (3. 13. 1284 a 1 sq.).

Both of the questions raised have thus been answered in a way to show that rule such as that exercised by a master over his slaves (*δεσποτικὴ ἀρχή*) is out of place in relation to the citizens of a State; it offends against the

πλέον εἶναι δοκεῖ, εἴπερ δίκαιος· οὐ γὰρ νέμει πλέον τοῦ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθοῦ αὑτῷ, εἰ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν· διὸ ἑτέρῳ ποιεῖ· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀλλότριον εἶναί φασιν ἀγαθὸν τὴν δικαιοσύνην . . . μισθὸς ἄρα τις δοτέος, τοῦτο δὲ τιμὴ καὶ γέρας· ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ ἱκανὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα, οὗτοι γίνονται τύραννοι. This agrees with Plato, Rep. 345 E. In the passage of the Politics before us, however, the *μισθός* is conceived to come in the shape of a period of private life, during which some one else governs for the *quondam* ruler's advantage. It should be noticed that Aristotle does not necessarily accept as correct the popular impression that one who rules for the benefit of the ruled is a loser and needs compensation. The popular view is not his own, but it serves the purpose of his argument.

aim with which the State was instituted, and against the nature of all rule which rests on knowledge. Rule in the State should be for the common advantage of all the citizens, whether rulers or ruled; and thus we arrive at the conclusion that those constitutions which aim at the common advantage are normal (*ὀρθαί*), and those which aim at the advantage of the rulers only are deviation-forms. The State is a *κοινωνία* of freemen, and must be governed as such. It does not necessarily follow that in all normal forms of it there will be an interchange of rule, the ruled becoming rulers, and the rulers becoming the ruled, from time to time: this is so in most forms of the rule which citizens exercise over citizens (cp. 1. 12 1259 b 4), and particularly in the 'like and equal' type of society which was becoming increasingly common in the Greece of Aristotle's day, but not in the Kingship. Democratic opinion held this interchange to be essential to freedom (8 (6). 2. 1317 a 40–b 3), but Aristotle's view is that the governed are free when the government is exercised for their benefit. A freeman, according to him, is 'one who exists for his own sake and not for that of another' (Metaph. A. 2. 982 b 25: cp. Pol. 3. 4. 1277 b 5: 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 1 sqq.). A man may thus be a freeman without having a share in ruling. The true characteristic of a freeman is that his interest counts as a thing to be studied—that his life is lived for himself, not for another. He who is the instrument (*ὄργανον*) of another and fit for nothing better, and yet a man, is a slave (1. 4. 1254 a 14, *ὁ γὰρ μὴ αὑτοῦ φύσει ἀλλ' ἄλλου, ἄνθρωπος δέ, οὗτος φύσει δοῦλός ἐστιν*).

Six constitutions—three normal, three the reverse.

Aristotle thus obtains the broad classification of constitutions into normal forms and deviation-forms, and takes also into account the fact that the supreme authority in a State must needs be a single individual, or a few, or many

[1] Aristotle is not careful at the outset of a discussion, when everything he says is tentative and provisional, to study absolute accuracy. See Ramsauer on Eth. Nic. 5. 3. 1129 b 15. So here he does not pause to remember that it means eventually to decide for the supremacy, not of any persons or persons, but of *νόμοι κατὰ*

he arrives at the conclusion that there are six constitutions, three for the common advantage (*ὀρθαί*) and three for the advantage of the rulers (*παρεκβάσεις*). It will be noticed, however, that at the end of the chapter (c. 7), the Few and Many in whose interest the oligarchy and democracy are said respectively to be ruled are identified with the rich and the poor (3. 7. 1279 b 7–9); and a chapter, the Eighth, necessarily follows, dealing with objections that may fairly be made to the definition given of oligarchy and democracy. The first is that if we take the numerical difference to be the essential thing, it follows that States in which many rich rule a few poor are democracies, and that States in which a few poor rule many rich are oligarchies, which is not a satisfactory conclusion. Then, if we make both differences essential, and refuse to consider that an oligarchy exists anywhere except where a few rich rule many poor, or a democracy except where many poor rule a few rich, we leave the forms of State to which reference has just been made altogether undescribed and unclassified. This is the second objection. It follows that the qualitative, not the numerical, difference is the essential one. The numerical difference between oligarchy and democracy is only accidental and may be reversed. It is the rule of the rich in their own interest that makes an oligarchy, and the rule of the poor in their own interest that makes a democracy.

Nature of Democracy and Oligarchy —their claims to be just constitutions analyzed, and rejected by a reference to the end of the State.

It was necessary to ascertain correctly what democracy and oligarchy are, before taking the next step, which is to state and examine the claims put forward on behalf of either constitution; and thus to win for the first time (c. 9) a closer view of what constitutes a State, and of the end for which the State exists.

Both oligarchs and democrats allege a basis in justice for the forms of constitution which they respectively favour, and not untruly; they take their stand on a principle which is in a degree just (*δίκαιόν τι*); but then they forget that it

ὀρθῶν (3. 11. 1282 b 1: cp. 3. 10. 1281 a 34), and that the supremacy of Law is a possible alternative.

falls short of absolute justice (τὸ κυρίως δίκαιον). 'They know in part and prophesy in part' (1281 a 8). There is, indeed, a difference between them, for while they agree in claiming that the things awarded by the State shall be awarded equally, they differ as to the persons to whom this equal award is to be made—the one side wishing to confine the benefit of it to those who are equal in wealth, the other claiming it for all who are equal in respect of free birth (ἐλευθερία)[1].

It has been already said (c. 6. 1278 b 17 sqq.) that the deviation-forms go counter to the end for which the State was originally formed, and this is now (1280 a 25) again brought up against them. Their advocates leave the decisive point untouched—they do not inquire for what end the State exists, yet this inquiry is really decisive of the whole matter. Aristotle proceeds to investigate this question, and here, as everywhere else, we must bear in mind that the subject of his investigations is the πόλις, or City-

[1] This appears to be the meaning of c. 9. 1280 a 9–25. In 3. 12. 1282 b 18 sqq. every one is said to agree that the just is the equal for the equal, but no one remembers to inquire, in what things men must be equal and unequal, if they are justly to claim equality and inequality in a distribution of power. In 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 28 sqq. both sides are said to agree that τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἴσον is ἁπλῶς δίκαιον, but to differ as to what constitutes τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἴσον—democrats holding that equality in a single thing constitutes absolute equality, and oligarchs, that inequality in a single thing constitutes absolute inequality. The three passages are not absolutely accordant, but they agree in laying stress on the importance of the question whether the claimants are really equal and unequal as they claim to be.

The word ἐλευθερία is commonly translated 'freedom' in 3. 9. 1280 a 24, but Bernays perhaps comes nearer to its meaning in his translation 'free birth.' Ἐλεύθερος and ἐλευθερία seem often to be used in relation to the circumstances of birth; cp. 3. 9. 1281 a 6, κατὰ μὲν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ γένος ἴσους: 3. 13. 1283 a 33, οἱ δ' ἐλεύθεροι καὶ εὐγενεῖς ὡς ἐγγὺς ἀλλήλων: 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 9 sqq. Ἐλευθερία may indeed occasionally mean something more than 'free birth'—in fact 'citizen birth'; cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 26, τὸ μὴ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πολιτῶν ἐλεύθερον, and 1290 b 9, οὔτ' ἂν οἱ ἐλεύθεροι ὀλίγοι ὄντες πλειόνων καὶ μὴ ἐλευθέρων ἄρχωσι (where οἱ ἐλεύθεροι are explained a little later to be οἱ διαφέροντες κατ' εὐγένειαν καὶ πρῶτοι κατασχόντες τὰς δυναστείας). Ἐλεύθερος is sometimes used in contradistinction to ξένος (Plato Com., Ὑπέρβολος, fr. 3, 4: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 670). Antisthenes is said by Diogenes Laertius in one passage not to have been ἐκ δυοῖν Ἀθηναίοιν (6. 1), and in another not to have been ἐκ δύο ἐλευθέρων (6. 4).

State. The πόλις exists not for the sake of the property of the participants, nor for the sake of bare life, nor, like an alliance, for protection from wrong, nor for protection in traffic and mutual dealings, but for the sake of good life (τὸ εὖ ζῆν). Our use of language, Aristotle urges, implies that a State exists only where there is a mutual care for virtue[1], where the character of each individual is no indifferent matter to the rest, or, in words used elsewhere, where men live with a view to the common advantage. The State, he implies, means a society where the individual lives for the whole. It involves something more than relations of exchange, or alliance, or co-operation against outrage; something more than residence in one and the same spot; something more than the links of marriage, of the phratry, of common sacrifices and gatherings for social intercourse[2]; it involves that to which these latter things are merely a means, an associated participation in a fully developed and complete existence, in a happy and noble life.

The farther inference is drawn, to clinch the case against oligarchy and democracy, that those who contribute more to a life of this nature have a better claim to political power than the representatives of wealth or free birth, the partisans, that is to say, of oligarchy and democracy (cp. 3. 13. 1283 a 23 sq.: 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 39 sq.: Plato, Laws 757 C). A comparative conclusion only, be it observed, for we shall find in the sequel that Aristotle does not concede even to a superiority in virtue, unless it is combined with an adequate provision of external goods, a right to predominance in the State.

Aristotle's account of the principle on which political

We note here the first use of an expression—that of 'contributing to a κοινωνία' (ὅσοι συμβάλλονται πλεῖστον εἰς τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν, 1281 a 4)—which somewhat varies the account elsewhere given of the procedure of the State in

[1] Cp. Plato, Gorgias 517 B, ἀλλὰ γὰρ μεταξιβάζειν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν, πείθοντες καὶ βιαζόμενοι ἐπὶ τοῦτο, ὅθεν ἔμελλον ἀμείνους ἔσεσθαι οἱ πολῖται, ὃν ἦν ἐκεῖνον, οὐδὲν τούτων διάφορον ἐκείνου ὅτερ μόνον ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀγαθοῦ πολίτου: Protag. 327 A sq.

[2] Plato is perhaps not really quite content with the life of his 'healthy State' (Rep. 372 B, ἡδέως ξυνόντες ἀλλήλοις).

power is to be distributed not always quite the same.

distributing political power. Sometimes we gather that th
State will give 'instruments' in proportion to capacity (c. 1
1282 b 33, τῷ κατὰ τὸ ἔργον ὑπερέχοντι: cp. de Part. An. 4. 1
687 a 10, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἀεὶ διανέμει, καθάπερ ἄνθρωπος φρόνιμο
ἕκαστον τῷ δυναμένῳ χρῆσθαι); sometimes that it gives the
in proportion to the contribution made to the κοινωνί
The two principles do not lie far apart, but from the o
point of view the grant of power is the payment of a deb
or rather resembles the distribution of a commercial com
pany's dividend, the amount of which in the case of ea
recipient is proportionate to the funds contributed [1], so th
power comes as a reward rather than as a burden, wh
from the other point of view power is given, like a to
to him who can use it best. Aristotle seems sometim
to pass almost unconsciously from the one view to t
other. His paramount doctrine, notwithstanding occasion
deviations (e.g. 3. 6. 1279 a 8 sqq.), probably is, that to t
good man political power, just like any other external go
is a good (cp. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 21 sqq.), and affords gr
opportunities of noble action, if only it is fairly won a
earned by adequate desert (4 (7). 3. 1325 b 3 sq.). W
naturally infer that he will confine political power to t
good, to whom it is alone a good, and give it to th
in the degree which makes best for virtue; and, in fa
we find power in the hands of the good in both the for
of the best State (cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 32, βούλεται γὰρ ἕκατ
κατ' ἀρετὴν συνεστάναι κεχορηγημένην). But then the questi
arose—are wealth and free birth, which, as we shall see,
allows to be, as well as virtue, elements contributing to
end of the State, to be denied any share of power, if their p
sessors do not also possess virtue? This is the question
cussed in 3. 13. 1283 a 42 sqq. Considerations of justice fo
from Aristotle the admission that a share of power must
conceded to them even under those circumstances. But w
if the possession of power be detrimental to its hold
in the absence of virtue? This difficulty seems not to h

[1] This view of the State, it appears from c. 9. 1280 a 27 sqq., had been put forward, as natural, by partisans of oligar

occurred to Aristotle. He usually approaches the question of the award of political power rather from the side of justice than from that of the ethical interest of the State or the individual, though, as has been said, the best State satisfies all these criteria[1]. At all events, the point of view of justice is far the more prominent in the Third Book. In the book on Revolutions it is also especially prominent, for justice is the best security against revolution (*μόνον γὰρ μόνιμον τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἴσον καὶ τὸ ἔχειν τὰ αὑτῶν*, 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 26). Even in the Fourth Book, where the other point of view naturally comes more to the front, it is not absent. For instance, the assignment of military functions to the younger men and of political functions to the elder, rests in some degree on considerations of justice (cp. 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 16, *οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἀμφοῖν νενεμῆσθαι συμφέρει καὶ δίκαιον εἶναι· ἔχει γὰρ αὕτη ἡ διαίρεσις τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν*). The just, in fact, and that which is for the common good are said to be identical (3. 12. 1282 b 17). But then, is the State sketched in 3. 13. 1283 a 42 sqq., or indeed any State but the best, truly just or for the common good? This question receives an answer, when we are told (6 (4). 8. 1293 b 25) that all constitutions but the best are deviations from the most normal constitution (*διημαρτήκασι τῆς ὀρθοτάτης πολιτείας*).

Summary of the conclusions so far arrived at as to the nature of a State.

If we now gather together the conclusions with regard to the nature of the State to which the preceding inquiries have led us, they seem to be the following:—the State is a body of men, not too large or small (*πολιτῶν τι πλῆθος*, 3. 1. 1274 b 41), collected in one spot (1280 b 30–1), possessing and exercising rights of trade and inter-marriage, joining in common festivals[2] and other forms of sociability (*τὸ συζῆν*), but above all, able and purposed to rule and be

[1] Cp. 4 (7). 2. 1324 a 23, *ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πολιτείαν ἀρίστην ταύτην καθ' ἣν τάξειν κἂν ὁστισοῦν ἄριστα πράττοι καὶ ζώη μακαρίως, φανερόν ἐστιν*: 4. (7). 9. 1328 b 33, *ἐπεὶ δὲ τυγχάνομεν σκοποῦντες περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ἡ πόλις ἂν εἴη μάλιστ' εὐδαίμων.*

[2] This recognition of festivals as an essential element in the State is characteristic enough. Perhaps the modern State has lost something in losing this bond of union.

ruled as freemen should rule and be ruled, i. e. with a view to the common advantage[1]—or, in other words, so as to aid each other in the realization of a life, as Aristotle puts it, complete in every way[2]—and held together by participation in a constitution (3. 3. 1276 b 1–2) devised to make possible and promote an existence of this kind.

It is evidently no easy thing, in Aristotle's view, to be in a true sense a member of a State. Society truly so-called makes a great demand on human nature. The instinct of sociability, which man shares with some other animals, rises in him to a higher level than in them, for it rests on a perception of the good and bad, the just and unjust, the advantageous and disadvantageous (1. 2. 1253 a 15), but, even in the form in which man has it, it goes only a little way towards the making of a State. An aim for the common good must be added, then an intelligent comprehension of what is noble developed by a long course of training from childhood upward (4 (7). 15. 1334 b 25 sq.), then a steady purpose to live for this oneself and to promote a similar life in others; above all, the capacity under which term is included not only adequate skill but adequate external means (*χορηγία*), to rule and be ruled, as freemen should rule and be ruled, for the attainment of these ends. It is plain that to be a true citizen one must be a man of full virtue (*σπουδαῖος*).

We see also that Aristotle's account of the State implies that there must exist within it a body (*πλῆθος*) of men competent to take, and taking, an active part in its government. Mere '*administrés*' are not citizens: the State is

[1] Aristotle does not appear to notice that rule must be exercised not merely for the common advantage of the existing generation, but for the advantage also of the unborn of future generations.

[2] Aristotle, as has been noticed already, distinguishes between *αὐτάρκεια τῶν ἀναγκαίων*, which even an *ἔθνος* possesses (4 (7). 4. 1326 b 4), and *αὐτάρκεια τοῦ εὖ ζῆν*. A *πόλις* must possess an adequate number of citizens for both these ends (cp. 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 2 sqq. esp. 1326 b 7, though *αὐτάρκεια ζωῆς* is the expression used in 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 24: 3. 1. 1275 b 20). Even virtue will not make up for inadequate numbers, unless it is of transcendent kind: cp. 3. 13. 1283 a 11, *ἢ τὸ ὀλίγοι πρὸς τὸ ἔργον δεῖ σκοπεῖν, εἰ δυνατοὶ διακεῖν τὴν πόλιν, ἢ τοσοῦτοι τὸ πλῆθος ὥστ' εἶναι πόλιν ἐξ αὐτῶν.*

a scene of collective effort, it is an union of co-operating equals, whose numbers must not, indeed, be over-great, but yet also must not be too small. It is only later that he reminds us that the appearance of a παμβασιλεύς on the scene, though most unlikely, is nevertheless possible, and that he finds a place in his theory for the παμβασιλεία, without, however, altering his original account of the State, which is not strictly wide enough to admit it. It was, indeed, hardly necessary for him to do so, for though, as we shall see, he holds that the best form of the State is that in which virtue fully provided with external means is possessed in an overwhelming degree by one or a few persons, and rule always remains in his or their hands, the conditions of this form were wholly unlikely to occur.

His account of the State also implies that it consists of those who can live its full life. Outside the citizen-body we find a fringe of dependents, necessary, indeed, to the existence of the State, but not brought within its inner circle, some free (women, children, artisans, labourers for hire) and others slaves. These are not, in strictness, a part of the State.

The question as to the place of Law in the State has so far not emerged: it emerges in connexion with the inquiry, what is to be the supreme authority of the State?

As yet the further characteristic of the State, that in every case save one—and this so rare as to be merely hypothetical—its working will be governed by Law, has not been added; the discussion of the next question, however, brings it under our notice. This question is, what is to be the supreme authority of the community (τὸ κύριον τῆς πόλεως)? Aristotle does not mean by τὸ κύριον what Austin means by 'sovereign,' for the supreme authority may, in the view of the former, be vested in law, not in any given 'persons'; he does not go behind law to the men who make it. To answer this question, he rapidly discusses (c. 10) the claims of a number of competitors for power, with the result that the supreme authority must be just[1], if only because otherwise the community will perish; yet

[1] Compare the saying of St. Augustine—'quid civitates sine iustitia nisi magna latrocinia?'

if supremacy is given to men of worth, who are usually but a few, or to one man of supreme worth, we are still met by the difficulty of reconciling the rest to their exclusion from power; and Aristotle falls back on the supremacy of law, as distinguished from that of a person or persons, who cannot be expected to be free, like law, from infirmities of character. But then, if the law be that of a deviation-form, an oligarchy or a democracy, its rule may be as bad as that of any person. 'Bad laws,' says Burke, 'are the worst sort of tyranny.'

The answer to this inquiry is—laws normally constituted.

Parenthetical recognition of the claims of the many, if not below a certain level of excellence, to a share in certain political rights which they can exercise collectively.

At this point Aristotle pauses to draw a lesson from the inquiry, before the moment for insisting on it has passed. He has already (c. 9) laid stress on the claims of virtue to power in the State, as against those of wealth or free birth, and his readers may well have gathered that he must favour a rule of the few Good (*ἐπιεικεῖς*). It is precisely this impression that he now wishes to correct. Even on the score of virtue the many, if they are not too degraded, have something to say for themselves. Plato had severely censured in the Laws (700 A–701 B) the tendency to what he terms a 'theatrocracy' (*θεατροκρατία*). It was, he says, in the theatre—

> 'When all its throats the gallery extends,
> And all the thunder of the pit ascends'—

that the people first learnt to believe itself infallible, and to despise the judgment of the wise few (*τοῖς γεγονόσι πεπαιδευσιν*, 700 C)—a lesson which they soon applied in matters of State. He rejects this popular supremacy both in the sphere of music and poetry[1] and in that of politics.[2] It is evident from 1281 b 7 sq. and from the whole course of c. 11, that Aristotle does not agree with Plato in this

[1] See Laws 670 B and the references given in Stallbaum's note.

[2] Plato's principle, in the Gorgias at all events, is 'cuique in sua arte credendum.' Cp. Gorg. 455 B, quoted by Engelhardt, Loci Platonici quorum Aristoteles in conscribendis Politicis videtur memor fuisse, p. 15: *ὅταν περὶ ἰατρῶν αἱρέσεως ᾖ τῇ πόλει σύλλογος ἢ περὶ ναυπηγῶν ἢ περὶ ἄλλου τινὸς δημιουργικοῦ ἔθνους, ἄλλο τι ἢ τότε ῥητορικὸς οὐ συμβουλεύσει; δῆλο. γὰρ ὅτι ἐν ἑκάστῃ αἱρέσει τὸν τεχνικώτατον δεῖ αἱρεῖσθαι κ.τ.λ.*

He did not hold that the rise of the drama or of Rhetoric[1] was to be deplored, or that neither deserved a place in a well-ordered State: tragedy is to him the highest form of poetry, and a boon to man; Rhetoric is necessary because the minds of the many are less easily influenced by strict philosophical reasoning than by arguments drawn from common opinion. In this matter, as in others, things had not gone so completely wrong as Plato thought. On the contrary, the views of men have a tendency to gravitate to the truth (Rhet. 1. 1. 1355 a 15 sq.: Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 243. 3). The wiser advocates of democracy had not claimed for popular gatherings an equal aptitude for all kinds of work. This is true, for instance, of Athenagoras, the leader of the popular party in the 'polity' (7 (5). 4. 1304 a 27) or 'aristocracy' (7 (5). 10. 1312 b 6–9), which existed at Syracuse till the defeat and capture of the Athenian armament led to its conversion into a democracy (1304 a 27). The utterance of Athenagoras on this subject (Thuc. 6. 39) apparently set the keynote of this Eleventh Chapter. *Φήσει τις* (he says) *δημοκρατίαν οὔτε ξυνετὸν οὔτ' ἴσον εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ ἔχοντας τὰ χρήματα καὶ ἄρχειν ἄριστα βελτίστους. ἐγὼ δέ φημι πρῶτα μὲν δῆμον ξύμπαν ὀνομάσθαι, ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ μέρος, ἔπειτα φύλακας μὲν ἀρίστους εἶναι χρημάτων τοὺς πλουσίους, βουλεῦσαι δ' ἂν βέλτιστα τοὺς ξυνετούς, κρῖναι δ' ἂν ἀκούσαντας ἄριστα τοὺς πολλούς, καὶ ταῦτα ὁμοίως καὶ κατὰ μέρη καὶ ξύμπαντα ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ ἰσομοιρεῖν.* Aristotle is inclined to agree with the view here taken of the capabilities of the many, so far at all events as some subjects are concerned. It is interesting to find him expressing the view that the many are better judges of music and poetry than the few (1281 b 7)[2]; he is not, however, here speaking of an audience of artisans and day-labourers, whose defects of taste he recognizes (5 (8). 7. 1342 a 18 sq.), but of one

[1] As to Rhetoric, contrast Plato, Laws 937 D sqq. with Aristot. Rhet. 1. 1. 1355 a 20–b 7.

[2] It should be noticed, however, that in the Fifth Book (5 (8). 6. 1340 b 23) he says that it is out of the question, or at all events not easy, for those who have not learnt to play and sing to become good judges of music.

not below a certain social level[1]. Whether he would praise the judgment of the Athenian people in these matters, many of whom were artisans and day-labourers we do not know. Nowhere else were audiences so frequently gathered together to sit in judgment on drama and choruses[2]. When Goethe says[3], 'Es bleibt immer gewiss, dieses so geehrte und verachtete Publikum betrügt sich über das Einzelne fast immer und über das Ganze fast nie,' he perhaps has rather the reading public in view than a theatre audience. Aristotle, however, goes on to admit that the people—always supposing them to be not below a certain level of merit—are capable critics of public service, when brought together in a body. A man of full virtue (*σπουδαῖος*), he says, may be surpassed by others in respect of each of the excellences whose combination makes him what he is[4]; his strength lies in his combination of virtues not necessarily singly present in a superlative degree. And something similar may be said of a large gathering of men. It is like a single individual possessed of many hands and feet and organs of sense, and many moral and intellectual faculties[5]. Aristotle forgets that bad qualities will

[1] He guards himself thus, possibly remembering a saying of Socrates—*πρὸς τὸ οὐκ ἀξιόλογον πλῆθος ἔφασκεν ὅμοιον εἶ τις τετράδραχμον ἐν ἀποδοκιμάζων τὸν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων σωρὸν ὡς δόκιμον ἀποδέχοιτο* (Diog. Laert. 2. 34). We see from the use of *πλῆθος* in this passage what Aristotle probably means by *πάντα δῆμον ... πᾶν πλῆθος* in 1281 b 16. He is not thinking so much of national differences, like that which existed between Boeotians and Athenians, as of differences of occupation (like that which distinguished the *γεωργικὸς δῆμος* from the *βάναυσος* or *ἀγοραῖος δῆμος*), or of social position (cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 38, *τοῦ κατὰ τὴν χώραν πλήθους*: 1319 b 1, *τὸ χεῖρον ἀεὶ πλῆθος χωρίζειν*).

[2] If the popular judgment in music prevailed, and was responsible for the degeneracy of the art which Aristoxenus deplores in a charming passage (Fr. 90: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 291), it can hardly have deserved much credit. Aristoxenus compares his own contemporaries, so far as the art of music is concerned, to the barbarized Paestans, who met once a year at a festival to mourn the loss of Hellenism, and to recall for a moment their old way of life.

[3] Quoted by Henkel, Studien, 80 n. 'It is quite certain, that the Public, which we are so ready both to honour and to despise, is almost always under a delusion in its judgments as to particular points, but hardly ever as to the total result.'

[4] This glimpse of the *σπουδαῖος* is interesting, and prepares us for the many-sidedness of the citizen of Aristotle's ideal State.

[5] Aristotle evidently has Geryon

be thrown into the common stock no less than good ones; he forgets also the special liability of great gatherings of men to be mastered by feeling, especially in the discussion of political questions, which are far more provocative of feeling than artistic ones. His principle, again, would justify the inference that the larger the gathering is, the greater its capacity will be[1].

Aristotle is led, partly by these considerations, partly by considerations of political safety (*οὐκ ἀσφαλές*, 1281 b 26: *φοβερόν*, 29), to the conclusion that there is good ground for a compromise between the rich and the good on the one hand, and the many—in the sense of *οἱ ἐλεύθεροι* (1281 b 23)—on the other. The many are not fit to hold the highest magistracies; they are only fit for collective political functions, such as those of deliberating and judging (*τὸ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ κρίνειν*, 1281 b 31). To these they may be admitted with advantage. Hence it is that some constitutions, that of Solon for instance, concede to the people the right of choosing magistrates and reviewing their official conduct, but not the right of holding office singly[2].

There were those, we know—for example, Socrates[3]—who held the master of an art to be the best hand both at judging how a work has been done and selecting the man to do it, but with this view—even taking the term 'master of an art' in its widest sense, so as to include not only the man of science (*ὁ εἰδώς*) and the practical worker (*ὁ δημιουργός*), but also the man who has had a general training on the subject (*ὁ πεπαιδευμένος*)—Aristotle does not agree. He feels, however, that the case of the many need not be wholly rested on the broad ground which he has

in his mind: cp. Plutarch, Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 26, *οὕτω γὰρ ἦν ὁ Γηρυόνης ζηλωτός, ἔχων σκέλη πολλὰ καὶ χεῖρας καὶ ὀφθαλμούς, εἰ πάντα μία ψυχὴ διώκει.*

[1] See as to Aristotle's view on this subject Henkel, p. 80 n.: Sus.[2], Note 565[b].

[2] 1281 b 34, *ἄρχειν δὲ κατὰ μόνας οὐκ ἐῶσιν*, where Bonitz (Ind. 472 b 42) compares Hist. An. 9. 43. 629 a 33, *λίχνον δ' ὂν καὶ πρὸς τὰ μαγειρεῖα καὶ τοὺς ἰχθύας καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀπόλαυσιν κατὰ μόνας προσπέπτωκε.*

[3] Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 49–50: 3. 5. 21 sqq.: 3. 9. 10 sqq. 'Credendum cuique in sua arte.'

taken up; they have another ground of claim, for they are the 'wearers of the shoe' and know best where it pinches. There are subjects on which the man who uses the product (ὁ χρώμενος) has more claim to be a good judge than the master of an art—subjects on which a mastery of the art is not essential to a right decision: the best critic of a banquet, for instance, is not the cook, but the guest[1]. It is implied that the decision as to the merits of a statesman is one of these.

After this objection has been dealt with, however another remains. Plato had insisted in the Laws (945 E sqq.) that the reviewing authority must be better than the magistracy reviewed[2], and had accordingly given the right of review in the State of the Laws to a specially constituted body, the priests of Apollo, not to the people. Aristotle probably has this arrangement in view in his defence (1282 a 32 sqq.) of the Solonian distribution of power. His reply is that under it the reviewing authority *is* better than the magistracy reviewed, for the reviewing authority is the collective whole, not the individuals, mostly of little worth, of whom it is composed, and this, if in the given instance the people is not below a certain level, will be better, and indeed richer, than the One or Few to whom high offices are entrusted.

Having followed this line of inquiry thus far, Aristotle recurs to the discussion from which he had diverged, and recognizes that it had led to the result that law must be supreme—law not conceived in the interest of a section, but normal and correct (νόμοι ὀρθῶς κείμενοι, 3. 11. 1282 b 1 sqq.), adding that where owing to its necessary generality it cannot give detailed guidance, the ruler, whether one or many, must in these matters be supreme. The question, however, what 'laws normal and correct' are, still remains.

[1] This saying, which was perhaps already proverbial, is echoed by Martial, Epigr. 9. 81, as is noticed by Sir G. C. Lewis (Authority in Matters of Opinion, pp. 184-5).

[2] Cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1143 a 33, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄτοπον ἂν εἴη καὶ δόξειεν, εἰ χείρων τῆς σοφίας οὖσα [ἡ φρόνησις] κυριωτέρα αὐτῆς ἔσται.

for solution. To answer it, Aristotle calls to mind that 'good and just laws and good and just constitutions go together, but that the laws must be adjusted to the constitution, not the constitution to the laws[1]: hence we may say that laws adjusted to the normal constitutions will be just, and those adjusted to the deviation-forms unjust.' With these words c. 11 closes.

What are normally constituted laws? Laws adjusted to the normal constitutions. Transition to the question, what the just is? —what attributes confer a just claim to a share in political power?

Arrived at this point, we expect that the next question for discussion will be, what 'laws adjusted to the normal constitutions' are, but instead of distinctly raising this question, Aristotle proceeds to discuss a question which, as he says, 'affords an opportunity for aporetic inquiry, and is not without instructiveness for the political philosopher.' The question he refers to is one relating to the nature of Political Justice[2]. The Twelfth Chapter, in fact, begins as follows—'but since in all sciences and arts the end is a good, and in the most sovereign of sciences—the Political Science—the greatest of goods is in an especial degree made the end, and since the just is the political good, and the just is no other than that which is for the common advantage[3] [we shall do well to inquire what the just is]. Now all say that the just is the equal: yes, and all agree up to a certain point with the conclusion arrived at in the philosophical discussions in which ethical questions have been treated in detail, that justice implies not only a thing awarded, but also persons to whom it is awarded, and say that justice means the award of that which is equal to equals. But then comes the question—equals in what?' Equals in respect of any good thing we may chance to select—complexion, for instance, or size of body? The Ethiopians, according to Herodotus (3. 20), made the biggest and strongest man among them their king, and Plato had seemed to imply in a hasty sentence that such

[1] Cp. 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 13 sq.

[2] Bernays (Aristoteles' Politik, p. 172 n.) has expressed the opinion that the contents of cc. 12 and 13 were placed where we find them, not by the hand of Aristotle, but by that of some later editor. On this question, see Appendix C.

[3] Cp. Isocr. Archid. § 35.

things might be taken into consideration[1]. Aristotle, on the contrary, says that in any distribution of 'instruments' (*ὄργανα*) the work to be done must be kept in view—that in a distribution of flutes, for instance, the best flute must be given not to the best-born or the handsomest, but to the most skilful flute-player. The contrary view, he says, would imply that all things which we call good are sufficiently one in kind to be reducible to a common measure and comparable the one with the other. Goods are really only comparable in respect of their contribution to a given work (*ἔργον*), and only goods which contribute to the same work can be compared with each other. 'The competitors for power must base their claim on the possession of things which really go to the making of a State' (1283 a 14). So that, if we draw up a rough list of competitors for political power, we shall find on it the well-born, the free-born, and the wealthy[2], and to these we shall have to add those possessed of justice and of military excellence. All these possess attributes contributing either to the being or well-being of the State. Each of these groups has a certain claim, none of them an absolutely just or exclusive claim, to power. Even a constitution which gave exclusive supremacy to the virtuous would not be just, for it would give exclusive supremacy to one only of the elements which contribute to the work of the State.

The normal constitution will recognize all elements

[1] Cp. Laws 744 B, where Plato enumerates not only *ἀρετὴν ἥ τε προγόνων καὶ ἡ αὐτοῦ* and *πλούτου χρῆσις καὶ πενίας*, but also *σωμάτων ἰσχύες καὶ εὐμορφίαι*, as entitling to a larger share of honours and offices. In Laws 757 B–C, however, true, or geometrical, justice is said to take account only of virtue in its distribution of honours. But then we must remember that the State of the Laws is avowedly a second-best State, and not constructed wholly on ideal principles.

[2] Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1133b 18, *τῇ μὲν οὖν ἀληθείᾳ ἀδύνατον τὰ τοσοῦτον διαφέροντα σύμμετρα γενέσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν χρείαν ἐνδέχεται ἱκανῶς* and Eth. Nic. 9. 1. 1164 b 2 sq.

[3] In Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1124a 20 sq. there is an account of the competing claimants for honour which reminds us of this passage of the Politics. We gather that those who combine the three *ἀγαθά*—wealth, nobility, and virtue—have the best claim. Cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 3, where the *βασιλεύς* is said to be *ὁ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχων*.

[4] Plato's language, Laws 757 C, is far more favourable to the claims of virtue. Geometrical (or true) justice, he says, *τιμὰς μείζους μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀεὶ μείζους, τοῖς δὲ*

The same would have to be said of one which gave exclusive supremacy to the many (*οἱ πλείους*) on the grounds developed in the Eleventh Chapter.

which contribute to the being and well-being of the State, not one of them only.

What then must be done, supposing all these elements—the good, the rich, the noble, the many—to co-exist in one and the same community? Are we to give power to the good, supposing only that they are sufficient in number to form, or at least to govern, a State[1]? But then there is a difficulty which affects all exclusive awards on the ground of superiority in this or that attribute. Each of the elements before us—the rich, the noble, the good, the many—is liable to have its claims defeated by those of a single individual richer or nobler or better than all the rest, or indeed by those of a mass of men of which this can be said. Our review of facts shows that none of these exclusive claims to supremacy on the ground of a bare superiority in one of the elements which contribute to the life of the State deserve to be accounted 'normal' (*ὀρθός*), or to find recognition in a normal constitution. We thus obtain an answer to the question raised at the end of c. 11 (1282 b 6), what are normally constituted laws, and whether they will be conceived in the interest of the better sort or the many (1283 b 35). They are, we find, laws designed for the common good of both; though there is one case in which all laws are out of place—that of the appearance of a *παμβασιλεύς*. When the good are not so superior as to outweigh in virtue the collective merit of the mass (*ὅταν συμβαίνῃ τὸ λεχθέν*, 1283 b 39), then they must share power with the many. Some mixed constitution must be adopted, which will give to the good and to the many a proportionate share of power; and in determining the proportion which is to fall to the lot of

A bare superiority in one only does not confer an exclusive right to supremacy.

Unless the virtue of the Good is so transcendent as to outweigh the collective merit of the Many, the Good,

τοὐναντίον ἔχουσιν ἀρετῆς τε καὶ παιδείας τὸ πρέπον ἑκατέροις ἀπονέμει κατὰ λόγον.

[1] This question is left unanswered, but the answer intended to be given to it may probably be gathered from the sentences which succeed. It is that, given a sufficient superiority in virtue, no deficiency in the numbers of the virtuous is a bar to their claims: even a single individual, if more virtuous than all the rest of the community, has an irresistible claim to rule.

the Rich, and the Many must divide power between them in the way most conducive to the common good.

each, regard must be had to the advantage of the whole State and the common advantage of the citizens[1]; 'and a citizen is, broadly, one who shares in ruling and being ruled, but he differs according to the particular constitution; under the best constitution he is one who is able and purposed to rule and be ruled with a view to a life of virtue' (1283 b 42 sqq.). We infer, then, that the best constitution will be so designed as to favour his pursuit of this end, and this we find to be the case if we compare the Fourth Book (4 (7). 2. 1324 a 23, *ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πολιτείαν ἀρίστην ταύτην καθ' ἣν τάξιν κἂν ὁστισοῦν ἄριστα πράττοι καὶ ζῴη μακαρίως, φανερόν ἐστιν*).

If, however, one man, or a small group of men not numerous enough to constitute a city, is forthcoming, possessing this transcendent amount of virtue, then a case for the Absolute Kingship arises.

'But if,' Aristotle continues, 'there is in the community some one man, or some group of men not numerous enough to constitute a city, so pre-eminent in virtue that the virtue and political capacity of all the rest put together is not commensurable with theirs'—in other words, *ὅταν μὴ συμβαίνῃ τὸ λεχθέν*—'this man or men,' notwithstanding the numerical paucity, 'must not be treated as a mere part of the State,' or called upon to share power with the rest and to submit to law, for to do so would be to do them injustice, and indeed would be ridiculous. This is shown to be the case by an appeal to the practice of the deviation-forms, which either put to death or ostracize any citizen who by reason of disproportionate wealth, or a disproportionate number of friends and adherents, or for any other cause, is formidable to the State. They do not expect such persons to obey the law; they get rid of them in one way or another. The normal constitutions have to face the same difficulty, and though they will try to prevent the case for the ostracism arising[2], they also may nevertheless be forced to resort to it; but then they will use the ostracism for the common good

[1] 1283 b 40, *τὸ δ' ὀρθὸν λεκτέον ἴσως· τὸ δ' ἴσως ὀρθὸν πρὸς τὸ τῆς πόλεως ὅλης συμφέρον καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τὸ τῶν πολιτῶν.* It is not clear whether Aristotle conceives any difference to exist between the advantage of the whole State and the common advantage of the citizens.

[2] Cp. 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 19: and Aristoph. Ran. 1357 sqq. as to Alcibiades.

not for the good of a section[1]. But what is the best constitution to do, if an individual makes his appearance, transcendent, not in respect of wealth or the number of his friends, but in respect of virtue? Virtue is everything to the best constitution, and as it cannot expel such a being[2] or exercise rule over him, the only possible course, and also the natural course, is to make him a life-long king. This is extended (3. 17. 1288 a 15) to the case of a whole family (*γένος*) of such persons appearing in a State. The whole family will then become royal.

It will be noticed that the alternatives considered in this chapter do not exhaust the list of possible alternatives. The cases considered are only those in which a Few Good and the Many, or one pre-eminently good man and the Many, coexist in the same community, and the purpose of the inquiry is to show how in such cases power must be allotted. The One and the Few have an exclusive right to supremacy only when their excess of virtue is very great; in all other cases power must be shared. The case in which the good are sufficient in number to form a full complement of citizens is not considered; and this is the case which is assumed to exist in that form of the best State which is described in the Fourth Book. In this the good, the well-to-do, and the free-born are the same persons—in other words, the citizen-body is composed of men

The case, we observe, in which the good are sufficient in number to constitute a city is not here considered: this is the case assumed to exist in the Fourth Book, where all citizens are men of virtue.

[1] Cp. Plato Polit. 293 D, *καὶ ἐάν τέ γε ἀποκτιννύντες τινὰς ἢ καὶ ἐκβάλλοντες καθαίρωσιν ἐκ' ἀγαθῷ τὴν πόλιν, εἴτε καὶ ἀποικίας οἷον σμήνη μελιττῶν ἐκπέμποντές που σμικροτέραν ποιῶσιν, ἢ τινας ἐπεισαγόμενοί ποθεν ἄλλους ἔξωθεν, πολίτας ποιοῦντες, αὐτὴν αὔξουσιν, ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ προσχρώμενοι, σώζοντες, ἐκ χείρονος βελτίω ποιῶσι κατὰ δύναμιν, τοῦτον τότε καὶ κατὰ τοὺς τοιούτους ὅρους ἡμῖν μόνην ὀρθὴν πολιτείαν εἶναι ῥητέον.*

[2] Aristotle evidently remembers Heraclitus' indignant censure of the Ephesians for their expulsion of Hermodorus: cp. Diog. Laert. 9. 2, *καθάπτεται δὲ καὶ τῶν Ἐφεσίων ἐπὶ τῷ τὸν ἑταῖρον ἐκβαλεῖν Ἑρμόδωρον, ἐν οἷς φησιν· Ἄξιον Ἐφεσίους ἡβηδὸν ἀπολέσαι πᾶσι καὶ τοῖς ἀνήβοις τὴν πόλιν καταλιπεῖν, οἵτινες Ἑρμόδωρον ἑωυτῶν ἀνήιστον ἐξέβαλον λέγοντες· ἡμέων μηδὲ εἷς ἀνήιστος ἔστω· εἰ δέ τις τοιοῦτος, ἄλλῃ τε καὶ μετ' ἄλλων*, and Cicero's translation of the passage, Tusc. Disp. 5. 36. 105. See Bywater, Heraclitii Ephesii Reliquiae, fragm. cxiv.

possessing virtue fully furnished with external means (ἀρετῇ κεχορηγημένῃ).

General conclusion—the normal constitution is not one and the same everywhere: it varies with the circumstances of the given case.

The conclusion, however, to which the whole discussion leads us is, that the decision what is the just or normal constitution in any given case must depend on the circumstances of that case—on the distribution of attributes conducive to the life of the State, and especially on the distribution of virtue—but that whatever allotment of power it makes will be for the common good, and that it will not give exclusive supremacy to One individual or a Few, except in the very rare case of their possessing an overwhelming superiority in virtue.

Far more often we shall find a small body of the better sort (βελτίους) confronted by a large body of the free-born, the former individually, the latter collectively superior, and in this case the normal constitution will be one which recognizes and rallies round it all elements conducive to the life of the State—wealth, free birth, virtue—and finds a place for each. All of them have claims: the State has need of all.

Already then we find a firm logical basis laid for that mixed constitution whose organization and nature will be more fully depicted in the Sixth Book. The mention of wealth, free birth, and virtue as the elements to be combined points perhaps rather to an aristocracy of the kind described in 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 14 than to a polity, for in a polity only wealth and free birth find recognition (6 (4). 8. 1294 a 19 sqq.). The mixed constitution of Aristotle, it is interesting to notice, is not necessarily a combination of all constitutions, like that mentioned in 2. 6. 1265 b 33 sqq., or that which his disciple Dicaearchus[1] and the Stoics of the third century before Christ[2], followed by Cicero and a host of others down to our own day, have agreed in extolling. It is not an union of Kingship, Aristocracy, and Democracy, for a King has no necessary place in it; it is rather a combination

[1] See Dicaearch. fragm. 23 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Graec. 2. 242): Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 892.
[2] Diog. Laert. 7. 131.

of social elements—virtue, wealth, free birth—than a combination of constitutions; it is a constitution which finds a place in the State for the good, the wealthy, and the many, and which rallies them all round it. It does justice to everything that contributes to the life of the State. Under its shadow the good, the wealthy, and the free-born work happily together, ruling and being ruled for the common good[1].

This is Aristotle's conception of the normal (not the best) State in the form which it most commonly assumes, and the pattern was one which Greece in his day especially needed to have held up for imitation. It has its value, however, even in our own times.

Plato had said in the Politicus (297 B), that 'no large body of persons, whoever they may be, can acquire the political science and govern a State with reason (μετὰ νοῦ), and that it is in connexion with a small and scanty body, or even a single individual, that we must look for the one normal constitution.' Even in the Laws, where he concedes a certain share of power to the people, he constantly surrounds his concession with safeguards which greatly reduce its value. The classes in which he places most faith are evidently those comprised in the first and second property-classes. Aristotle has somewhat more confidence in the judgment, on some political subjects at all events, of some, though not all, kinds of demos[2].

[1] We notice that Aristotle does not rest the claims of mixed government on the ground that a system of 'checks and balances' is necessary, but on grounds of justice.: all elements contributing to the being and well-being of the State should receive due recognition in the award of supreme authority. Considerations of expediency, however, reinforce those of justice. A constitution of this kind is the safest, inasmuch as all elements of the State gladly combine to give it support. We see also that if Aristotle does not believe in the divine right of the One or the Few, neither would he accept the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people, even in the limited sense of the sovereignty of the ἐλεύθεροι. Sovereignty rightfully rests with those who, contributing elements of importance to the life of the State, can and will rule for the general good.

[2] He strongly deprecates a pauper demos (8 (6). 5. 1320 a 32), and he much prefers an agricultural or pastoral demos to a demos of artisans or day-labourers or ἀγοραῖοι (8 (6). 4).

We see how great a part justice, and its equivalent th common good, play in determining the structure of th Aristotelian State. If the slave is a slave, it is becaus it is just and well for him and every one else, that he shoul be so. The same principle governs the assignment c citizen-rights and of supreme authority in the State. A State in which the best should rule by force would no satisfy Aristotle, even if they ruled for the best ends there must be a willing co-operation of all, whether rule or ruled, and this can only be secured through an univers conviction that an adequate place is found for everybod and that no one's just claims are overlooked. Aristotle principle is a salutary one, whatever we may think of h application of it. It is—let every element that contribut to the being and well-being of the State receive due reco nition in its award of rights. The permanent value this principle will best be seen if we study some instan of its infraction—for example, the *ancien régime* in Franc

Justice and the common good the two-fold clue to the normal constitution.

We note also that the just being, in Aristotle's vie identical with that which is for the common good, he h both these clues to guide him in the construction of t State. Τὸ ὀρθὸν λῃπτέον ἴσως· τὸ δ' ἴσως ὀρθὸν πρὸς τὸ πόλεως ὅλης συμφέρον καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τὸ τῶν πολιτ (1283 b 40). Rights, it would seem, are to be measur by the common good.

It is, however, mainly by considerations of justice th Aristotle is guided in his construction of the Stat Justice was to him the key to all constitutional problems varying views of justice lay at the root of constitution diversity and constitutional change. He saw that all th competing claimants for political power—democrats n less than oligarchs—appealed to justice in support of the claims. The champions of oligarchy seem occasionally have used the argument that those who contribute ninet nine hundredths of a common fund should not be place on the same footing as those who contribute the remainin hundredth (3. 9. 1280 b 27 sqq.), and it was apparent from them that Aristotle learnt the view that politic

power should be distributed among the members of a State in proportion to contribution. He holds, indeed, that account should be taken in the distribution of power, not of property only, but of everything that contributes to the being and well-being of a State. The free-born and the virtuous have as good a claim to a share of power as the wealthy. Still, though he amends the contention of the champions of oligarchy, he adopts it in the amended form.

Is Aristotle's account of the principle on which political power should be distributed correct?

It is an interesting question, whether his account of the principle on which political power should be distributed is correct. It places the matter at any rate in a distinct light, whereas, when similar questions arise among ourselves, and an appeal is made to considerations of justice, there is often a good deal of vagueness about the arguments used. Aristotle's view is that those who contribute to the common stock the attributes, material moral and intellectual, which are essential to the being and well-being of the State—whether (like the citizens of the best State) they individually possess the whole of them, or whether some possess one of them and others another, the rich, the free-born, and the virtuous forming distinct classes—ought in fairness, as a requital for their contribution, to be the citizens and rulers of the State. It is evident, however, that the award of supreme power to men thus endowed may be rested on another ground. The State may give it to them, not in requital for their contribution, but because it is for the common good that 'the tools' should be in the hands of 'those who can use them.' It may well be that the Common Good is a safer standard in questions of this kind than the Distributive Justice of Aristotle, and that the State is more likely to be successful in attaining the ends for which it exists, if it abstains from attempting to balance contribution and recompense, and is guided in its distribution of power simply by considerations of the Common Good. We may test the soundness of Aristotle's theory in some degree by the view which it leads him to take of Kingship. He finds himself, as we shall shortly

see, obliged to deny the legitimacy of Absolute Kingship in all cases but one—the case in which the Absolute King is an overwhelmingly important contributor to the State. Would it not have been better to say that the Absolute Kingship is only in place where it is essential to the well-being of the community?

We may, indeed, go further and ask whether the recognition of contribution, or even of capacity, is really justice—whether justice is not rather the recognition of desert. On this point some remarks of Mr. J. S. Mill (Political Economy, Book ii. c. 1. § 4) deserve to be quoted. 'The proportioning of remuneration to work done,' he says, 'is really just, only in so far as the more or less of the work is a matter of choice: when it depends on natural difference of strength or capacity, this principle of remuneration is in itself an injustice: it is giving to those who have—assigning most to those who are already most favoured by nature.' But is it possible for the State to sound the depths of human desert? And if it were possible, would it be well that the State should award the advantages at its disposal in accordance with desert? A man's extraction, his training, or other circumstances beyond his control may be so bad that he deserves more credit for being only a thief and not a murderer, than another man deserves for being an useful member of society. Yet would not the State be acting a suicidal part, if it gave power to a man of this kind? It would seem that the only sort of justice which is capable of affording a basis to society is that which is recognized by Aristotle; yet is this really justice?

Transition to Kingship, which is examined first as being one of the normal constitutions. Its true form,

Aristotle has now answered the question raised at the commencement of c. 10—what ought to be the supreme authority of the State—and he passes on in c. 14 to examine the subject of Kingship, 'for we say that this is one of the normal constitutions.' His plan seems to be to study the normal constitutions first, perhaps on the principle mentioned in c. 7. 1279 a 23, where he says that 'when

these have been described, the deviation-forms will be evident.' He reserves an examination of the polity, however, till he has analysed democracy and oligarchy, 'for its nature will be more evident, after these constitutions have been described' (6 (4). 8. 1293 b 22–33). There is no such reason for postponing the study of Kingship and the true Aristocracy.

the Absolute Kingship, distinguished from the rest.

The question is asked whether a State and country (καὶ πόλει καὶ χώρᾳ, c. 14. 1284 b 38) which is to be well constituted may be placed with advantage under a Kingship, or whether some other constitution will be better for it, or whether again in some cases a Kingship will be in place and in others not. It is evident from 3. 16. 1287 a 10 sq. (cp. 3. 17. 1287 b 37 sqq.), that the question of the naturalness of Kingship had given rise to discussion. Isocrates, for instance, had spoken of it in one passage (Philip. § 107) as an institution uncongenial to Greeks, but indispensable to barbarians.

Aristotle evidently feels that this question cannot be discussed till the various forms of Kingship have been distinguished, and those which do not really come into consideration eliminated. He accordingly distinguishes five forms of Kingship, the extreme form at one end of the scale being the Laconian (ἡ Λακωνική)—a mere Generalship for life—and that at the other being the form in which one man is 'supreme over everything, just as a nation (ἔθνος) or City-State is supreme over all public affairs—a form which agrees in type with household rule[1], for as household rule is a sort of Kingship over a household, so this type of Kingship is household rule over a City-State or over one or more nations.' We observe that the Absolute Kingship (παμβασιλεία) is evidently conceived by Aristotle as applicable not only to a City-State but also to an ἔθνος or a collection of ἔθνη. Of these two forms he dismisses the first-named as being rather an institution which may exist in

[1] 3. 14. 1285 b 31, τεταγμένη κατὰ τὴν οἰκονομικήν: cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 5. 1130 b 18, ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετὴν τεταγμένη δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀδικία: Pol. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 32, ἡ βασιλεία τέτακται κατὰ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν: and other references given in Bon. Ind. 748 b 18 sqq.

connexion with a variety of constitutions, than a distinct form of constitution. The other form, accordingly, remains for consideration.

Question of the expediency of Kingship discussed—is the rule of the best man or the rule of the best laws the more expedient?

As to this, the first question to be considered is, he says, whether it is more advantageous to be ruled by the best man or the best laws. This question had been already discussed by Plato in the Politicus (294 A–296 A) and in the Laws (874 E–875 D)[1]. In the former passage Plato thus states his doctrine:—'the legislative art is certainly in some sense an element in the art of kingly rule [and legislation is therefore a function of the king], but the best thing is that supreme authority should rest, not with the laws, but with the man who having wisdom is capable of kingly rule' (294 A). No art (he urges) can lay down anything 'simple and universal' (ἁπλοῦν) as to things as shifting as men and their doings, at all events if it is to ordain what is best; yet this is what law tries to do, 'like a stupid and wilful man, resolved not to allow anything to be done contrary to his appointment or any question to be asked, even if some fresh thing different from what he commanded should happen to be better for some individual[2].' Then why (Plato asks) make laws at all? For just the same reason for which gymnastic trainers draw up a general rule for the exercises of those whom they are training. They do this, because they cannot possibly be at everybody's elbow at every moment, ready to indicate the best thing to do. Imagine, for instance, a trainer going abroad and expecting to be a long time away—he will leave behind him written instructions for his pupils; but if he should happen to come back sooner than he

[1] This is pointed out by Mr. Jackson in his note on Eth. Nic. 5. 6. § 5. The comparative merits of the rule of law and the rule of an autocrat are discussed in a well-known passage of the Supplices of Euripides (389 sqq.) with an obvious intention to give the victory to Theseus, the representative of the former. Compare also Eurip. fr. 600 (Nauck),

τρόπος ἐστὶ χρηστὸς ἀσφαλέστερος νόμου

with 3. 16. 1287 b 6, ὥστε τῶν κατὰ γράμματα [νόμων] ἄνθρωπος ἄρχων ἀσφαλέστερος, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἔθος.

[2] See Prof. Campbell, Sophiste and Politicus of Plato, p. 137–4 whose renderings I have mainly followed here.

intended, would he feel bound to follow those written instructions in his management of them, supposing some change were desirable? Undoubtedly not. The moral is that law is only a make-shift, that the best thing is the unceasing guidance and supervision of a true King, and that if law exists, it is essential that the King should be free to depart from it, wherever he can do so with advantage.

In the Laws (874 E sqq.) the same view is implied, but Plato is here more conscious how impossible it is for any mortal man to see that it is to his own interest, no less than to that of others, to study the common advantage rather than his own private advantage, or if he did so, to abide by this principle and to act on it throughout his life. Of genuine Reason, designed by nature to be free, there is not a particle anywhere, or, at least, not much (875 D); hence it is that we have to call on law to rule, though it looks only to that which is for the most part and cannot discern that which holds universally. Mankind must have laws and live in accordance with them—otherwise they will be no better than the most savage beasts (874 E)—but Law is only the second-best thing.

Aristotle evidently has the teaching of the Politicus in view in the aporetic analysis which he brings to bear on the question (1286 a 9 sqq.). Those who are for Kingship, he says, will object to law that it gives merely a general rule, and does not adjust its directions to the circumstances of the particular case. To exercise any art by written rule is foolish: even in Egypt, where the physicians are expected to treat their patients by stereotyped written rules, they are allowed to change the treatment after four days, if desirable. But then, if it is made an objection to law that it embodies a general principle, we must remember that the ruler also must possess the general principle, so that he is open to the same objection; indeed, in him it is exposed to the disturbing influence of emotion and passion, from which no human breast is free; it will consequently be less pure and less potent. It may, however, be rejoined that in

compensation for this the individual ruler will be able to deal better with the particular case than law could do.

Provisional conclusion arrived at in favour of a Law-giver-King, who makes laws, but reserves to himself the power to break them, where they deviate from the right.

These considerations evidently point to the advisability of adopting some arrangement, by which the One Best Man will promulgate laws which will be supreme except where they deviate from what is right[1]. But then comes the question, is it better that these cases with which the law fails to deal aright should be dealt with by a single individual of surpassing excellence, and not by the whole body of citizens or by a less numerous body of men of full virtue (*σπουδαῖοι*)? The subject is discussed with a leaning to a conclusion in favour of these *σπουδαῖοι*. The reason why Kingship prevailed in early times was perhaps merely this, that in those days only a very few possessed virtue; when more came to do so, Aristocracy took its place[2]. Besides, there is a special difficulty connected with the probability of the King, who is assumed to possess supreme power, passing his Kingship on to an unworthy child. There is also the difficulty that the King, being, not a body of men, but a solitary individual, and therefore needing to be supplied with the means of enforcing his will, must of necessity be supplied with a guard. This, however, may be got over.

But the subject which Aristotle intended to investigate was the King, who is supreme over everything and may act as he pleases, not he who is in part checked by

But Aristotle now awakes to the consciousness, or makes believe to do so, that in all this discussion of the rule of a Lawgiver-King he has been treating of a Kingship governed by Law—a *βασιλεία κατὰ νόμον*—for he has been criticising a Kingship in which law is supreme, at all events till it deviates from right (1286 a 23). The subject to be considered, however, is in reality the King who 'is supreme over everything and may act as he pleases' (c. 16. 1287 a 1), not he who is in part checked by law. What is to be said of his claims?

[1] Compare the provisional conclusion as to the relation of law to the ruler thrown out in c. 11. 1282 b 1 sqq.

[2] The theory of the succession of constitutions put forward here occurs in an entirely aporetic passage and does not necessarily represent Aristotle's definitive view on the subject. In 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 16 sqq. the changes in constitutions are connected less with changes in the distribution of virtue than with changes in the art of war.

To this subject Aristotle addresses himself afresh, and the polemic against the rule of the One Best Man begins again with increased intensity, and in such a way as to disturb some arguments in favour of a ruler of this type, which had passed without objection in the previous discussion. Among men who are like each other it is contrary to nature and unjust to make one man supreme over everything; the proper arrangement in such a case is interchange of rule, which involves the existence of law. Then, again, no human being would be able to take cognisance of the details which the law is unable to regulate; hence the objection commonly made to the rule of the law applies also to the rule of the One Best Man: the law, however, does all that can be done to meet this difficulty, for it purposely trains the rulers to deal fairly and justly with these matters[1]. The law has this merit, that it not only regulates but educates—educates men to supply its own inevitable defects[2]. Besides, it permits and makes possible its own amendment. The rule of law is the rule of God and reason[3]: the rule of a man involves a part-rule of the brute which is present in every man, inasmuch as desire and anger are present in him. The parallel of the arts (which had been accepted before) does not hold. The master of an art—a physician, for instance—is seldom drawn by passion or partiality in a direction contrary to that which reason dictates, whereas the ruler has to deal with matters in which he may have a personal interest,

law. Is a King of this type an expedient institution?

[1] In 1287 a 25, ἀλλ' ἐπίτηδες παιδεύσας ὁ νόμος ἐφίστησι τὰ λοιπὰ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ γνώμῃ κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν τοὺς ἄρχοντας, the terms of the Athenian juror's oath (περὶ μὲν ὧν νόμοι εἰσί, ψηφιεῖσθαι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, περὶ δὲ ὧν μὴ εἰσί, γνώμῃ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ, Poll. 8. 122, quoted by C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 1. § 134. 10) are evidently present to Aristotle's recollection.

[2] Ἀλλὰ μήν (1287 a 23: cp. 1287 a 41, b 8) appears to introduce a fresh objection made by the advocate of law to the rule of a human being (ἄνθρωπος), even if he be the best of men (cp. ἄνθρωπον, 30). Some high authorities, however, and Bernays among them, take it as introducing an objection to the rule of law made by the advocate of the rule of an ἄριστος ἀνήρ, to the effect that magistrates are of no use in supplying the deficiencies of law. The point is doubtful.

[3] Aristotle probably has in his mind Plato's language, Laws 713 E–714 A.

and about which he is not dispassionate; to him, therefore, the law may be useful as a standard representing the mean, by which he can shape his course. The argument against curing men by written rule and governing by written rule also applies only to one sort of law—written law; unwritten law, which is the more authoritative sort remains untouched by it. Then, again, the One Man cannot supervise everything; he must therefore employ others and if he does so, why should not supreme authority be given to the whole number at once? Besides, 'several heads are better than one,' especially after they have had the training of intellect and character which only law can give. Lastly, a king must govern with the help of friends but friends are like and equal to each other; supreme authority should therefore be given to the whole body.

Throughout this prolonged series of arguments against the rule of the One Best Man, Aristotle has remained quietly in the background. He has perhaps been not unwilling to have the considerations fully stated, which from a popular point of view (for this is naturally the prevailing point of view in an aporetic discussion) make against the absolute rule of the best man, unchecked by law—partly because the arguments of the Politicus needed to be met, though abandoned or apparently abandoned, by Plato in the Laws, partly because he holds, unlike Plato, that one form of the best State is a State governed by law; but now he steps in and closes the discussion by saying that all these arguments against the substitution of the rule of the One Best Man for that of law only hold good in certain cases; they do not hold good where he is a man of transcendent excellence and one whose excellence outweighs that of all the other persons in the State put together. 'It is clear from what has been said,' he remarks (3. 17. 1287 b 41 sqq.), 'that among those at any rate who are alike and equal, it

The Absolute Kingship is in place under given circumstances—i. e. if the King's virtue is so transcendent as to exceed the collective virtue of all the rest.

[1] As to the φίλοι or ἑταῖροι of the Macedonian Kings—an important and recognized body of men—see P. Spitta, De Amicorum qui vocantur in Macedonum regno condicione, who refers among other passages to the following in Diodorus—16. 54. 4: 17. 2. 5: 17. 16. 1: 17. 57. 7: 17. 54. 3: 17. 57. 1: 17. 112.

neither expedient nor just that a single individual should be supreme over all, whether laws do not exist and he himself is supreme, as being a law, or whether they do' (the hypothesis dealt with in 1286 a 21–b 40), 'and whether he is a good man ruling over good men, or a man not good ruling over not good men—aye, and even if he is superior to his subjects in virtue' (cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 1. 37), 'unless indeed he is superior in a certain degree' (i.e. to such an extent, that 'his virtue exceeds the virtue of all the rest put together,' 1288 a 17).

In one case, then (that of the Absolute Kingship) the conclusion arrived at in the earlier part of the book that normally constituted laws are the true supreme authority, does not hold good.

Aristotle's first object in this long inquiry is to show that the normal constitution, though always just and for the common advantage, is not in all cases the same, but varies according to the distribution in the given society of the elements which contribute to the being of the State, and especially of virtue. We learn from it that the principle provisionally laid down in c. 11 (1282 b 1)—that supreme authority in the State should be given to 'laws normally constituted,' or, in other words, to laws adjusted to the normal constitutions—is subject to one important exception; it only holds good when the State consists of men alike and equal or of those who are approximately alike and equal. It does not hold in cases where its observance would work injustice, and would be hostile to the general good, and indeed impossible and ridiculous. If a man of transcendent excellence[1] should appear in a State, one

[1] In 3. 13. 1284 a 6 the transcendent superiority referred to is said to be in virtue and *πολιτικὴ δύναμις* (cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 10–14); but in 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 32 Kingship and the true Aristocracy are said *βούλεσθαι κατ' ἀρετὴν συνεστάναι κεχορηγημένην*, and in Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 3 we find a superiority not only in virtue but 'in all goods' ascribed to the king (*οὐ γάρ ἐστι βασιλεὺς ὁ μὴ αὐτάρκης καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχων*). In Pol. 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 18 a transcendent superiority in bodily endowments is added to the picture—a characteristically Greek thought inherited from Plato (Polit. 301 D–E)—for otherwise men's doubts of the transcendent qualities of the One Man might not be silenced and overpowered (cp. Pol. 1. 5. 1254 b 34 sqq.). It was the custom of the Ethiopian race, which the Greeks loved to imagine as especially noble (Maspero, Hist. ancienne des peuples de l'Orient, p. 535, ed. 2) to make the biggest and strongest man among them king (Hdt. 3. 20,

whose excellence outweighs that of all the rest put together, then the only thing that is right or expedient or possible is that his will should be gladly obeyed and that all other law should disappear. He must be the living law of the State; he must be what a father is in a household or Zeus in the universe. For the moment the State becomes all that the most ardent of hero-worshippers could wish it to be, only that Aristotle requires his Absolute King to possess, not merely transcendent capacity, but transcendent moral excellence. He does not seem to hold, with Plato in the Laws, that no mortal nature is fit to be invested with these immense powers; nor does he concede them to a man possessed of true knowledge and virtue, irrespectively of the extent of his superiority to his fellows: the Absolute King must not only be a man of transcendent virtue, but there must be an immense disparity between his virtue and that of his subjects. Plato had not dwelt with equal emphasis in the Politicus on the extent of this necessary disparity, though he undoubtedly implies that it will be great.

Aristotle's object in making this reservation in favour of the Absolute Kingship is to prevent the claims of Law clashing with those of justice and reason.

It is evident from the Fourth Book[1] that if Aristotle makes an exception to the supremacy of law in favour of the Absolute King, it is rather because his account of the State would otherwise be incomplete and open to objection, than because the appearance on the scene of such a being is at all probable. To have said that the supreme authority in every community must always be 'laws normally constituted' would have exposed him to a fatal rejoinder from the followers of Antisthenes[2]. 'What,' they would have asked, 'do you really mean to claim obedience to law from a Heracles?' A scene or two from the Bacchae of Euripides would have been at once quoted, in

τὸν ἐν τῶν ὁσιῶν κρίνωσι μέγιστόν τε εἶναι καὶ κατὰ τὸ μέγαθος ἔχειν τὴν ἰσχύν, τοῦτον ἀξιοῦσι βασιλεύειν).

[1] C. 14. 1332 b 23, ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτ' οὐ ῥᾴδιον λαβεῖν, οὐδ' ἔστιν ὥσπερ ἐν Ἰνδοῖς φησὶ Σκύλαξ εἶναι τοὺς βασιλείας τοσούτου διαφέροντας τῶν ἀρχομένων: cp. 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 3 sqq., where Aristotle in noticing the circumstance that no new kingships arose in his own day accounts for it by remarking that men were rarely then forthcoming who towered above their fellows sufficiently to deserve an 'office' so great and exalted.

[2] Cp. 3. 13. 1284 a 15 sqq.

which the fruitless attempt of the misguided King Pentheus to control and imprison the god Dionysus, and the fate which his folly brought upon him, are described in glorious verse.

His doctrine of the Absolute Kingship, however, also implies that it is not in place in the absence of transcendent virtue.

But the object of Aristotle, or at all events the effect of his teaching on this subject, was not perhaps solely to prevent the infringement of the claims of a hypothetical παμβασιλεύς or Absolute King. The rights of the natural παμβασιλεύς were to be respected, but no one was a natural παμβασιλεύς who did not possess transcendent virtue and an immense superiority to everyone else belonging to the State. Only a man of this type could claim to be above law.

Salutary tendency of this teaching.

The age of Aristotle was one which needed this lesson. Kingship had grown in credit during the fourth century before Christ, in proportion as the defects of the free constitutions of Greece had become more apparent. Both Xenophon and Isocrates had sketched an ideal King as well as an ideal constitution[1]. Xenophon describes with enthusiasm the born King whom men instinctively and willingly follow, as bees follow the queen-bee—who rules to make his subjects as virtuous as possible, and makes them so partly by example, partly by rewarding virtue and stimulating emulation, partly by close personal superintendence, like a 'seeing Law[2]'; and we derive the impression from his writings, that though he had learnt from the Lacedaemonian State how much Law could do, especially in maintaining and enforcing a public system of education, not ending with youth but carried on to maturer years, he is, nevertheless, still more interested in the personal agencies which make for virtue, as indeed a disciple of Socrates might naturally be. Xenophon seems, in fact,

[1] 'Isocrates, like Xenophon, depicted not only a perfect constitution, but also a perfect Prince, and described the qualities of a true ruler and king in his address to Nicocles and in his Evagoras, partly in a hortatory form, partly in the form of an encomium' (Henkel, Studien, p. 155).

[2] See the references in Henkel, Studien, p. 142 sqq., and cp. Cyrop. 8. 1. 22, *αἰσθάνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἐδόκει καὶ διὰ τοὺς γραφομένους νόμους βελτίους γιγνομένους ἀνθρώπους· τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἄρχοντα βλέποντα νόμον ἀνθρώπους ἐνόμισεν, ὅτι καὶ τάττειν ἱκανὸς ἐστι καὶ ὁρᾶν τὸν ἀπειθοῦντα καὶ κολάζειν.*

to be divided between the respect for law which h
herited from Socrates and his enthusiasm for born
of men.

Isocrates, again, though he recognizes the edu
influence of law[1], and allows it to be the source o
greatest benefits to human life[2], yet holds that the
other things better—Rhetoric, for example, which do
like law, concern itself only with the internal condit
a State, but teaches men how to deal with problems
ing Greece as a whole[3]. In this spirit he tells Ph
Macedon[4], that while other descendants of Heracle
fast bound in the fetters of a constitution and of law
probably refers to the Lacedaemonian kings—will
only the city to which they belong, Philip should
the whole of Hellas as his country, and work
advantage no less than for that of Macedon.

The Macedonian kingship under Philip, and still
under Alexander, was tending to outgrow its old
stitutional limits[5], and to pass into a form in whic
king possessed almost divine prerogatives. A say
ascribed to Philip by Stobaeus[6], which shows how
a view he took of the rights of the throne. 'The
he said, 'ought to remember that he is at once
and the depositary of power godlike in extent, in
that he may aim at all things noble and divine
yet speak with the voice of a human being.' So
Anaxarchus, the follower of Democritus, in the
words which he addressed to Alexander after the
of Cleitus, told him that the Great King could no m
wrong than Zeus himself[7]—we know not whether
or after the composition of the Politics. Aristotle fel
differently. He had perhaps already, in his di
entitled Ἀλέξανδρος ἢ ὑπὲρ ἀποίκων (or ἀποικιῶν), a
Alexander to exercise despotic sway only over the

[1] Ad Nicocl. §§ 2–3.
[2] De Antid. § 79.
[3] De Antid. § 79: cp. §§ 271–280.
[4] Philip. § 127.
[5] See O. Abel, Makedo
König Philipp, p. 123 sqq.
[6] Floril. 48. 21.
[7] Arrian, Exped. Alex.

barians,' and to deal with the Greeks as freemen deserving to be led (*ἡγεμονικῶς*)[1], and his advice was echoed in Alexander's presence by his imprudent relative and disciple Callisthenes[2]. His effort to inculcate moderation of rule in relation to Greeks on the omnipotent Macedonian Monarchy is quite in harmony with the general tendency of his political teaching[3], and was a real service to mankind. It was a time when the intoxication of empire and power, which seems to have mastered men's minds in antiquity more often than in modern days, and always with fatal results, was especially strong, and needed to be firmly checked[4].

Naturalness of the idea that men should be ruled by beings higher than themselves.

The thought which underlay both the conception of the Single Ruler in the Politicus and Aristotle's conception of the *παμβασιλεύς* was a natural one. It was this—was not the true type of human society that in which men surrender themselves to the guidance of some being or beings of superior race? 'We do not,' says Plato (Laws, 713 D), 'set oxen to rule over oxen, or goats over goats; a superior race rules them, that of men'; and so in the golden age of the reign of Cronus, demigods (*δαίμονες*) were set by him to rule over man, 'and they with great ease and pleasure to themselves, and no less to us, taking care of us

[1] Fragm. Aristot. 81. 1489 b 27 sqq.

[2] Arrian, Exped. Alex. 4. 11. 8. The whole of this eleventh chapter shows how little Callisthenes (and Aristotle also in all probability) was prepared to concede divine honours to Alexander; and in Aristotle's conception the *παμβασιλεύς* is little less than a god (3. 13. 1284 a 10). Theophrastus spoke of Callisthenes as having 'fallen in the way of a man of colossal power and good fortune, but one who knew not how to use prosperity aright' (Cic. Tusc. Disp. 3. 10. 21). There is no sign that Aristotle was at all more prepared than Theophrastus to find a *παμβασιλεύς* in Alexander.

[3] Cp. Pol. 4 (7). 2. 1325 a 11, *καὶ τοῦτο τῆς νομοθετικῆς ἐστὶν ἴδιον, δέον τινες ὑπάρχωσι γενναῖοντες, ποῖα πρὸς ποίους δουτέον ἢ πῶς τοῖς καθήκουσι πρὸς ἑκάστους χρηστέον.*

[4] Demetrius of Phalerum is said, not on very good authority however, to have advised Ptolemy King of Egypt to purchase and read the books written 'on the subject of Kingship and Government' (*περὶ βασιλείας καὶ ἡγεμονίας*): *ἃ γὰρ οἱ φίλοι τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν οὐ θαρροῦσι παραινεῖν, ταῦτα ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις γέγραπται* (Plutarch (?), Reg. et Imperat. Apophthegmata —Demetr. Phaler., p. 189 D).

and giving us peace and reverence and order and justic never failing[1],' secured a life of concord and happiness t the tribes of men. 'This tradition,' he continues, 'tell us, and tells us truly, that for cities of which some mort and not God is the ruler, there is no escape from evils an toils' (Laws, 713 E).

How natural this thought is, appears from its perhap unconscious repetition in modern literature. 'Here,' says reviewer, speaking of a work by Sir H. Holland[2], 'we fin the remark that whereas some of the lower animals a tamed and educated by man, man himself has no high animal to educate him. "He alone is submitted to n superior being on the earth capable of thus controlling perfecting his natural instincts, of cultivating his reason, of creating new capacities or modes of action." This strictly true; yet in all organized communities the indiv dual man is submitted to a superior control—namely, th of society and of social, as distinct from individual, ends action; and the education of man in his individual charact by man in his corporate or political character is really far greater and more wonderful thing than the developme of the half-human intelligence, wonderful as that is, of well-bred and well-trained dog[3].' It is to this educatic by society that Plato points, when he goes on, in the san passage, to say that man must imitate the life which is sa to have existed in the days of Cronus, and hearken to wh we have of immortality within us, to the voice of Reas expressed in law (Laws, 714 A), seeing that the demig rulers of Cronus are no longer forthcoming.

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Some non-hereditary forms of Kingship according to law noticed by him—among them, that of the aesymnete[3]—may have in some degree resembled great offices like that to which Aristotle refers, when he speaks of a single individual being often made 'supreme over the administration' (*κύριος τῆς διοικήσεως*, 1287 a 6), and may perhaps

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A King, and especially a hereditary King, even if he rul according to law, is a very different being from a magi trate with a wide competence. Our modern terminolog which counts as a Monarchy any government in which King exists, however limited his powers, would seem be more correct. The mere fact that a King finds a pla in a constitution is sufficient to give it a special colour a to make it quite different from what it would otherwi have been. In the Lacedaemonian constitution, indee the powers of the King were so limited that it was perha rightly classed, not as a Kingship, but as an Aristocrac and the so-called Kings at Carthage were hardly Kings any real sense. But Kingship in accordance with law, many of the forms in which it existed in Aristotle's da fully deserved to be accounted a distinct form of Kingsh and to find a place among varieties of constitution.

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which the fruitless attempt of the misguided King Pentheus to control and imprison the god Dionysus, and the fate which his folly brought upon him, are described in glorious verse.

His doctrine of the Absolute Kingship, however, also implies that it is not in place in the absence of transcendent virtue.

But the object of Aristotle, or at all events the effect of his teaching on this subject, was not perhaps solely to prevent the infringement of the claims of a hypothetical παμβασιλεύς or Absolute King. The rights of the natural παμβασιλεύς were to be respected, but no one was a natural παμβασιλεύς who did not possess transcendent virtue and an immense superiority to everyone else belonging to the State. Only a man of this type could claim to be above law.

Salutary tendency of this teaching.

The age of Aristotle was one which needed this lesson. Kingship had grown in credit during the fourth century before Christ, in proportion as the defects of the free constitutions of Greece had become more apparent. Both Xenophon and Isocrates had sketched an ideal King as well as an ideal constitution[1]. Xenophon describes with enthusiasm the born King whom men instinctively and willingly follow, as bees follow the queen-bee—who rules to make his subjects as virtuous as possible, and makes them so partly by example, partly by rewarding virtue and stimulating emulation, partly by close personal superintendence, like a 'seeing Law[2]'; and we derive the impression from his writings, that though he had learnt from the Lacedaemonian State how much Law could do, especially in maintaining and enforcing a public system of education, not ending with youth but carried on to maturer years, he is, nevertheless, still more interested in the personal agencies which make for virtue, as indeed a disciple of Socrates might naturally be. Xenophon seems, in fact,

[1] 'Isocrates, like Xenophon, depicted not only a perfect constitution, but also a perfect Prince, and described the qualities of a true ruler and king in his address to Nicocles and in his Evagoras, partly in a hortatory form, partly in the form of an encomium' (Henkel, Studien, p. 155).

[2] See the references in Henkel, Studien, p. 142 sqq., and cp. Cyrop. 8. 1. 22, *αἰσθάνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἐδόκει καὶ διὰ τοὺς γραφομένους νόμους βελτίους γεγονόμενους ἀνθρώπους· τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἄρχοντα βλέποντα νόμον ἀνθρώποις ἐνόμισεν, ὅτι καὶ τάττειν ἱκανὸς ἐστι καὶ ὁρᾶν τὸν ἀτακτοῦντα καὶ κολάζειν.*

to be divided between the respect for law which he in
herited from Socrates and his enthusiasm for born rule
of men.

Isocrates, again, though he recognizes the educati
influence of law[1], and allows it to be the source of t
greatest benefits to human life[2], yet holds that there a
other things better—Rhetoric, for example, which does n
like law, concern itself only with the internal condition
a State, but teaches men how to deal with problems affe
ing Greece as a whole[3]. In this spirit he tells Philip
Macedon[4], that while other descendants of Heracles, m
fast bound in the fetters of a constitution and of laws—h
probably refers to the Lacedaemonian kings—will lo
only the city to which they belong, Philip should cou
the whole of Hellas as his country, and work for
advantage no less than for that of Macedon.

The Macedonian kingship under Philip, and still mo
under Alexander, was tending to outgrow its old co
stitutional limits[5], and to pass into a form in which t
king possessed almost divine prerogatives. A saying
ascribed to Philip by Stobaeus[6], which shows how hi
a view he took of the rights of the throne. 'The kin
he said, 'ought to remember that he is at once a m
and the depositary of power godlike in extent, in ord
that he may aim at all things noble and divine, a
yet speak with the voice of a human being.' So aga
Anaxarchus, the follower of Democritus, in the famo
words which he addressed to Alexander after the murd
of Cleitus, told him that the Great King could no more
wrong than Zeus himself[7]—we know not whether bef
or after the composition of the Politics. Aristotle felt qu
differently. He had perhaps already, in his dialog
entitled Ἀλέξανδρος ἢ ὑπὲρ ἀποίκων (or ἀποικιῶν), advis
Alexander to exercise despotic sway only over the 'b

[1] Ad Nicocl. §§ 2-3.
[2] De Antid. § 79.
[3] De Antid. § 79: cp. §§ 271-280.
[4] Philip. § 127.
[5] See O. Abel, Makedonien v
König Philipp, p. 123 sqq.
[6] Floril. 48. 21.
[7] Arrian, Exped. Alex. 4. 9.

barians,' and to deal with the Greeks as freemen deserving to be led (ἡγεμονικῶς)[1], and his advice was echoed in Alexander's presence by his imprudent relative and disciple Callisthenes[2]. His effort to inculcate moderation of rule in relation to Greeks on the omnipotent Macedonian Monarchy is quite in harmony with the general tendency of his political teaching[3], and was a real service to mankind. It was a time when the intoxication of empire and power, which seems to have mastered men's minds in antiquity more often than in modern days, and always with fatal results, was especially strong, and needed to be firmly checked[4].

Naturalness of the idea that men should be ruled by beings higher than themselves.

The thought which underlay both the conception of the Single Ruler in the Politicus and Aristotle's conception of the παμβασιλεύς was a natural one. It was this—was not the true type of human society that in which men surrender themselves to the guidance of some being or beings of superior race? 'We do not,' says Plato (Laws, 713 D), 'set oxen to rule over oxen, or goats over goats; a superior race rules them, that of men'; and so in the golden age of the reign of Cronus, demigods (δαίμονες) were set by him to rule over man, 'and they with great ease and pleasure to themselves, and no less to us, taking care of us

[1] Fragm. Aristot. 81. 1489 b 27 sqq.

[2] Arrian, Exped. Alex. 4. 11. 8. The whole of this eleventh chapter shows how little Callisthenes (and Aristotle also in all probability) was prepared to concede divine honours to Alexander; and in Aristotle's conception the παμβασιλεύς is little less than a god (3. 13. 1284 a 10). Theophrastus spoke of Callisthenes as having 'fallen in the way of a man of colossal power and good fortune, but one who knew not how to use prosperity aright' (Cic. Tusc. Disp. 3. 10. 21). There is no sign that Aristotle was at all more prepared than Theophrastus to find a παμβασιλεύς in Alexander.

[3] Cp. Pol. 4 (7). 2. 1325 a 11, καὶ τοῦτο τῆς νομοθετικῆς ἐστὶν ἰδεῖν, ἐάν τινες ὑπάρχωσι γειτνιῶντες, ποῖα πρὸς ποίους ἀσκητέον ἢ πῶς τοῖς καθήκουσι πρὸς ἑκάστους χρηστέον.

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then law cannot exist. Aristotle, in fact, approaches the question of the structure of the State from the point of view of justice. Power must be proportioned to contribution.

'Kingship,' says Henkel[1], 'was in the whole Political Theory of antiquity only a form of Aristocracy, resting on no separate and independent basis of its own.' Erdmann expresses the modern view of the subject, when he says[2]: 'When men expect talent in a King, they forget that a King is not a high official: a high official, no doubt, cannot discharge his functions without the particular kind of talent required for their discharge. The things which a King chiefly needs to possess are love for his people, and the conscientiousness which will beget in him doubts of his own omniscience, and lead him to choose virtuous and capable ministers. When, as in the instance of Frederick the Second, these two characteristics are combined with a great mental superiority—a thing which occurs only once in a century—the highest standard is unquestionably attained.' Expediency, interpreted by experience, is a better guide in questions of constitutional organization than justice, as Aristotle understands it. Not a few Kings have received enthusiastic support from their subjects, and have made their rule a blessing to mankind, though they could claim no such transcendent superiority to those over whom they ruled as that which Aristotle requires in a King.

Retrospective summary of the conclusions of the Third Book as to the nature of the State.

When we put together the various data as to the nature of the State with which the Third Book furnishes us, we shall find them somewhat contradictory. The State is 'a community of citizens sharing in a common constitution' (*κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτείας*, 3. 3. 1276 b 1): it is also 'a certain number of citizens' (*πολιτῶν τι πλῆθος*, 3. 1. 1274 b 41): is then the *κοινωνία* identical with the *κοινωνοί*? Then again, its identity is especially to be sought in the constitution (3. 3. 1276 b 10): this seems to imply that the State

[1] Studien, p. 57. [2] Vorlesungen über den Staat, p. 167.

is rather to be sought in the *σύνθεσις* than in the citize
the *σύνθετα*; so that if the constitution lasts for centur
the life of the State will far outlast that of the body
citizens (*πλῆθος πολιτῶν*) with which it is occasiona
identified[1], and if it lasts only a few months, the reve
will be the case. Elsewhere again (4 (7). 1. 1323 b 29
1324 a 13), the State is described as a moral agent capa
of virtue and happiness. Must it not, then, be a Person,
well as an aggregate or a *σύνθεσις* of persons[2]?

Still further, as we have already seen, the State is oc
sionally described as including not only citizens, but a
women, children, and slaves (e.g. 1. 13. 1260 b 13 sqq.: 2
1269 b 14 sqq.: cp. 3. 4. 1277 a 5 sqq.); but here the te
is used in a broader and more inclusive sense than el
where. Thus in the Fourth Book (c. 8. 1328 a 21 sc
only those are allowed to be 'parts of the State' w
can live its full life and be *κοινωνοί*, and these are
citizens; so that we come back to the view that the St
is to be identified with its citizens, or rather with
κοινωνία which they form, and does not include those v
are not citizens, or (to use the words of the Fourth Bo
that it is a *κοινωνία* of men like each other, existing for
sake of the best life to which they can attain (4 (7).
1328 a 35).

The State at its best is thus, in Aristotle's view, un
ordinary conditions, a company or brotherhood of ec
comrades, enjoying that 'leisure from the quest of ne
saries' (*σχολὴ τῶν ἀναγκαίων*) without which full vi
cannot exist, 'able and purposed to rule and be ru
with a view to the life in accordance with virtu
not necessarily equal absolutely, but proportion
equal — sufficiently equal to be commensurable, to

[1] Unless indeed the word *πλῆθος* contains the notion of perpetual renewal.

[2] As to these unreconciled contradictions, a plentiful crop of which usually comes to light whenever we make a careful study of Aristotle's teaching on any subject, see Heyder's rem (Vergleichung der Aristotelis und Hegel'schen Dialektik, p. 1 quoted by Eucken, Methode Aristotelischen Forschung, p. They arise in part from Aristo desire to do justice to all point view.

for the same end, and to accept the control of a common body of law. At first sight the State, as Aristotle conceives it, presents the aspect of a body of friends, exceptionally numerous indeed, but tending as friends do, to be like and equal, and engaged in one and the same scheme of life—'one equal temper of heroic hearts.' Virtue, which is the secret of unity in friendship, is also the secret of unity in the State (Eth. Nic. 9. 6. 1167 b 2 sqq.). A body of friends, however, is not an unity in the same degree as a State; it need not, like the State, be composed of diverse elements; its members are not, like those of the State, divided into rulers and ruled, nor are their relations regulated by law; the essential characteristic of State-life is exchange of service, that of friendship common life and accordant feeling; the aim of friendship is especially 'living together' (*τὸ συζῆν*), an aim which, though presupposed in the State, is less its aim than 'advantage' (*τὸ συμφέρον*)[1]; above all, in the case of the State, a Whole is formed which reacts upon its members and imparts completeness to them, and which is itself a moral agent, a Person, dealing with those outside it as well as with those within. The State, we see, is something more than a body of friends. It is also to be distinguished from a school, if only because in a school there is no interchange of service. It is not a Church, again, for its aims are more varied than those of a Church; it does not exist for the worship of God alone, or for the promotion of spiritual, as distinguished from intellectual, growth; its objects range from the provision of commodities to the full development of the whole man; it has a military force at its disposal; its ultimate aim is not, as Socrates, Xenophon, and Plato had said, the production of virtue, but rather the efflux of virtue in virtuous action, unimpeded and happy. So far from the State ceasing to be necessary, as the view of these inquirers might be construed to imply, when full virtue is already possessed by the citizens, it is not

[1] Eth. Nic. 9. 6. 1167 b 2: and compare Eth. Nic. 9. 12. with Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 35–40. Cp. also Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 8–30.

at its best except when all of them are men of full virtu
If it is itself the source of their virtue, partly through tl
material conditions with which it surrounds them, part
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a Whole in which they can merge themselves as part
rising thus to a nobler level and type of action than th
could singly realize; it must be to them a sort of God
less remote, more helpful, more akin to them than the Gc
of Aristotle—a Being in whom they lose themselves only
find themselves again.

Aristotle has not learnt that the State does not exi
exclusively for the advantage of its members, but in pa
for that of the world outside it. To him it is a natur
Whole, which in all normal cases grows up, as it were, rour
the individual, raising him to the full level of humanity ar
satisfying all his wants from the lowest to the highest;
exists for the sake of those within it, not for the sake
those outside. Its task is especially to satisfy man
highest needs, and we expect him to say that supren
power in it must be allotted to those who can so rule
to secure this result. He is led, however, by considerations
of justice to award supreme power to those who contribu
to its life in proportion to their contributions, and esp
cially to those who possess 'virtue fully furnished wit
external means.'

It is because the State is so high a thing, that there a
many who, in their own interest no less than in that of tl
whole, had better have nothing to do with its manag
ment. They cannot live its full life, and are rather in
than of it.

If Aristotle had said that the State exists not only f

[1] Aristotle, it is true, nowhere says this: still there is much in the Politics to suggest the idea to which Hobbes gave definite expression, when he spoke of the State as 'that "mortal god to whom we owe under t "immortal God" our peace a defence' (Leviathan, part 2, 17).

the realization of the highest quality of life, but also for the development in all within it of the best type of life of which they are capable, he would have made the elevation of the mass of men one of its ends. But this he hardly seems to do. It is true that the head of the household is charged with the moral improvement of the slave, but then we are elsewhere told that the slave is ruled for his own good only accidentally—primarily for that of his master. Still less is the State expected to concern itself with the moral interests of the artisan and day-labourer: this class seems to be wholly uncared for. If Aristotle's view of the office of the State is defective in this respect, it has, however, the merit, that it brings into prominence a truth which in our own day is often forgotten—that one of the aims of the State should be to aid in the realization of the highest type of life, and that this should be fully as much its aim as to help those who cannot attain to the highest type to advance as far towards it as they can. Civilization should grow in height as well as in breadth.

It is evident that to Aristotle the State is far less than it is to us an abstraction apart from, and distinguishable from, the individuals who belong to it[1]; it is not a system of institutions, which, however it may change, retains its identity, while one generation after another finds shelter under it and passes away; it is not the house, but the human beings who live in it[2]. From the modern point of

[1] Compare Lucian, Anacharsis c. 20, πόλιν γὰρ ἡμεῖς οὐ τὰ οἰκοδομήματα ἡγούμεθα εἶναι, οἷον τείχη καὶ ἱερὰ καὶ νεωσοίκους, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὥσπερ σῶμά τι ἕδραῖον καὶ ἀκίνητον ὑπάρχειν ἐς ὑποδοχὴν καὶ ἀσφάλειαν τῶν πολιτευομένων, τὸ δὲ πᾶν κῦρος ἐν τοῖς πολίταις τιθέμεθα· τούτους γὰρ εἶναι τοὺς ἀναπληροῦντας καὶ διατάττοντας καὶ ἐπιτελοῦντας ἕκαστα καὶ φυλάττοντας, οἷόν τι ἐν ἡμῖν ἑκάστῳ ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχή. τοῦτο δὴ τοίνυν κατανοήσαντες ἐπιμελούμεθα μέν, ὡς ὁρᾷς, καὶ τοῦ σώματος τῆς πόλεως κατακοσμοῦντες αὐτό, ὡς κάλλιστον ἡμῖν εἴη . . . μάλιστα δὲ καὶ ἐξ ἅπαντος τούτου προνοοῦμεν, ὅπως οἱ πολῖται ἀγαθοὶ μὲν τὰς ψυχάς, ἰσχυροὶ δὲ τὰ σώματα γίγνοιντο κ.τ.λ.

[2] The nineteenth Article of the Church of England defines 'the visible Church of Christ' as 'a congregation of faithful men, in the which the pure Word of God is preached and the Sacraments duly ministered.' With regard to all definitions of a State or a Church as a number of individuals, it may be asked whether the notion of a succession of individuals does not enter into our conception of a State or Church. Would a mere aggregate of individuals, even

view it is rather a 'fabric,' and to a large extent an inherited fabric. Aristotle regards it as a Whole consisting of its citizens as parts, and if in one passage he finds its identity mainly in the constitution, he follows this thought no further. The view of Isocrates that the State is immortal he evidently does not hold. The notion of the historic continuity of the State belongs to a later time, though Aristotle is aware that the past of a State influences its present[1]. The constitution of a State is to him less an outcome of its past than a reflection of contemporary facts —of the moral level and social composition of the community. In reality it is both.

Conflict of the Absolute Kingship with Aristotle's general account of the State.

To one form, indeed, of the best State of Aristotle the foregoing account of the State does not apply. In the Absolute Kingship, the highest but also the least realizable of its forms, many of its usual features seem to disappear. The State in this form seems to fall into two sections, the Absolute King, and those he rules, one of which, the Absolute King, is not a part of the State at all (3. 13. 1284a 8). Is he then outside the State, and is the State constituted by his subjects alone? Or is he rather to be regarded as himself the State? But then the State will apparently cease to be a *κοινωνία*, for there will be only one *κοινωνός*. And on that hypothesis, what becomes of the principle that the State consists of persons differing in kind? or of the principle that it is an aggregate of individuals? If, on the other hand, the State is composed of the Absolute King and his subjects[2], what is his or their

though animated by a common aim, possessed of a common creed, and living the same kind of life, constitute a State or a Church, if some provision were not made for the perpetuation of the society by the admission of fresh members?

[1] Cp. Pol. 2. 12. 1274a 12 sqq., where the existence of an extreme democracy at Athens is traced to the circumstance that the maritime empire of Athens was originally won by the demos.

[2] This would seem to be Aristotle's view, if we examine the reasoning in 2. 2. 1261a 29 sqq., where the State is said to be composed of persons differing in kind —i.e. rulers and ruled—both when the same persons always rule and when, in consequence of the equality of the members of the State, rule is interchanged.

relation to it, if he is not a part of the State? Aristotle's admission of the Absolute Kingship as a possible form of the State seems altogether to conflict with his general account of the State. We do not learn why, if he is 'complete in himself' (Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 3 sq.), the Absolute King should trouble himself to rule or to live in society at all.

Strongly, however, as the Absolute Kingship contrasts with what we may call the typical form of the State, one paramount feature of the latter still survives in it. It is a means of placing the individual in constant contact and connexion with Reason, here indeed represented not by Law but by the Absolute King—a means of realizing the highest and most complete human life. Thus, however altered the structure of the State may be, its end remains the same; and this would seem to be enough for Aristotle. The State may exist without Law[1], if only it secures to its members the highest quality of life. Plato had already allowed the ideal State sketched in his 'Republic' freely to assume the form either of a Kingship or of an Aristocracy[2], but then in neither form were the rulers to be fettered by Law. Aristotle finds room for the Absolute Kingship at some cost of consistency. He makes room for it, as he tells us (3. 13. 1284 b 32: 3. 17. 1288 a 19 sqq.), because he has no choice: not only would no other course be just, but no other course is possible.

Under what circumstances are Kingship, Aristocracy, and Polity respectively in place?

Aristotle had said towards the close of the discussion on Kingship (3. 17. 1287 b 37), that there are those who are marked out by nature and by considerations of justice and advantage to be ruled as a master rules his slaves, and others marked out for subjection to a king, and others for membership of a polity; and even in the midst of his

[1] The view that a constitution implies the rule of Law is perhaps only said to be εὔλογος, and not absolutely adopted, in 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 30 sqq. The words are—εὐλόγως δὲ ἂν δόξειαν ἐπιτιμᾶν ὁ φάσκων τὴν τοιαύτην εἶναι δημοκρατίαν οὐ πολιτείαν· ὅπου γὰρ μὴ νόμοι ἄρχουσιν, οὐκ ἔστι πολιτεία.

[2] Rep. 445 D, ἐπονομασθείη δ' ἂν καὶ διχῇ· ἐγγενομένου μὲν γὰρ ἀνδρὸς ἑνὸς ἐν τοῖς ἄρχουσι διαφέροντος, βασιλεία ἂν κληθείη· πλειόνων δὲ ὀλιγαρχία.

anxiety to establish the necessity and justice of the
lute Kingship under certain circumstances, he pauses
the opportunity of explaining (1288 a 6 sqq.) unde
circumstances each of the normal constitutions is in

A people is a fit subject for Kingship, if it is
stituted as to produce (*πέφυκε φέρειν*[1], 1288 a 8) a
excelling in virtue and in capacity for political lea
This is shortly after amended to the effect that
a single individual of this character makes his appe
he is deserving of Kingship.

A people is a fit subject for Aristocracy, if it is
stituted as to produce a body of individuals cap
being ruled as freemen should be ruled by men c
for political leadership by virtue. It appears fro
1288 a 35, that under this form both rulers and ru
be 'men excelling in virtue,' the former having th
which qualifies for rule tending to the highest qu
life, the latter having the virtue which qualifies fo
ruled to that end.

A people is a fit subject for Polity, in which a
individuals naturally springs up (*πέφυκεν ἐγγίνεσθαι*
sessed of military excellence and capable of ruli
being ruled in accordance with a law distributing
among the well-to-do in accordance with desert[2].

The Third Book has mainly concerned itself with the normal constitutions, but we gain from it

So far—that is to say, down to the end of
chapter but one—the Third Book has concerne
mainly with the varieties of the 'normal const
The normal constitution, we gather from it, is in a
just and for the common advantage, and precisely
it is so, it is not in all cases the same. It varies
social conditions vary; it awards supreme power

[1] For *φέρειν* in this sense, cp. Plutarch, Dion c. 58, *ἀλλ' ἔοικεν ἀληθῶς λέγεσθαι τὸ τὴν πόλιν ἐκείνην* (Athens) *φέρειν ἄνδρας ἀρετῇ τε τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἀρίστους καὶ κακίᾳ τοὺς φαύλους πονηροτάτους*: Plato, Tim. 24 C–D: Damox. Inc. Fab. Fragm. (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 4. 536)—

Κῶος· *θεοὺς γὰρ φαίνει φέρειν.*

[2] For this expression, tot. Fragm. 85. 1491 a 1, *ὅ ἐστι γένος ἐν ᾧ πολλοὶ πεφύκασιν ἐγγίνεσθαι.*

[3] See Appendix D.

ing to the distribution in the given community of the elements which contribute to the life of the State; here it will be a Kingship, there an Aristocracy, there a Polity. occasional glimpses of the best constitution.

But though the normal constitution is the main subject of the book, we catch, as it advances, clearer and clearer glimpses of the best constitution also. It may be well to note these indications and to bring them together.

The best State, we are told (c. 5. 1278 a 8), will not give citizenship to the *βάναυσος*. In the best State, again, a part at all events of the citizens—those of them who are 'statesmen and who are charged, or fit to be charged, with the management of public affairs'—will possess the full virtue of the good man (*σπουδαῖος ἀνήρ*, c. 5. 1278 b 2 sqq.: cp. c. 18. 1288 a 37 sq.); and thus the best State is apparently referred to as a State in the hands of men of full virtue (*διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων ἀνδρῶν*, c. 13. 1283 b 6), and in the same chapter the citizen of the best State is defined as 'he who is able and purposed to rule and be ruled with a view to the life of virtue' (1284 a 1). So far all the indications given us of the nature of the best State point to a State of equal *σπουδαῖοι* ruling and ruled by turns, but later in this chapter (the thirteenth) we learn that under certain circumstances the best State may be forced to assume the form of an Absolute Kingship, and the succeeding chapters even go on to inquire whether the Absolute Kingship is not really the best form of constitution (c. 15. 1286 a 7 sqq.: cp. 1286 b 22, *εἰ δὲ δή τις ἄριστον θείη τὸ βασιλεύεσθαι ταῖς πόλεσιν*). The answer is that the best constitution will assume the form of an Absolute Kingship or the more equal form of an Aristocracy of *σπουδαῖοι*, according to circumstances. It will be the former, if an individual or a family of surpassing excellence exists in the State; it will be the latter, if this surpassing excellence is possessed by a body of citizens capable of ruling or being ruled with a view to the most desirable life (c. 18. 1288 a 33 sqq.)[1].

[1] Not simply *πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν κατ' ἀρετήν*, as we had been told in c. 13. 1284 a 1 sqq.: however, even as far back as the ninth

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